Fertility in time of economic crisis : the Great Recession effects on childbearing in the United States by COMOLLI, Chiara Ludovica
	  
	  
Fertility in time of economic crisis 
The Great Recession effects on childbearing in the 
United States 
Chiara Ludovica Comolli 
	  
	  
	   	  
	  
Thesis submitted for assessment with a view to 
obtaining the degree of Doctor of Political and Social Sciences 
of the European University Institute 
 
Florence, 27 April 2016 

	  
European University Institute 
Department of Political and Social Sciences 
Fertility in time of economic crisis 
The Great Recession effects on childbearing in the United States  







Thesis submitted for assessment with a view to 
obtaining the degree of Doctor of Political and Social Sciences 
of the European University Institute 
Examining Board 
Prof. Fabrizio Bernardi, EUI (Supervisor) 
Prof. Martin Kohli, EUI (Co-Supervisor) 
Prof. Anette Eva Fasang, Humboldt University and WZB, Berlin 
Prof. Arnstein Aassve, Università L. Bocconi, Milan 
	   	  
© Chiara Ludovica Comolli, 2016 
 
No part of this thesis may be copied, reproduced or transmitted without prior 
permission of the author 
	  
	   	  
	  
Researcher declaration to accompany the submission of written work  
Department of Political and Social Sciences - Doctoral Programme 
I	  Chiara	  Ludovica	  Comolli	  certify	  that	  I	  am	  the	  author	  of	  the	  work	  “Fertility	  in	  time	  of	  economic	  crisis”	  
I	  have	  presented	   for	  examination	   for	   the	  Ph.D.	   	   at	   the	  European	  University	   Institute.	  	   I	   also	   certify	  
that	  this	  is	  solely	  my	  own	  original	  work,	  other	  than	  where	  I	  have	  clearly	  indicated,	  in	  this	  declaration	  
and	  in	  the	  thesis,	  that	  it	  is	  the	  work	  of	  others.	  
I	   warrant	   that	   I	   have	   obtained	   all	   the	   permissions	   required	   for	   using	   any	   material	   from	   other	  
copyrighted	  publications.	  
I	   certify	   that	   this	   work	   complies	   with	   the	   Code	   of	   Ethics	   in	   Academic	   Research	   issued	   by	   the	  
European	  University	  Institute	  (IUE	  332/2/10	  (CA	  297).	  
The	   copyright	  of	   this	  work	   rests	  with	   its	   author.	  Quotation	   from	   it	   is	   permitted,	   provided	   that	   full	  
acknowledgement	  is	  made.	  This	  work	  may	  not	  be	  reproduced	  without	  my	  prior	  written	  consent.	  This	  
authorisation	  does	  not,	  to	  the	  best	  of	  my	  knowledge,	  infringe	  the	  rights	  of	  any	  third	  party.	  
I	  declare	  that	  this	  work	  consists	  of	  98290	  words.	  
	  
Statement	  of	  inclusion	  of	  previous	  work:	  
I	  confirm	  that	  chapter	  V	  was	  jointly	  co-­‐authored	  with	  Prof.	  Fabrizio	  Bernardi	  and	  I	  contributed	  60%	  of	  
the	  work.	  
I	   confirm	  that	  chapter	  V	  draws	  upon	  an	  earlier	  article	   I	  published	  with	  Fabrizio	  Bernardi	   in	   the	   IZA	  
Journal	   of	   Labor	   Economics	   2015,	   4(21),	   entitled	   "The	   causal	   effect	   of	   the	   Great	   Recession	   on	  
childlessness	  of	  white	  American	  women”.	  
	  
Statement	  of	  language	  correction:	  
This	   thesis	   has	   been	   corrected	   for	   linguistic	   and	   stylistic	   errors.	  	   I	   certify	   that	   I	   have	   checked	   and	  
approved	  all	  language	  corrections,	  and	  that	  these	  have	  not	  affected	  the	  content	  of	  this	  work.	  	  	  
	  















This dissertation addresses the effects of the Great Recession on childbearing, focusing in 
particular on how economic and employment insecurity affects the transition to first birth in the 
United States. Chapter II offers an in-depth macro analysis of the effect of the Great Recession on 
fertility rates in the United States and in Europe. The chapter goes beyond the standard analysis of the 
relationship between unemployment rates and total fertility rates by using other macroeconomic 
indicators, such as public debt risk and an economic policy uncertainty index. Results show a strong 
negative correlation between such indicators and birth rates both in Europe and in the United States. 
Chapters III and IV investigate micro-level childbearing dynamics in the US, and the mechanisms 
linking employment insecurity and the transition to first birth. They further address the link between 
macroeconomic indicators of the crisis and individual demographic behaviors. Chapter III shows that 
the probability of having the first child depends on couples’ employment dynamic and that, compared 
to dual earners, all working status combinations are detrimental for childbearing, including those 
couples where women are housewives. The income effect seems to explain the results, while I find no 
evidence of an opportunity cost mechanism at play. 
Chapter IV focuses on women and on the impact of intergenerational social mobility on the transition 
to the first birth. The findings confirm Easterlin’s theory (1961, 1976) of resources and aspirations: 
during the crisis, American women become mothers earlier if they are socioeconomically non-
downwardly mobile with respect to their parents. 
Finally, this thesis shows a negative effect of the crisis on the extensive margin of fertility for women 
close to the limits of biological fertility. The latter is a crucial result related to the debate on the 
temporary versus permanent effect of business cycles’ fluctuations on fertility. Chapter V studies 
childless women close to the end of their reproductive life, for whom any further birth postponement 
is likely to slide into permanent childlessness. The analysis is based on a novel research design 
implemented in order to go beyond the associational analysis. A difference-in-difference estimate, 
applied to pseudo-cohorts of childless White American women, identifies the (positive) causal effect 
of the Great Recession on permanent childlessness. 
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“More seems to be at work, however, than these mechanical forces - namely, a general feeling of 
uncertainty. Assessing the precise nature and effects of this uncertainty is essential, but it is not 
easy. […] Uncertainty appears more diffuse, more Knightian in nature. Worries about the ability 
of European policymakers to control the euro crisis and worries about the failure to date of U.S. 







A direct consequence of the rising levels of complexity in modern industrial societies is the 
emergence of new forms of risk (Chappe 2012). These are defined in the socio-economic literature as 
‘manufactured’ risks because they are product of human activity, in comparison to natural risk, the 
only type that existed in preindustrial societies (Beck 1992; Giddens 1990).  
According to the German Sociologist Ulrich Beck the central issue in modern society is the 
distribution of risk2. However, as the American economist Frank H. Knight (1921) pointed out, the 
risk framework is something very different from real uncertainty, under which the probabilistic 
calculus, the ability of assigning a probability distribution to future outcomes is impossible3. This is 
the kind of Knightian uncertainty also Olivier Blanchard referred to in the citation introducing this 
chapter, taken from his foreword to the International Monetary Fund (IMF) Outlook of 2012, where he 
talks about the Great Recession. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1	  Foreword	  of	  the	  IMF	  Outlook	  of	  October	  2012	  (pp.	  XV).	  
2	  The	  concept	  of	  decision	  under	  risk	  is	  intrinsically	  linked	  to	  that	  of	  probability,	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  the	  actors	  behave	  according	  to	  a	  well-­‐defined	  event	  
space	  in	  which	  each	  decision	  is	  linked	  to	  a	  set	  of	  possible	  outcomes,	  each	  one	  associated	  with	  a	  known	  probability.	  
3	  It	  might	  be	  impossible	  to	  identify	  all	  the	  possible	  outcomes	  or,	  even	  if	  all	  outcomes	  are	  known,	  it	  might	  be	  impossible	  to	  attach	  probabilities	  to	  them.	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While in this thesis I do not enter into the theoretical technical discrimination between risk and 
uncertainty, I find relevant for the theoretical line I follow in my investigation the broad argument that 
during highly uncertain circumstances it is necessary to look beyond the typical decision-making 
process. 
Along the same lines, John Maynard Keynes (1937) argued that it is not always possible to assign a 
numerical value to probabilities and that many human decisions are driven by an ‘animal spirit’, 
namely attitudes and ideas led by psychological motivations that do not allow for a probabilistic 
calculus. Keynes went further, outlining three ways in which actors might deal with radical uncertainty 
in decision making: first, they might assume that the past is a guide to the future, secondly, they might 
assume that the market correctly anticipates the future, and third, actors tend to disregard their own 
judgment, favoring instead external judgment and conforming to the behavior of the majority4.  
Individuals are embedded in structures of social relationships and networks of people influencing and 
shaping - whether by constraint or persuasion - individual beliefs and actions (Montgomery and 
Casterline 1996). These networks might be limited to family or friends, or be much broader, 
encompassing the region, the country or the state of residence. Social interaction and the involved 
exchange of information, services and goods between individuals, is one of most powerful 
mechanisms explaining social behavior and shaping reproductive decisions (Montgomery and 
Casterline 1996, Rossier and Bernardi 2009). The literature on social interaction5 is found across 
disciplines as diverse as sociology, economics, and cognitive and social psychology. Many of the 
concepts used in sociological theory derive from, and are deeply connected to, these other disciplines.6 
Besides the theory of social interaction, the theoretical and methodological framework of the life 
course also emphasizes the embeddedness of the individual in a larger context. The focus of the life-
course approach, in fact, centers on three main principles: first, that decisions are embedded in a cross-
level array of social and personal factors; second, that each event in one domain of the life course is 
deeply interrelated with other life’s dimensions; and third, that each event or decision is also 
interlinked to past life course events and decisions, as well as to the anticipation of the future 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4	  Keynes	  continued	  predicting	  [for	  the	  individual	  subject	  to	  this	  uncertain	  conjuncture]	  the	  occurrence	  of	  sudden	  reversals	  of	  conduct,	  disillusions	  and	  
breakdowns	   in	  beliefs	  and	  attitudes.	  He	  also	  cited	   two	  other	   interesting	  mechanisms	   for	   individuals	   to	  make	  decisions	  under	  uncertainty:	   reverting	  
heavily	  to	  social	  norms	  or	  directing	  behavior	  towards	  avoiding	  severe	  harm.	  
5	  Some	  scholars	   refer	   to	   this	   literature	  as	  Diffusion	  Theory	   (or	  Diffusion	  Models)	   even	   though	  others	   link	   it	  more	   specifically	   to	   the	  Social	  Learning	  
mechanism	  of	  social	  interaction.	  
6	  A	   large	  part	  of	  social	   interaction	  takes	  place	  within	  networks:	  relatively	  small	  groups	  within	  which	   individuals	  are	  embedded,	   to	  which	   individuals	  
claim	  membership	  and	  make	  reference	  during	  the	  decision-­‐making	  process.	  Networks	  affect	  individual	  behavior	  through	  their	  size,	  the	  characteristics	  
of	   their	   members	   and	   their	   heterogeneity,	   the	   degree	   of	   intensity	   of	   the	   relationship	   between	   members,	   their	   density	   and	   power	   structure.	   The	  
literature	   has	   identified	   three	   different	   mechanisms,	   albeit	   often	   overlapping,	   through	   which	   the	   network	   influences	   individual	   behavior:	   social	  
learning,	  social	  influence	  and	  social	  support.	  The	  social	  support	  function	  of	  networks	  is	  self-­‐explanatory	  –	  referring	  to	  the	  “informal	  exchange	  of	  goods	  
and	  services	  between	  network	  members”	  (Rossier	  and	  Bernardi	  2009:472).	  
Social	   learning	   refers	   to	   the	   mechanism	   of	   acquisition	   of	   information	   through	   social	   interaction,	   both	   explicitly	   (verbally)	   and	   implicitly	   (via	  
observation).	  Kohler	  (2001)	  defines	  social	  learning	  as	  a	  mechanism	  of	  diffusion	  in	  which	  information	  about	  new	  technology	  or	  new	  ideas	  is	  extracted	  
from	  the	  behavior	  of	  others.	  It	  is	  a	  general	  concept	  that	  includes	  not	  only	  personal	  networks	  but	  also	  other	  impersonal	  sources	  of	  social	  learning	  like	  
mass	  media,	  markets,	  etc.	  Social	  learning	  is	  particularly	  relevant	  in	  cases	  of	  complex	  situations	  involving	  a	  great	  degree	  of	  uncertainty,	  during	  which	  a	  
lack	  of	  information	  through	  usual	  means	  is	  replaced	  by	  the	  network’s	  behavioral	  examples.	  
Social	  influence	   follows	   from	  the	  primary	  need	  to	  avoid	   intra-­‐group	  differences	  (Montgomery	  and	  Casterline	  1996:	  155)	  and	  the	  human	  tendency	  to	  
conform	   to	   shared	   practices	   so	   as	   to	   reinforce	   the	   individual	   sense	   of	   identity.	   This	  mechanism	   defines	   how	   individual	   behavior	   is	   constrained	   by	  
consensus	   in	   the	   network	   group.	   Kohler	   (2001)	   describes	   social	   influence	   as	   encompassing	   the	   notions	   of	   conformity	   and	   endogenous	   change	  
preferences	  induced	  by	  the	  behavior	  of	  others.	  In	  other	  words,	  the	  aggregate	  behavior	  modifies	  private	  incentives	  because	  preferences	  are	  endogenous	  
to	  environmental	  influences.	  According	  to	  the	  author,	  social	  influence	  differs	  from	  social	  learning	  because	  in	  the	  latter	  information	  changes	  but	  neither	  
preferences	  nor	   incentives	  do:	  holding	   information	  constant	   individual	  behavior	   is	  not	  affected	  by	   that	  of	  other	  community	  members.	   In	   the	  case	  of	  
social	  influence,	  holding	  information	  constant,	  individual	  behavior	  might	  change	  according	  to	  the	  one	  prevalent	  in	  the	  group	  (Kohler	  2001:	  11-­‐12).	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consequences (Huinink and Kohli 2014: 1295). This is where the argument put forward by Keynes 
(1937) echoes.  
As pointed out by the above-cited authors, an economic crisis and the uncertainty it generates might 
increase the influence that others’ opinions have on one’s own choices. Family and peer networks 
might become more important when individuals are unprepared to rationally evaluate present 
conditions, information, and future outcomes. In this thesis too couples and individual childbearing 
choices are evaluated throughout the analyses as embedded in the larger context of the 
multidimensionality and the cross-level character of those choices. 
 
The recent economic and financial crisis represents the longest and strongest downturn that 
western economies have faced since the Great Depression of the thirties. 
The Great Recession hit Europe a bit later and longer than the US, but its effects have been equally 
strong on both sides of the Atlantic. The financial roots of the crisis were the same and the 
consequences for the real economy have been – and in some European cases still are – dramatic. The 
crisis touched households at the very heart of their finances in all countries.  
The starting event was an “orderly repricing of risk for assets linked to U.S. subprime mortgages” 
(Cardarelli et al. 2011: 80) that mounted by the summer of 2007 to a liquidity squeeze of the banking 
system when the assets became unsellable. The liquidity crisis generated doubts on the solvency of 
many financial institutions both in the US and in Western Europe.  
The toxic assets backed subprime mortgage loans that enabled individuals in the United States with 
poor or no credentials to afford very high interest rates on their housing loans. These then found 
themselves unable to repay their debts and faced foreclosure. When the speculative housing bubble 
burst, the real estate market collapsed quickly and the owners saw house prices drop sharply, together 
with the values of their properties.  
From the US, the European financial institutions in possession of the same illiquid assets got into 
trouble rapidly too. The banking sector in UK, Ireland, Denmark and Iceland were the most exposed to 
the subprime crisis and the most affected in 2008 by the initial phase of the financial crisis. 
 
The consequences for the real economy in both the US and in Europe arrived soon, when the 
banking sector, in dramatic shortage of liquidity, stopped giving credit to individuals and firms. As a 
consequence, the latter, unable to borrow money, could not invest and hire. Internal and external 
demand plummeted and firms remained with large unsold stocks. To compensate for this, they had to 
fire employees and unemployment quickly reached unprecedented levels, especially among young 
adults with less experience on the labor market.  
Unemployment reached 10% in the US in October 2009 and youth (young adults below 20 years of 
age) unemployment was at the time at more than 27%. In some European countries such as Greece 
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and Spain unemployment rates started to rise in 2008 and reached 25% in 2012. Production growth in 
2009 plummeted at -5% both in the US and in Europe. 
Governments, trying to save the financial sector and the economy, injected money into the banking 
sector, forcing their debts to grow so much that, as a spiral, the financial markets doubted that they 
could ever repay it. After an illusionary recover of the economies in 2010, in fact, the second phase of 
the Great Recession was characterized, especially in Europe, by the so-called sovereign debt crisis. 
Public debts grew so much that a governmental credibility crisis occurred. Interest rates on European 
sovereign debt skyrocketed, due to a speculative attack in countries like Greece, Spain, Ireland and 
Italy. The latter countries fell in a second period of negative GDP growth that, although milder, lasted 
a long time and dragged into recession the entire Eurozone until the first quarter of 20137. 
 
 
This first introductory chapter illustrates the rationale and the main contributions of the 
investigation. The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows: Section 2 illustrates the research 
questions and the contribution of this thesis to the existing empirical evidence on the topic and Section 
3 anticipates the main findings of the study. Section 4 outlines the methodology applied: why the 
Great Recession is an interesting case; the reasons for choosing the United States as a case study and 
the transition to the first child as the main outcome to explain. This section also briefly engages with a 
discussion on the different methods used in the analyses. Finally in Section 5 I conclude by illustrating 
the structure of this thesis.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7	  I	  do	  not	  go	  further	  in	  the	  narrative	  of	  the	  crisis	  since	  the	  major	  events	  and	  features	  of	  and	  the	  statistics	  concerning	  the	  Great	  Recession	  both	  in	  the	  US	  
and	  in	  Europe	  are	  described	  in	  more	  details	  in	  Chapter	  II.	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A great deal of research has been devoted to studying the impact of business cycles on fertility 
dynamics. Many theories were elaborated in the aftermath of the Great Depression of the thirties and 
in the following decades, describing whether and how childbearing behavior differs during economic 
booms and downturns. However, the evidence from the literature is still far from conclusive and the 
causal mechanisms through which the process operates have not been completely uncovered yet.  
Economic uncertainty is a factor deemed as crucial in shaping childbearing decisions, but what kind of 
uncertainty? In which direction does it operate? What are the mechanisms at the basis of the 
relationship with fertility behavior? On which margins of fertility does it operate? These are some of 
the research questions I try to answer in this dissertation. 
 
Economic uncertainty exists and affects childbearing behavior outside the periods of recession 
and severe financial and economic downturns too. Blossfeld and Mills (2003) argue that globalization 
creates social and economic uncertainty that is translated into economic, temporal and employment 
uncertainty for young adults facing the decision to start a new family. As they point out, “the 
increasing dynamics and volatility of outcomes of globalizing markets makes it more difficult for 
individuals, firms and governments to predict the future and to make choices between different 
alternatives and strategies. Increasing uncertainty about economic and social developments is 
therefore a definitive feature of globalization in advanced economies” (Blossfeld and Mills 2003:191). 
The principal rationale of this thesis is to assess if something different happened to the childbearing 
response to the economic uncertainty generated by the Great Recession. 
To put it briefly, the crucial issue I am here interested in is how aggregate financial and economic 
instability influences the micro-level perception of economic insecurity, and how this uncertainty 
generated in one domain of the life course, by economic or employment insecurity, spreads into non-
pecuniary dimensions, shaping family-related life course events such as the entry into parenthood or 
the decision to remain childless. Note that in this thesis I refer alternatively to the transition to the first 
child as the transition to motherhood or parenthood. 
The economic uncertainty created by the Great Recession concerns primarily individuals’ present and 
anticipated future income streams, and their employment position. However, the individual dimension 
of insecurity is not the only one at play since even a person who is permanently employed but 
observes a high unemployment rate in her social network or in her country, may still perceive as 
relatively high the risk of future unemployment. In other words, even if one’s own position is 
relatively safe, the mere fact of having a very large country-level unemployment rate, or of 
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experiencing unemployment through family, friends or colleagues might create a sense of insecurity 
strong enough to have an impact on consumption, investment and savings decisions. Perhaps this is 
even more true for those decisions that lie between the purely economic and the personal spheres such 
as whether or not to marry, to buy a house or rent it, and whether or not to have the first or an 
additional child. This first argument speaks in favor of a multiplicative negative effect of the aggregate 
conditions on micro-level insecurity. 
On the other hand, being unemployed when many other people are as well might reduce the stigma 
and the psychological distress of unemployment and buffer the negative consequences on 
consumption, investment and saving decisions. This second argument speaks in favor of a moderating 
effect of the crisis on the negative impact of individual-level employment insecurity on those 
decisions. 
This argument leads to one main cross-chapter research question driving the analyses in this thesis, 
especially regarding the micro-level investigations in the central chapters (III-IV): 
 
RQ 1: How do aggregate and individual level economic and employment uncertainty 
interact to shape the transition to the first birth? 
 
 
While this research question is relevant, to some extent, to the whole study, the next research 
questions are singularly answered in each chapter. I now outline them, starting from the first empirical 
investigation, conducted in Chapter II. 
Chapter II contributes to the existing literature on the relationship between business cycle fluctuations 
and aggregate fertility rates. The existing evidence on birth rate responses to the Great Recession has 
mainly focused on the pro-cyclical correlation between economic growth or unemployment rates, and 
fertility rates, during the early years of the crisis. Moreover, most studies look at the United States and 
Europe separately. 
The main innovative features of my study are the following: first, I consider recent data that allows me 
to make a comparative analysis of the European and the American cases; and second, I look not only 
at the fertility response to unemployment increase during the Great Recession but I also investigate the 
effect of financial and economic policy uncertainty on births. To measure this uncertainty I use, first, 
an index of Economic Policy Uncertainty (EPU) created by three American professors, and, second, 
sovereign debt risk, measured in absolute terms with government bonds’ yields and in relative terms 
via the spread between countries’ bond yields and the German ‘safe’ bonds. 
The purpose of this chapter is to test whether the perception of economic uncertainty is as influential 
as the objective circumstances of the economy (i.e. job market characteristics) on fertility. Despite 
being a fundamental issue, it has been rarely treated in the literature. 
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The main objective of this chapter is to define how sizeable the impact of the economic and 
financial crisis on fertility has been. To do so, I engage in a comparative analysis. Furthermore, 
describing the facts that characterized the crisis in the two regions helps explain the rationale for 
choosing the US for the micro-level the analyses. As illustrated later on, in fact, the impact of the 
crisis has been rather similar in Europe and in the US, but the financial and the real economy 
mechanisms at play have been instead quite different8. All this synthetically translates in the following 
research question (and sub-questions) to which Chapter II suggests an answer: 
 
RQ 2: Is the recent decline in birth rates in the US and in Europe correlated to the 
onset of the Great Recession? 
 RQ 2.1: How large was the effect on birth rates in the US and in the European 
countries in comparative terms? 
 RQ 2.2: Which kind of aggregate economic and financial uncertainty generated by the 
Great Recession affected birth rates the most? 




An important contribution of this thesis is that I address, besides the embeddeddness of 
individual choice regarding fertility on the macro-level time-varying context (RQ 1 above), also the 
mechanisms of transmission of uncertainty between the different domains of work and family 
formation. These are the main determinants of the empirical investigations I conduct in Chapter III-IV. 
More precisely, Chapter III and IV focus on the transition to the first child and how the latter is 
affected by the employment instability generated by the Great Recession in the United States.  
As mentioned, in both chapters I analyze the cross-level interplay between aggregate labor market 
conditions and household individual employment position; and I also rely for both chapters on the 
same American dataset, the Panel Survey of Income Dynamics (PSID). 
However, the differences between the two are many. Chapter III investigates couples’ employment, 
unemployment and non-employment dynamics; while in Chapter IV the focus is only on women, and 
in the analysis I investigate not only the employment/non-employment dynamic, but also the influence 
of intergenerational occupational mobility on motherhood, testing the Easterlin hypothesis of 
resources and aspirations. The research questions driving the investigation in Chapter III and IV are 
the following: 
 
RQ 3: How does the couple’s employment dynamic affect the probability of parenthood 
among childless couples in the US during the Great Recession? 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8	  These	  considerations	  entail	  practical	  implications	  for	  my	  study	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  availability	  of	  data	  at	  the	  start	  of	  my	  PhD	  in	  2011.	  Europe	  at	  the	  time	  
was	  still	  dazed	  by	  the	  sovereign	  debt	  crisis	  and	  it	  was	  impossible	  to	  predict	  even	  the	  short-­‐term	  individual-­‐level	  consequences	  for	  fertility.	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RQ 4: How does the intergenerational socioeconomic mobility of women impact on 
their transition to motherhood? 
 
 
 Chapters II-IV follow the demographic and sociological literature in their attempt to moderate 
the influence on unobserved heterogeneity in the estimates, by adopting well-suited statistical 
techniques (illustrated in the method section) to control for possible bias in the estimates of the effect 
of labor market conditions on fertility decisions. However, the findings of these first three empirical 
chapters are based on associational evidence and I cannot rule out the possibility that some unobserved 
couples’ or individuals’ characteristics bias my estimates by influencing both employment and fertility 
decisions. To make up for this, the last empirical - design-based - Chapter V is dedicated to the 
assessment of a causal effect of the Great Recession on the extensive margin of fertility, namely 
childlessness. 
In addition, the results from the previous chapters suggest that the crisis does have a postponement 
effect on the transition to the first child but, from the available data, I cannot infer whether the delayed 
births would be recuperated or not, and whether the complete fertility of those women would be 
affected or not. This is the second purpose of Chapter V: assessing as precisely as possible whether 
there is a permanent effect of the Great Recession on births. The two purposes of the last empirical 
chapter are summarized in the following research question: 
 
RQ 5: What is the causal and permanent effect of the Great Recession on first births in 
the United States? 
 
 
 On that note, I finally mention that Chapter V is an extension of an earlier paper co-authored 
with Fabrizio Bernardi (Comolli Bernardi 2015), entitled “The causal effect of the Great Recession on 
childlessness of White American women” and published in the IZA Journal of Labor Economics in 
November 2015.  
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In line with the existing empirical evidence, my results (Chapter II) show that the crisis has 
depressed birth rates both in the US and in European countries. Also in line with the literature, I find 
that the largest negative aggregate effect was registered on first birth rates to very young women 
(below 25 years old). In contrast, among older women (35+) the aggregate negative effect seems to be 
larger on higher-order births compared to parity one. 
The original findings of my study reveal that the increase in unemployment rates in Europe and the US 
has been responsible for more than the two-thirds of the average decline in the general fertility rate in 
those countries. However, although the elasticity of birth rates to unemployment is five-to-eight times 
larger than the elasticity of birth rates to financial uncertainty measures, the latter did have a 
substantial impact on the general fertility rates in the US and in Southern European countries.  
These findings show that at the aggregate level we do witness a substantial reduction in births during 
the Great Recession, and that this decline strongly correlates with macroeconomic and financial 
indicators of the crisis. However, they do not reveal why this happens, namely the mechanisms that 
explain this fertility drop. Leaving the aggregate perspective and moving to an individual-level (one 
country) investigation, the purpose of the two central chapters of this thesis is to test some of the 
mechanisms identified by the literature. 
 
More precisely, Chapter III and IV focus on the transition to the first child and how the latter 
is affected by the employment instability generated by the Great Recession in the United States.  
The two chapters show common results. First, notwithstanding the strong correlation in the macro-
level analysis conducted in Chapter II, aggregate unemployment rate per se seems not to be a good 
proxy in micro-level analyses of the negative impact of the Great Recession on first births. Second, 
my findings tend to exclude the possibility of any moderating effect of aggregate macroeconomic 
conditions, supporting instead the opposite hypothesis of a negative multiplicative effect of individual-
level employment insecurity on the transition to the first child. 
At the couple level, husband’s unemployment reduces the probability of having the first child 
compared to dual earners couples, but even when he is employed, if the wife loses her job or leaves 
the labor force the likelihood of the first birth declines compared to dual earners.  
For women (without considering the husband’s occupation) the hazard of first birth is also larger for 
working immobile or upwardly mobile women, compared to the downwardly mobile. This confirms 
that the Easterlin mechanism of resources and aspirations is at play.  
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All in all, the two investigations in chapters III-IV suggest that the work and family 
dimensions are positively linked, and that reconciliation between the two domains seems not to be the 
main driver of postponement during the last decade – of intense financial and economic insecurity – in 
the US. As a matter of fact, couple’s employment uncertainty and women’s intergenerational 
downward mobility positively correlates to the postponement of parenthood.  
Both chapters’ analyses point to the same mechanism of transmission of insecurity from the working 
to the family domain, namely an income effect. The reduction in couples’ (present and future) 
economic security due to either the husband’s or the wife’s job loss seems responsible for the 
postponement of childbearing during the Great Recession, with dual-earner couples being the most 
likely to have their first child. In contrast, neither of the analyses in Chapters III-IV supports the 
hypothesis that a reduction of the opportunity cost of childbearing arising from the job loss of one of 
the two partners speeds up the transition to parenthood.  
Moreover, according to my findings employed women seem to take into consideration their 
socioeconomic aspirations (based on the status of their family of origin) before becoming mothers, as 
the Easterin Hypothesis would suggest. 
 
Finally, as illustrated in the previous section, the purpose of the last empirical chapter (V) is 
slightly different and twofold: testing, first, the existence of a causal effect and, second, the existence 
of a permanent effect of the Great Recession on fertility. The difference-in-difference estimates 
suggest that the answer to both questions is affirmative: there is a permanent increase in cohort 
childlessness caused by the crisis in the US. The increase in the proportion of women around the age 
of 40 who remains childless due to the crisis is not very large, as expected from previous findings 
from the literature, but it is significant and, moreover, judging from the robustness checks conducted 
in Chapter V, I am fairly confident that those births have not be recuperated after the recession and we 
can label this decline in first births as a permanent consequence of the Great Recession on fertility. 
A final major contribution of this last empirical chapter is the innovative and very flexible research 
design adopted for the analysis. The difference-in-difference approach applied to pseudo-panels of 
women has rarely been implemented in studies of fertility but it is very versatile and I show it can be 
helpful in situations where it is complicated to identify a suitable treatment/control comparison. 
The quality of the contribution of Chapter V is witnessed by the fact that, as mentioned above, a 
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Estimating in 20159 whether and how the ongoing economic and financial crisis will impact 
on fertility decisions might seem premature given that some countries in the Eurozone have not even 
recovered from the recession, and the American recovery appears much slower than expected. 
Moreover, the time interval between the treatment event (the crisis) and the outcome (fertility) under 
study is further expanded by the lag between financial and socio-economic events, the individual 
decision-making process and childbearing realizations.  
On the one hand, the prompt timing of this investigation is a fundamental contribution of this thesis 
that enriches the literature on the topic of how economic uncertainty affects fertility behavior at the 
individual level. On the other hand, the quasi-simultaneity between the study and the event under 
study generates some problems. 
This essentially explains the choice of the United States as my case study (and the fertility margins 
chosen as outcome variables illustrated in the next section). 
The Business Cycle Dating Committee of the US National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) 
officially dated the recession in the United States as beginning in December 2007 and ending in June 
2009. After that, the recovery in the US was slow but solid, without further large drops in productivity, 
employment or financial stability. As mentioned in the previous section, instead, the Eurozone went 
through two very different phases of the Great Recession, where probably the latter (the sovereign 
debt crisis of 2011 and 2012) bore the largest consequences for households and family dynamics. 
However, only today, in 2015, was it possible to begin to analyze the latter.  
A linked issue is that of data: the US offered high quality and recently updated data, compared to 
European countries. Regarding the latter, very good data were available for countries that were much 
less strongly affected by the recession, such as the Scandinavian countries or Germany, but not for the 
severely hit countries like Italy, Greece or Spain.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9	  I	   actually	   started	   the	   empirical	   investigation	   in	   2011,	   when	   I	   started	   doctoral	   work	   at	   the	   EUI.	   At	   the	   time,	   Europe	  was	   still	   at	   the	   onset	   of	   the	  
sovereign	   debt	   crisis	   and	   no	   outcome	   was	   predictable	   back	   then:	   the	   Greek	   exit	   from	   the	   Eurozone	   seemed	   a	   possible	   option,	   together	   with	   a	  
reconfiguration	   of	   the	   European	   Union	   in	   term	   of	   fiscal	   or	   even	   political	   union.	   It	   was	   clearly	   complicated	   at	   the	   time	   to	   foreseen	   the	   fertility	  
consequences	  of	  a	  crisis	  that	  was	  still	  very	  much	  going	  on.	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The possibility to more clearly define a time horizon of the Great Recession, to set for it a date 
enough in the past to measure its consequences for fertility behavior at the individual level, and the 




	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10	  For	   seek	   of	   completeness,	   though,	   the	   first	   empirical	   chapter	   (Ch.	   II)	   treating	   at	   the	  macro	   level	   the	   consequences	   of	   the	   recession	   for	   aggregate	  
fertility,	  illustrates	  comparatively	  both	  the	  effects	  in	  the	  US	  and	  in	  the	  European	  countries.	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Scholars’ engagement with the issue of how economic crises affect the different margins of 
fertility has a long-standing history (Becker 1981; Easterlin 1961, 1976, 1980; Elder 1974; Ermisch 
1988; Oppenheimer 1988, 1994; Oppenheimer et al 1997) and interest re-flourished in the aftermath of 
the recent Great Recession (Goldstein et al 2013; Kalmijn 2011; Morgan et al 2010, 2011; Schneider 
2015; Sobotka et al 2011).  
An important result of this literature is that business cycles can have a very heterogeneous effect 
across the different margins of fertility, such as the propensity to marry, the diffusion of marital 
separation, the probability of remaining childlessness or becoming parents for the first time, the 
propensity to have a second or higher-order births, and finally completed fertility of mothers. 
Although recent descriptive macro-level studies document no acceleration in the early years of the 
crisis in the decline of marriages and divorces in the US (Morgan et al 2011; Cherlin 2013), previous 
studies showed that both tend to decline during recessions (Ahn and Mira 2001; Nobles and 
Buttenheim 2006; Prioux 2003) 11.  
Empirical evidence also shows a heterogeneous impact of economic downturn on the extensive and 
intensive margins of fertility: first birth rates, especially among young adults, tend to be pro-cyclically 
correlated to macroeconomic aggregates, while the latter affect the fertility of mothers (parities higher 
than one12) to a lesser degree (Cherlin 2013; Goldstein 2013; Morgan et al 2011; Neels 2010; 
Schenider 2015; Sobotka et al 2011).  Finally, childlessness rates also tend to rise during periods of 
economic uncertainty (Morgan 1991). 
 
As also mentioned in the last section on the case study selection, the investigation of the long-
term impact of the crisis on fertility trends goes beyond the scope of this study, which was conducted 
right after the end of the recession in the United States. For this reason I could for instance not embark 
on the ambitious endeavor of measuring the effect of the Great Recession on completed fertility; this 
will be possible only when the cohorts of women who experienced the economic downturn reach the 
end of their reproductive years. 
Therefore, to reach the main objective of this thesis, that is to uncover some of the mechanisms of 
transmission of the economic and employment uncertainty generated by the Great Recession to the 
family domain, I have to narrow down the fertility outcome that I am looking at, renouncing the 
broader picture of the different margins of fertility (from marriage to higher births parities) and 
concentrating on only one outcome, namely the transition to parenthood. In other words, I preferred to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11	  Eurostat	  statistics	  also	  show	  for	  Europe	  that	  the	  decline	  in	  marriage	  started	  decades	  ago	  and	  do	  not	  show	  any	  acceleration	  since	  2009.	  Divorce	  rate	  in	  
the	  European	  Union	  is	  stable	  around	  2	  per	  1000	  individuals	  since	  the	  mid-­‐2000s	  (Eurostat	  2015).	  
12	  Note	  that	  by	  ‘fertility	  of	  mother’	  I	  hereby	  refer	  to	  second	  or	  higher-­‐order	  births,	  as	  opposed	  to	  first	  births	  to	  childless	  women.	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widen the range of my explanatory independent variables (using different measures of economic and 
employment insecurity) than to widen the range of my dependent variables (fertility behavior at 
different parities).  
 
As said, this restriction allows me to devote more effort to designing my explanatory variables 
and to going deeper into the mechanisms of the nexus between economic and employment uncertainty 
and the transition to parenthood, which clearly differ a great deal from the mechanisms linking 
insecurity to higher-order births. As will be illustrated in greater detail in the next chapters, individual-
level empirical findings tend to point to a negative effect of economic and employment uncertainty on 
first births (Blossfeld and Huinink 1991; Neels 2010; Neels, Theunynck and Wood 2013; Lange et al. 
2014). The effects on higher parities are less investigated in the literature but most studies find a 
negative smaller, or null, impact on the second while finding a substantial negative effect on the 
probability of having a third child after the husband’s job loss (Heckman and Walker 1990; 
Amialchuck 2013). The decision to have a second or third child might be less affected by economic 
uncertainty because parents enjoy economies of scale after the first child, and the difference between 
the second and third child might be explained by the diffused social norm of the two children.  
Parenthood instead implies a life-changing transition that is intrinsically different from moving to 
higher-order birth parities. The larger negative effect of economic and employment insecurity on this 
transitions might be explained by the fact the together with the negative income effect, there is also a 
negative affordability mechanism (Oppenheimer 1988; Rindfuss and VandenHeuvel 1990) at play in 
the transition to parenthood. Young couples might think that having a rewarding career and a stable 
income is a precondition to becoming parents and postpone childbearing until they have established 
this solid position. The latter are some of the mechanisms that I empirically test in Chapters III and IV 
of the thesis. 
 
Finally, in this thesis I do not only look at the probability of parenthood; I also investigate the 
‘complementary’ probability that women end up never having children due to the Great Recession.  
What, in fact, appears to be a crucial point in the debate on the consequences of economic uncertainty 
on fertility is time: I realized that more research is needed to address whether economic shocks impell 
women to only temporarily postpone marriage and births, or whether this postponement also depresses 
the total number of children women have. Chapter V contributes to these crucial issue in the literature, 
focusing on the permanent causal effect of the Great Recession on childlessness. 
Permanent childlessness has important implications at the societal level and for policy purposes too. 
First, rising rates of childlessness have demographic implications such as declining aggregate fertility 
rates in advanced societies that already face the challenge of population decline. These changes in the 
population structure bear crucial economic implications such as an increase in the dependency ratio, 
burdening public spending. Another argument put forward in the literature on the justification of 
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public support for individual fertility choices is that having children increases individual welfare 
(Bernardi 2005). The child gap, the difference between the desired and the actual number of children 
women have, would measure a sort of a welfare deficit worth of public interest. Bernardi (2005) 
shows for Spain that this child gap is mostly concentrated on childless couples. According to the 
welfare deficit argument, therefore, childless couples that would like to have a child, but for some 
reason cannot, represent a large public policy concern and welfare cost.  
Finally, old individuals have been shown to have an increased likelihood of social isolation (Bachrach 
1980; Koropeckyj-Cox and Call 2007; Connidis 2010) and institutionalization (Rowland 1998) if they 
are childless.  
These are some of the many reasons justifying the importance of investigating the determinants of 




	   16	  
  
	   17	  




The four empirical chapters of this thesis (II-V) follow a similar rationale of explaining the 
reaction to the Great Recession of first births and childlessness rates. Although each chapter makes 
use of a different quantitative method to reach this purpose, there is a sort of methodological 
circularity to the study: from the macro-level broader and comparative perspective of Chapter II, I 
move to the micro-level in-depth study of one country (the United States) and one dataset (PSID) in 
Chapter III and IV, first investigating the couple-level (Ch. III) and then the womens’ (Ch. IV) 
perspective, and finally I go back to an aggregate cohort approach to study childlessness. 
Chapter II consists of a macro-level study of the impact of the Great Recession on fertility rates in 
advanced economies, i.e. the US and Europe, to contextualize the investigations at the micro-level 
conducted in the following chapters of this thesis.  
The analysis starts from a recent study by Goldstein, Kreyenfeld, Jasilioniene and Orsal published in 
2013 in which they investigate the role of rising unemployment in Europe in the decline in births in 
the period 2001-2011. My analyses depart from this study in the following ways: first, I enlarge the 
sample to include more countries and more recent data; second, I do not only look at the effect of 
unemployment on fertility rates but I also include measures of financial and economic uncertainty 
such as long-term sovereign bond yields and the Economic Policy Uncertainty (EPU) Index. Finally, I 
also complement the analysis exploiting the monthly variation in the dependent and independent 
variables. 
Besides consisting of a macro-level investigation, there is a further important remark to be mentioned 
on the distinctive character of this first chapter with respect to the following, namely that it analyzes 
comparatively the impact of the Great Recession on fertility in the US and in European countries, 
while afterwards I will focus only on the American case.  
The investigation is clearly descriptive but I try as much as possible to control for time trends, country 
time-invariant characteristics and country-specific time trends in fertility (and seasonality of births in 
the monthly analysis).  
 
 As mentioned, Chapter III is the first micro-level investigation of the mechanisms for 
transmission of economic and employment uncertainty on the transition to the first birth. Using a 
panel fixed effects model on the Panel Survey of Income Dynamics (PSID), the analysis tests the 
existence of an interaction effect between couples-level employment status conditions and aggregate 
macro-economic circumstances, represented by US states’ aggregate unemployment rates. The 
couple’s fixed effect guarantees that the final estimates are net of couples’ time-invariant unobserved 
characteristics that influence both employment conditions and fertility decisions. Important 
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unobservables are couples’ attitudes toward childbearing, career motivation and ability. The non-
explicit underlying assumptions of this couples’ fixed effect model are, first, assortative mating, 
namely that partners select themselves based on those similar characteristics (usually attitudes and 
preferences towards work and family; educational level etc.) and, second, that these characteristics are 
constant over time. 
 
The method of estimation is a linear probability model (LPM) of the probability that couples 
have their first child. The advantage of this method is simplicity and a more straightforward 
interpretation of the estimates than a more complicated estimation method (e.g., Conditional Logit) 
would allow. In LPM, in fact, implementation and interpretation is relatively easy, the sample size 
does not shrink during estimation and the model is more robust to different specifications. Moreover, 
the logit marginal effects equal the LPM estimates in the cross-sectional setting. For this reason, the 
preference for the LPM compared to non-linear models in the literature is non-negligible (Currie and 
Gruber 1996; Fairlie and Sundstrom 1999; McGarry 2000; Angrist 2001, 2008). More details 
regarding the choice of this model are provided in the method section in Chapter III.  
A disadvantage of modeling the transition to parenthood with a panel fixed effect of the probability 
0/1 of having the first child is that this model does not explicitly consider the postponement effect of 
the crisis on parenthood. The best way in fact to model transitions is through Event History Analysis 
(EHA) which models the risk of first birth in terms of the instantaneous survival probability to the 
specific event of childbearing.  
The Cox Proportional Hazard is the method, in fact, used in Chapter IV where I investigate the effect 
of employment insecurity during the Great Recession on the risk of motherhood for women. This 
specific model allows me to further investigate the effect of time, varying occupational spells on the 
transition to the first child and taking into consideration the duration of each spell. Specifically, in 
Chapter IV I analyze both the impact of non-working versus working time spells and the effect of 
intergenerational socioeconomically mobile job spells of women (with respect to their parents) on the 
hazard of first birth.  
The model becomes clearly more complex (non-linear) with respect to the panel data of the previous 
chapter and it becomes more difficult to comment on the magnitude of the effects and on the 
interaction terms. However, first, this time-varying EHA method more efficiently exploits the detailed 
occupational information provided by the PSID dataset and more accurately models the transition to 
the first child, and second, as I argue in Chapter IV, the results of the analysis are still generally 
comparable to those of Chapter III. 
 
An additional purpose of this thesis is to address the causal link between the crisis and fertility 
more specifically, in the attempt to moderate the effect of the unobserved heterogeneity that plagues 
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the majority of the studies on this topic13. The statistical methods applied in Chapters II-IV, in fact, are 
useful to control for unobserved characteristics of states, couples or individuals, that might influence 
simultaneously employment conditions and fertility behavior, but only if those characteristics do not 
vary over time. Appling these methods, and controlling for as many as possible observed variables that 
might influence the causal path, does not guarantee that the final estimates are entirely free of bias and 
truly estimate the causal effect of the recession on childbearing. 
To do that, a study needs to rely on the randomization of the treatment that in this case means that 
couples or individuals should be randomly assigned to the Great Recession, and this is clearly not 
feasible. As the section on identification strategy in Chapter V illustrates in details, to circumvent this 
problem, I use a slight variation of the difference-in-difference approach applied to pseudo-cohorts 
(Comolli and Bernardi 2015). 
Instead of comparing a treatment and control group across space (and time), I compare them across 
birth cohorts by contrasting the childlessness rates among women whose last reproductive years 
coincided with the Great Recession, to childless women who spend those same years in the period just 
before the onset of the crisis. The year of birth is randomly assigned and the identification of the 
causal effect of the recession on childlessness relies on the fact that these two groups of women differ 
only in the fact that the first are treated (were in their late thirties during the Great Recession) and the 
second are not. Chapter V justifies empirically why this is the case, first, comparing descriptively the 
two groups on the main determinants of fertility behavior, and second, by testing graphically the 
parallel trend assumption and third by conducting a set of robustness checks on the final estimates. 
Among the latter, it is worthwhile mentioning that the analysis has been replicated on two different 
datasets from the American census, the America Community Survey and the June Fertility 
Supplement of the Current Population Survey. The two datasets slightly differ in the way the question 
about the number of children is posed; therefore, showing that the results are robust across the 
different datasets is a very important contribution of this analysis. Replication is an extremely 
important asset of empirical research to robustly validate findings even though it is unfortunately a not 




	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13	  And	   that	   could	   also	   bias	   the	   estimates	   in	   my	   micro-­‐level	   analyses	   in	   Chapters	   III-­‐IV,	   if	   these	   unobserved	   variables	   affecting	   both	   occupational	  
conditions	  and	  fertility	  decisions,	  vary	  over	  time.	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After the present introductory first chapter outlining the main research questions, contributions 
and findings of this study, the thesis is composed of four main empirical chapters (II-V). At the cost of 
some repetition I hereby conclude this chapter briefly summarizing the content of the next chapters. 
The first empirical chapter, Chapter II, is a macro-level investigation with two main purposes: it first 
presents a description of the events and facts related to the Great Recession in the US and in Europe. 
The second purpose of Chapter II is to correlate these facts to the evident decline in aggregate fertility 
rates in western countries, comparatively in the US and in European countries.  
The two central chapters move from the aggregate to the individual level to analyze closer the fertility 
response to the crisis, and in particular to the labor market insecurity generated in the US after 2008. 
Chapter III engages with the mechanisms of transmission of insecurity from the employment domain 
to the transition to the first child. The focus of this chapter is on childless couples and their probability 
of entering into parenthood, conditional on the couple’s combination of employment status and on the 
aggregate conditions of the US state in which they reside. 
Chapter IV focuses on childless women, instead of couples, and analyzes their fertility behavior in 
response to the crisis through the lens of the Easterlin Hypothesis of relative socio-economic status. 
The purpose of this fourth chapter is to test the effect on the transition to first birth, of women’s 
intergenerational occupational mobility, before and during the Great Recession. 
The last empirical chapter, Chapter V, abandons the couple- and individual-level perspective and goes 
back to the macro-level, adopting a cohort approach to investigate the existence of a permanent causal 
nexus between the Great Recession and the renunciation of motherhood among childless women 
around the age of 40. Using a more design-based approach to US census data, Chapter V shows that 
the proportion of White American women close to the end of their reproductive lives remaining 
childless due to the Great Recession increased. Note that Chapter V, as already mentioned, is an 
extended version of a co-authored paper published with Fabrizio Bernardi in November 2015 (Comolli 
and Bernardi 2015). Finally, Chapter VI concludes this dissertation by summing up the most relevant 
results, highlighting the main caveats of the analyses and giving some insights for implications and 
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CHAPTER II 
 
THE FERTILITY RESPONSE TO THE GREAT RECESSION 
IN EUROPE AND THE UNITED STATES.  











Literature and evidence repeatedly suggest the existence at the aggregate level of a pro-
cyclical relationship between fertility behavior and economic growth, having characterized developed 
societies on completion of the Demographic Transition, from the XX century onward. Periods of 
economic depression were characterized by, generally temporary, downturns in fertility, followed by 
more prosperous intervals when fertility was recuperated. At the aggregate level this holds true for the 
vast majority of the XX century financial and economic crises (e.g. the Great Depression of 1929, the 
oil shock-induced recession of the mid-seventies, the US stock market crash of 1987, the Scandinavian 
banking crises of the early nineties in Europe, and the post-communist crisis in Central and Eastern 
European countries). All these events, albeit very differently and for various reasons, brought about a 
reduction, more or less pronounced, of fertility. However, the impact of economic depressions on 
fertility rates is normally rather small and of short duration because such socio-economic factors are 
relatively short-term compared to secular demographic trends (Lee 2003; Lesthaeghe 2010). The 
former are generally adumbrated by long-term fertility tendencies, so that the final number of children 
that women will have at the end of their reproductive life is seldom affected. All the economic 
recessions of the XX century had only a temporary and small impact on fertility rates, because all of 
them occurred in a context of long-term fertility decline that was only partially accelerated by 
economic hardship (Lee 1987, 1997, 2003; Morgan et al. 2011, 2012; Sobotka et al. 2010, 2011). 
Looking at the long time trend of Total Fertility Rate (TFR) – the most commonly used period 
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measure of aggregate fertility14 – in the US since 1920, illustrated in Figure 2.1, it is evident that 
periods of economic recession, highlighted with vertical bars, had only a small and temporary effect 
on birth rates compared to the large dips in fertility that characterized the inter-war period and the two 
decades of the sixties and seventies. Societal changes, access to contraceptive measures and cultural 
revolutions clearly have a determinant long-lasting impact on childbearing behavior, and economic 
downturn might only accelerate an existing negative trend in fertility, or halt a positive trend.  
 
As Kreyenfeld et al. (2012) argue the effect of macroeconomic conditions on fertility is all but 
uniform, being heterogeneous across crisis-events (and also countries and individual life-stages). 
Compared to the three previous recession episodes15 that have been followed by a drop in the TFR of a 
maximum of 0.06, the fertility decline during the Great Recession has been stronger (-0.26 between 
2007 and 201416) and it has lasted longer.  
The most frequently cited comparison in the interpretation of the potential consequences of the Great 
Recession of 2007-2009, though, is the Great Depression of the thirties, which had strong negative 
effects for fertility, even if a large part of the drop in the TFR (the total decline in the fertility rate was 
-0.36 between 1929 and 1937) was due to the postponement of births. However, at that time the 
postponement lasted long enough to generate a cohort of ‘children of the Great Depression’ (Elder 
1974) of extraordinarily small size entering adulthood in the forties and fifties, and stimulating interest 
in the research of fertility cycles (Cherlin et al. 2013; Easterlin 1961, 1976, 1980).  
 
  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14	  The	  total	  fertility	  rate	  (TFR)	  is	  the	  average	  number	  of	  children	  born	  to	  a	  woman	  over	  her	  lifetime,	  if	  she	  were	  to	  experience	  the	  current	  age-­‐specific	  
fertility	   rates	   (ASFR)	   through	  her	   lifetime,	   and	   if	   she	  were	   to	   survive	   from	  birth	   to	   the	   end	   of	   her	   reproductive	   life.	   It	  might	   be	   understood	   as	   the	  
expected	  number	  of	  births	  under	  the	  assumption	  that	  the	  age	  specific	  rates	  don’t	  change	  over	  time.	  The	  TFR	  is	  a	  period	  rate	  biased	  by	  a	  tempo	  effect,	  
because	  it	  doesn’t	  consider	  changes	  in	  the	  mean	  age	  at	  childbearing.	  Therefore	  it	  systematically	  underestimates	  fertility	  in	  times	  of	  postponement	  of	  
childbearing,	  and	  overestimates	  it	  in	  times	  of	  anticipation	  of	  childbearing.	  
15	  The	  ‘Double-­‐dip’	  recession	  of	  1980-­‐82	  driven	  by	  the	  contractionary	  monetary	  policy	  adopted	  in	  the	  US	  to	  combat	  high	  inflation;	  the	  recession	  of	  the	  
early	  nineties	  due	  to	  the	  US	  junk	  bond	  market	  collapse	  and	  the	  Scandinavian	  banking	  crisis;	  and	  finally	  the	  2000-­‐2001	  one	  induced	  by	  the	  burst	  of	  the	  
dot-­‐com	  bubble	  and	  the	  9/11	  attacks.	  
16	  2014	  are	  the	  last	  available	  estimates	  at	  the	  time	  of	  writing.	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Figure 2.1: Total Fertility Rate in US (1920-2014). 
 
Source: Elaboration of the author based on data from US National Center for Health Statistics. Social Security Administration 1997 for data 1920-1980. 
 
  
Only to scratch the surface of the analogy, a first remarkable difference between the two 
economic crises concerns the very different historical trends, and the related levels of fertility, during 
which they took place. The 1929 crash happened during a decline in fertility already ongoing for two 
decades, due to the advent of the first birth-control movement that promoted family planning among 
married couples to space children and reduce family size17 (Dawson et al. 1980; Wardell 1980); 
however the Great Depression also happened during an historical period where TFR was well above 
2.5 children per women. In contrast, the Great Recession hit the US, as it did the rest of the western 
countries, during an extended period (lasting more than two decades) of stagnation of fertility at 
exceptionally low historical levels. Actually, the first years of the 2000s were characterized by a 
moderate, but diffused rise in birth rates that was abruptly halted by the onset of the economic and 
financial crisis of 2007. 
 
The aim of this first empirical chapter is to contribute to the evidence of aggregate-level 
studies of the impact of the Great Recession on fertility rates in advanced economies, and to 
contextualize the investigations at the micro-level conducted in the following chapters of this thesis.  
The analytical section of this chapter starts from a recent study by Goldstein and colleagues (2013) in 
which they investigate the role of rising unemployment in Europe in the decline in births during the 
first decade of the XXI century. With respect to their paper, the innovative features of the present 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17	  The	   second	  wave	   of	   birth	   control	   begun	   in	   1960	  with	   the	   diffusion	   of	  modern	   contraception	  methods	   like	   the	   birth	   control	   pill	   and	   intrauterine	  
devices	  (IUD).	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study are numerous: first, I enlarge the sample to include more countries and more recent data; second, 
I do not only look at the effect of unemployment on fertility rates, but also include measures of 
financial and economic uncertainty such as long-term sovereign bond yields and the Economic Policy 
Uncertainty (EPU) Index (see Section 2.3 for an in-depth description). 
The specific aim of this chapter is to assess whether these latter indicators of the perception of 
economic uncertainty are as relevant in influencing fertility as structural objective circumstances of 
the economy, such as job market conditions. This crucial issue has been rarely treated in the literature 
of aggregate studies of fertility and business cycles. 
Finally, I complement the analysis exploiting the monthly variation in the dependent and independent 
variables. The monthly variation is likely to be less determinant for unemployment rates that vary to a 
lesser extent on a month-to-month basis, but it is crucial for the measures of financial and economic 
insecurity that vary with a higher frequency, often on a daily basis. 
Besides consisting of a macro-level investigation, there is a further important remark to be mentioned 
on the distinctive character of this chapter with respect to the following, namely that it analyses 
comparatively the impact of the Great Recession on fertility in the US and in European countries, 
while afterwards I will focus only on the American case. 
The rationale for doing this is twofold: first, the scope of this first empirical chapter is to qualify and 
quantify the object under study in this dissertation, namely of which kind and how sizeable has been 
the impact of the economic and financial crisis on fertility. Therefore, I think that to better grasp the 
scope and the magnitude of such an effect, the analysis should be done in comparative terms. Second, 
having a complete picture of the circumstances in the two regions serves as an explanation for why at 
the micro-level the analyses have been conducted on the US. As will be soon clarified, in fact, while 
the strength of the crisis has been similar in Europe and in the US, the financial and the real economy 
mechanisms at play have been rather different. This is all the more so if we consider the large 
variation within Europe of the impact and the consequences of the Great Recession. These 
considerations entail practical implications for my study in terms of the availability of data at the start 
of my PhD in 2011. Europe at the time was still in a daze from the sovereign debt crisis and it was 
impossible to predict even the short-term individual level consequences for fertility. On a final note, 
the empirical research that I will cite in the backdrop of all my analyses was conducted in both Europe 
and the US, another reason for not leaving European countries completely out of the picture. 
 
The analysis is conducted starting from a sample of about thirty European countries plus the 
US. I use different financial and macroeconomic indicators that proxy the onset and the escalation of 
the recession, to study their impact on birth rates in the period 2003-2013. However, before 
conducting the analysis it is useful to review the main facts and events pertaining to the unfolding of 
the Great Recession. A detailed timeline of the financial and economic meltdown would serve as a 
reference frame for the rigorous analysis later on, in this and in the following chapters, when the 
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explanatory variable of the model (the recession) is operationalized through macroeconomic and 
financial indicators. The narrative of the Great Recession starts from the American case where the 
financial turmoil originated (and the case study of Chapters III-V of this thesis); and then, for the 
sakes of comparison and completeness, I will briefly describe the main events in the Eurozone. 
After this brief introduction the chapter is structured as follows: Section 2 illustrates the main 
economic and financial events that characterized the recession in the US and in Europe and the trend 
in the last ten-to-fifteen years of the main financial and macroeconomic measures that I will use later 
in the analyses as explanatory variables. Section 3 shows the tendency in fertility in the period across 
the Great Recession years, while Section 4 describes how this study fits into the existing literature and 
the evidence on the impact of business cycles on fertility. In Sections 5 and 6 the main analyses of the 
effect of macroeconomic and financial indicators on yearly and monthly birth rates are conducted. 
Finally, Section 7 draws the conclusions. 
 
  
	   28	  
  
	   29	  









Driven by the burst of the housing bubble that had topped in 2005-06, the US subprime 
mortgage crisis of 2007 was characterized by a series of negative events that took place in late summer 
and autumn of that year: the collapse of the Bear Stearns Hedge Funds in June 2007 followed by the 
losses registered by major Wall Street firms which had loaned the firm’s money, like JP Morgan 
Chase, Citigroup, Goldman Sachs and Merril Lynch.  
Hereafter the emergence of subprime losses exposed other risky loans and, with a domino effect, those 
losses mounted and panic diffused into the inter-bank loan market. One year later, at the beginning of 
September 2008, Fannie Mae (Federal National Mortgage Association) and Freddy Mac (Federal 
Home Loan Mortgage Corporation), two of the largest government sponsored financial enterprises 
underwriting home mortgages, were put into government conservatorship, and on 15th September 2008 
Lehman Brothers went bankrupt. The 18th of September the Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson and the 
Federal Reserve Board Chairman Ben Bernanke proposed a $700 billion plan to stabilize the US 
financial system (which failed to pass in the Congress the following 29th September but was finally 
approved one week later). The New York Times reported18 what would become one of the most 
famous statements of the crisis: “If we don’t do this,” Mr. Bernanke said according to the several 
participants to the night meeting in which the rescue plan was presented, “we may not have an 
economy on Monday.” On the 25th of September the largest savings and loans American association, 
the Washington Mutual Bank, closed down, and seven days later, during the first week of October 
2008 the DJIA (Dow Jones Industrial Average) lost 18.15 percentage points, registering its all-time 
worst weekly performance. 
The Business Cycle Dating Committee of the US National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) 
declared that the recession in the United States began in December 2007 and ended in June 2009. US 
demand had been shrinking for five consecutive quarters at the pace of -2.6% per quarter at annual 
rate. The Real Gross domestic Product (GDP) began contracting in the third quarter of 2008, reaching 
almost -5% in 2009 with respect to 2008; capital investment reached post-war levels in the first 
quarter of 2009, and residential investment dipped more than 23% lower than the year before. The 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18	  Sorkin,	  Henriques,	  Andrews,	  and	  Nocera.	  As	  Credit	  Crisis	  Spiraled,	  Alarm	  Led	  to	  Action.	  New	  York	  Times.	  Published	  October	  1	  2008.	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housing market was hit by a large drop in house prices and a boost in the rate of defaults and 
foreclosures (the total number of home foreclosures in 2008/2011 was 14.1 million, compared to the 
3.2 million of the years 2004/200719), with ownership rates consequently falling from 69% in 2004 to 
66.4% in 2011 (CPS)20. The number of new privately owned housing units authorized declined from 
more than 2 million in 2005 to 600 thousands in 2010. Between 2006 and 2008, America’s second 
largest household’s asset, total retirement assets, dropped 22%, savings and investment assets lost $1.2 
trillion and pension assets lost $1.3 trillion (Altman 2009). 
According to the US Security and Exchange Commission (SEC)21, between June 2007 and November 
2008 Americans lost an estimated average of more than a quarter of their collective net worth.22 
Income levels had dropped so much that the median male worker was earning, on an inflation-adjusted 
basis, in 2010 less than in 1968 (Census Report of Income data). The unemployment rate – 
traditionally quite low in the US, around 4-6% between 2000 and 2008 – had almost reached the high 
levels of the early 80s recession: peaking at 10% in October 2009 (Bureau of Labor Statistics data) 
and remaining above 8% until mid-2012. 
The economic turmoil also accentuated income inequality, increasing the concentration of wealth at 
the top of the income distribution, at the expense of the middle class, the poor and the younger 
generations. The middle class income share fell from 62% in the seventies to 45% in 2011, while that 
of the upper class went from 29% to 46% (Taylor 2012)23. The intergenerational economic gap grew 
too: individuals below 35 years old are 68% less wealthy than they were in 1984, while in the same 
period those over 55 have become 10% wealthier24. 
 
The financial meltdown also brought about substantial consequences for the public finances of 
the US government, which had to face a dramatic increase in public deficit, with repercussions on the 
ability of the states to repay their debt. A political debate started in the summer of 2011 concerning the 
necessity to increase the debt ceiling25, which had a large negative effect on public support for the US 
government. President Obama signed the Budget Control Act on the 2nd of August 2011 according to 
which the borrowing limits were expanded and public expenditure was reduced. In response, several 
days later S&P downgraded the credit rating of US bonds for the first time in history, and international 
markets went through the most volatile week since the start of the crisis (the DJIA suffered a 5.6% 
loss in one day). The new debt ceiling approved in 2011, of $16.4 trillion, was reached by the US 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19	  RealtyTrac,	  Federal	  Reserve,	  Equifax	  through	  http://www.statisticbrain.com/home-­‐foreclosure-­‐statistics/.	  
20	  Current	  Population	  Survey	  –	  Housing	  Vacancies	  and	  Homeownership.	  
21	  The	   Security	   and	   Exchange	   Commission	   is	   an	   independent	   federal	   agency	   established	   pursuant	   to	   the	   Securities	   Exchange	   Act	   of	   1934,	   in	   the	  
aftermath	  of	  the	  Great	  Depression.	  Its	  aim	  is	  to	  regulate	  capital	  markets,	  protect	  investors,	  and	  maintain	  fair	  and	  efficient	  markets,	  enforce	  security	  laws	  
and	  monitor	  the	  stock	  exchange.	  
22	  http://www.sec.gov/about/secstratplan1015.pdf.	  
23	  http://www.pewsocialtrends.org/2012/08/22/the-­‐lost-­‐decade-­‐of-­‐the-­‐middle-­‐class/?utm_expid=53098246-­‐2.Lly4CFSVQG2lphsg-­‐KopIg.0	  
24	  Taking	  into	  account	  also	  the	  steep	  increase	  in	  college	  expenses.	  
25	  The	  debt	  ceiling	  is	  a	  cap	  set	  by	  the	  US	  Congress	  on	  the	  amount	  of	  money	  the	  federal	  government	  may	  borrow.	  The	  limit	  applies	  to	  debt	  owed	  to	  the	  
public	  (i.e.	  anyone	  who	  buys	  U.S.	  bonds)	  plus	  debt	  that	  the	  Treasury	  owes	  to	  government	  trust	  funds	  such	  as	  those	  for	  Social	  Security	  and	  Medicare.	  The	  
Republicans	  are	  in	  favor	  of	  the	  ceiling	  as	  they	  claim	  it	  puts	  a	  limit	  on	  government	  spending,	  but	  in	  the	  end	  the	  ceiling	  refers	  to	  obligations	  that	  have	  
already	  been	  incurred,	  not	  to	  new	  ones.	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government the 31st December 2012, the date on which the Treasury Department allowed 
‘extraordinary measures’ to allow the federal government to keep paying its bills26.  
 
The Great Recession left American households with a huge debt and the economy with a large 
and durable loss in output and employment. Total debt is high (375% of GDP in April 2009 to 343% 
of GDP in the third quarter of 2013: Federal Reserve, Bureau of Economic Analysis27) due to non-
financial private debt that is very large. Household debt has gone back to pre-crisis levels but is still 
substantial (98% of GDP in the last quarter of 2009 and 80% in mid-2014). The general deleveraging 
of the private sector has been possible only by an increase in the public debt: Government debt went 
from around 62% in the third quarter of 2007 to more than 103% at the beginning of 2014, hitting the 
100% threshold already at the end of 2012. Mortgages delinquency rates (loans more than a month 
past due) increased from 2% at the beginning of 2007 to 11.3% in the first quarter of 2010 to return to 
7% in the third quarter of 2014 (residential private loans). However, more than five years after the 
crisis a significant proportion of mortgage holders are still ‘under water’ meaning that the difference 
between what they owe and the current value of their houses is positive and substantial.  
In December 2014 the unemployment rate was 5.6% (down from the 10% of October 2009) even 
though part of the recuperation is due to the decline in labor force participation (down to 63% today, 
from 66% before the crisis). The rest of the recovery in employment is due to the private sector 
(especially jobs with low wages, minimal benefits, short hours and erratic schedules in sectors like 
retail, food service and personal care) since public jobs have constantly declined in the last four years. 
Long-term unemployment remains a problem compared to pre-crisis levels: if in 2007 the median 
duration out of the labor market was of 7-8 weeks, after peaking at 25 weeks in 2010, today it is still 
around 16 weeks of unemployment (OECD 2014 US Report). Moreover, exiting unemployment is not 
easy even if a person has been non-working for a short time: only 15% of the unemployed have, one 
year later, a steady full-time job. Moreover, the share of workers who have a (involuntary) part-time 
job due to economic reasons are today still almost double (5%) that of 2007. 
 
Finally, in the US, as much as in Europe, the burden of unemployment fell on the younger 
generations: in October 2009 27.2% of 16-19 years old adolescents (out of compulsory education28) 
didn’t have a job (20.7% today), while among the 20-24 year olds that percentage reached 17.2% in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26	  After	  months	  of	  debates	  around	  the	  issue,	  another	  similar	  budget	  impasse	  happened	  in	  October	  2013	  when	  the	  US	  federal	  government	  shut	  down	  for	  
two	   weeks	   due	   to	   a	   funding	   gap	   (neither	   a	   legislation	   appropriating	   funds	   for	   fiscal	   year	   2014	   nor	   a	   continuing	   resolution	   of	   the	   temporary	  
authorization	   of	   appropriations	   for	   fiscal	   year	   2104	  were	   enacted	   on	   time),	   created	   by	   the	   failure	   of	   agreement	   between	   the	   two	   chambers	   of	   the	  
Congress.	  At	  the	  center	  of	  the	  disagreement	  between	  Democrats	  and	  Republicans	  that	  led	  to	  the	  budget	  impasse	  was	  basically	  the	  Patient	  Protection	  
and	  Affordable	  Care	  Act	  (Obamacare)	  and	  the	  attempt	  to	  delay	  it	  made	  by	  the	  Republicans,	  coupled	  with	  a	  long-­‐standing	  political	  disagreement	  on	  the	  
increase	  or	  abolition	  of	  the	  debt	  ceiling.	  In	  February	  2014	  the	  debt	  ceiling	  was	  suspended	  without	  conditions	  through	  March	  2015.	  
27	  Data	  gathered	  by	  the	  report	  by	  Schwenninger	  and	  Sherraden	  for	  the	  Economic	  Growth	  Program	  of	  the	  New	  America	  Foundation	  (March	  2014).	  The	  
New	  America	  Foundation	  is	  a	  nonprofit,	  nonpartisan	  public	  policy	  institute	  that	  invests	  in	  new	  thinkers	  and	  new	  ideas	  to	  address	  the	  next	  generation	  of	  
challenges	  facing	  the	  United	  States;	  and	  the	  St.	  Louis	  Fed.	  
28	  Compulsory	  school	  attendance	   in	   the	  US	  varies	  by	  state.	  The	  ending	  age	  varies	  around	  16-­‐18	  years	  old	  or,	   if	  happening	  before,	   the	  completion	  of	  
secondary	  school.	  Some	  states	  allow	  for	  early	  leave	  with	  parental	  approval,	  or	  they	  allow	  for	  education	  outside	  the	  school	  and	  conducted	  at	  home.	  Other	  
students	  may	  be	  exempted	  from	  completing	  compulsory	  education	  if	  they	  meet	  specific	  requirements:	  for	  instance,	  New	  York	  City	  and	  Buffalo	  require	  
attendance	  until	   17	  unless	   students	   are	   employed,	   in	  which	   case	   they	   can	   leave	  before	   that	   age	   (National	   Center	   for	  Education	   Statistics	   IES,	   2008	  
statistics).	  
	   32	  
April 2010 (11.9% today). In 1996, the same age-specific unemployment rates were 16.7% and 9.3% 
respectively (BLS). As a consequence, young adults (below 25 years old) find it much harder today 
then ten years ago to establish their own independent households and either they move back (or stay) 
with their parents, or they go back to studying (the share of student loans in total private debt has 
increased sharply). 
Real wages are stable (or declining) and households’ median income is steadily decreasing since the 
crisis has started. Consumption is still high while savings and investment are not growing enough 
(both private and public). Even though housing prices are slowly recovering, the number of first-home 
buyers is still low due to unemployment.  
Inequality has never been so large in US: the top 1% of the income distribution between 2009 and 
2012 has captured the 95% of the increase in national income. The richer strata are the drivers of the 
recovery: their consumption has increased by 12% in 2007-2012 while for the households in the last 
95% it has decreased by 2% in the same period. 
According to OECD estimates, in 2010, 12% of the households with at least one working member 
experienced in-work relative poverty, while 8% of those with all adults working were in poverty. The 
estimated total number of people in poverty is of 12 million (Council of Economic Advisers (CEA), 
2014)29. 
  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29	  Six	  years	  after	  the	  onset	  of	  the	  Great	  Recession	  the	  US	  economy	  has	  started	  to	  pull	  itself	  back	  together.	  The	  banking	  sector	  has	  returned	  to	  health,	  the	  
stock	  market	  has	  reached	  new	  heights,	  the	  real	  estate	  market	  is	  recovering	  and	  housing	  prices	  are	  rising,	  unemployment	  rates	  have	  fallen	  and	  economic	  
growth	   is	   restored	   together	   with	   consumer	   confidence.	   However,	   the	   upswing	   has	   been	   slower	   than	   expected	   and	   the	   economic	   and	   social	  
consequences	  of	  the	  recession	  are	  far	  from	  forgotten.	  Many	  Americans	  are	  still	  struggling	  with	  increasing	  inequality,	  the	  costs	  of	  mortgages	  higher	  than	  
real	  house	  values,	  the	  stuck	  of	  real	  incomes	  and	  the	  high	  cost	  of	  healthcare	  and	  education.	  
Moreover,	  the	  recovery	  of	  the	  real	  economy	  and	  production	  has	  been	  slower	  compared	  to	  past	  recessions	  and	  GDP	  growth,	  in	  the	  four	  and	  a	  half	  years	  
after	  the	  end	  of	  the	  crisis,	  has	  grown	  at	  an	  average	  of	  2.4%	  (OECD	  2014	  US	  Report:	  pp.	  7).	  The	  economic	  rebound	  has	  been	  weaker	  compared	  to	  the	  
other	  economic	  crises	  of	  the	  second	  half	  of	  the	  XX	  century	  both	  in	  terms	  of	  GDP	  and	  employment	  recovery.	  Four	  years	  after	  the	  negative	  peak	  in	  GDP	  
growth	  of	  2009,	  the	  US	  economy	  had	  regained	  less	  than	  half	  of	  what	  it	  did	  in	  the	  sixties	  and	  seventies.	  In	  terms	  of	  employment,	  more	  than	  six	  years	  
afterward,	  it	  hasn’t	  reached	  its	  pre-­‐crisis	  levels.	  Besides	  the	  strong	  financial	  component	  of	  the	  Great	  Recession,	  according	  to	  the	  OECD	  report,	  the	  slow	  
catch-­‐up	  is	  due	  to	  the	  smaller	  public	  spending,	  especially	  in	  terms	  of	  public	  employment,	  compared	  to	  past	  crises.	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Financial instability and the economic downfall spread to the other side of the Atlantic, rapidly 
affecting every corner of Europe. However, countries were impacted upon very differently: some of 
them were struck earlier and more severely (Greece, Spain and Italy, but also Iceland, Ireland and 
Portugal) compared to others that generally did better (Germany, France, UK and the Northern 
countries). Some countries were penalized more strongly by the exposure of financial institutions and 
banking sector to the subprime crisis in the US (Ireland and UK), while others were damaged later on 
by the sovereign debt crisis caused by the public coverage of the financial exposure of private 
institutions (Greece, Spain, Italy, Portugal) and followed by the subsequent consequences for the real 
economy, namely skyrocketing unemployment and negative and prolonged economic growth due to 
the stagnation of productivity. The incredibly high density of events during the last six years hinders a 
complete coverage of all countries and all crisis-related events. Nevertheless, it is still useful to focus 
on the most important events, especially concentrating on those that more likely have had an impact 
on individuals’ perception of the crisis like the collapse of big financial institutions, the adoption of 
severe austerity measures, or countries’ bailout requests.  
Financial troubles related to the subprime crisis in the US appeared in Europe very quickly. An 
example is the August 2007 termination of withdrawals by BNP Paribas in UK from three hedge funds 
due to a lack of liquidity in the market and the subsequent intervention of the European Central Bank 
(ECB) injecting liquidity with more than €200 billion in few days. The escalation then occurred very 
fast: two weeks later the British Northern Rock was subject to the biggest bank run in more than a 
century, and was nationalized in February 2008. Central banks were forced to make funding available 
and cut interest rates throughout the whole year and during the first months of 2008. UK government 
figures showed that more than 850 companies went into administration during the first 3 months of 
2008, with an increase of 54% with respect to the previous year. By the end of the year, the British 
real estate market also fell on its knees, when house prices dropped by 15.9%. 
The Irish government officially announced it was in recession on the 25th September 2008, the month 
in which unemployment also started to rise sharply. Ireland was the first state in the Eurozone to enter 
recession as declared by its Central Statistics Office: the GDP fell by more than 3% in 2008 and nearly 
8% in 2009. The burst of the construction-industry bubble was responsible for the banking system 
collapse. This all came to a head in January 2009, when the Irish government nationalized the Anglo 
Irish Bank30.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
30	  Three	  days	  after	  Ireland	  announced	  the	  start	  of	  the	  recession,	  in	  September	  28th	  2008,	  the	  European	  banking	  and	  insurance	  giant,	  Fortis,	  was	  partly	  
nationalized	  by	  the	  authorities	  in	  the	  Netherlands,	  Belgium	  and	  Luxembourg,	  to	  ensure	  its	  survival.	  The	  authorities	  coined	  the	  motto	  too	  big	  to	  fail.	  By	  
the	  end	  of	  the	  month	  the	  credit	  crisis	  was	  deepening	  and	  the	  banking	  sector	  shaken	  again	  when	  the	  turn	  came	  for	  Dexia	  to	  be	  bailed	  out	  by	  the	  Belgian,	  
French	  and	  Luxembourg	  governments.	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In Denmark the large exposure of the banking sector and the burst of the housing bubble led to a 
banking crisis that firstly materialized in July 2008 with the collapse of the Roskilde Bank. Declining 
property values and increasing mortgage interest rates caused a boom in the number of defaults on 
loans. In autumn 2008 the Danish government launched the first of five bailouts programs for the 
banking sector to inject liquidity and stabilize the financial system. The banking crisis in Denmark 
extended between the summer 2008 and the autumn 2010 and was followed by months of economic 
recession: 12 months between 2008 and 2009, six months in 2011 and other 6 months of negative 
GDP growth were registered again at the end of 2012. 
The collapse of the Icelandic banking sector31 of autumn 2008 was, relative to the economy’s small 
size, the largest in its history. The reason for this sudden collapse was the large financialization of the 
Icelandic economy: much of Iceland’s growth prior to the crisis was sustained by the rapid expansion 
of the financial sector, following the privatization of the banking system in the early 2000s. The 
massive exposure of the Icelandic banks to foreign assets - more than 10 times the national GDP - 
caused the collapse of the three largest banks of the country at the end of 2008.32 By the end of 
January 2009 the Icelandic government also collapsed, and during the year the GDP fell by nearly 7% 
and the unemployment rate reached more than 9%. 
 
In October 2008, after days of rally of both American and European stock markets, and the 
US in the dip of the recession, governments on both sides of the Atlantic announced the intention to 
coordinate injecting money into the financial system33. At the end of the year the European Central 
Bank announced that the Eurozone had entered into recession in the third quarter of 2008. 
The first months of 2009 were characterized by negative economic growth and fast-growing 
unemployment all over Europe, and by the countless public cash injections into the financial system 
and stimulus plans to sustain the economy, from Germany to the UK, and southern European 
countries. In October 2009 unemployment rates in the Eurozone34 hit a 10-year high (9.7% in 
September), the worst case being Spain, which approached 18% unemployment in the third quarter of 
200935. 
In June 2009 the European Central Bank (ECB) for the first time warned governments that had 
borrowed heavily to stop accumulating debt. In fact, later in 2009 fears of the sovereign debt crisis 
spread among investors as a result of the growing indebtedness of the private and public sectors and 
the consequent downgrading of government debt in some European countries. Standard & Poor’s’ cut 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
31	  On	  the	  9th	  of	  December	  2008	  the	  Icelandic	  bank	  Landsbanki	  entered	  bankruptcy.	  
32	  Iceland	  started	  to	  grow	  at	  1.2%	  in	  the	  third	  quarter	  of	  2010	  and	  exited	  recession	  in	  December	  2010.	  
33	  At	  the	  end	  of	  November	  the	  Spanish	  government	  announced	  a	  €11	  billion	  stimulus	  package	  to	  generate	  300.000	  new	  jobs.	  Exactly	  one	  week	  later	  
France	  launched	  a	  stimulus	  plan	  of	  €26	  billion	  for	  public	  sector	  investments	  and	  loans	  to	  the	  car	  industry.	  
34	  In	  2009	  only	  16	  EU	  countries	  had	  adopted	  the	  Euro	  (Estonia,	  Latvia	  and	  Lithuania	  entered	  the	  Eurozone	  in	  2011,	  2014	  and	  2015	  respectively).	  
35	  Spanish	  economic	  growth	  had	  slowed	  down	  already	  in	  2007,	  but	  only	  in	  the	  second	  quarter	  of	  2008	  did	  the	  country	  enter	  into	  recession.	  In	  2009	  the	  
GDP	  contracted	  by	  3.7%	  after	  16	  years	  of	  growth.	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of the rating of the Greek debt was the first credit downgrade among western European countries since 
the start of the financial crisis.36  
The massive public spending resulting from the bailout of the banking system and the attempts to 
recover from the negative economic growth busted public deficits and endangered the ability to repay 
their fast-growing government debts. A crisis of confidence emerged in European countries 
traditionally characterized by large public debt, and it materialized in widening bond yield spreads 
between them and the more virtuous ones, Germany in the lead. Moreover, given that many European 
banks held a significant amount of sovereign debt, the negative spiral of insolvency between private 
and public debt became inevitably self-reinforcing. The confidence crisis was so remarkable that 
despite the fact that only a few European countries registered worrisome levels of sovereign debt 
(Greece, Ireland and Portugal, together accounting only for the 6% of the Eurozone’s GDP), the 
speculation of contagion and the fear of a possible breakup of the Eurozone was so strong that the 
crisis forced five countries to ask for financial help by the end of 2012 (with Greece, Ireland and 
Portugal, also Spain and Cyprus). Rumours about other countries being in need of financial help were 
also becoming more and more frequent at the time in the media (Italy was one of the countries plagued 
by speculation) and public debates touched repeatedly upon the survival of the Eurozone, put at risk 
by the scenario of the Greece exit. 
Spring 2010 saw a further intensification of the Eurozone sovereign debt crisis, which led to the 
creation of institutions for financial support between countries: the European Financial Stability 
Facility (EFSF) and the European Financial Stabilization Mechanism (EFSM).  
 
The first and most abiding victim of this confidence crisis was indeed Greece. The Greek 
economy has contracted constantly and substantially every year since 200937, while the budget deficit 
reached 15% of GDP in 2009, 11% in 2010 and 9% in 201138. On the 10th of December 2009 Greece’s 
Deputy Finance Minister, Philippos Sachinidis, admitted that the country’s debt had reached the 
highest level in its modern history39.  
In spring 2010 Greece was again in trouble, and announced a series of austerity measures to secure a 
loan from the EU and the IMF amounting to 110 billion euros. Massive protests against austerity 
measures shook the country, ending up with three people dead during a violent protest in which the 
Marfin bank in Athens was set on fire on the 5th of May 2010 (BBC news)40.  
After S&P’s cut Greece’s credit rating once more in June 201141, Greece became the country with the 
lowest credit rating in the world42. Those summer weeks, from June to September 2011, saw again 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
36	  At	  the	  end	  of	  March	  2009	  S&P	  cut	  the	  Irish	  sovereign	  credit	  rating	  (Moody’s	  would	  do	  the	  same	  in	  December	  2010),	  and	  by	  the	  end	  of	  the	  year	  	  Spain	  
too	  saw	  its	  credit	  outlook	  cut	  from	  stable	  to	  negative.	  
37	  According	  to	  Eurostat	  and	  World	  Bank	  estimates:	  -­‐4.4%	  in	  2009,	  -­‐5.4%	  in	  2010,	  almost	  -­‐9%	  in	  2011,	  -­‐6.6%	  in	  2012	  and	  -­‐3.3%	  in	  2013.	  
38	  Down	  to	  5%	  of	  2014.	  
39	  The	  problems	  escalated	  in	  April	  2010	  when	  Greece	  asked	  the	  EU	  and	  IMF	  for	  a	  €45	  billion	  financial	  rescue	  plan	  and	  the	  EU’s	  statistics	  office	  reported	  
that	  the	  budget	  deficit	  was	  far	  larger	  than	  expected	  the	  previous	  year	  and	  that	  figures	  might	  even	  get	  worse.	  A	  few	  days	  later	  the	  rating	  agency	  S&P’s	  
downgraded	  Greece’s	  debt	  to	  the	  ‘junk’	  status.	  
40BBC	  news	  at	  news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/8661385.stm.	  
41	  Outside	  Greece	  in	  2011	  also	  the	  Italian,	  Spanish,	  Belgian	  and	  Hungarian	  sovereign	  debts	  were	  downgraded.	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thousands of protesters in the Greek streets and various national strikes, against the austerity measures 
undertaken by the ruling class under the requests for more belt-tightening from the IMF43. At the end 
of the year, Papandreu resigned as prime minister and former vice-president Lucas Papadermos took 
his place. 
Austerity measures were on the agenda of other countries too: at the end of November the Irish 
government outlined a €15 billion in spending cuts and tax increases44, with the purpose of reducing 
the budget deficit to 9.1% of the GDP in 2011. In February 2011, the widespread economic 
uncertainty in the country led to the collapse of the government and the ruling parties, the resignation 
of the prime minister, and to general elections.  
In response to the instability, the Euro started to fall against the dollar, and borrowing for Spain, Italy 
and Belgium became more expensive as anxiety over the Eurozone debt crisis mounted45.  
At the beginning of April 2011, Portugal – the third country in the Eurozone – requested a financial 
bailout from the European Union, which was officially approved in May for €78 billion. In the same 
month, following the failure of the Parliament to pass austerity measures, the government was forced 
to resign and general elections took place in Portugal in June.  
In July Spanish Prime Minister Luis Rodriguez Zapatero also announced new elections for the 
following November, in which Mariano Rajoy became new PM.  
The political turmoil continued in Europe in autumn 2011 with the premature end of national 
governments in Slovenia and Slovakia, Greece and Italy4647.  
  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
42 	  Greece	   now	   has	   the	   lowest	   credit	   rating	   in	   the	   world.	   S&P	   says.	   Huffington	   post	   on	   line,	   posted	   June	   13	   2011.	  
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/06/13/standard-­‐poors-­‐greece-­‐now_n_876151.html	  
43	  In	  October	  a	  second	  loan,	  conditional	  to	  the	  implementation	  of	  further	  austerity	  measures,	  of	  about	  €130	  billion	  was	  offered	  to	  Greece,	  and	  despite	  
the	  initial	  intention	  of	  Prime	  Minister	  Papandreu	  to	  submit	  the	  decision	  over	  the	  acceptance	  of	  the	  bailout	  to	  citizens	  through	  a	  referendum,	  the	  loan	  
was	  finally	  accepted	  by	  the	  government,	  after	  strong	  pressure	  from	  the	  Troika	  (EC,	  ECB,	  IMF).	  
44	  The	  formal	  announcement	  of	  Ireland’s	  bailout	  was	  made	  on	  Sunday	  the	  28th	  of	  November	  2010	  at	  €85	  billion.	  
45	  S&P’s	  announced	  a	  possible	  downgrade	  for	  Portugal	  and	  Greece	  in	  March	  2011,	  and	  actually	  cut	  Portugal’s	  rating	  twice	  in	  the	  following	  two	  weeks,	  as	  
did	  the	  other	  rating	  agency,	  Fitch.	  
46	  In	  November,	  two	  days	  after	  Papandreu’s	  resignation,	  Berlusconi	  resigned	  as	  prime	  minister	  in	  Italy,	  and	  the	  economist	  Mario	  Monti	  was	  declared	  the	  
new	  prime	  minister	  of	  a	  technical	  government.	  Two	  weeks	  later	  Monti	  launched	  a	  €30	  billion	  austerity	  package.	  
47	  The	  major	  economic	  risk	  for	  the	  Eurozone	  remains,	  on	  the	  verge	  of	  2015,	  Greece.	  Household	  income	  is	  down	  by	  a	  third	  of	  what	  it	  was	  before	  austerity	  
measures	  and	  the	  rate	  of	  unemployment	  is	  above	  25%	  (and	  youth	  unemployment	  above	  50%),	  Gross	  Domestic	  Product	  is	  17%	  lower	  in	  2014	  than	  in	  
2008,	  the	  national	  government	  debt-­‐to-­‐GDP	  ratio	  is	  around	  200%,	  and	  pension	  (20%),	  minimum	  wage	  (20%)	  and	  social	  security	  (5%)	  have	  been	  cut.	  In	  
total	  Greece	  received	  €240	  billion	  lending,	  plus	  €50	  billion	  by	  the	  ECB,	  and	  new	  bailouts	  may	  be	  needed	  in	  2015/16.	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Among the most commonly used indicators of business cycles there are production and 
employment. The very definition of recession implies registering two consecutive quarters of negative 
real Gross Domestic Product (GDP) growth (NBER, Business Cycle dating Committee).  
Figure 2.2, published by Eurostat in 2014, shows the latest estimates of GDP growth in the Eurozone 
and US between 2005 and 2014. The US first entered into recession at the end of 2007 but the largest 
drop in GDP growth was registered when Europe entered into recession in the second quarter of 2008. 
The negative peak was -2% in the US and almost -3% in the Euro area. The latter entered into a 
second recession in the third quarter of 2011 when, as described in Section 2.2, the sovereign debt 
crisis was already underway. The absolute drop in GDP was less dramatic but the EU stayed longer in 
recession this second time (for almost eight quarters). In the last quarter of 2012 the Eurozone 
economy shrank by 0.6%48. Countries below the average were Italy, whose economy contracted by 
0.9%, Spain (-0.7%), Greece (0.6%) and Portugal, who with a negative GDP growth of -1.8% was by 
far the worst performer. Germany’s economy contracted at the average, while France was the country 
that did least badly in the Eurozone, with a negative GDP growth at -0.3%. 
 
Figure 2.2: GDP growth rates in the US and EU (2005-2014Q1). 
 
Source: Eurostat News release on GDP Growth (May 2014). EU28, euro area and United States GDP growth rates. % change over previous quarter. 
http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/cache/ITY_PUBLIC/2-15052014-AP/EN/2-15052014-AP-EN.PDF 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
48	  In	  the	  first	  quarter	  of	  2014	  the	  Eurozone	  grew	  –	  less	  than	  expected	  –	  only	  0.2%,	  down	  from	  the	  1%	  growth	  of	  2013.	  Except	  for	  Germany,	  which	  grew	  
0.8,	  the	  Eurozone	  is	  thus	  basically	  back	  to	  zero	  growth.	  Italy	  had	  negative	  growth	  (-­‐0.1%)	  –	  and	  so	  did	  the	  Netherlands	  (-­‐1.4%),	  Portugal,	  Cyprus	  (both	  -­‐
0.7%)	  and	  Estonia	  (-­‐1.2%).	  In	  most	  of	  the	  countries	  the	  growth	  dynamic	  remains	  negative	  or	  flat.	  Together	  with	  Germany,	  it	  is	  positive	  only	  in	  Spain,	  
Belgium	   (both	   +0.4)	   and	   Slovakia	   (+0.6).	   Finally,	   the	  Greek	   economy	  posted	   its	   smallest	   contraction	   in	   four	   years	   during	   the	   first	   quarter	   of	   2014,	  
shrinking	  only	  by	  1.1%	  compared	  to	  6%	  in	  the	  same	  period	  last	  year.	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The second most-used indicator of economic downturn is unemployment. Figure 2.3 
illustrates the trend in unemployment rates in some European countries and in the US. The graph 
shows that there is substantial country variation in the increase in the deterioration of the job market 
during the Great recession. In southern European countries like Greece and Spain unemployment rates 
since 2007 have increased by more than 15 percentage points, reaching the astonishing level of 25% in 
2012 49; in other countries like the US, the UK or Denmark unemployment never went beyond the 
10% threshold and increased by around 5 percentage points since 2008. Finally, other countries like 
Germany or Belgium never really experienced a surge in unemployment rates. 
 
Figure 2.3: Unemployment rate trend in selected European countries and the US (2002-2013). 
 




	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
49	  Research	  by	  Caritas,	  a	  Catholic	  pastoral	  agency	   in	   Italy,	  described	  a	  lost	  generation	  and	  says	   that	  around	  three	  out	  of	  every	  10	  children	   in	  Greece,	  
Ireland,	   Portugal,	   Italy	   and	   Spain	   are	   in,	   or	   on	   the	   edge	   of	   poverty	  (Euro	   Intelligence	   from	  Reuters).	   Between	   January	   2008	   and	   April	   2013	   youth	  
unemployment	  grew	  40%	  in	  Greece,	  35%	  in	  Spain,	  22%	  in	  Portugal	  and	  Cyprus	  and	  20%	  in	  Italy.	  These	  countries	  have	  in	  common	  a	  huge	  class	  of	  non-­‐
educated	  young	  adults	  with	  few	  job	  prospects	  and	  low	  morale.	  Many	  of	  those	  with	  some	  education	  are	  leaving	  to	  seek	  work	  elsewhere	  (in	  Germany	  the	  
number	  of	  Spanish	  and	  Greek	  jobseekers	  almost	  doubled	  during	  the	  first	  half	  of	  2012).	  The	  fact	  that	  the	  media	  started	  to	  use	  the	  term	  humanitarian	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Besides these macroeconomic indicators, the Great Recession has generated a diffused sense 
of economic uncertainty in markets, institutions, and among private individuals. This uncertainty also 
tends to reinforce, in a negative spiral, the deterioration of the real economy (International Labor 
Organization (ILO) Report 2013: 2050). Given its complex nature, it is difficult to precisely measure 
economic uncertainty and the way it has been estimated in the literature is very heterogeneous. In fact, 
there are many different proxies of economic uncertainty, none exhaustive, but each nonetheless 
useful in underscoring a certain type of uncertainty. Among the commonly used measures we find 
financial indicators such as volatility in the stock market or in the sovereign debt risk; or more 
institution-related indicators like the degree of policy uncertainty revealed in the media; or, finally, 
consumer-oriented measures such as the consumer confidence index. 
Figure 2.4 shows51 the trend in 10 years of government bond yield in selected European countries in 
the time interval between January 2007 and December 201352. The trend of long-term interest rates on 
public debt confirms that the peak of the sovereign debt crisis can be traced to between the end of 
2011 and the beginning of 2012. 
The interest rate to be paid on the public debt is a very sensitive measure of the risk associated with a 
country’s ability to repay its debt, and therefore of the uncertainty associated with credit worthiness. 
Germany is usually taken as a reference to measure the relative riskiness of other European countries, 
being considered the safest country in which to invest, with an interest rate of around 1.6%. The polar 
opposite is represented by Greece, with a long-term public debt interest rate above 9% since the 
summer 2010 (orange line). The government bond yield peaked in February 2012 around 29% and 
again in June around 28%: insanely large rates given that the threshold considered to be critical for 
debt repayment is 6%. Since then the yield has been dropping and after being around 10% in June 
2013, it was at 6.2%53 in April 2014 but again above 8% at the end 2014 (not shown). Other countries 
that exceeded the critical threshold of 6% are Portugal, Cyprus, Italy, and Spain5455 (and Ireland, see 




	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
50	  Global	  Employment	  Trends	  2013.	  Recovering	  from	  a	  second	  jobs	  dip.	  
51	  Published	  by	  ECB	  on	  www.ecb.int/stats/money/long/html/index.en.html.	  
52	  For	  the	  complete	  plot	  including	  all	  Eurozone	  countries	  see	  Figure	  A1.1	  in	  Appendix	  1.	  
53	  Source:	  Eurointelligence.	  
54	  Portugal’s	  (yellow	  line)	  and	  Ireland’s	  (not	  shown)	  rates	  peaked	  in	  the	  summer	  2011	  surpassing	  the	  rate	  of	  12%.	  One	  year	  later	  Ireland	  had	  returned	  
below	  the	  critical	  rate	  of	  6%	  (it	  leveled	  off	  around	  1.6%	  in	  November	  2014).	  Portugal	  instead	  hit	  a	  new	  spike	  in	  January	  2012	  with	  a	  rate	  around	  14%	  
but	  since	  then	  the	  perceived	  risk	  has	  been	  steadily	  declining	  and	  today	  the	  10-­‐year	  bond	  yields	  is	  less	  than	  4%.	  
55	  Cyprus	  has	  been	  heavily	  penalized	  on	  international	  debt	  markets	  since	  May	  2011	  due	  to	  its	  considerable	  exposure	  to	  the	  Greek	  sovereign	  debt.	  The	  
country	  asked	  for	   financial	  aid	  from	  its	  EU	  partners	   in	   June	  2012	  -­‐	  being	  the	  fifth	  Euro	  country	  to	  ask	  for	  bailout	  after	  Ireland,	  Portugal,	  Greece	  and	  
Spain	   -­‐	  and	  received	   from	  the	  Troika	  €10	  billion	   in	  2013.	   In	  return	   for	   the	  bailout	   the	  government	  was	  required	  to	  severely	  cut	  uninsured	  deposits	  
(mostly	  held	  by	  Russians)	  and	  to	  agree	  on	  financial	  sector	  supervision.	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Figure 2.4: Long-term government bond yield in selected European countries (2007-2013). 
 
Source: Elaboration of the author based on ECB data.   
 
 
Alongside strictly financial indicators, in 2012 the American professor Scott R. Beker and two 
colleagues56 developed another very interesting and quite comprehensive measure of uncertainty: the 
Economic Policy Uncertainty (EPU) Monthly Index, produced for the US, Germany, France, Italy, 
Spain, UK and the Netherlands (the latter only recently added). The index is a composite indicator of 
three measures of uncertainty: the frequency of newspaper references to economic policy uncertainty, 
the number of federal tax code provisions set to expire, and the extent of forecaster disagreement over 
future inflation and government purchases. The first component of the index is itself an index of the 
frequency of reference to policy-related economic uncertainty in the leading newspapers of each 
country (searching for the terms or derivatives of ‘uncertain’, together with ‘economy’ and one or 
more terms among: Congress, Fed, deficit or regulation for the US, and tax, policy, spending, central 
bank, or budget for European countries).  
The second component measures the number of temporary tax provisions that will expire in the 
following years and will be subject to last-minute decision-making by the Congress, of extension or 
not, clearly creating a source of uncertainty for the actors in the economy. This component of the 
index is present only in the case of US, expiring tax-code provisions being a very typical feature of the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
56	  Scott	  R.	  Beker	  is	  Assistant	  Professor	  of	  Finance	  at	  the	  Kellogg	  Management	  School	  at	  Northwestern	  University;	  N.	  Bloom	  is	  Professor	  of	  Economics	  at	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American economy and not being relevant for European countries. 
The third and last component is the economic forecaster disagreement drawing, for the US, from the 
Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia’s Survey of Professional Forecasters (SPF), and the Consensus 
Economics Forecast database of public expenditure, for each of the other six European countries. 
For the US the authors used individual data of forecasts on three variables: the Consumer Price Index 
(CPI), the purchase of goods and services by the state and local governments, and the purchase of 
goods and services by the federal government. The dispersion of the forecasts on those variables 
represents the uncertainty related to monetary policy issues and consumer confidence insecurity.  
For the European countries the index relies instead on the dispersion of individual forecasts on CPI 
and budget balances, scaled by national GDP57. 
VAR estimates58 show that the resulting index is very accurate in predicting economic shocks. The 
estimates also show that the increase in the EPU Index from 2006 to 2011 – which more than doubled 
in this period – predicted declines of up to 2.3 percentage points in GDP and 2.3 million in 
employment positions. 
Figure 2.5 illustrates Becker’s et al. (2012) EPU Index59 monthly trend between January 2000 and 
March 201460 in the US and in European countries. The level of uncertainty is clearly higher during 
the Great Recession compared to other previous events, for example the 9/11 terrorist attacks in the 
US. The black line represents the EPU monthly index in the US. The trend is very similar to that of the 
Eurozone countries (in grey), which start to rise in late summer 2007 and rise more sharply with the 
Lehman Brothers bankruptcy in September 2008, when the index reached 190 points. It stayed at quite 
high levels during 2009 and it peaked again in August 2011 at 245 points, after the Congress passed a 
bill allowing a raise in the country’s borrowing limits and S&P downgraded the credit rating of US 
bonds for the first time in history. Since then the index of uncertainty stabilized around 100 points, a 
level comparable to the pre-crisis period (it is still 25-20 points above the 2007 value). 
 
  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
57	  The	  limitation	  of	  this	  index	  is	  that	  it	  cannot	  really	  distinguish	  between	  real	  economic	  uncertainty	  and	  consumer	  confidence,	  as	  perceived	  for	  example	  
through	  the	  bad	  news	  in	  the	  newspapers.	  This	  issue	  however	  is	  less	  relevant	  in	  the	  present	  study	  since	  I	  focus	  on	  the	  most	  general	  type	  of	  economic	  
insecurity.	   It	   goes	   beyond	   the	   scope	   of	   this	   chapter	   to	   distinguish	   the	   effects	   of	   economic-­‐policy	   uncertainty	   on	   business	   and	   households	   from	   the	  
perception	  of	  this	  same	  economic	  insecurity.	  
58	  Vector	  Autoregression	  (VAR)	  analysis	  is	  a	  model	  illustrating	  the	  linear	  interdependencies	  among	  multiple	  time	  series.	  Each	  variable	  is	  explained	  by	  
its	  own	  lags	  and	  the	  lags	  of	  the	  other	  model	  variables.	  
59	  Data	  are	  freely	  available	  on	  www.policyuncertainty.com.	  
60	  The	  general	  EPU	  index	  is	  not	  available	  from	  April	  2014,	  after	  which	  only	  the	  Newspaper	  Uncertainty	  Index	  is	  available.	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Figure 2.5: Monthly Economic Policy index, US and EU (2000-2014). 
 
Source: Elaboration of the author based on Becker et al. (2012, 2015). EPU Index data available on www.policyuncertainty.com. 
 
 
Figure 2.6 plots the EPU index in the six European countries – Germany, Italy, UK, Spain, 
France and the Netherlands – in the time interval 2006-2014. The index is, as expected, highly 
correlated with the events described in the previous section of this chapter, peaking simultaneously 
first with the collapse of financial institutions in Europe and the US, and later on with events related to 
the sovereign debt crisis, like the Greek requests of financial aid, and the following riots and heavy 
protests in the country, or the resignation of the Italian government in November 2011. 
All the six European countries started in January 2006 with a very similar EPU index ranging between 
40 for Spain and 100 for Germany (though the Netherland’s index is very volatile in the entire period). 
The trend had been quite stable up to the late summer 2007 at which time the index started to rise in 
all the countries, the first relative peak occurring in October 2007 with the first bank runs on American 
and European financial institutions, as described. The index roughly stabilized during the following 12 
months, to begin rising again in August 2008. This is especially true in the UK and Germany, whose 
financial institutions were more involved in the subprime mortgages crisis exploding at that time in the 
US, hitting 250 in the former and 210 in the latter. In November 2008 the ECB officially announced 
that the Eurozone had entered recession. The index of Spain grew to 190, after that date too, due to the 
stimulus package that had to be passed to protect the Spanish economy. 
Thanks to injections of liquidity from the public to the financial sector, the level of uncertainty was 
initially attenuated, until the spread of the first fears in the markets of the burst of public deficit in 
some European countries and the subsequent risk of default on the sovereign debt. 
The confidence crisis materialized in late 2009 and spring 2010, when the uncertainty index peaked at 
more than 251 in the UK and 270 in France (May 2010) and at more than 160 in Italy a month later. In 
Germany and Spain the EPU started to increase dramatically only during summer 2011, rising to its 
maximum level in autumn up to the point where both the Italian and the Greek governments had lost 
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during 2012, the trend has fluctuated strongly in all the six countries, with the UK (apart from the 
spike of uncertainty in the Netherlands at the beginning of 2013) always scoring higher in economic 
policy uncertainty, being close to 300 still in November 2012. For the other countries the situation 
seemed to be getting better during the year, even if in Spain in June 2012 the economic uncertainty 
very likely rose because of the financial aid necessary to sustain its banking sector and the steadily 
increasing costs of its public debt, with interest rates reaching almost 7% that summer. Only in spring 
2013 did  economic insecurity seem to start easing in all the six European countries, even though still 
by mid-April 2014 it had not returned to its pre-crisis level yet. 
 
 
Figure 2.6: Monthly Economic Policy Uncertainty index in GER, IT, UK, SP, FR, NETH (2006-2014). 
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The picture presented in the last section of a nearly collapsing financial sector, an induced 
sovereign debt crisis in the Eurozone and effects for the real economy of negative growth and rising 
unemployment, suggests that the consequences of the Great Recession for households might have 
been heavy. Credit conditions have been tight both for firms and for individuals because banks were 
using liquidity to rebalance assets and debts in their balance sheets, which meant, for households, 
lower spending power and an even lower likelihood of being able to afford buying a house. Firms, 
when still in the market, preferred to take a prudent attitude and postpone investment and hiring. The 
public sector in many countries curtailed resources in support of financial institutions at the beginning 
of the crisis, and recently for social security provisions. Moreover, the widening of public deficits 
obliged governments to adopt severe austerity measures, by raising taxation and reducing public 
expenditures, implying that fewer resources were available for social policies directed to families. 
These deteriorating economic conditions have grinded on households’ consumption, investment and 
savings arrangements, and they might have weighted on family dynamics. The aim of this chapter is to 
investigate how big the impact of macroeconomic factors on fertility rates has been, but to start with, it 
is important to assess whether there is a phenomenon that needs to be explained61. 
Figure 2.7 illustrates the trend in TFR in nine European countries and in the United States (dotted line) 
during the period 2002-2013. The first relevant pattern in the figure is the well-known persistent 
north-south dichotomy in fertility: in the last decade northern European countries, and the US, kept an 
average fertility rate around 1.9-2, while southern European countries like Italy, Greece and Spain 
averaged 1.3-1.4 children per woman, in the same time interval.  
Fertility in Central Europe has been also quite low: the example reported in the figure is Poland which 
is, together with southern European countries, one of the countries with the lowest fertility levels in 
the world, the TFR in the period 2004-2011 averaged in fact only 1.32.  
The second interesting and widely known fact is that, in both groups of countries, the beginning of the 
2000s saw a diffused and stable increase in fertility (amounting to around 0.1 in the US and around 0.2 
in Europe), which peaked in 2007 in the US registering a TFR of 2.12 and generally a year later in 
most European countries (with the exception of Iceland, which reached its highest fertility rate, 2.23, 
in 2009). Greece was the country that showed, in the last decade, the sharpest increase in TFR: +0.25 
between 2002 and 2009.  
This positive trend in fertility, the first continent-wide one since the baby boom of the seventies 
(Sobotka 2013), has been explained by the recuperation of the births that were postponed during the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
61	  In	  R.K.	  Merton’s	  word	  (1987:	  2-­‐6)	  if	  there	  is	  “enough	  of	  a	  regularity	  to	  require	  and	  allow	  explanation”.	  
	   46	  
nineties. The rise in TFR at the beginning of the century would have been an ‘artifact’ of the measure 
that did not take into consideration that women were slowing down the pace of postponement, 
anticipating births with respect to the decade before. However, being this due to a tempo or a quantum 
effect (i.e. temporary or permanent), it is an established fact that between 2002 and 2008 societal 
conditions seemed favorable to fertility and TFR increased on average in European countries by about 
0.15 live births per woman (Lanzieri 2013). 
 
Figure 2.7: Total Fertility Rate in selected European Countries and the US (2002-2013). 
 
Source: Elaboration of the author based on Eurostat data for European countries, and US data from US National Center for Health 
Statistics. Data for 2013 from the Population Reference Bureau (Washington DC)62. 
 
  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
62	  http://www.prb.org/DataFinder/Topic/Rankings.aspx?ind=17	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Figure 2.8 focuses on fertility in the US during the recent period: 2000-2014. As already 
pointed out, the US is no exception to the generally positive fertility trend of the first years of the 
2000s, and in fact between 2002 and 2007 the TFR increased from 2 children per woman to 2.12.  
According to the National Vital Statistics (2011), the highest number of births in the US since the 
1960s was registered in 2006, but besides the positive trend in fertility, during the first years of the 
2000s the US saw various changes in very important childbearing-related features: teenage 
pregnancies, for instance, dropped significantly (22% lower in 2000 than in 1991) and for 14 years in 
a row (until 2006). The mean age at first birth kept increasing until reaching 25 in 2006, albeit with 
large regional variation (in 2006 the lowest age was Mississippi with 22.6 and the highest was 
Massachusetts with 27.7 years old)63. The median age at first marriage kept increasing too and, since 
the ‘70s when it was below 21 years old, it reached 24 at the beginning of the nineties when it 
overtook the median age at first birth, and since then stayed above being almost 27 in 2011 (26 for 
first birth).  
The National Center for Family and Marriage Research (Hymowitz et al. 2013) reports a large 
difference across educational levels in the median age at first birth and marriage, registered in the 
country in 2010: college-educated women marry around 27 years old and have their first child around 
30; on the contrary, poorly educated women (less than high-school) marry at 25 and become mothers 
around five years before, and women with a high-school diploma or some college marry at 26 and 
have a baby around 24. Compared to ten years ago, the median age of first births has increased but not 
changed that much, in all educational groups, while age at marriage has seen a sharp rise in all groups, 
especially for poorly educated women for whom in 2000 the age at marriage was around 22 years old 
(Hymowitz et al. 2013). 
Voluntary childlessness was less diffused in the 2000s compared to the nineties, with 6.2% of women 




	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
63	  The	  geographic	  variation	  reflects	  the	  racial	  and	  age	  composition	  of	  the	  population:	  immigrants,	  especially	  Hispanics,	  tend	  to	  have	  more	  children	  and	  
have	   them	   at	   younger	   ages,	   and	   southern	   US	   states	   have	   a	   much	   larger	   proportion	   of	   White	   Hispanics,	   compared	   to	   northern	   and	   especially	  
northeastern	  States.	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Figure 2.8: Total Fertility Rate in the US (2000-2014).
 
Source: Elaboration of the author based on data from US National Center for Health Statistics. 
 
 
From 2007 onward though, the steady positive trend in fertility in the US came to a halt. A 
large decline in fertility has been in fact registered for four consecutive years from 2007 to 2011, when 
the TFR moved from more than 2.1 (the replacement rate) to 1.89, only slightly increasing to 1.90 in 
2012 but falling again in 2013 to 1.86 children per woman64 (a 12.3% decline since 2007, according to 
the US National Center for Health Statistics), far below the early 2000s rates. Also the General 
Fertility Rate65 (not shown), in the same period 2007-2013, declined by 10.1% (69.5 to 62.5). 
The age at first birth reached 26 years old in 2012 (CDC estimates).  
The proportion of non-marital births, after years of remaining constant at around one-third of total 
births, increased to 41% in 2009, and almost to the half (48%) in 2011 (Hymowitz et al. 2013) and 
only one-fifth of those were due to teenagers’ childbearing. There are large ethnic differences also in 
out of wedlock birth rates, with only 29% of White mothers having children outside marriage, 
compared to the much larger 53% of Hispanics and the 73% of Black mothers (Roy et al., 2014).  
Educational differences in non-marital births are also growing larger: in 2010 only 12% of women 
with a college degree had their first child out of wedlock, versus 58% of women with a high-school 
diploma or some college and 83% of high-school dropouts (in 2000 the percentages were respectively 
of 8%, 74% and 44%). For comparison, in 1970 only 3% of highly educated women were not married 
at first birth, 12% of the middle groups and the 33% of the very poorly educated women (Hymowitz et 
al. 2013). 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
64	  In	  particular,	  fertility	  was	  1.8	  for	  White	  women,	  2	  for	  African	  American,	  2.6	  for	  Mexican	  and	  3.5	  for	  other	  Hispanic	  women	  (National	  Vital	  Statistic	  
2011,	  as	  reported	  by	  Roy	  et	  al.,	  2014).	  
65	  The	  General	  Fertility	  Rate	  is	  the	  number	  of	  births	  per	  1000	  women	  of	  15-­‐44	  years	  old.	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The fertility drop in Europe was delayed, with respect to the US, by one or two years, 
excepting the UK, which registered a slight decline between 2008 and 2009 but recovered already one 
year later; Germany where – though with ups and downs – the TFR in the last 5-6 years basically 
didn’t change; and France that showed a constant fertility rate and an increase between 2009 and 2010, 
nullified between 2010 and 2013. All the other European countries recorded a drop in fertility after 
2008: in some countries the drop was more pronounced, like Iceland, Greece and Spain (Denmark also 
saw a remarkable – of almost 0.2 – decline in fertility but only after 2010) while in others the fertility 
drop was more modest and smooth, i.e. Ireland and Italy (around 0.05). 
Figure 2.9 depicts in particular the change in TFR between 2008 and 2012 for 35 European countries 
(for which Eurostat publishes annual TFR data) in comparison to the US. Of those, 23 registered a 
decline in fertility, six saw no change and in only seven of them the TFR increased between 2008 and 
2012. Among the latter the average increase was of 0.056 children per woman, while the average drop 
in fertility in the 23 countries was of about 0.081 children per women. The highest decline in TFR 
happened in the US (-0.18), where the crisis materialized earlier. As mentioned, the drop was 
significant in southern European countries, in particular Spain and Greece, but also in some northern 
countries like Denmark, Estonia and Latvia. Germany, France and Sweden are among the countries 
where the positive path of fertility of the early 2000s did not reverse but only halted after 2008. 
Eastern European countries like Macedonia, Serbia and Slovenia actually registered, instead, a slight 
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Figure 2.9: Total Fertility Rate variation in EU and US (2012-2008). 
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Many authors have investigated the macro-level relationship between business cycles and 
childbearing, especially in the aftermath of the Great Depression and in the last years after the Great 
Recession. The vast majority of the studies argues for, and finds evidence in support of, a pro-cyclical 
relationship of births to economic fluctuations in advanced economies (Rindfuss et al. 1988; Tzanatos 
and Simons 1989; Lee 2003; Livingstone et al. 2010; Sobotka et al. 2010, 2011; Livingstone 2011; 
Morgan et al. 2011; Ananat et al 2013; Black et al 2013; Cherlin et al 2013; Goldstein et al. 2013; 
Hofmann et al. 2013; Currie and Schwandt 2014; Schneider 2015). Some analyses descriptively track 
the declining trends in general and total fertility rates (some differentiating between age, parity, 
ethnicity-specific rates) by country or in comparative perspective, across recession periods 
(Livingstone and Cohn 2010; Morgan et al 2011; Cherlin et al 2013).  
Conversely, very few studies (Butz and Ward 1979; Ermisch 1980, 1988) put forward the theory that 
couples take advantage of the limited opportunities in the labor market during recessions to have 
children. In a well known, but questioned (Ahlburg 1983; Macunovich 1995, 1996; McDonald 2000) 
work, Butz and Ward (1979) argued that at high levels of female participation in the labor force, 
fertility becomes counter-cyclical (birth rates increase when unemployment rates also increase) 
because of the lower opportunity costs of childbearing for working women. The latter take advantage 
of a period of unemployment to become mothers so that in the future they will not have to renounce a 
good job to have a baby. 
 
One way of classifying the evidence on the topic is by the different ways in which business 
cycles are operationalized in the analyses, through the various financial and macroeconomic indicators 
that proxy the ups and downs of the economy: some of them capture the structural tendency of the real 
economy, while others reflect more the actors’ (markets, institutions or individuals) perception of the 
economy, present and future. 
A first strand of research investigates the correlation between productivity (usually GDP) or economic 
growth, and fertility rates. 
For instance, recently Morgan et al. (2011) investigated the period effect of US recessions since 1975 
and show their pro-cyclical correlation to fertility: when the economy goes down, so does fertility. 
Sobotka and colleagues (2010, 2011) show that among 27 low-fertility countries in the period 1980-
2008, in the 81% of the episodes of GDP decline and in the 65% of the cases of GDP stagnation 
(yearly growth less than 1%) a fall in TFR followed.  
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Adsera and Mendez (2011) find a positive correlation between GDP and fertility rates in 18 Latin 
American countries and Lanzieri (2013) finds that GDP growth is positively correlated to changes in 
TFR also among European countries (additionally showing that fertility responds to the economic 
shock with a delay of 19 months). 
However, in many of these studies, once variables like unemployment, individual socio-economic 
variables, or consumer confidence are introduced into the model, this correlation disappears (Sobotka 
2010; Adsera and Mendez 2011) suggesting that indicators other than the GDP better capture the 
impact of the business cycle on fertility.  
Some studies then focused on income instead. One of those is the Pew Research report by Livingstone 
(2011) that relates the fertility decline in the US to the decline in income per capita.  
In another interesting paper Black et al, (2013) exploit the coal boom of the 1970s as a natural 
experiment to assess the effect on fertility of a sudden increase in men’s income (in the coal-mining 
region of the Appalachian). The authors find a 3% increase in completed fertility for the cohorts that 
benefited from a total income increase of 6%. 
 
A larger branch of research focuses on unemployment rate, using it in aggregate time-series 
studies to investigate the relationship between the business cycle and fertility. In the US both men and 
women’s unemployment rates and (especially) young women’s rates have been found to reduce 
childbearing, usually more pronouncedly for second or higher-order births (Macunovich and Easterlin 
1988; Macunovich 1996). However, Rindfuss et al. (1988) find a negative effect of unemployment on 
first births (without making any distinction between men’s and women’s unemployment) in the US. 
The authors report large similarities in the effect of unemployment on fertility across decades after the 
Great Depression in the US, suggesting that the negative response of births to unemployment is not 
just a crisis-related pattern. Similar results on the inhibiting effect of men’s unemployment on first 
births have been shown for Europe, in particular for the UK in the post-war period (Ermisch 1988) and 
during the Great Depression (Tzannatos and Symons 1989).  
More recent research on the Great Recession in the US has been conducted. For instance, Morgan et al 
(2011) showed  negative correlation between unemployment rates and the change in fertility rates in 
2007-09 and Cherlin (2013) repeated the analysis on the impact of the percentage point change in 
unemployment and the percentage point change in GFR between 2007 and 2011 in the US. Ananat’s 
et al. (2013) analyzes the general fertility rates response to mass layoffs in North Carolina counties 
during the nineties and up to 2010. They find a negative fertility effect only for African American 
teens and no effect for White American teens or women in their twenties.  
Currie and Schwandt (2014) investigate both short- and long-term effects on births of increasing 
unemployment using pseudo-cohorts of American women. They show a negative overall effect of -0.5 
conceptions per 1000 women for each percentage-point increase in unemployment. Looking at 
specific age ranges, the authors find, in line with the literature, that the fertility of younger women is 
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more negatively affected by unemployment compared to older women (they found no effect on 
women around 40 years of age). A 1% increase in unemployment rate experienced around 20-24 years 
of age reduces conceptions in the same age group (short-run effect) of about 6 births per 1000 women, 
and reduces completed fertility of these women at 40 years old of about 14 conceptions per 1000 
women.  
Schneider (2015) finds very similar effects analyzing national and local employment conditions across 
the Great Recession in the US: at the state level, the general fertility rate declines of 0.60 births per 
percentage-point increase in unemployment rate, after controlling for demographic characteristics of 
the state and adding state and year fixed effect. The author predicts that this effect, considering the 
increase in unemployment during the recession, means a sizeable reduction of 7.5% in births. He also 
notes that the effect is larger for younger women and declines with age. 
 
Other studies have investigated the nexus between unemployment and fertility in Europe 
(Özcan 2010; Adsera 2011; Goldstein et al 2013; Lanzieri 2013; Neels 2013; Sobotka 2011; 2013). 
The unemployment rate in general was found to have depressed fertility during the Great Recession; 
this is especially true of long-term men’s unemployment rates on first birth rates to childless couples 
(Adsera 2011; Neels 2013) and among young adults below 25 years of age (Goldstein et al. 2013; 
Lanzieri 2013; Sobotka 2011; 2013). In the already-mentioned study, Lanzieri (2013) finds a lag 
between the unemployment rate rise and fertility drop of 19 months on average in European countries 
(similar to that of the fertility reaction to GDP growth). Neels et al. (2013) show a strong negative 
effect of unemployment on the hazard of first births among men and women below 30 years of age, 
especially for the highly educated. After 30 it influences the probability of men having children, with 
no corresponding effect on women. 
The paper by Goldstein et al. (2013) on Europe is especially interesting for the present investigation. 
The authors conducted a study on the effect of unemployment rates on age and parity-specific fertility 
rates in 28 European countries (they include Russia) in the period 2000-2010, using data from the 
Human Fertility Database, Eurostat and the OECD database. The authors find that the elasticity of 
fertility to unemployment is negative and especially concentrated on very young women and on first 
births. The effect of a percentage-point increase in unemployment rates generates a 0.2% decline in 
first birth rates among 15-19 years old women and a -0.1% among women 20-24. The effect on second 
and third births is smaller and generally not statistically different from zero. 
 
A third group of studies investigates how the perception of an economic downturn and of 
future uncertainty might affect fertility rates.  
Already in the sixties the economist G.S. Becker (1960) studied the US between 1920 and 1957 and 
argued that changes in fertility rates were positively correlated with the purchase of durable goods. His 
more recent studies have considered the relationship between consumer confidence and fertility. In the 
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US, Schneider (2015), besides looking at unemployment, analyzes the effects of mortgage foreclosure 
start rate, press coverage of the Great Recession and consumer confidence on birth rates. The author 
finds for foreclosure start rates a very similar negative effect to that of unemployment (-0.64 point 
reduction in GFR), and that higher levels of confidence are associated with significantly higher 
fertility rates. Press coverage of the crisis is negatively but moderately linked to the general fertility 
rate (GFR). 
For Europe, in the Netherlands, both van Giersbergen and de Beer (1997) and Fokkema et al. (2008) 
report a positive association between the two variables: in the former study an increase in the index of 
consumer confidence of 10% is associated with a +1.5% in total births per year; and the latter show 
that an increase of 10 points in the confidence index is associated with an increase of 0.04 in TFR, a 
sizeable effect. Hoffman and Hohmeyer (2013) find a negative effect of perceived future employment 
instability on fertility of German couples, driven mainly by women’s concerns about the future in 
male-breadwinner households. 
 
As illustrated, the macro evidence on the correlation between business cycles and fertility is 
extensive. Nonetheless a comprehensive study of the fertility response to a combination of the 
different aspects (objective economic conditions and economic insecurity perception) of the recession 
is still missing. This is precisely the objective of this first empirical chapter of the thesis.  
The analysis that follows is divided in two main parts: in the first part, starting from Goldstein et al.’s 
(2013) work, I investigate the elasticity of age and parity-specific fertility rates in the European 
countries and the US to the yearly variation of the different financial and macroeconomic indicators of 
the Great Recession, illustrated in Section 2.3. Importantly, not only do I expand the dataset and the 
number of explanatory variables, but I also try to combine the latter in a unique picture to grasp how 
these different components of the crisis affect childbearing rates.  
In the second part I exploit the availability of monthly birth data and monthly fluctuations in those 
economic indicators to get a more precise sense of the correlation between fertility and variation in 
economic conditions.  
In both the first and second part of the analysis I also investigate the geographical heterogeneity in the 
economy-fertility correlation, with a special focus on US and southern European countries that were 
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5. The impact of aggregate economic indicators on age and parity-specific fertility rates 









This first empirical investigation of the fertility response to macroeconomic indicators of the 
Great Recession starts from the analysis conducted by Goldstein and colleagues (2013) on the 
elasticity of age- and parity-specific fertility rates to unemployment in Europe in the period 2000-
2010.  
The dependent variables on which I focus in this section are the annual Total Fertility Rate, age-
specific fertility rate (ASFR) and parity-specific TFR (for first and second births). All fertility data are 
retrieved from Eurostat and US National Vital Statistics for the US. 
In comparison to Goldstein’s et al.’s (2013) paper, the analysis unfolded here includes more countries, 
more recent data and it tests different explanatory variables beyond unemployment rates that might 
convey the effect of the Great Recession on childbearing across countries. In particular I analyze four 
key explanatory variables in 31 European countries plus the US in the time period 2003-201366.  
The worsening of the economic objective conditions during the recession is captured by annual 
general and youth unemployment rates.  
However, beyond material hardship, also economic uncertainty and future expectations play a role in 
shaping childbearing decisions (Sobotka 2010; Kreyenfeld 2012; Hoffman and Hohmeyer 2013; 
Schneider 2015). Hence, I included in the analysis different measures and indexes of uncertainty about 
the economy. 
One macro-indicator of the intensity of an economic crisis and its associated economic uncertainty is 
market volatility. In the case of Europe, as already shown, the main confidence crisis concerned 
sovereign debt, and a good proxy of market expectations is the trend in government bond yields. The 
cost of repaying public debt, namely the interest rate to pay on it, is a powerful measure of the market 
credibility of a government, which was severely undermined in some European countries during the 
last three years of the sovereign debt crisis. This more general feeling of financial and economic 
insecurity about the future is thus represented by sovereign debt risk, measured through long-term (10- 
year) government bond yields. The second measure of economic uncertainty I am using, more 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
66	  From	   the	   thirty-­‐two	   countries	   for	  which	   Eurostat	   data	   on	   birth	   rates	  were	   available	   I	   dropped	   only	   Turkey	   (because	   of	  many	  missing	   data	   and	  
because	  substantially	  it	  is	  a	  very	  different	  country	  for	  the	  others).	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comprehensive in its design, is the annual average of Beker’s (2012) monthly Economic Policy 
Uncertainty (EPU) Index, described in Section 2.3. 
Unemployment and youth unemployment rate data (from Eurostat) are available for all the 32 
countries considered, while government bond yields (from Eurostat and for the missing countries from 
the ECB, Bank of England, OECD and Federal Reserve Economic Data, St. Louis FED) could be 
retrieved for all countries except Croatia and Estonia. As described earlier, the EPU index was created 
only for US, Italy, Germany, France, the UK, Spain and (only recently) the Netherlands. 
 
The aim of the analysis is to show the separate and joint effect of these financial and 
macroeconomic variables on fertility rates. In the following analyses all variables are log-transformed, 
so that I estimate the effect of the recession on fertility in terms of the elasticity of fertility rates to the 
macroeconomic indicators (also to make them comparable to the results of Goldstein et al.’s paper).  
The density distribution of each independent variable and its log-transformed distribution are 
illustrated in Figure A1.2 in Appendix 1. 
All independent variables are lagged to the previous year and country dummies are included to capture 
country-specificities in fertility. A linear time trend is also added to capture the underlying period 
fertility trends, associated with the postponement of fertility, typical of all low-fertility countries. 
Finally, the linear time trend is interacted with the country dummies so as to capture any country-
specific time trend in fertility, as done also in Goldstein et al. (2013). 
In this analysis, compared to Goldstein et al. (2013), I look more specifically into cross-country 
differences in the effect of the indicators on fertility, first separating European countries from the US 
and, second, within Europe constructing country the following clusters: Western Europe (Austria, 
Belgium, France, Germany, Ireland, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Switzerland, UK); Central-Eastern 
Europe (Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, 
Slovakia, Slovenia); Northern Europe (Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, Sweden) and Southern 
Europe (Cyprus, Greece, Italy, Malta, Portugal, Spain). 
The results are shown graphically to the greatest extent possible, to facilitate an immediate grasp of 










Figure 2.10 shows the means and confidence intervals of the macroeconomic indicators used 
in the analysis by year, pooling all 32 countries together. After 2009 we witness a large increase in 
unemployment rates, both general and of young adults (top panels). Between 2008 and 2009 general 
unemployment went from around 6% to more than 8%, reaching 10.4% in 2013, and the variation in 
the sample also increased a great deal. Youth unemployment increased on average from 15% to 20% 
between 2008 and 2009, peaking at almost 25% in 2013. The figures show a huge +70% in both 
unemployment and youth unemployment rates between 2007 and 2013 in those 32 countries. 
 
Figure 2.10: Great Recession financial and macroeconomic indicators. Means and 95% confidence 
intervals. 
 
Source: elaboration of the author based on data from Eurostat, ECB, Bank of England, OECD and Federal Reserve Economic Data (St. Louis FED), 
US National Vital Statistics and US Treasury. EPU index by Beker et al. (2012). 
 
 
Interest rates on public debt (bottom left panel in Fig. 2.10) also rose on average after 2009 
compared to 2005-2006 but the increase is extremely small compared to the other explanatory 
variables (+4% only between 2007 and 2011), since the sovereign debt crisis was very much 
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soon after 2011. The variation in that sample though increased significantly after 2009. I don’t expect 
therefore sovereign debt to be determinant in the complete analysis including the entire sample, but I 
do expect to find some effect in southern European countries where the large increase in the cost of 
public debt materialized. 
The EPU index (bottom right panel in Fig. 2.10) also suddenly increased after 2008, more than 
doubling in 2011 with respect to 2007. Between 2007 and 2011, in fact, the index registered a +102% 
increase. In 2013 policy uncertainty had not yet gone back to its pre-crisis levels. 
 
Figure 2.11: Elasticity of Total Fertility Rate to Great Recession indicators. All parities and age 
groups. 
 
Source: elaboration of the author based on data from Eurostat, ECB, Bank of England, OECD and Federal Reserve Economic Data (St. Louis FED), US 
National Vital Statistics and US Treasury. EPU index by Beker et al. (2012). 
 
Figure 2.11 illustrates the elasticity of TFR to the four indicators (Table A1.1 in the Appendix 
1 reports the detailed analysis). The top panels show the elasticity to unemployment: a 1% increase in 
general unemployment rate is associated to a decline in TFR the following year of 0.087%. Results for 
youth unemployment are very similar. Gensler (1996) found a very similar elasticity of fertility to 
unemployment (0.09%) for the birth rates of single-female households in the US during the nineties. 
Also, this value is close to the elasticity found for fertility rates to housing prices in the US (between -
0.1 and -0.2) between 1997 and 2009 (Dettling and Kearney 2013).  
In non-log-transformed variation, this means that for every percentage-point increase in 
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unemployment rates went from 6.11% in 2007 to 10.4% in 2013 among the countries considered here, 
according to our estimate the increase in unemployment rate of more than 4% implied a total fertility 
rate average decline of around 0.05 births in the 32 countries in the sample, a 3% decline since pre- 
crisis TFR in advanced economies.  This is comparable to estimates reported in previous studies that 
point to an effect of the Great Recession on TFR of around 2-5% in the US (Morgan 2011a, 2011b) 
and the estimate by Currie and Schwandt (2014) that estimated a 2.4% decline in complete fertility of 
those cohorts who experienced a rise in unemployment during the first phase of the Great Recession at 
the age of 20-2467. 
Looking at the proxies for more general economic uncertainty and fear (Figure 2.11 - bottom panels), 
sovereign debt risk seems not to be associated with fertility, at least in the complete sample of 
European countries and the US. An increase, instead, of 1% in the Economic Policy Uncertainty index 
is associated with a drop in TFR the next year of around 0.05%, around half the elasticity found for 
unemployment. 
These estimates are already informative but the effect of the recession on fertility is likely to be very 
heterogeneous across age groups, parities and across countries (Kreyenfeld et al. 2012). These more 
specific estimates are presented in the next figures. 
 
Looking at age-specific TFR in Figure 2.12, the pattern seems very robust to the different 
economic indicators used (except for the government bond yields that again have an effect on fertility 
that is substantially and statistically zero in all age groups): the largest negative impact of the crisis has 
been so far on very young women, followed by women in their late thirties.  
A percentage-point increase in unemployment (or youth unemployment) is followed by a drop in 
fertility of almost 0.2% for the very young (15-19 year-old women) and of around 0.1% for women in 
their twenties (ages 20-29). The negative effect increases again for 30 year-old women, up to a -0.15% 
and is the smallest for 40-44 year-old women (-0.07%). These results are very similar to those 
obtained by Goldstein et al. (2013) and even a bit lager, probably because in many European countries 
the negative effects of the Great recession materialized later than 2011, the last year analyzed in their 
paper. It is thus important to include more recent years to grasp the total negative effect of the crisis on 
childbearing. These age-specific results are also in line with Schneider (2015) who finds a negative 
effect of unemployment rates declining with age groups in the US, and Lanzieri (2013) who finds for 
Europe an effect of unemployment only for women younger than 30 years of age (the models in those 
papers are very different from the present one so the magnitude of the estimate in not directly 
comparable). The EPU index shows the same tendency of a large negative effect for fertility at 
younger ages (around -0.12% at 15-19) but it shows a generally smaller effect, with respect to job 
market indicators, on fertility at older ages (less than -0.05% for women older than 25). 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
67	  However,	  these	  estimates	  are	  much	  smaller	  if	  compared	  to	  the	  elasticity	  of	  fertility	  to	  men	  income	  increase,	  estimated	  by	  Black	  et	  al	  (2013)	  around	  
0.5,	  even	  though	  their	  estimates	  are	  on	  completed	  cohort	  fertility.	  
	   60	  
 
Figure 2.12: Elasticity of Age-specific Fertility Rates to Great Recession indicators. All Parities. 
 
Source: elaboration of the author based on data from Eurostat, ECB, Bank of England, OECD and Federal Reserve Economic Data (St. Louis FED), 




The effect on first births is illustrated in Figure 2.13: the elasticity to unemployment is again 
stronger for young women (around -0.2 for 15-19 years old) and very close to zero for women above 
40. The elasticity by age group on first births is very similar to those for all births pooled together, 
except for 40-44 year-old women for whom unemployment rate has not affected the likelihood that 
they will become mothers. These women are close to the end of their reproductive life and if they are 
childless and want to have children the economic conditions might influence them less than younger 
women 68  (this is also confirmed by the estimates on second births). The results for youth 
unemployment are again identical to general unemployment rates. The estimates for the EPU index are 
much less precise than before because the sample is smaller, but in magnitude the elasticity is again 
very similar to that found for all births pooled together. Finally, there seems to be once more no effect 
of long-term government bond yields on first birth rates. 
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Figure 2.13: Elasticity of Age-specific Fertility Rates to Great Recession indicators. Parity one. 
 
Source: elaboration of the author based on data from Eurostat, ECB, Bank of England, OECD and Federal Reserve Economic Data (St. Louis FED), 




The elasticity of second births (Figure 2.14) is still negative but the effect in this case is larger 
for thirty and forty year-old women compared to women in their twenties and to the results for parity 
one. The range of the estimates, however, do not vary much, remaining between -0.15% for the 15-19 
and 35-39 year-old women to -0.07% for women in their twenties. These results are similar to those 
obtained by Goldstein at al. (2013) who find a negative and significant elasticity of first births to 
unemployment rates only for women 30-39 around -0.05/-0.1. 
To sum up, the negative effect of unemployment rates affects especially young women in their 
transition to motherhood, namely women that can afford to postpone their first child but, at this level 
of aggregation, they seem not to affect the decision of women close to the end of their reproductive 
lives to postpone first births69. Once they have had a first child, rising unemployment reduces more 
strongly the likelihood that thirty and forty year-old women proceed to a second child compared to 
women in their twenties. There is no indication of an effect of sovereign debt and policy uncertainty 
on second birth rates. Long-term government bonds and the EPU index are not precisely estimated and 
all confidence intervals cross the zero line; moreover, the point estimates for both indicators are also 
very close to zero.  
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Figure 2.14: Elasticity of Age-specific Fertility Rates to Great Recession indicators. Parity two. 
 
Source: elaboration of the author based on data from Eurostat, ECB, Bank of England, OECD and Federal Reserve Economic Data (St. Louis FED), 





The next set of figures depicts the different elasticity of age-specific fertility rates to the 
financial and macroeconomic indicators in different geographical regions. I first separate the US from 
Europe and, second, within European countries I look at the diverse effect of the crisis by country 
clusters (North, South, West and Central-East Europe). 
In the US and in the southern European countries (Fig. 2.15-2.16) the effect of unemployment on 
fertility was the largest, especially so among young women. A 1% increase in unemployment reduces 
teens’ fertility rate of -0.25% while for the same percentage-point increase in youth unemployment the 
decline in teens’ fertility rate is more than -0.3% both in the US and in South Europe (see Figure A1.3 
in Appendix 1 for youth unemployment in Europe). 
The difference between the two geographic areas concerns older women: while in the US women in 
their thirties and forties did not seem to be much affected by rising unemployment, that was not the 
case in southern Europe, where a 1% increase in unemployment rate still reduces fertility at 35-39 and 
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Figure 2.15: Effect of recession indicators on Age-Specific Fertility Rates in the US. 
 
Source: elaboration of the author based on data from Eurostat, ECB, Bank of England, OECD and Federal Reserve 
Economic Data (St. Louis FED), US National Vital Statistics and US Treasury. EPU index by Beker et al. (2012). 
 
 
Fertility rates (at any women’s age) in western European countries were the least affected by 
unemployment rates, while both in the Nordic countries and in the Central-European countries we do 
see a negative effect of unemployment on fertility rates. In particular, teenagers’ fertility rates reacted 
substantially negatively in both country clusters (elasticity close to southern Europe at -0.2%) but also 
20- and 30-year-old women reacted to rising difficulties in the job market by reducing fertility in both 
regions. In contrast, I don’t find any effect in northern Europe for women ages 40-44. 
The EPU Index is available only for the US (Fig. 2.15), for Italy and Spain in southern Europe and 
Germany, France, UK and the Netherlands in Western Europe (Fig. 2.17). Once more the effect on 
age-specific fertility rates is similar in the US to the effect found in Italy and Spain, excepting the 40-
44 year-old women. At younger ages the elasticity of fertility rates to a 1% point increase in the 
uncertainty index is around -0.2% for less than 25 year-old women and around -0.05/-0.075% for 
women between 25 and 40 years of age. The elasticity of 40-44 years olds’ fertility is not significantly 
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Figure 2.16: Unemployment rate effect on Age-Specific Fertility Rates. Europe. 
 
Source: elaboration of the author based on data from Eurostat, ECB, Bank of England, OECD and Federal Reserve Economic Data (St. Louis FED), 
US National Vital Statistics and US Treasury. EPU index by Beker et al. (2012). 
Country clusters: Western Europe (Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Ireland, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Switzerland, UK); Central-Eastern Europe 
(Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia); Northern Europe (Denmark, Finland, 
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Figure 2.17: EPU index effect on Age-Specific Fertility Rates. Europe. 
 
Source: elaboration of the author based on data from Eurostat and EPU index by Beker et al. (2012). 
Country clusters: Western Europe (France, Germany, and the Netherlands) and Southern Europe (Italy and Spain). 
 
Figure 2.18: Long-term governments bond yields effect on Age-Specific Fertility Rates. Europe. 
 
Source: elaboration of the author based on data from Eurostat, ECB, Bank of England, OECD and Federal Reserve Economic Data (St. Louis 
FED), US National Vital Statistics and US Treasury. EPU index by Beker et al. (2012). 
Country clusters: Western Europe (Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Ireland, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Switzerland, UK); Central-
Eastern Europe (Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia); Northern 
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Figure 2.18 illustrates the elasticity of age-specific fertility rates to sovereign bond yields by 
European country cluster. The long-term bond yields’ effect on fertility rates for the US is not shown 
because they do not have the same financially informative role on the American economy70.  
The only country group where I do find a negative effect of the rising cost of public debt is southern 
Europe, where the Great Recession actually materialized as a sovereign debt crisis. Considering only 
the countries in this cluster, the increase between 2007 and 2011 in long-term bond yields was of more 
than 75% (the average sovereign bond yield was 4.49% in 2007 while it was 7.86% in 2011; see Fig. 
2.4), a surge similar to that seen in unemployment rates. The negative elasticity is again stronger for 
the fertility rates of younger women, moderate among 30 year-old women and almost null for women 
40+. The magnitude of the effect resembles that of the policy uncertainty index (EPU) and confirms 
that the two indicators convey a different effect of the Great Recession compared to unemployment, 
one more linked to the perception of economic uncertainty than to the more objective economic 
conditions of which unemployment is an excellent measure.  
 
  
Table 2.1 concludes this first part of the analysis of the effect of the Great Recession on 
fertility rates by merging the results obtained separately with each indicator of the crisis (Models 1-4 
show the results illustrated graphically in Figure 2.11). Country and country year fixed effect are 
reported in Table A1.1 in Appendix 1. 
Model 5 combines all four measures I used to describe the different components of the crisis that 
might have had an impact on TFR in advanced economies: on the one hand, unemployment rates, 
conveying the deterioration of the objective conditions of the economy, and on the other hand, 
sovereign debt cost and an index of policy uncertainty, conveying the perception of economic 
insecurity and the ‘fear’ accompanying the Great Recession. 
The results show, first, that the negative effect of rising unemployment rate on TFR is only partially 
reduced by the effect of economic uncertainty on TFR. Controlling for the level of uncertainty, a one- 
percentage point increase in unemployment rates reduced the TFR by 0.06%, a one-third reduction 
compared to the total effect of unemployment that was of -0.09% (Model 1). The effect of a rise in the 
economic policy index (EPU) is halved when we consider it together with unemployment and 
sovereign debt cost, reduced to a -0.02% in fertility for a percentage-point increase in the index71.  
Importantly, the R-squared is very high in all the model specifications (also due to the country and 
year fixed effects, and the country linear time trend controls, figured into this) but it increases to more 
than 0.99 in the model in which all the explanatory variables are added together. This is an indication 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
70	  First,	   they	  are	  usually	  countercyclical	  due	  to	   the	  role	  of	   the	  dollar	  as	  a	  safe	  currency	  during	  economic	  and	   financial	  crisis	  and	  second	  because	  the	  
Federal	  Reserve	  more	  aggressively	  uses	  unconventional	  monetary	  policy	  measures	   to	  keep	   sovereign	  debt	   interest	   rates	   low	   (IMF	  World	  Economic	  
Outlook	  2012).	  
71	  Controlling	  for	  unemployment	  and	  the	  EPU	  index,	  government	  bond	  yields	  increase	  is	  actually	  a	  good	  thing	  for	  fertility	  rates	  and	  a	  1%	  increase	  in	  the	  
yield	  implies	  an	  increase	  in	  TFR	  of	  0.04%.	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that I am explaining a very large time variation in TFR in the sample that combines these independent 
variables. 
All in all, the negative effect of the objective economic conditions on fertility rates still seems  
predominant in this first analysis compared to the effect of indicators of the perception of the 
recession, with rising unemployment rates (and youth unemployment behaving very similarly) 
responsible for roughly a 0.05 point decline in TFR (-3%).  
 
 
Table 2.1: The Great Recession indicators effect on Total Fertility Rate in Europe and the US (2003-2013). 
Country and Country-year Fixed effect models. 
 
Model Model Model Model Model 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Unemployment rate -0.087*** 
   
-0.064*** 
 
(-0.106 - -0.068) 
   
(-0.090 - -0.038) 
Youth Unemployment Rate 
 
-0.086*** 
   
  
(-0.108 - -0.065) 
   





   
(-0.014 - 0.034) 
 
(0.010 - 0.076) 
EPU Index (annual average) 
   
-0.043*** -0.021*** 
    
(-0.060 - -0.026) (-0.036 - -0.006) 
Year 0.003** 0.005*** 0.004*** -0.009*** -0.004** 
 
(0.000 - 0.006) (0.001 - 0.008) (0.001 - 0.006) (-0.012 - -0.005) (-0.006 - -0.001) 
Country FE YES YES YES YES YES 
Country*Year FE YES YES YES YES YES 
Constant -5.447** -8.949** -7.153*** -36.714*** -10.309** 
 
(-10.893 - -0.002) (-15.945 - -1.954) (-11.756 - -2.551) (-49.315 - -24.114) (-19.675 - -0.943) 
N 352 343 318 76 76 
R-squared 0.967 0.965 0.965 0.989 0.993 
Source: elaboration of the author based on data from Eurostat, ECB, Bank of England, OECD and Federal Reserve Economic Data (St. Louis 
FED), US National Vital Statistics and US Treasury. EPU index by Beker et al. (2012). 
Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1Robust ci in parentheses. All variables are log-transformed and the independent variables are lagged one year.  
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6. The decline in birth rates following monthly fluctuations in unemployment, 









In this second part of the analysis I exploit the availability of monthly birth data and monthly 
fluctuations in those economic indicators to get a more precise view of the relationship between 
fertility and the variation in economic conditions. As in Section 5, I also investigate the geographical 
variety in the economy-fertility correlation, but add here a special focus on southern European 
countries that were especially hit during the sovereign debt crisis after 201072.  
Besides the monthly variation in both dependent and independent variables, the difference between the 
analyses in the previous section is that first, youth unemployment is not included as an explanatory 
variable since the annual analysis yielded almost identical analyses between general and youth 
unemployment. Second, together with monthly long-term (10yr) government bond yields, an absolute 
measure of financial and economic uncertainty, I am now including the monthly national sovereign 
spread, a measure of relative instability of the national economies during the recession. 
The term spread, defined as the difference between risky countries’ long-term (10-year) bond yield 
and that of the safe ones – namely, Germans – has come into ordinary use in the media and public 
debate in Europe at the beginning of the crisis, hence becoming a source of information for the general 
public as well (see Sections 2.2-2.3 for more details).  
It is useful then to look at how fertility reacted to variations in the spread, an increase of which 
represents a rise in economic uncertainty for the business community but also for households that not 
only might have invested a part of their savings in government bonds, but might also associate 
sovereign volatility with state financial distress, seeing the spread as a barometer of the economic 
condition of the country. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
72	  The	  initial	  increase	  in	  the	  spread	  between	  the	  long-­‐term	  interest	  rates	  in	  Italy	  and	  Germany	  is	  to	  be	  dated	  to	  September	  2011	  when	  a	  third	  version	  of	  
the	  so-­‐called	  ‘Manovra	  bis’	  containing	  austerity	  measures	  was	  approved	  by	  the	  Parliament,	  while	  Mario	  Draghi	  announced	  that	  Italy	  was	  running	  a	  high	  
risk	   and	   the	   BCE	   could	   not	   guarantee	   that	   it	   keep	   buying	   Italian	   government	   bonds.	   The	   situation	   escalated	   in	  November	   2011	  when	  Berlusconi’s	  
government	  was	  forced	  to	  resign,	   largely	  because	  of	  the	  extremely	  negative	  perception	  of	  his	  government	  on	  the	  international	  markets.	  The	  10-­‐year	  
yield	  peaked	  at	  that	  time	  at	  7.06%,	  and	  gradually	  declined	  afterwards	  to	  around	  2.6%	  in	  February	  2013,	  even	  if	  the	  political	  elections	  results	  of	  the	  end	  
of	  the	  month	  created	  instability	  on	  the	  markets,	  making	  the	  spread	  with	   the	  German	  bond	  yield	  fluctuating	  quite	  a	   lot	  (after	  being	  steady	  around	  4-­‐
4.5%,	  it	  was	  at	  3.2%	  in	  April	  2014,	  and	  slightly	  above	  2	  today).	  	  
In	  autumn	  2012	  “Spain	  replaced	  Greece,	  Ireland	  and	  Portugal	  as	  the	  main	  focus	  in	  the	  euro	  zone	  debt	  crisis	  after	  its	  crippled	  banks,	  highly-­‐indebted	  
regions,	  a	  second	  recession	  in	  three	  years	  and	  soaring	  debt	  unnerved	  investors”,	  as	  Reuters	  reported	  in	  October.	  The	  country's	  borrowing	  costs	  had	  
reached	   levels	  deemed	  unsustainable	   in	   the	   long	   run,	   that	  peaked	   in	   July	  2012	  at	  6.8%	  after	  Madrid	   received	   a	  €100	  billion	   aid	   from	   its	  Eurozone	  
counterparts	   in	   June	   to	   support	   its	   financial	   sector.	  Regarding	   the	   first	  months	  of	  2013,	   the	  yield	  was	  around	  3.6%	  (March	  2013),	  even	   if	   the	  party	  
funding	   scandal	   involving	  Prime	  Minister	  Rajoy,	   and	   the	   revival	  of	   the	  Catalan	   secessionist	  debate,	  had	   induced	   fluctuations	   in	   the	   interest	   rate	   the	  
previous	  month.	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The dependent variable is now the General Fertility Rate (GFR), which is the number of 
monthly live births divided by the number of women 15-44 years old (multiplied by 1000)73. 
Again I have 31 European countries for which Eurostat publishes monthly fertility, employment and 
public finances data, plus the US. As before, the EPU index is only available for the US and six 
European countries. All independent variables are lagged 9 months and all variables are log-
transformed. 
In all models I included a linear yearly time trend, a country fixed effect and a monthly fixed effect to 
capture the seasonality in births. Since this seasonality in births varies strongly across countries I 
included in all models an interaction between country and month. The estimates of the interaction 





	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
73	  This	  is	  a	  more	  accurate	  measure	  compared	  to	  birthrates,	  the	  number	  of	  monthly	  live	  births	  divided	  by	  the	  number	  of	  all	  women	  (any	  age).	  





Table 2.2 shows the country-months fixed effects models of the impact of the financial and 
economic indicators on monthly birth rates (for the complete estimates see Table A1.2 in Appendix 1). 
The point estimate in Model 1 shows that results are very similar to those obtained with yearly data: 
for an increase of 1% in unemployment rate (lagged 9 months), the birth rate per 1000 women 15-44 
decreases by 0.085% (it was 0.087% in the annual analysis). In non-log transformed form (not shown) 
this translates into a drop in the GFR per 1000 women 15-44 of 0.42, for every percentage point 
increase in unemployment rate. In a similar analysis, but for the US alone and based on annual 
estimates, Schneider (2015) finds a similar effect of unemployment rate on the general fertility rate of 
-0.60 births per women 15-45. 
For an average increase in unemployment of 4% this means a reduction in GFR of 1.68 births per 
1000 women 15-44. Since between 2008 and 2013 the GFR went from 55.1 births to 52.6 births (see 
Fig. A1.3 in Appendix 1), out of this total decline of 2.5 births per 1000 women 15-44, the rise in 
unemployment seems responsible for a 70% (1.68/2.5) of it.  
Models 2 and 3 present the estimate for long-term government bond yields, and the derived spread 
between national bond yields and the secure German bonds. As already seen in the yearly analysis, the 
negative effect of the Great Recession channeled by the debt crisis was concentrated in southern 
European countries, and this is probably why in Models 2-3 we get a very small effect on births of the 
increasing cost of public debt. This will be clearer later on when I repeat the analysis by country and 
country clusters. 
Model 4 looks at the effect of the EPU index (only for the available countries): for a 1% increase in 
the EPU index birth rate per 1000 women 15-44 decreases of 0.01% (it was 0.043% in the annual 
analysis). The difference with the annual setting estimate for the EPU index (for instance compared to 
unemployment for which the point elasticity are very similar in the two model specifications) is due to 
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Table 2.2: Elasticity of monthly fertility rates to macroeconomic indicators of the Great Recession.  
31 European countries plus the US. OLS with country and month fixed effects (2003-2013). 
 
Model Model Model Model 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Unemployment rate 
-0.085***   
 (-0.092 - -0.077)   
10y Govt Bond Yields 
 -0.008*   
 (-0.017 - 0.000)   
Spread in Bond Yields 
  -0.006***  
  (-0.009 - -0.004)  
EPU index 
 
  -0.011*** 
 
  (-0.018 - -0.004) 
Year 0.007*** 0.004*** 0.005*** 0.003*** 
 (0.006 - 0.008) (0.003 - 0.005) (0.004 - 0.007) (0.001 - 0.004) 
Country FE YES YES YES YES 
Month FE YES YES YES YES 
Country*Month YES YES YES YES 
Constant -10.400*** -4.594*** -7.221*** -1.168 
 (-12.039 - -8.761) (-6.286 - -2.902) (-9.612 - -4.831) (-3.504 - 1.168) 
N 4,181 4,004 3,503 898 
R-squared 0.857 0.841 0.830 0.945 
Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Robust CI in parentheses. In Model 2 the fertility and the unemployment rates are not logged.  
Source: elaboration of the author based on data from Eurostat, ECB, Bank of England, OECD and Federal Reserve Economic Data (St. Louis FED), US 
National Vital Statistics and US Treasury. EPU index by Beker et al. (2012). 
Country clusters: Western Europe (Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Ireland, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Switzerland, UK); Central-Eastern Europe 
(Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia); Northern Europe (Denmakr, Finland, 





The latter findings illustrate the average negative effect of the Great Recession on GFR, but 
within European countries there is a large variation that is worthwhile exploring also at this month-
level analysis. Figure 2.19 illustrates the difference in elasticity of fertility to unemployment and 
interests on public debt, across European country clusters and for the US. The largest negative effect 
of rising unemployment rates was registered in southern European countries, where the estimate is 
very similar to that of the US, at around -0.12. For every percentage point increase in unemployment 
rates, the GFR declined by 0.12%, a rough 30% more negative effect compared to the country average 
effect of -0.085%. 
Western European fertility rates seem barely affected by unemployment rates, while in Northern 
European and Central-eastern European countries the elasticity is between -0.05% and -0.1%. 
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Figure 2.19: Elasticity of fertility rate to unemployment rate and long-term government bond 
yields by European country clusters and the US. Country and month fixed effects (2003-2013). 
 
Source: elaboration of the author based on data from Eurostat, ECB, Bank of England, OECD and Federal Reserve Economic Data (St. Louis FED), 
US National Vital Statistics and US Treasury. EPU index by Beker et al. (2012). 
Country clusters: Western Europe (Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Ireland, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Switzerland, UK); Central-Eastern Europe 
(Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia); Northern Europe (Denmark, Finland, 





As also shown in the analysis by years in the previous section, the negative effect of the 
increase in long-term interest rates on public debt on fertility rates, is present only in southern 
European countries, where the sovereign debt crisis actually hit harder (see Fig. 2.18 and 2.19). The 
right panel of Figure 2.19 indicates that a one-percentage point increase in 10-year bond yields is 
associated with a decline in GFR of around 0.07% in those countries, which is comparable in 
magnitude to the effect of unemployment rates in the entire sample. For the Nordic countries and in 
the US we find an effect of the same magnitude, but positive. There is basically no relationship 
between sovereign bond yields and fertility in western and central-eastern European countries. 
Figure 2.20 illustrates the elasticity of the GFR to the relative measure of sovereign financial 
uncertainty, namely the spread between southern European countries’ bond yields and the Germans’ 
(for the similar plot for 10y Govt. bond yields see Figure A1.5 in Appendix 1). The graph depicts the 
effects by country to give a more detailed picture of the heterogeneity of the relationship between the 
crisis and fertility rates. While there is no significant effect of a rise in the spread on the GFR in Malta 
and Portugal, I do find a negative correlation in Cyprus, Greece, Italy and Spain. Even though the 
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around -0.05% in Greece to -0.01% in Cyprus, the potential total effect on fertility is not that much 
smaller, given that in those countries the spread increased much more than unemployment. The Greek 
sovereign risk, for instance, grew so large that the monthly spread with the German bond yields 
multiplied 27 times between 2009 and 2012. The elasticity of -0.05 of GFR to a percentage point 
increase in the Greek spread translates to a decline of -0.40 births per 1000 women 15-44 for every 
point increase in the spread. For 27 points increase in the Greek spread the GFR declined of around 11 
births per 1000 women 15-44. For the sake of comparison, the unemployment rate in Greece grew 
fourfold in the observed period (from around 7% to 28%) and at the estimated elasticity of the GFR to 
the unemployment rate in Greece is of -0.21% (not shown) for every percentage point increase in 
unemployment. In non log-transformed correlations, for every percentage point increase in 
unemployment the GFR declined in Greece of -0.64 births per 1000 women, which gives a total effect 
of -2.6 births per 1000 women 15-44 (-0.64x4) due to rising unemployment. Greece is certainly a 
specific case, but these estimates suggest that the impact of the sovereign debt crisis is more than 
comparable in magnitude to the negative effect of structural job market conditions in southern 
European countries. 
 
Figure 2.20: Elasticity of fertility rate to the spread of government bond yields to German bonds in 
Southern European countries. Country and month fixed effects (2003-2013). 
 
Source: elaboration of the author based on data from Eurostat, ECB, Bank of England, OECD and Federal Reserve Economic Data (St. Louis FED), 














Cyprus Greece Italy Malta Portugal Spain
Elasticity of Fertility Rate to Spread to German Bonds in Southern European countries
	   75	  
 
Figure 2.21 shows the detailed results of the analysis on the EPU Index by country. The 
elasticity of the GFR to the economic policy uncertainty index is again negative in southern European 
countries and in the US and basically zero in continental Europe and UK. In Italy and Spain a 1% 
increase in the EPU Index is associated to a 0.03/0.04% drop in GFR while in the US the effect is the 
double, around -0.075%.  
 
Figure 2.21: Elasticity of fertility rate to the EPU Index by country. Country and month fixed 
effects (2003-2013). 
 




Tables 2.3-2.4 conclude the analysis, as I did in the previous section, with the models 
combining all the indicators (for the complete models with fixed effect see Tables A1.3-A1.4 in 
Appendix 1). The models in Table 2.3 include the sample of countries for which the EPU Index is 
available (France, Germany, Netherlands, UK, Spain, Italy and the US), while models in Table 2.4 
include only the southern European countries (Cyprus, Greece, Italy, Spain, Malta and Portugal). The 
objective is to show how all the indicators behave together in explaining the monthly variation in the 
GFR. Model 1 in Table 2.3 shows that the effect of unemployment rates on the GFR in these countries 
persists even taking into account the level of economic policy uncertainty, and the magnitude of the 
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The reverse is not true: once I control for unemployment, the effect of the EPU index on fertility 
disappears (becomes positive and not statistically different from zero). Once also long-term 
government bond yields is added (Model 2) – taking out the US of the sample because, as mentioned, 
sovereign bonds cannot be equated to the European ones as a public financial sustainability measure – 
the effect of unemployment declines a bit but remains negative and significant statistically and in 
magnitude. The point estimate of economic policy uncertainty remains small and not statistically 
different from zero while a sovereign bond yield increase is associated with a decline in GFR, even 
though the effect is not statistically significant (-0.011).  
Model 3 in Table 2.3 substitutes government bond yields with their spread to the German bonds. 
Results only slightly change: the negative effect of unemployment rate and both the point estimates of 
the EPU index and the spread remain unchanged, even though the latter are here statistically different 
from zero74. 
Focusing on southern European countries only (Table 2.4) also shows that long-term government bond 
yields still have a negative impact on fertility after controlling for the objective conditions of the labor 
market (the elasticity is -0.026% in Model 1) while their value relative to the German bonds does not75 
(Model 2). Results further show that the effect of unemployment rates on fertility is larger than in the 
complete sample, a 1% increase in unemployment reduces the GFR by around 0.11-0.13%, even 
controlling for sovereign debt risk.  
For the sake of completeness, Models 3-4 show the estimates when we restrict the analysis to the years 
of the sovereign debt crisis (and afterwards) in southern European countries. Here we witness a 
decline in the elasticity of fertility to unemployment and an increase in the importance of financial 
uncertainty measures. The monthly GFR reacts negatively to rising sovereign risk, similarly, as 
expected, if we look at bond yields or their spread to the Germans. The elasticity of the birth rate is 
around -0.02/0.04 for each percentage point increase in public interest rates after 2010. 
 
It is difficult to interpret the magnitude of these estimates in a more substantive way because 
of the complexity of the models, with country, month and country-month fixed effects. Moreover, the 
sample of countries for which the EPU index is available is very heterogeneous, which complicates 
the comparison to the group of southern European countries. However, to sum up, controlling for 
country, time trends, and fertility seasonality we can say that: first, the effect of unemployment on 
birth rates is very persistent and robust in magnitude across models; second, that the perception of 
uncertainty also negatively influences fertility rates but that, third, the elasticity of fertility to the 
objective conditions of the job market is larger compared to the perceived financial and economic 
climate, at least in the way I measured the latter here. The elasticity of the GFR to unemployment rate 
is, in fact, generally five-to-eight times larger (depending on the model specification) to that of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
74	  Results	  are	  robust	  to	  the	  exclusion	  of	  Germany	  from	  the	  sample.	  
75	  This	  is	  also	  evident	  comparing	  the	  two	  plots	  of	  the	  elasticity	  of	  fertility	  to	  the	  spread	  versus	  government	  bonds	  by	  countries	  (respectively	  in	  Fig.	  2.20	  
and	  Fig.	  A1.5	  in	  Appendix	  1)	  where	  the	  latter	  is	  much	  larger.	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sovereign risk and economic policy uncertainty. This does not mean that that the total effect on 
fertility rates of the two is not similar, given the different range of variations of each variable in the 
period 2003-2014, as explained earlier in this section. 
 




Model Model Model 
 
(1) (2) (3) 
Unemployment rate -0.085*** -0.071*** -0.062*** 
 
(-0.096 - -0.074) (-0.082 - -0.060) (-0.076 - -0.048) 
EPU index 0.005 0.005 0.006* 
 
(-0.002 - 0.012) (-0.002 - 0.012) (-0.001 - 0.014) 





(-0.023 - 0.002) 
 
Spread in Bond Yields 
  
-0.011*** 
   
(-0.014 - -0.009) 
Year 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.008*** 
 
(0.003 - 0.005) (0.003 - 0.006) (0.006 - 0.009) 
Country FE YES YES YES 
Month FE YES YES YES 
Country*Month YES YES YES 
Constant -4.163*** -4.605*** -11.032*** 
 
(-6.345 - -1.980) (-6.946 - -2.264) (-14.210 - -7.855) 
N 898 775 636 
R-squared 0.959 0.954 0.944 
Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Robust CI in parentheses. 
Source: elaboration of the author based on data from Eurostat, ECB, Bank of England, OECD and Federal Reserve Economic Data (St. Louis FED), US National 
Vital Statistics and US Treasury. EPU index by Beker et al. (2012). 
 
 
Table 2.4: Elasticity of monthly fertility rates to macroeconomic indicators. Complete models on Southern 
European countries. 
 Southern sample 
 Entire period 2003-2014 After 2010 
 Model Model Model Model 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Unemployment rate -0.110*** -0.125*** -0.069*** -0.082*** 
 (-0.127 - -0.092) (-0.144 - -0.106) (-0.116 - -0.021) (-0.127 - -0.036) 
10y Govt Bond Yields -0.026*** 
 
-0.038***  
 (-0.038 - -0.014) 
 
(-0.056 - -0.019)  
Spread in Bond Yields 
 
0.001  -0.020*** 
 
 
(-0.004 - 0.006)  (-0.031 - -0.009) 
Year 0.004*** 0.004*** -0.013*** -0.007 
 (0.002 - 0.006) (0.001 - 0.006) (-0.021 - -0.004) (-0.016 - 0.002) 
Country FE YES YES YES  
Month FE YES YES YES  
Country*Month YES YES YES  
Constant -4.178* -3.319 29.869*** 18.046** 
 (-8.480 - 0.123) (-8.541 - 1.903) (12.737 - 47.001) (0.515 - 35.578) 
N 782 777 332 332 
R-squared 0.674 0.670 0.727 0.726 
 Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Robust CI in parentheses. 
Source: elaboration of the author based on data from Eurostat, ECB, Bank of England, OECD and Federal Reserve Economic Data (St. Louis FED), US National 
Vital Statistics and US Treasury. EPU index by Beker et al. (2012). 
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This first empirical chapter describes the recent macro trends in fertility rates in the United 
States (US) and in Europe and argues for a relationship between the substantial and diffused decline in 
fertility and the financial and economic crisis that has plagued western countries in the last years five-
to-eight years.  
The Great Recession, as described in Section 2 of this chapter, hit Europe a bit later and for longer 
than the US, but it has been equally strong on both sides of the Atlantic. The financial roots of the 
crisis were the same and the consequences for the real economy have been dramatic. 
The banking sector, in dramatic shortage of liquidity, stopped giving credit to individuals and firms, 
and to grant mortgages. As a consequence firms, who couldn’t borrow money from banks, were not 
able to grow, invest and hire. Internal and external demand plummeted and firms found themselves 
with large amounts of unsold stock. Having to reduce production to compensate for the lower demand, 
non-closing firms had to lay off some, and sometimes many, of their employees and unemployment 
quickly reached unprecedented levels, especially among young adults with less experience on the 
labor market. The housing market collapsed and house-owners saw house prices dropping sharply 
together with the values of their properties.  
The Great Recession hit households at the very heart of their finances. Meanwhile governments, in 
sustaining the financial sector and the real economy, had to inject money into the banking system and 
in social security cushions, forcing their debt to grow so much that, as a spiral, the financial markets 
doubted that they could ever repay it. Interest rates on European sovereign debt skyrocketed, leaving 
room for a speculative attack on the weaker countries like Greece, Spain, Ireland and Italy. 
 
This has been the longest and strongest recession since the Great Depression of the thirties and 
it is hard to deny that economic shocks of this dimension do not impact on family dynamics.  
In fact, of the 36 countries (see Figure 2.8 in Section 3 of this chapter) for which Eurostat publishes 
updated data - plus the US - 23 registered a decline in fertility between 2008 and 2012, six registered 
no change and in only seven of them the TFR increased. The 28 European countries had on average a 
total fertility rate in 2013 of 0.06 children, which is lower than in 2008.  
These are substantial declines, especially in light of the fact that they happened after a period, at the 
beginning of the century, of recuperation of births, common to most western countries, and it is 
difficult to attribute them to a general declining trend in fertility and not the economic downturn that 
hit those same countries. Moreover, analyzing macro data in detail, as done in this chapter, the 
negative correlation between economic shocks, whether they are measured with annual or monthly 
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variation, using objective economic conditions or indicators of economic uncertainty, and fertility 
measures, Total or General Fertility Rate, is evident. 
 
All in all, the findings of the analyses suggest that the largest negative effect on fertility rates 
is due to the deterioration of labor market structure. The sharp increase in unemployment (general and 
youth) rates characterizing the recession reduced the Total Fertility Rate on average in the 32 
advanced economies of 0.05 births, a 3% decline since the beginning of the crisis. Moreover, the total 
average increase in the unemployment rate in Europe and in the US (around 4%) explains the 70% of 
the reductions in the general fertility rate that dropped from 55.1 births in 2008 per 1000 women 15-
44, to 52.6 births in 2013. This result is very similar to those of analogous studies conducted in the US 
(Morgan 2011a, 2011a; Schneider 2015). 
At the aggregate level, the largest negative effect of the crisis on fertility rates was registered among 
very young women, 15-24 years old, while the effect was mild for women older than 40. This is 
especially true for first births, while older women were more likely to renounce to their second child 
because of the crisis, compared to their younger counterparts. 
In a cross-country comparison, rising unemployment rates had a much stronger negative impact on 
fertility rates in southern European countries and in the US, compared to the other regions in Europe. 
For every percentage point increase in unemployment rates, the GFR declined in the US and southern 
Europe by 0.12%, a rough 30% more negative effect compared to the entire sample average effect of -
0.085%. 
It is more complicated to identify accurate indicators of how economic insecurity is perceived beyond 
the objective characteristics of the economy, and I cannot be sure that I picked the best ones. I selected 
the EPU Index because it is comparable across different countries and includes together with policy 
uncertainty by experts also measures of media coverage of this uncertainty, which is usually one of the 
best barometers of how private individuals perceive the economic climate and future development. I 
also selected indicators of the sovereign debt risk as the latter became a distinctive feature of the last 
phase of the Great Recession in Europe. 
The elasticity of fertility rates to these uncertainty indicators is milder compared to unemployment but 
still negative and significant in most model specifications. The R-squared, being in most cases over 
0.90, also confirms that the explanatory variables selected accurately explained the changes over time 
of TFR and GFR in western countries in the period analyzed. However, as said, compared to the 
measure of the perceived economic and financial uncertainty the fertility elasticity to unemployment is 
larger, more persistent over time and robust across models. In fact, in the complete sample, the 
elasticity of the GFR to unemployment is five-to-eight times larger than that of the sovereign bond 
risk and the EPU index. Moreover, the relationship between the latter and fertility disappears once we 
add unemployment, public debt risk and the period effect of the Great Recession to the model. 
Nevertheless, the negative effect on the GFR of the sovereign debt risk in southern European countries 
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during the sovereign debt crisis is comparable to the effect of unemployment in the entire sample. The 
geographic specificity of the public debt crisis and the particular calibration of the EPU Index on the 
American case, are probably the reason why we do find a substantial effect of those explanatory 
variables only in specific countries. 
 
Despite the timing of the fertility drop and its correlation to macroeconomic indicators are 
widely consistent with the argument that this severe economic downturn caused a renunciation – or at 
least a postponement – of childbearing, it is not possible to conclude only after these descriptive 
analyses that a causal link exists. I have been using the term ‘effect’ throughout the chapter for the 
sake of simplicity and because this is customary in the literature, but this does not mean that these 
estimates can be interpreted as purely causal76. Moreover, these findings do not reveal which 
mechanisms underlie the relationship between economic downturns and fertility behavior. The 
purpose of the next chapters is to fill these gaps in the preliminary findings of Chapter II, by first 
modeling some of the mechanisms at play - at the individual level – and, second, by determining 
whether there is a causal effect of the Great Recession on childbearing. 
The next chapters will focus on the American experience and on the extensive margin of childbearing, 
namely having a baby or remaining childless. Using different research designs, datasets and 
quantitative methods, the investigation will focus on childless women, or childless couples, and the 
consequences that the economic crisis might entail for their decision to have, or not have, their first 
child. 
In particular, the following Chapter III addresses the mechanisms of transmission of economic 
insecurity from the labor market domain to the family domain, and precisely to the transition to the 
first births. Using a panel fixed effects model on the Panel Survey of Income Dynamics (PSID) 
dataset, the analysis focuses on childless couples and their probability of entering into parenthood, 
conditional on the couple’s employment combination and on the aggregate conditions of the US state 
in which they reside. The chapter further tests the existence of an interaction effect between couple-




	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
76	  For	  a	  more	  precise	  discussion	  of	  the	  topic	  of	  correlation	  versus	  causation	  see	  Chapter	  V	  where	  a	  more	  design-­‐based	  study	  is	  applied	  to	  go	  into	  the	  
direction	  of	  getting	  a	  causal	  estimate	  of	  the	  effect	  of	  the	  recession	  on	  childbearing.	  In	  the	  theoretical	  section	  of	  the	  same	  chapter	  the	  reader	  can	  find	  a	  
detailed	  illustration	  of	  the	  debate	  on	  the	  issue.	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CHAPTER III 
 
THE INTERPLAY OF INDIVIDUAL AND AGGREGATE 











As illustrated in Chapter II the recent economic downturn has been, from many viewpoints, 
the most severe one experienced by the advanced economies since the Great Depression of the 
Thirties.  
According to the Business Cycle Dating Committee of the US National Bureau of Economic Research 
(NBER), the Great Recession in the US lasted 18 months (December 2007 - June 2009), making it the 
longest of any recession since World War II. 
In seventeen months, between June 2007 and November 2008, US citizens “lost more than a quarter of 
their collective net worth”, and by the end of 2008 the value of savings, investments and pensions 
suffered dramatic losses (SEC)77. US demand contracted for five consecutive quarters at the record 
negative pace of -2.6% per quarter; the housing market was hit by a large drop in house prices (-20% 
by the end of 2008 since their peak in 2006) and by a boost in the rate of defaults and foreclosures (the 
total number of home foreclosures in 2008/2011 was of 14.1 million compared to the 3.2 million of 
the years 2004/200778), with ownership rates consequently falling from 69% in 2004 to 66.4% in 
201179 together with the number of new privately owned housing units authorized, which dropped 
from more than 2 million in 2005 to 600 thousand in 2010.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
77http://www.sec.gov/about/secstratplan1015.pdf	  and	  the	  updates	  at	  http://www.sec.gov/about/sec-­‐strategic-­‐plan-­‐2014-­‐2018.pdf	  	  
78	  RealtyTrac,	  Federal	  Reserve,	  Equifax	  through	  http://www.statisticbrain.com/home-­‐foreclosure-­‐statistics/.	  
79	  Current	  Population	  Survey	  –	  Housing	  Vacancies	  and	  Homeownership.	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D'Ambrosio and Rohde (2014) estimated the distribution of economic insecurity80 in the last 15 years 
in the US. They found that the decline in economic security during the Great Recession was 
substantial and it was characterized by a sharp negative translation of the distribution. In other words, 
the financially insecure individuals that before the crisis were located around the mean of the 
distribution, moved towards more insecure positions, while the proportion of highly secure individuals 
did not change during the crisis. Financial shocks of these dimensions shook the economic foundations 
of American households and they likely affected family dynamics and fertility decisions (Harknett and 
Schneider 2012).  
 
In Chapter II of this thesis, I show that birth rates sharply declined in all advanced economies 
after the onset of the Great Recession. Moreover, the findings of Chapter II illustrate that at the 
aggregate level there is a negative correlation between macroeconomic indicators of the crisis both in 
Europe and in the US. Births are negatively associated with increasing unemployment rates but also 
with an increase in economic and financial uncertainty. 
For most couples, having a child and the long-term commitment associated with parenthood is linked 
to economic and employment security. Especially after the emergence of the economic crisis, scholars 
agree that economic and labor market uncertainties are important factors explaining the postponement 
of family formation in contemporary society (Mills and Blossfeld 2005; Sobotka et al 2011; Goldstein 
et al. 2013; Kreyenfeld and Andersson 2014). However, evidence on the micro-level relationship is 
still far from conclusive. 
Advancing the argument of Chapter II, the aim of Chapter III is to investigate at the micro-level how 
different aspects of economic insecurity combine and affected fertility choices during the Great 
Recession, focusing in particular on the transition to the first child. 
 
The term transition is a key concept in life-course theories (parallel and complementary to the 
concept of trajectory81). The latter address how historical context and structural institutions (cultural, 
social, economic, etc.) affect life stages and how early events influence future life decisions and paths. 
Within this theoretical framework, a transition represents a discrete life change that brings about a 
drastic change in the role or status of a person; it is usually socially organized and, especially in the 
past, socially ordered (Roy et al., 2014). Examples of transitions extensively studied within the life- 
course perspective are those from education to the labor market, the transition to adulthood (e.g. 
moving out of the parental home) or the transition to parenthood (Kohli 2007). The theoretical 
framework of life-course research motivated, and clearly also benefited from, the collection of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
80	  Economic	   insecurity	   is	  measured	  as	   the	  composite	  of	  current	  wealth	  and	   the	  changes	   in	  wealth	  experienced	   in	   the	  recent	  past.	   In	   the	  article	   they	  
compare	  insecurity	  in	  the	  US	  and	  Italy.	  
81	  The	  concept	  of	  trajectory	  emphasizes	  the	  idea,	  crucial	  to	  life-­‐course	  theory,	  that	  events	  do	  not	  happen	  in	  isolation	  (Aisenbrey	  and	  Fasang	  2010).	  Life-­‐	  
course	  trajectories	  are	  sequences	  of	  events	  and	  transitions,	  and	  are	  usually	  analyzed	  using	  the	  method	  of	  sequence	  analysis.	  Event	  history	  analysis	  is	  
instead	  the	  principal	  method	  used	  by	  sociologists	  and	  demographers	  to	  analyze	  transitions	  and	  durations	  of	  events	  in	  the	  life	  course.	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longitudinal data and the methodological development of longitudinal analysis (i.e. panel data 
analysis, event history analysis and sequence analysis). 
The transition to the first child is one of the major life-course events. The role change implied by 
becoming parents is huge as are the associated responsibilities. Moreover, the age at which the 
transition occurs is determinant insofar as completed fertility depends on the timing of first birth. The 
process of postponement of parenthood of the last decades is well known and extremely well 
documented in the literature (Abma and Martinez 2006; Bagavos 2010; Berninger, Weiß, and Wagner 
2011; Billari 2008; Billari and Kohler 2004; Blossfeld and Huinink 1991; Blossfel and Hofmeister 
2006; Bonke and Esping-Andersen 2011; Boushey 2005; Breen and Salazar 2009; Budig 2003; 
Caldwell 1976; Esping-Andersen 2009; Impicciatore and Billari 2012; Kohler, Billari, and Ortega 
2001; Lesthaeghe (1995; 2010); Matysiak and Vignoli 2008; McQuillan et al. 2008; Myrskyla, 
Kohler, and Billari 2009; Oppenheimer 1994; Rondinelli, Aassve, and Billari 2010; Shang and 
Weinberg 2013;  van de Kaa 2001; Worts et al. 2013).  
 
 The major reason for the increasing mean age of women at first birth, alongside the decline in 
teenage pregnancies (especially in the US), is the shift of the role of motherhood in women’s lives. As 
repeatedly reported by scholars, the multiplication of achievements of women in higher education and 
in the labor market (Bailey 2006; Card and Lemieux 2001; Diprete and Buchmann 2006; Fernández, 
Fogli, and Olivetti 2004; Goldin, Katz, and Kuziemko 2006; Lesthaeghe 1995; van de Kaa 2001), 
brought about an historical shift (Astin et al. 2002) in the role of women in western societies, and 
transformed motherhood as one of many paths that a young woman can choose. 
During the nineties the hazard rate82 of first births in the US was bimodal (Sullivan 2005), registering 
a first peak around 20 years of age and a second one around 28, while it became more unimodal in the 
first decade of the XXI century (peaking at around 29-30 years of age).  
This change is due to shifting racial patterns of age at first birth, with White non-Hispanic women 
responsible for the second peak in the distribution during the nineties, as the leaders in the 
postponement of childbearing, and Hispanic White women responsible for the earlier peak and its 
disappearance later on when they also started postponing first births, at the end of the nineties 
(Sullivan 2005).  
The change from bimodal to unimodal patter of first births does not seem related to education 
(Sullivan 2005). The hazard rates of first births greatly differed across educational levels in the 
nineties, with low educated women reaching the maximum probability of becoming mothers around 
21 while American women with a BA or higher degree reaching such probability around the age of 30. 
Since then, in contrast to what happened with racial differences in age at first birth, the difference 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
82	  In	  Survival	  Analysis	  the	  Hazard	  Rate	  is	  defined	  as	  the	  instantaneous	  probability	  of	  the	  occurrence	  of	  an	  event	  at	  time	  t,	  conditional	  on	  the	  survival	  –	  
non-­‐happening	  –	  of	  the	  event	  until	  t.	  Sullivan	  (2005)	  argues	  that	  the	  bimodal	  pattern	  appears	  only	   if	  Type	  I	  First	  Birth	  rates	  are	  used	  instead	  of	  the	  
more	  typical	  Type	  II	  First	  Birth	  Rates.	  The	  difference	  between	  the	  two	  rates	  is	  that	  the	  former	  counts	  first	  births	  over	  the	  number	  of	  childless	  women	  
only,	  while	  the	  latter	  has	  all	  women	  in	  the	  denominator	  (a	  Type	  II	  measure	  is	  for	  instance	  the	  TFR).	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across educational groups in the US has been large and is increasing, as highly educated women keep 
delaying their entry into motherhood (Sullivan 2005).  
 
Very closely linked to the revolution in fertility and the increasing age at first births is the 
change in the marital institution. Non-marital cohabitation has become very common, whether as a 
primary step to later moving on to a wedding or as an alternative to it. The postponement of marriage 
delays childbearing, but in addition, the smaller commitment imposed by cohabitation and the 
increasing ease with which marriages are dissolved also negatively affect fertility by devaluing the 
traditional gender contract and reducing the willingness of individuals to commit to a life-plan of 
family and children (Ehrhardt and Kohli 2011).  
Last but not least, another significant consequence of the increase in women’s education is the 
growing difficulty they experience in finding a suitable male partner. Many childless women point to 
this difficulty when asked about reasons for their childlessness. First of all, women have become now 
more educated than men: among Millenials83 25-32 years of age in 2012, 38% have a bachelor’s 
degree, compared with 31% of men; among the younger of the 18-24 year-olds, 45% women versus 
38% of men are enrolled in college (2012). These educational gaps in favor of women emerged in the 
1990s and have widened since then (US Census, Current Population Survey). 
As a consequence, more and more women marry educationally downward: in 2012 for the first time in 
history the proportion of couples in which the wife is more educated than the husband is larger 
(20.7%) than those were husbands have higher education than their spouses (19.9%). These 
percentages in 1980 were respectively 10% and 20% (Wang 2014, Pew Research Center based on US 
census data). 
 
The transition to parenthood is arguably one of the most demanding of life choices. It is time-
intensive, and it is also financially demanding both in terms of the direct expenses of raising a child 
and in terms of the opportunity cost of reduced hours in the job market.  
Couples are, in fact, increasingly dependent on the income of both partners and the cost of not 
working to stay home taking care of the children is increasingly higher, especially in societies such as 
the American one where many policies rely on the expectations that both parents work and support 
themselves through the market (Craig and Mullan 2010). Policies and norms hotly influence 
parenthood and in a context like the US, the normative idea that young children need constant parental 
care translates into policies framed in terms of childcare being the responsibility of the household. In 
this way the costs of childbearing are highly concentrated on parents and are not considered a public 
responsibility (as they are in northern European countries, which offer parental leave, state provision 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
83	  The	  terms	  Millennials	  (or	  Millennial	  Generation,	  or	  Generation	  Y)	  refers	  to	  the	  demographic	  cohort	  of	  individuals	  born	  between	  the	  early	  1980s	  to	  
the	  early	  2000s.	  There	  is	  no	  precise	  definition	  of	  the	  beginning	  and	  end	  date	  of	  the	  birth	  cohort	  but	  the	  term	  was	  coined	  by	  Strauss	  and	  Howe	  (2000)	  in	  
their	   book	   “Millenials	   rising:	   the	   next	   great	   generation”.	   NY:	   Vintage	   Original.	   The	   term	   has	   now	   become	   of	   diffused	   use	   among	   journalist	   and	  
academics.	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of childcare, etc.). In the US the great majority of non-parental childcare is purchased on the market 
(the public expenditure on formal childcare in the US was 0.08% of its GDP in 2005, compared for 
instance to the 0.36% of the GDP of France and the 0.85% of Denmark)84, and no paid parental leave 
is envisaged (Kamerman and Waldfogel, 2014). The federal Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA) 
provides leave for a variety of health and family-related reasons, among which childbirth or the care of 
a newborn up to 12 months is included. The leave lasts up to 12 weeks in a 12-month period (taken 
continuously or in blocks), and is unpaid. Five states (Hawaii since 1969, New York since 1989, 
California since 2004, New Jersey since 2009 and Rhode Island since January 2014) have a special 
program (Temporary Disability Insurance - TDI) that provides a partial compensation – from half to 
two-thirds of earnings depending on the state – covering 10 to 12 weeks of absence from work around 
the time of childbirth, including four weeks before the birth and six-to-eight weeks after. The coverage 
of the TDI program is though only of a quarter of the labor force: FMLA applies only to employees of 
covered employers and who have worked for that employer for at least one year and over 1250 hours 
in the last 12 months. Basically, all public-sector employees, but not private employers or non-profit 
organizations with fewer than 50 employees, are covered  (Kamerman and Waldfogel, 2014).  
Only Minnesota, Montana and New Mexico have active At-Home Infant Care policies providing low-
income working parents a cash benefit for the parent staying home with the newborn during the first 
year.  
 
In cases where the parental leave is unpaid, parents simply do not take it. This is one of the 
reasons why the participation of mothers in the workforce is quite low in the US, in comparison for 
instance to northern European countries: 61.4% of mothers with a child younger than 3 years of age 
and 64.8% of mothers with children under the age of 6 work, compared to 76% and 79%, respectively, 
in Denmark (2011 Bureau of Labor Statistics data).85 To put it in another way, among all mothers 
(children below 18 and residing in the household) 18-69 years of age, 29% are stay-at-home moms (35 
million women). A growing share of them are stay-at-home mothers because they cannot find a job 
(6% of them in 2012 versus 1% in 2000) but it is a pattern also mirrored by the female labor force 
participation rate, which is stagnating after decades of growth in the US (the FLFPR was 60% in 2001 
and since 2014 it has been below 57%).  
Interestingly, 4% of stay-at-home mothers in the Us are so-called “opt-out moms” (Belkin 2003): 
women with at least a Master’s degree, a family income of 75000$ and a working husband, who 
declare that they are out of the labor force to take care of the family (Livingstone G., 2014, Pew 
Research Center). To be more specific, 11% of professional-degree (medical, law, etc.) holders, 9% of 
Master’s degree and 6% of PhD holders are opting-out. The great majority of these are White 
Americans (69%) but a substantial part (19%) is Asian (fewer are Hispanics, 7%, and Black, 3%). 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
84	  OECD’s	  Family	  database.	  Statistics	  reported	  in	  the	  paper	  by	  Craig	  and	  Mullan	  (2010).	  
85	  Part-­‐time	  employment	  is	  also	  not	  so	  diffused:	  only	  around	  the	  18%	  of	  total	  women	  employed	  in	  2011	  according	  to	  OECD	  data.	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On the one hand, the above resembles a classic work-family reconciliation problem - 69% of the opt-
out mothers state they would not have stayed at home if they had more flexible work arrangements. 
On the other hand, the fact that in the great majority of these couples, wives are more educated than 
their husbands (in 37% of cases women are more educated than their partner, in 45% they are equally 
educated and only in 18% of the couples is the husband more educated) supports the argument that 
these high-achieving women are still following the traditional model of the male breadwinner 
(Livingstone, 2014, Pew Research Center). 
 
However, childbearing, as a major life decision, does not depend only on the current financial 
position of the couple, but also, and maybe even more so, on the expected future economic conditions 
of the household. Changes in the aggregate circumstances of the economy and of the employment 
market generate uncertainty about these future conditions. In other words, macroeconomic 
uncertainty, boosted by the utterly negative economic outlook of the last six years, might affect 
fertility behavior over and above individual-level economic insecurity. A number of complementary 
factors whose implications are often difficult to tease out, triggered by the financial and economic 
crisis, alter childbearing decisions through their impact on economic uncertainty. Among them are 
unemployment and work instability, declining wages, the difficulty in accessing credit, the declining 
value of savings in the form of bonds, stock investment or housing wealth, the growing difficulties in 
purchasing adequate housing services or meeting daily expenses but also, more indirectly, the 
increasing time spent in education as a response to labor market saturation. This list is not exhaustive 
but highlights some of the main channels through which economic insecurity is transmitted from the 
aggregate business cycle’s downturn to households’ financial conditions.  
Among those, pressure on fertility is likely to come via the increase in unemployment rates and in job 
market instability. The Great Recession, in fact, has been associated with a marked weakening of the 
labor market: unemployment rates have reached and remained at high levels for months, together with 
the average duration of unemployment that has been unusually long. Farber (2011) documented that 
only in the period 2007-2009 in the US86, 16% of people aged 20-64 reported they had lost their job 
and less than 50% of them were employed again in January 2010. Job losers who managed to find a 
new job did so relatively quickly, while those not reemployed stayed in unemployment for a long 
while (the mean duration of unemployment in 2010 according to the Current Population Survey (CPS) 
was about 35 weeks). Moreover, one among five full-time job losers had in 2010 a part-time job, and 
they were earning almost 22% less than in their previous job (11% if the foregone earning increase of 
non-job-losers is taken into consideration). On average, for both full-time and part-time workers, this 
decline in earnings in the new job compared to the lost job was 17.5%. This stubborn rise in 
unemployment and the difficulties in re-entering the labor market are very likely to have raised 
household economic uncertainty, and also to have borne consequences in terms of childbearing 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
86	  Data	  from	  January	  2010	  Displaced	  Workers	  Survey	  (DWS).	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decisions.  
Figure 3.1 shows together the trends in fertility and unemployment rates in the US between 2002 and 
2014: the two curves are almost mirror images. As soon as unemployment starts to rise, fertility drops 
and the process seems to be almost simultaneous87. The decline in TFR is steep until unemployment 
starts decreasing again in 2011; then it keeps declining at a slower pace, even while the unemployment 
rate recuperates. Recently, unemployment has almost returned around pre-crisis levels (6% in 2014) 
but fertility does not show signs of recovery yet. 
 
 
Figure 3.1: Unemployment rate and Total Fertility Rate in the US (2002-2014). 
 
Source: Elaboration of the author based on data from US National Center for Health Statistics. 
 
 
The principal hypothesis that is tested in this chapter is that two entwined components of 
economic uncertainty drive family decisions during a recession period: at the individual level, the 
financial or employment conditions of the members of the couple, and at the aggregate level, the 
economic circumstances characterizing the state, region or market in which the individuals are 
embedded. 
Given the dimensions of the US territory and its economical and attitudinal diversity, individuals are 
more likely affected by state-level circumstances than by federal ones. Moreover, the macroeconomic 
and demographic conditions also differ across states, sometimes sharply. In 2012, for instance, 18 
states registered an increase in TFR (including Idaho, Kansas, North Dakota, Texas and Ohio). These 
were also the states least affected by the recession and where the decline in fertility was already 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
87	  The	  anticipation	  is	  probably	  due	  to	  the	  uncertainty	  created	  financial	  turmoil	  that	  preceded	  the	  real	  economy	  labor	  market	  effects	  of	  the	  crisis.	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minimal or null. Contrariwise, states like Arizona, Nevada, California or Florida, where the economy 
was more dramatically affected, registered the largest drop in fertility rates in the last years 
(Klimasinska 2013).. 
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Figure 3.2 shows three maps (Federal Reserve of St. Louis) of the United States in 2007, 2009 
and 2012 respectively, illustrating graphically the evolution of state unemployment across the 
recession (darker red color represents higher rates). As already mentioned, the regions where 
unemployment was higher are part of the West, e.g. California, Nevada, Oregon; part of the Midwest, 
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e.g. Michigan, Indiana; and of the South, e.g. Tennessee, North and South Carolina and Florida. The 
central states of the Great Plans like Montana, Wyoming and North and South Dakota were somehow 
spared the major damages of skyrocketing unemployment. 
 
In a study on the decline of fertility during the Great Recession, Morgan and colleagues 
(2011) found that the drop in fertility rates was larger in states that were hit more strongly by the 
economic downturn. Moreover, they found that the decline was bigger in the ‘red states’, where the 
voter majority is Republican, than in ‘blue states’, mainly supporting Democrats.  
In the paper the authors argue that this was due to the Obama optimism created by the 2008 elections, 
dampening the negative effect of the crisis on the future economic situation. The analysis suggests 
that, beyond the objective financial conditions, the subjective perception of the severity of the 
recession matters for childbearing choices. For instance, the highest proportion of Obama/McCain 
vote share was 2.2 in Vermont and the lowest was 0.50 in Wyoming. The authors predict that the 
effect of a doubling of unemployment rates on fertility would be of +0.01 in Vermont and -0.05 in 
Wyoming88. 
Figure 3.3 below replicates a graph presented in Morgan at al.’s (2011) paper comparing fertility and 
unemployment ratios 2002/2009 (they found a negative correlation of -0.38). I repeated the analysis 
with more recent data, comparing the ratios 2003/2010. The result is the same: states in which the 
increase in unemployment rate was more dramatic are the states where fertility dropped most and the 
resulting negative correlation is -0.56. The same result is found by Cherlin et al. (2013) comparing the 
variation in fertility and unemployment between 2007/2009 for which they show a correlation of -
0.50. The negative effect continued after the formal end of the recession in 2009 (throughout 2011). 
The authors further found that the pre-recession unemployment rate variation was uncorrelated with 
changes in fertility (r=-0.01). 
 
  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
88	  For	  the	  full	  analysis	  of	  Morgan	  et	  al	  (2011)	  see	  the	  online	  appendix	  8A.1	  at	  http://www.russellsage.org/greatrecession_onlineappendix.pdf	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Figure 3.3: Total Fertility Rate and unemployment rate variation pre/post- recession by US states. 
 
Source: Elaboration of the author based on data from US National Center for Health Statistics and St. Louis Fed. 
 
After this introduction to the main topic of the recent trend of fertility in the US and its 
linkages to the Great Recession, the remainder of this chapter is structured as follows: Section 2 
introduces the background of this study, the relevant theoretical and empirical literature on 
childbearing dynamics and the business cycle at the individual level. Most of the theoretical 
hypotheses and empirical findings on the impact of the recession on fertility refer, specifically, to the 
nexus between labor market uncertainty and first births, since it is the object under investigation in the 
chapter. Section 3 describes the longitudinal micro-level data (PSID) used for the analysis, and 
Section 4 illustrates the statistical model on which the analysis of the longitudinal dataset is based. The 
descriptive results are presented in Section 5 while the findings of the multivariate regression analysis 
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Micro-level research on fertility behavior and family dynamics has long been dominated by 
the neoclassical economics paradigm of rational action applied to households. This paradigm, 
designed by Gary Becker (1960, 1976, 1981), had couples enter parenthood (or proceed to further 
births) according to a maximization process based on some fixed unitary household preferences over 
those choices, weighting the benefits and costs entailed by those actions. Becker’s (1976, 1981) model 
was pioneering in introducing the study of family dynamics into the discipline of economics and, 
perhaps more importantly, in bringing the formal modeling - typical of economics - into studies of 
household decision-making processes. However, Becker’s model is also theoretically rooted on the 
traditional male breadwinner–female housewife model of household, which is typical of the mid XX 
century but clearly not representative of families nowadays. 
Subsequent scholars of New Household Economics (NHE)89 questioned first and foremost the original 
assumption of a unified household preference function, in which the household was treated as a "black 
box" (Pollak 1985, Samuelson 1956) and in which the dynamic of intra-household decision-making 
was left silent. However, the existence of separate and often conflicting preferences within the couple 
has been extensively documented by the literature. Assuming families are typically in harmonious 
agreement regarding the use of household resources (Samuelson 1956) or assuming the existence of 
one altruistic member who makes all the decisions for the benefit of the other members (Becker 1976, 
1981) is not only simplistic but has also been shown to be inaccurate.  
Given those differentiated preferences, household behavior has been theoretically investigated as a 
strategic interaction through the use of bargaining models (Manser and Brown 1980; McElroy and 
Homey 1981) according to which individual members pursue their own interests while taking into 
consideration the interest of others, given their relative bargaining positions inside the household. The 
Bargaining Model assumes diverging preferences between the two members of the couple over desired 
family size, and assumes further that decisions on childbearing are a product of negotiation between 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
89	  Together	  Gary	  Becker	  and	  Jacob	  Mincer	  founded	  the	  NHE	  in	  the	  sixties	  at	  Columbia	  University	  .	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the two90.  
 
In the same direction of increasing complexity, but decisively in a more demographic than 
economic perspective, since the seventies, the life-course theory91 has argued for a more dynamic and 
interrelated approach in the study of individual and family behavior. The main theoretical point is that 
individuals and their actions are embedded into specific structural, social and cultural contexts that are 
multidimensional and evolve over time. The life course is a social institution embracing all domains of 
the individual life and shaping the transitions through sequences of positions in different domains in a 
biographical complex perspective (Kohli 2007). As far as fertility choices are concerned, three main 
propositions elaborated by the scholars of the life-course approach are pertinent to the present 
discussion: first, childbearing choices are embedded into a multi-level structure of social dynamics 
(vertically), second, they are interrelated with choices in other domains of the life course 
(horizontally), and third, they are path-dependent; that is, present choices depend on the past and the 
expectations about the future (Aisenbrey and Fasang 2010). 
Relatedly, modernization and demographic transitions theories (Chesnais 1992; Bongaarts 2001; 
Coleman 1996; Lesthaeghe 1983, 1985; Lesthaeghe and van de Kaa 1986; van de Kaa 1987, 2001) 
argue that the decline in fertility is part of an inevitable process stemming from the external forces of 
economic development, industrialization and urbanization, and leading to epochal changes in attitudes, 
beliefs and cultural norms. 
An implication shared by all of these theories is that, if in the past childbearing was the first and often 
the only, source of wellbeing for certain groups in society (i.e. women), today children are only one of 
the many instruments of life satisfaction that individuals have. With modernization the number of 
options increases and parenthood competes with other, mostly economic- or work-related paths 
(Huinink and Kohli 2014). Women can choose between a satisfying career in the job market and a 
satisfying life as mothers, or they can do both. 
 
The recent transformations in family structures in developed countries are often juxtaposed by 
scholars to the socioeconomic empowerment of women, the de-structuring of individual live-courses 
and the increasing fragility of the traditional family structure. All these changes make childbearing a 
more risky and expensive choice, raising the opportunity cost of motherhood and inducing parents to 
trade off quantity for quality with regard to their offspring. The number of children is reduced to allow 
the parents to dedicate more resources to each child9293. The role of women and the compatibility of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
90	  The	   outcome	   of	   the	   negotiation	   depends	   on	   one’s	   relative	   bargaining	   power,	   usually	   measured	   by	   individual	   earnings.	   These	   are	   the	   resources	  
transferable	  to	  another	  relationship	  and	  measure	  the	  credibility	  of	  an	  exit	  option	  from	  the	  current	  relation,	   in	  other	  words,	   the	  threat	  of	   leaving	  the	  
relationship	  in	  case	  of	  non-­‐agreement	  in	  the	  dispute.	  
91	  Even	  though	  the	   life-­‐course	  perspective	  appears	  to	  be	  more	  of	  a	  methodological	  approach	  than	  a	  systematic	  theoretical	   framework,	  at	   least	  at	   the	  
moment	  (Huinink	  and	  Kohli	  2014).	  
92	  Besides	   the	   rational	   calculus	   of	   the	   material	   increase	   in	   the	   cost	   of	   raising	   a	   child	   and	   the	   change	   in	   preferences	   of	   individuals,	   there	   are	   also	  
psychological	   reasons	   that	   reinforce	   this	  quantity-­‐quality	   trade-­‐off.	   For	   instance,	   evidence	   (Eibach	  and	  Mock,	  2011)	   suggests	   that	   since	   the	   costs	  of	  
childbearing	  have	  grown	  so	  much,	  parents	  tend	  to	  attribute	  more	  value	  to	  parenthood,	  and	  to	  idealize	  their	  role,	  to	  cope	  with	  the	  cognitive	  dissonance	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the various life domains (i.e. work/family) have dominated the theoretical debates and empirical 
research on declining fertility in advanced economies in the last decades.  
However, in the same way that it is conceptually wrong to take the household as a black box, it is 
likewise erroneous to ascribe all the responsibility of childbearing to women (Vignoli et al. 2012). In 
the first place, the process of expanding education is common to both genders, and the lengthening of 
time spent in the educational system affects in the first place family formation; thus, both men and 
women.  
Second, despite the revolution in women’s position in society and within the family, men’s economic 
position is still crucial for both the marriage market and childbearing decisions. While scholars have 
tended to foreground the new economic independence of women, Oppenheimer (1988) saw in the 
declining economic prospects of young men during the eighties and nineties an important reason for 
the decline in marriage rates (Kalmijn 2011). Aggregate economic and employment uncertainty affects 
young men economic potential, reducing their attractiveness in the marriage market, first, because 
setting up a household is costly and, second, because an unstable career signals uncertainty as to 
whether or not the potential husband will be able to financially maintain a family94 (Oppenheimer 
1988; Kalmijn 2011). 
Third, with the spotlighting of women and the evolution of their roles (Esping-Andersen 2009) short 
shrift has been given to the fact that several of these changes also affect men’s role and behavior, and 
even more so they affect gender dynamics within the couple (Neyer, Vignoli and Lappegard 2010, 
Vignoli, Drefahl and De Santis 2012). More and more often, in fact, men also have to adjust their 
work schedule to meet the needs of a family with a working mother, which increases men’s 
opportunity cost of childbearing too95 (Hart 2015). In addition, men also face a higher risk compared 
to women in case of relationship break-up, since laws on parental custody generally favor mothers 
(Ehrhardt and Kohli 2011). 
 
 As this discussion highlights, both Becker’s and the Second Demographic Transition theories 
predict - although supported by different mechanisms and reasons - a new equilibrium of family 
dynamics around low fertility, fewer marriages and large couples’ instability. Whether this is correct 
or not is a matter of empirical research (see the next section) but both theories point to fertility 
decisions being  crucially influenced by the pervasive complexity typical of modern societies. 
The strong interdependence of life domains (family/work balance), the influence of societal and 
economic structural conditions, and the role of the expectations about the future, significantly affect 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
of	  the	  increasing	  cost	  of	  it.	  This	  emotionally	  rewarding	  role	  of	  parenthood	  in	  turn	  increases	  the	  investment	  in	  children,	  and	  further	  reduces	  the	  number	  
of	  them	  parents	  decide	  to	  have.	  
93	  The	  latter	  concept	  of	  quality	  of	  children	  was	  also	  emphasized	  by	  Becker	  (1991).	  
94	  This	  is	  called	  the	  career	  uncertainty	  or	  career	  instability	  or	  immaturity	  hypothesis	  (Kalmijn	  2011).	  
95	  Even	  though	  significant	  gender	  differences	  exist	  across	  western	  countries	  in	  the	  degree	  of	  involvement	  in	  paid	  work	  and	  family	  caring	  between	  men	  
and	  women	  (especially	  during	  the	  transition	  to	  parenthood).	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households’ childbearing choices. In periods of economic uncertainty especially the latter factor plays 
a key role in the decisional process to parenthood.  
Using the life-course perspective we can categorize the theoretical mechanisms identified in the 
literature on the fertility response to economic insecurity into two main groups: first, the mechanisms 
that explain the transmission of economic uncertainty between different domains within the household 
(work/family) and, second, the mechanisms that pertain to the multilevel dimension of the life course 
(external structural economic conditions/parenthood). 
Among the mechanisms in the first group, two date to Becker (1976, 1981): income and opportunity- 
cost effects. The income effect predicts that a recession would reduce disposable economic resources 
and future income streams via decreasing wealth and earnings value, or unemployment or insecure job 
positions. If children were normal goods, couples behaving like normal consumers would decrease 
consumption during periods of economic downturns and postpone childbearing.  
In contrast, the opportunity cost (or price effect) of having a child consists in the lost benefits, in terms 
of earnings streams but also in terms of tenure, accumulation of human capital etc., of being out of the 
labor market while having a baby. The child penalty increases with the number of children and with 
the number of years out of the labor market, since it is composed of actual wage losses during 
maternity (or paternity) and human capital depreciation and experience loss due to work interruption. 
The opportunity cost also increases with occupational status and wage, and it is at the minimum in 
cases in which the individual is unemployed. Conversely, it is at the maximum for highly educated 
women as women are still the principal caregivers to children and higher levels of education imply 
greater wage and human capital losses. Finally, the opportunity cost is usually also large for women 
with unstable contracts, even though job status and wage are low, because of the precariousness of the 
contract and the higher risk of losing the job once entering maternity. The direction of the total 
opportunity-cost effect of childbearing during the Great Recession is debatable. On the one hand, 
during a recession, the opportunity cost of childbearing is lower than during periods of economic 
growth because ‘there is less to lose’ for those out of the labor market, but, on the other hand, for those 
who manage to stay in the labor market, the proliferation of precarious contracts and fragile work 
positions increase the opportunity cost of parenthood. 
  
 The third mechanism in the first group is more normative in nature: it has been defined as the 
adverse effect (or the affordability clause by Rindfuss and VandenHeuvel 1990) and reflects the fact 
that being unemployed or having an insecure job position might be viewed as a normatively and 
materially incompatible situation with entry into parenthood (see also Oppenheimer 1988). The 
argument is that couples postpone parenthood until they have “established a relatively solid position in 
the labor market” (Vignoli et al. 2012:42; Bernardi and Nazio 2005). 
Finally, the fourth interesting mechanism in the first category points to an opposite positive effect of 
economic uncertainty on fertility. This is Friedman, Hechter and Kanazawa’s (1994) theory of 
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uncertainty reduction. The theory suggests that individuals facing uncertainty in the economic or 
working sphere might want to compensate for this insecure position by entering into parenthood, 
thereby increasing certainty in the personal and emotive sphere 96 . The uncertainty reduction 
hypothesis is still ascribable to the rational choice framework even if the predictions are in the end 
quite different. In their work, Friedman and collegues (1994) argue that individuals facing different 
kinds of economic uncertainty and pursuing ‘global strategies’ to overcome them might actually 
decide to have children to balance the public uncertainty increasing private security. In other words, 
the economic crisis, by increasing the level of uncertainty about future financial and employment 
outcomes, might encourage people to increase security in other non-pecuniary dimensions, e.g. the 
formation of a family or having a child.   
Regarding the second group of mechanisms concerning the multilevel dimension of the life course, the 
interaction of the two macro- (external) and micro-levels, I am interested in testing the very simple 
hypotheses of whether the aggregate economic situation generated by the Great Recession amplifies or 
buffers the negative individual effect97that is predicted at the micro-level. 
These two alternative mechanisms investigated in the literature are first, an uncertainty multiplier 
effect of negative aggregate employment conditions on top of an insecure financial and employment 
status of the individual and, second, an attenuation effect (Oesch and Lipps 2012) of the normative 
stigma of being unemployed when unemployment is a diffused condition. Whether poor individual 
financial and working circumstances have a larger or smaller effect on childbearing would then 
depend on the context in which the couple lives. For instance, being unemployed among many people 
unemployed, by increasing the risk of staying out of the labor market for a long time, could make it 
even more stressful or, conversely, being unemployed when this is the norm might buffer the stigma 
and the feeling of distress typical when one is out of the job market. Depending on which cross-level 
mechanisms prevail, the consequences on childbearing decisions of individual insecurity might be 




	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
96	  Specifically,	  Friedman	  et	  al.	  (1994)	  suggest	  two	  alternative	  behavioral	  mechanisms.	  On	  the	  one	  hand,	  one	  might	  transform	  the	  problem	  of	  uncertainty	  
into	  risk	  by	  gathering	  information	  and	  delaying	  parenthood	  until	  one	  exits	  from	  unemployment.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  one	  might	  pursue	  global	  strategies	  
to	  reduce	  uncertainty	  in	  entire	  paths	  of	  future	  courses	  of	  action,	  as	  described	  above,	  through	  parenthood	  (Inanc	  2015).	  
97	  For	  simplicity	  I	  assume	  that	  the	  effect	  of	  individual	  economic	  insecurity	  is	  negative	  for	  fertility	  (as	  three	  out	  of	  four	  mechanisms	  above	  point	  to).	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Evidence on couples’ decision-making processes shows a decline over time in gender 
specialization within the household (at least before first birth) and a strong increase in assortative 
mating in education, preferences and tastes (Blossfeld and Drobnic 2001; Esping-Andersen 2009). 
Moreover, with the reshaping of gender-based roles, the bargaining process between the two members 
of the couple becomes more and more the norm (Testa, Cavalli and Rosina 2012, 2011).  
Whether the prediction of an inexorable process of nuclear-family shrinkage put forward by Becker 
(1976, 1981) in his theory that the benefits of marriage and parenthood lie in gender specialization,98 
and by postmodern scholars of the SDT, who adduce attitudinal changes towards the institution of the 
family, is valid nowadays is still an open question. 
From cross-country studies (McDonald 2000, 2006; Esping-Andersen 2009; Wood, Neels and Kil 
2014) it  does not seem so. In highly egalitarian countries, like those in the nothern European, fertility 
rates are much larger than in southern European countries, where the traditional male-breadwinner 
model (gender specialization) is still dominant (Myrskyla, Billari and Kohler 2011). At the aggregate 
level, we also have witnessed a reversal from negative to positive in the correlation between fertility 
rates and economic development and income and female labor force participation rates (Ahn and Mira 
2002; Billari and Kohler 2004; Myrskyla, Kohler and Billari 2009). 
At the micro-level, the same appears when looking at educational differentials: highly educated 
couples that are the frontrunners in the gender equality revolution, tend to reduce fertility less today 
compared to poorly educated couples, where the tranditional gender model dominates (Chesnais 1996; 
Kravdal and Rindfuss 2008; Caltabiano, Castiglioni, and Rosina 2009; Esping-Andersen 2009; 
Livingstone et al 2010; Neels and De Wachter 2010; Hazan and Zoabi 2011; Thévenon 2011; Esping-
Andersen and Billari 2015). An example is the study by Hart (2015) who investigates whether in more 
gender egalitarian societies, i.e. Norway, a positive correlation between women’s earnings and first 
births emerged (and increases over time) while the same correlation becomes less positive for men, if 
the opportunity cost of fatherhood increases. The author finds support for the hypothesis with regard 
to women (higher earnings are positively correlated with higher odds of motherhood) but he does not 
find that the opportunity cost for men is increasing over time. 
 
However, in other studies couple specialization still positively correlates to fertility (Zhang 
and Song 2007), and to the differentials in wages of husbands and wives too. Zhang and Song (2007) 
illustrate the argument, explaining the fertility differentials between married and cohabiting couples in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
98	  Becker’s	  (1981)	  economic	  theory	  of	  comparative	  advantage	  is	  not	  the	  only	  existing	  theoretical	  argument	  on	  couples’	  specialization;	  other	  theories	  
point	  to	  socialization	  or	  structural	  constraints	  that	  lead	  couples	  to	  adopt	  the	  male	  breadwinner	  model	  (Kohli	  2007).	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the US. The former, they argue, have more children, not because of a selection mechanism into 
marriage, but because of the greater comparative advantage of gender specialization (Becker 1981) in 
marriage than in cohabitation. 
Rondinelli, Aassve and Billari (2010) also show that in Italy women’s wage (potential, based on 
educational attainment) negatively correlates with the timing of first birth. Women with higher wages 
and thus a larger opportunity cost, delay motherhood (and also reach a smaller complete fertility) with 
respect to low-wage women, even controlling for institutional and cultural factors. 
Finally, Kalmijn (2011) investigates the impact of men’s income and employment insecurity on 
marriage and cohabitation in Europe. He finds support for Oppenheimer’s theory (1988) that men’s 
economic and employment uncertainty deter union formation. Marriage, compared to cohabitation, is 
particularly negatively affected by employment insecurity. However, men’s income and employment 
positions have a larger effect in traditional compared to more egalitarian European societies. This 
would suggest a tendency over time of a reduction of the impact of men’s status on marriage (and 
consequently for fertility) when gender roles become more symmetrical. 
What is certainly clear is that all these arguments speak in favor of couple-level research where men 
and women’s economic standing is analyzed simultaneously (Kalmijn 2011). Nonetheless, the latter is 
still an exception in the fertility literature, with many studies focusing instead on men, or on the 
relationship between women’s changing role within and without the household, and fertility choices. 
 
The impact of changing labor market conditions on fertility has been investigated extensively 
especially in light of the burst of the Great Recession (among others: Ahn and Mira 2001; Amialchuk 
2011, 2013; Bernardi and Nazio 2005; Bernardi, Klarner, and Von der Lippe 2008; De la Rica and Iza 
2005; Del Bono, Weber, and Winter-Ebmer 2008; Farber 2011; Kreyenfeld 2009, Kreyenfeld et al 
2012; Lindo 2010; Lutz 2014; Macunovich 1996; Mills and Blossfeld 2005; Pailhé and Solaz 2012; 
Ridnfuss et al. 1988; Santarelli 2011; Vignoli, Drefahl, and De Santis 2012). However, micro-level 
studies and, in particular, those addressing the difference between the labor market position of men 
and women, and research on the effect of aggregate macroeconomic conditions on micro-level data, 
have not yet reached conclusive results.  
Looking at research conducted on European countries, the evidence is mixed. Kravdal (2002) found 
some negative effect of aggregate unemployment on fertility but a negligible effect of individual level 
unemployment in Norway. Neels et al. (2013) find a strong negative effect of unemployment rates on 
the hazard of first births to men and women up to age 30, and the effect is stronger for the highly 
educated. The negative effect of unemployment rates on childbearing after 30 is instead concentrated 
only on men. Schmitt (2012) found that male unemployment reduces first birth rates but the 
magnitude of the effect differs a lot across European countries (modest effect in UK and Germany and 
large in France). Pailhé and Solaz (2012) investigate the role of employment uncertainty in France in 
shaping the tempo and quantum of fertility. Their findings confirm the delaying effect of 
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unemployment on first child for men but not for women, who neither anticipate nor delay childbearing 
due to unemployment. Moreover, completed fertility seems to be affected only by the long-term 
unemployment of men. 
Regarding the US, Amialchuck (2013) and Lindo (2010) investigate the effects on fertility of the 
husband’s job loss, focusing on the income shock that the job displacement generates for the 
household. Amialchuck (2013) uses the American Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) data in 
the period 1968–1992 and examines the risk for first and higher-parity births, one-to-six years after 
job displacement. The author finds a negative effect of the husband’s job loss and layoffs on the first 
and the third births. Lindo (2010) using the same data finds an increase in fertility immediately after 
the husband’s job loss, but a decline in the three-to-eight years after the job loss. After the eighth year 
the effect is still slightly negative, although not statistically significant.  
 
Most studies on female unemployment point to a general negative effect of unemployment 
uncertainty on fertility (even though few studies manage to distinguish between unemployment and 
inactivity) but other studies produce weak (Ozcan 2010) or positive (Schmitt 2012) results on the 
relationship between women’s unemployment and first births in Europe.  
Meron and Widmer (2002) find in France that women’s continuous periods of unemployment 
postpone first birth the most, followed by women who experienced intermittent periods of 
employment compared to women with continuous experiences of employment. They find also that 
inactive women are less likely compared to working-women to postpone childbearing. 
Matysiak (2009) reports that women (both childless and mothers) in Poland postpone childbearing 
until they have found a job, net of their propensity for job market work versus family. 
In the US, Rindfuss et al. (1988) and Macunovich (1996) also found a pro-cyclical relationship 
between women employment and fertility. The authors, investigating the effect of female 
unemployment on birth rates, point to the disruptive effect of lower expectations on future income to 
explain the negative impact of women’s unemployment on fertility. 
Bulchholtz et al. (2009)99 found opposite results for women according to their educational level 
(mainly in Central and southern European countries compared to other European countries): less-
qualified women react to labor market insecurity by focusing on their role of wives and mothers (as a 
way to reduce uncertainty) while highly qualified women react to employment insecurity by reducing 
childbearing. Edin and Kefalas (2005) found the same mechanism in studying single mothers in the 
US: disadvantaged women use motherhood as a strategy to enhance their social status, that is, to 
compensate for lack of personal success, i.e. low educational or work achievement, but also for the 
absence or misbehavior of men, and abiding feelings of despair100. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
99	  The	  paper	  summarizes	  the	  results	  of	  the	  Globalife	  (Life	  Courses	  in	  the	  Globalization	  Process)	  project	  on	  the	  impact	  of	  globalization	  on	  individual	  life	  
courses.	  
100	  This	   reminds	  of	  Elster’s	   concept	  of	   ‘self-­‐binding’	   (Elster	  1979).	  When	   complexity	   is	   very	  high,	   increasing	  uncertainty	  makes	   long-­‐term	   life	  paths	  
unpredictable;	  individuals	  may	  want	  to	  constrain	  their	  future	  actions.	  Moreover,	  according	  to	  Elster,	  self-­‐binding	  is	  also	  an	  effective	  technique	  to	  make	  
one’s	   promises	  more	   credible,	   in	   front	   of	   other	   actors,	   like	   the	   partner	   or	   the	   employer,	   so	   that	   they	   interact	   and	   cooperate	  more	   effectively	   than	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Beyond the fact of being employed or not, job quality and job stability are further crucial 
conditions for parenthood (Kreyenfeld 2009). Temporary contracts have been often blamed to depress 
fertility (De la Rica and Iza 2005; Polavieja 2005; Worts et al. 2013) through the negative impact they 
have on perceived household income insecurity and also in general on life satisfaction (Scherer 2009). 
Results, however, differ across countries and also depending on who is suffering from job insecurity, 
men or women.101 
Pailhé and Solaz (2012) find that women delay motherhood if they hold insecure job positions in 
France, but non-permanent employment has no effect for men. 
Bernardi and Nazio (2005) investigated the effect of employment insecurity on first child in Italy and 
found that being in search of first job, or having a fixed-term contract reduces the probability of 
fatherhood; they did not find, however, any effect for women. However, being employed in the public 
sector - a highly secure job position - has a positive effect on the likelihood of motherhood. 
Results from the European Household Panel in Spain (De la Rica and Iza 2005) indicate that for men 
the decision to get married is strongly negatively associated with both unemployment and unstable 
contracts. For women, rather, it seems that holding a precarious job contract does not affect negatively 
entry into marriage, although for childless women it is associated with delayed entry into motherhood. 
A recent special collection of Demographic Research specifically engages with the issue of economic 
and employment uncertainty and fertility and family dynamics in Europe (Kreyenfeld et al 2012). 
Results of the studies confirm the negative effect of economic and employment uncertainty on family 
dynamics and parenthood decisions, even though some systematic variations are found across 
European countries.  
A final important issue highlighted by both theoretical and empirical studies is that couple-level 
research is worthwhile. As said, however, the impact of the partner's characteristics is rarely 
investigated, mostly because it is complicated to find data that report detailed information on both 
members of the couple. For instance, the meta-analysis of micro-level studies on female labor-force 
participation and fertility done by Matysiak and Vignoli (2008) shows that the negative effect of 
women’s employment on fertility might be overestimated if information regarding the partner and his 
occupation are not included together with indicators of women’s job characteristics. 
In a recent study, Vignoli et al. (2012) investigate the likelihood of becoming a parent in Italy, given 
the stability or instability of both couple members' job positions (similarly to what I do here). The 
authors point to the increasing competition in the labor markets and to the demand for workers’ 
flexibility as factors discouraging childbearing (see also Mills and Blossfeld 2005), and in particular 
regarding the transition to first birth (see also Kreyenfeld 2009). The authors find that the importance 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
without	  such	  self-­‐binding	  commitments	  (Elster	  1989,	  1983,	  1979).	  	  
101	  As	  evidence	  on	  job	  insecurity	  (Rosenblatt,	  Z.,	  I.	  Talmud	  and	  A.	  Ruvio	  1999)	  demonstrates,	  contrary	  to	  what	  gender	  theories	  of	  female	  disadvantaged	  
position	   in	   the	   labor	  market	  would	   have	   predicted,	   in	   general	  male	  workers	   are	  more	   job-­‐insecure	   than	   female	   ones.	   Specifically,	  men	   are	  mainly	  
worried	  about	  the	  financial	  aspects	  (e.g.,	  maintaining	  pay	  level,	  cutting	  of	  work	  hours,	  etc.)	  of	  job	  deterioration,	  while	  women	  emphasize	  both	  financial	  
and	  autonomy	  (e.g.,	  changes	  in	  work	  schedule	  or	  in	  the	  autonomy	  in	  work	  design)	  aspects	  of	  the	  job.	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of dual-earner couples for childbearing is growing over time, and that compared to them other 
couples’ job combinations reduce fertility.  
 
As Kreyenfeld pointed out in the introduction to the special issue of Demographic Research 
on uncertainty and family dynamics “economic uncertainty may be understood as an individual risk 
factor, related to phases in the life course that are characterized by unemployment, part-time work, 
working on a term-limited contract, or difficulties entering the labor market in the first place” 
(Kreyenfeld 2012: 838). But “[…] it may also be conceptualized as an aggregate phenomenon, 
reflecting general uncertainties during, for example, an economic recession” (Kreyenfeld 2012: 838). 
Empirical research on the interaction of different levels of economic insecurity, macro and micro, is 
frequent, but again, the findings regarding the consequences for individual and family dynamics are 
mixed.  
Recently, Oesch and Lipps (2012) studied the effect of aggregate and individual unemployment on 
wellbeing in Germany and Switzerland testing, first, the social norm argument just described, that is, 
that the higher the level of aggregate unemployment around the individual, the less painful is the 
stigma associated with unemployment. Second, they further tested a habituation effect to recurrent 
episodes of unemployment, against the labor-market prospects argument that high unemployment 
rates signal more difficulties in finding another job, thus increasing the stress experiences around 
individual loss of employment. They found that people do not adapt to unemployment, and that higher 
regional unemployment leads to a significant decline in life satisfaction. Moreover, interacting macro 
and micro levels of employment uncertainty, they found no social-norm attenuation affect: the 
interaction is negative for German women, meaning that higher environmental unemployment 
increases the negative effects of being unemployed, while it is positive but not significant for men in 
Germany and for both men and women in Switzerland. 
Lange, Wolbers, Gesthuizen and Ultee (2014) studied specifically the interaction of macro and micro 
economic uncertainty on family formation in the Netherlands, testing instead the previously described 
affordability clause (Rindfuss and VandenHeuvel 1990), that is, the normative and material principle 
of being economically able to support a family (Oppenheimer 1988; Kreyenfeld et al 2012). They 
found that individuals postpone the first union and marriage, but not the first child, due to high 
unemployment rates. Individual-level job conditions, i.e. temporary employment or unemployment, 
also do not seem to “prevent people from making long-term family commitments” (Lange et al 2014: 
161). Finally, the authors didn’t find that macro- and micro-level insecurities reinforce each other or 
that they vary between individuals with different educational qualifications. 
 
 
In summary, the empirical evidence points to a generally negative effect of employment 
uncertainty on fertility. The most solid results indicate that the largest and more robust negative effect 
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on birth concerns men’s unemployment, and in particular the transition to first births (see for the US 
Amialchuck 2013 and Lindo 2010). Women’s unemployment has also been found to be negatively 
associated with fertility in some studies (Rindfuss et al. 1988); Macunovich 1996), but more recent 
and qualitative studies (Edin and Kefalas 2005) found instead that women in very low socioeconomic 
strata might compensate for the instability in their economic and working environment by reverting to 
the role of mother. 
In the present and the following chapters I try to advance this debate on how economic and 
employment insecurity affect the transition to parenthood in the US. Specifically, I will focus on the 
employment instability generated by the Great Recession, trying to address if and how the individual 
(for both men and women) and the aggregate labor market conditions interact in their impact on first 
births. 
Having data that allows me to do so, the couple-perspective is another distinctive feature of the present 
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The model tests the hypothesis that both aggregate shocks to the labor market and individual 
job conditions have an impact on the transition to first birth. 
As mentioned, the main focus is thus on the labor market and the way it has changed during the 
financial and economic crisis, on the one hand directly for the individuals and their position in the job 
market, but on the other hand also at the state aggregate level. A third determinant of the model is the 
couple perspective. As is clear from recent research, we can no longer assume a male-breadwinner 
model where the dynamics of the household depend only on the economic and employment conditions 
of the male partner. Therefore the unit of analysis will be the couple and in particular the change in 
their working status combination across the years of the crisis. The process under investigation is the 
transition to the first child, or more precisely, the probability of couples with different combinations of 
employment status entering into parenthood. Equation (1) below illustrates formally the model of first 
-child probability102.  
 
𝑃𝑟 𝑌!, !!!,! = 1 =𝛽𝑋!,!!! + 𝛾𝑍!,!!! + 𝛿𝑋!,!!! ∗ 𝑍!,!!! + 𝜀!" 
 
𝜀!" = 𝜐! + 𝜇!,!  
 
The dependent variable is dichotomous and takes value 1 if the couple has a first child within 
the last 12 months before the interview (between t and t-1). In this way the independent variables, 
lagged by one wave, result measured around one year before childbirth (514 couples had their first 
child in the observed sample)103. 
There are two sets of explanatory variables in model (1): the XC covariate measured at the couple level 
and the ZS covariate measured at the aggregate level. The micro-level main explanatory variable is 
categorical and represents the couples’ combination of employment status (from 0 to 8): 0 for dual 
earners couples; 1-2 if the husband is employed and wife (or cohabiting woman) is either unemployed 
or out of the labor force (mainly housewives but also retired, disabled or students), 3-4 if the head of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
102	  I	  here	  acknowledge	  that	  the	  most	  efficient	  method	  to	  study	  the	  transition	  to	  the	  first	  child	  is	  Event	  History	  Analysis	  (EHA).	  For	  sake	  of	  simplicity	  I	  do	  
not	  do	  EHA	  in	  the	  present	  chapter,	  but	  I	  apply	  EHA	  in	  the	  following	  Chapter	  IV.	  
103	  Once	  couples	  have	  their	  first	  child	  in	  t+1	  they	  are	  excluded	  from	  the	  sample	  in	  t+2	  as	  they	  are	  not	  units	  of	  interest	  anymore.	  
(1)	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household is out of the labor force and the woman is either employed or unemployed; 5-6 if the 
husband is unemployed and the wife is either out of the labor force or employed, and finally the 
variable equals 7 when both members of the couple are out of the labor force and 8 if they are both 
unemployed104. The rationale of having this variable is to grasp whether there is a different impact of 
the husband’s and the wife’s labor-market position on the transition to parenthood, and test whether 
the conditions of being unemployed and out of the labor force differ in some way in their impact on 
first birth and across gender within the couple. Following the theoretical framework illustrated in 
Section 2.1, I assume that a positive impact on first births’ probability of dual earners (the reference 
category in the analyses) over any other kind of more economically insecure couples’ working 
combinations, signals the presence of an income effect of employment status on the propensity to 
parenthood. Finding instead a positive effect on first child of moving from a dual earners to a couple 
where only the head (or the wife) is employed would indicate that an opportunity-cost mechanism is at 
play; this is all the more so if the effect is positive in cases of being out of the labor force and maybe 
also more in cases where the wife becomes non-working. Given the already-reduced sample size it is 
not possible here to directly test the adverse and uncertainty reduction mechanisms that are more 
complicated to identify without further dividing the sample (i.e. across educational levels, age 
categories, or experience in the labor market). 
 
Income or earnings, though theoretically central, are not included in the present analysis 
because they would absorb the income effect of unemployment, and, moreover, earnings are known to 
be endogenous to childbearing because of the simultaneity of the decisions and selection effect 
(Amialchuk 2013, Walker 2002). Education is used here as a proxy of permanent income of an 
individual, even though education also might be endogenous if women withdraw from education to 
give birth. However, this seems not to be the case given the very little variation of the education 
variable across time within the individual. Head’s (and Wife’s) education was originally coded as a 
categorical variable: 1 for 0-5 grades, 2 for 6-8 grades, 3 for 9-11 grades, 4 for completed high school, 
5 for some non-academic training, 6 for some college and 8 for college plus some graduate studies. 
Since the lower educational categories are constant over time, given the age interval in which 
individuals were selected in the sample (16 years of age for women and 18 for men), to increase the 
within variation of the variable (FE models require independent variables to change across time for a 
substantial portion of the individuals) both heads’ and wives’ education were then re-categorized as 
dummies for Higher Education equal 1 if having some college, or college plus some graduate studies. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
104	  In	  an	  earlier	  specification	  this	  variable	  of	  couple-­‐working	  status	  the	  combination	  was	  coded	  more	  simply,	  pooling	  the	  categories	  of	  unemployed	  and	  
being	  out	  of	  the	  labor	  market	  resulting	  divided	  in:	  dual	  earners;	  head	  working	  wife	  not	  working;	  head	  not	  working	  wife	  working	  and	  both	  members	  out	  
of	  the	  labor	  market.	  Despite	  the	  greater	  simplicity	  of	  this	  latter	  specification	  the	  conditions	  of	  being	  unemployed	  and	  being	  out	  of	  the	  labor	  force	  have	  
such	  different	  implications	  for	  the	  argument	  of	  this	  investigation	  that,	  when	  possible,	  I	  think	  the	  distinction	  has	  to	  be	  made.	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105  In this way I expect the variable to vary more over time and not to be cancelled out in the FE 
model.106 
Besides education, the other controls are race107, woman’s age (linear and mean centered) and marital 
status, a categorical variable equal 1 if the head of the household is married, 2 if he has never been 
married and 3 if he is divorced, annulled or separated108.  
 
The aggregate-level explanatory variable, capturing macroeconomic labor insecurity, is the 
state-level yearly unemployment rate (average of monthly rates from the Bureau of Labor Statistics, 
mean-centered). To test whether unemployment has a non-linear effect on first child, unemployment 
quartiles (1 below 4.82%; 2 in 4.82-5.78%; 3 in 5.78-7.5%; and 4 for state unemployment above 
7.5%) are also included as alternative model specification. Here I test whether there is a higher-level 
economic insecurity that goes beyond the individual conditions (Kreyenfeld 2012) affecting 
childbearing. 
Finally, I am also interested in the cross-level interaction of the two explanatory variables: individual 
and aggregate job market conditions, to investigate whether the effect of employment insecurity on 
first births differs depending on the macroeconomic environment. The question I try to answer here is 
whether states’ rising unemployment rates have an attenuating or a multiplicative negative effect on 




	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
105	  The	  variable	  is	  lagged	  to	  the	  year	  before	  birth	  so	  as	  to	  avoid	  reverse	  causation.	  
106	  Given	   the	   small	   sample	   size	   I	   avoided	   including	   other	   controls,	   even	   though	   the	   richness	   of	   the	   survey	   would	   have	   allowed	   me	   to	   use	   House	  
Ownership	  and	  House	  Typology,	  number	  of	  siblings	  of	  both	  members	  in	  the	  couple,	  and	  others.	  
107	  Originally	  coded	  in	  detail	  (White,	  Black,	  Native	  American,	  Asian,	  Latino	  and	  Other),	  in	  the	  descriptive	  analysis,	  for	  sample	  size	  reasons,	  has	  been	  re-­‐
categorized	  as	  only	  White,	  Black	  and	  others	  in	  the	  multivariate	  regression	  analysis.	  
108	  Marriage	  most	  probably	  mediates	  the	  effect	  of	  the	  crisis	  on	  fertility	  since	  the	  latter	  is	  likely	  to	  have	  a	  depressing	  effect	  on	  marriage,	  which	  is	  still	  a	  
strong	  channel	  of	  transition	  to	  childbearing,	  even	  though	  aggregate	  trends	  only	  suggest	  moderate	  changes	  in	  marriage	  and	  cohabitation	  (Cherlin	  2013)	  
that	  are	  more	  likely	  attributable	  to	  long-­‐term	  trends	  rather	  than	  to	  the	  Great	  Recession.	  Marriage	  rates	  have	  been	  declining	  since	  the	  1980s	  and,	  at	  the	  
same	  pace,	  they	  continued	  to	  decline	  during	  the	  crisis,	  in	  2007-­‐2010	  (US	  National	  Center	  for	  Health	  Statistics,	  CDC	  NCHS,	  2012	  and	  Cherlin	  2013).	  	  
The	  issue	  of	  mediation	  of	  marital	  status	  is	  treated	  more	  in	  depth	  in	  Chapter	  IV	  where	  both	  single	  and	  partnered	  women	  are	  included	  in	  the	  analysis.	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When studying employment and fertility it must be taken into consideration that a process of 
selection is occurring109; in other words, that there are unobserved characteristics of men and women 
that both influence the entrance/exit from the labor market and the probability of having children. One 
way to overcome this problem is to use panel data and control for those individual unobserved traits. 
As illustrated in model (1) the error term can be then considered as composed by the unobserved 
heterogeneity of the individual υi plus a true pure random component µi,t. The panel structure with 
Fixed Effects (FE) helps to deal with the selection because it controls for all time-constant 
characteristics. This is as though individuals were used as controls for themselves, because it only uses 
the within- individual variation to estimate the effects of the covariates on the dependent variable.  
Fixed-effect models are usually preferred because they suffer less from omitted variables bias, 
compared to random or between-effects models. However as Allison (2005) put it: whenever the 
within individual variation of explanatory variables is low, FE estimates are very imprecise and 
standard errors might become “too large to tolerate” (Allison 2005). Also, even though FE models are 
indeed a powerful instrument to control selection, in the case of dichotomous outcomes they are even 
more problematic. 
The Logistic model is a non-linear model used by sociologists and demographers to study fertility, to 
which the panel FE structure is applied. However, in most cases, the estimator is inconsistent owing to 
the incidental parameters problem110 caused by having T (fixed) observations per individual i, thus an 
increasing sample, but a fixed number of parameters to estimate (the individual fixed effects). In linear 
FE, with least squares estimation, we can in any case estimate individual effects ui (the randomness in 
the parameters is averaged out), or difference out individual effects, and coefficients are still 
consistent111 in both cases. In non-linear FE models, with maximum likelihood estimation, coefficients 
are inconsistent because the randomness in the estimation of the ui cannot be averaged out as is 
possible in linear models. Moreover, in non-linear FE models we cannot simply get rid of the 
individual effects by differencing them out with within estimation (exactly because of the non-
linearity of the model).  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
109	  There	  is	  also	  an	  issue	  of	  reverse	  causation,	  namely	  that	  when	  pregnant,	  women	  leave	  work.	  And	  there	  is	  quite	  a	  lot	  of	  evidence	  that	  this	  is	  the	  case	  in	  
the	  US	   (Chang	  and	  Wu	  2009,	  unpublished;	  US	  Census	  Bureau	  2011;	  Livingstone	  2014,	  Pew	  Research	  Center	  Report).	  However,	   this	  problem	  can	  be	  
largely	  overcome	  by	  lagging	  the	  independent	  variables	  on	  labor	  market	  condition	  by	  one	  year,	  or	  more,	  before	  the	  birth	  of	  the	  child.	  
110	  “The	  justification	  for	  maximum	  likelihood	  estimators	  is	  usually	  asymptotic,	  which	  means	  that	  it’s	  based	  on	  how	  the	  estimators	  behave	  as	  the	  sample	  
gets	  large.	  However,	  the	  validity	  of	  that	  justification	  depends	  on	  the	  presumption	  that	  the	  number	  of	  parameters	  remains	  constant,	  as	  the	  sample	  gets	  
larger.	  For	   longitudinal	  data,	   that	  works	   just	   fine	   if	   the	  number	  of	   individuals	   remains	   constant	  but	   the	  number	  of	  observations	  per	   individual	   gets	  
larger.	  But	  if	  the	  number	  of	  individuals	  gets	  larger	  while	  the	  number	  of	  time	  points	  remains	  constant,	  then	  the	  number	  of	  parameters	  in	  a	  fixed	  effects	  
model	   (including	   coefficients	   of	   the	  dummy	  variables)	   increases	   at	   the	   same	   rate	   as	   the	   sample	   size.	   This	   is	   not	   a	   problem	  with	   linear	  models	   and	  
(somewhat	  surprisingly)	  for	  the	  Poisson	  models.	  But	  it	  is	  a	  serious	  problem	  with	  logistic	  regression	  and	  many	  other	  nonlinear	  regression	  models.	  The	  
biases	   are	   greatest	  when	   the	   number	   of	   time	   points	   per	   individual	   is	   small.	   The	   solution	   to	   this	   problem	   is	   to	   do	   conditional	  maximum	   likelihood	  
(Chamberlain	  1980)	  […]”	  Allison,	  Paul	  David	  (2005).	  Fixed	  effects	  regression	  methods	  for	  longitudinal	  data:	  Using	  SAS.	  Vol.	  SAS	  Institute.	  	  
111	  A	  consistent	  estimator	   is	  an	  asymptotically	  unbiased	  estimator,	  meaning	  that	  as	  n	  grows	  to	   infinity	  the	  distribution	  of	  the	  estimator	  converges	   in	  
probability	  to	  the	  true	  parameter	  object	  of	  estimation.	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This is why the Conditional Maximum Likelihood (CML) estimation is used, which 
transforms the ML function as dependent on the β and not on the ui: the CML estimator is consistent, 
even though very model-specific, and it works only with the Logistic form112. In practice, the 
Conditional logit estimates the ordinary logit within groups - it models the probability of the outcome 
being 1 in group 1, conditional on observing that outcome in that group - where each group is the 
individual over time. 
Moreover, the CML method works only with the subsample of individuals who present a change in the 
dependent variable (we lose many observations compared to the linear FE) since groups that contain 
all-positive or all-negative outcomes do not provide information because the conditional probability of 
observing such groups is 1 regardless of the parameters. In a logistic regression with FE, in fact, if the 
dependent variable is always 0 or always 1 then (the maximum likelihood estimator of) the coefficient 
of that individual’s fixed effect is infinite in magnitude. The fixed effect for that individual becomes a 
perfect predictor113 of the outcome. In a simple linear regression, perfect prediction does not ‘blow up’ 
estimates; the fixed effect for that individual is simply equal to 0, which does not prevent estimation, 
and this is the reason why observations are not dropped from the linear analysis as they are in the 
logistic. For example in the present case the sample size drops substantially, from around 1400 
individuals (roughly 3000 observations) to 400 (around 1400 observations). 
Changes in the covariates are thus used to explain changes in the observed sequence of outcomes yi1 
… yiT. Differencing the covariates removes all the variables that are constant over time (i.e. gender, 
birth year, etc.) so that the intercept cannot be estimated. In the same fashion the Conditional Logit 
also removes the individual effects ui, such that no assumptions about it have to be made, but as a 
consequence it cannot be estimated. The fact that the intercept remains unestimated explains why 
predicted probabilities and marginal effects cannot be obtained – or it makes little sense to get them: 
the predicted probabilities we get114 are the conditional probabilities of a positive outcome, given a 
single positive outcome within the group, which is different from the overall probability of a positive 
outcome you get after a simple logit. The only way to get predicted probabilities and marginal effects 
is to calculate them assuming that the individual fixed effect is zero, an extremely unrealistic 
assumption, forcing the group specific deviations to be zero (i.e. you obtain the probabilities for the 
average group). If you do not set these group deviations to zero they are left unspecified, because the 
model does not estimate them. Hence they will not appear in the variance covariance matrix and the 
delta method will not estimate it115. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
112	  Fixed	  Effects	  non-­‐linear	  Model	  is	  only	  allowed	  with	  the	  logistic	  functional	  form.	  
113	  Perfect	  prediction	  is	  also	  defined	  as	  complete	  separation.	  
114	  With	  the	  usual	  command	  PREDICT	  after	  a	  CLOGIT.	  
115	  “The	  fixed	  effects	  logit	  estimator	  of	  β	  immediately	  gives	  us	  the	  effect	  of	  each	  element	  of	  xi	  on	  the	  log-­‐odds	  ratio…	  Unfortunately,	  we	  cannot	  estimate	  
the	  partial	  effects…	  unless	  we	  plug	  in	  a	  value	  for	  αi.	  	  Because	  the	  distribution	  of	  αi	  is	  unrestricted	  –	  in	  particular,	  E[αi]	  is	  not	  necessarily	  zero	  –	  it	  is	  hard	  
to	  know	  what	   to	  plug	   in	   for	  αi.	   	   In	  addition,	  we	  cannot	  estimate	  average	  partial	  effects,	  as	  doing	  so	  would	  require	   finding	  E[Λ(xit	  β+	  αi)],	   a	   task	   that	  
apparently	  requires	  specifying	  a	  distribution	  for	  αi.”Wooldridge,	  J.	  (2002).	  Econometric	  Analysis	  of	  Cross	  Section	  and	  Panel	  Data.	  Vol.	  MIT	  Press.	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These are some of the reasons for preferring the Fixed Effects Linear Probability Model 
(LPM) even if the dependent variable is binary (0,1). LPM is simple to implement, its coefficients 
have a very straightforward interpretation compared to non-linear models, its sample size is reasonable 
and the model is relatively stable. Finally, the marginal effects in the logit model equal the estimates in 
the LPM in the cross-sectional setting. However, the LPM itself suffers from some often cited- 
problems when applied: first, the predicted probabilities of the outcome may fall outside the 
admissible [0,1] interval, second, the variance of the error terms is not constant but depends on the 
independent variables, i.e. errors are Heteroskedastic (though the robust standard errors option would 
solve the problem) but most importantly, the effect of the covariate Xj on the dependent variable is 
constant at βj, independent of the value of Xj and other covariates, which is usually not the case in 
non-linear models. When analyzing binary responses we are, in fact, modeling the underlying 
probability of Outcome=1 and non-linear methods would be most appropriate for this, even though it 
is more difficult to estimate coefficients because in a non-linear setting the coefficients are not directly 
tied to the marginal effects. However, when coming to comparing the LPM to the Conditional Logit 
the drawbacks and complexity of the latter seems to be large and this is the reason why in the 
literature, despite the attractiveness of non-linear models, LPM is still widely used and there are plenty 
of empirical rationales for it. For instance, McGarry (2000) appeals to the ease of interpretation of 
estimated marginal effects, while Fairlie and Sundstrom (1999) prefer LPM because it implies a 
simple expression for the change in unemployment rate between two censuses. Currie and Gruber 
(1996) state that logit, probit, and OLS are similar and only report LPM results. 
In the case of panel data, moreover, the great complexity – described above – is usually a reason for 
preferring LPM to the Conditional Logit (see Klaassen and Magnus 2001; Horrace and Oaxaca 2006). 
 
A final remark must be made regarding the structure of the research questions of this 
chapter116. In fact, despite the structure of the data and the hypotheses outlined in this and the previous 
sections being hierarchical in nature, I did not mention until now the possibility of using a Multilevel 
model. The hypothesis of a cross-level interaction between aggregate (i.e. state-level), and couple-
level explanatory variables would suggest a statistical model with a hierarchical structure too. 
However, cross-level interactions can be tested in both panel fixed-effect models and multilevel 
(random effects) models and there are two reasons justifying my preference for a panel FE model: 
first, the model is quite complex and the sample size (see the next section) is small, and second, I am 
not specifically interested in estimating the second-level independent-variables (i.e. US states) effect 
on first births but only on the effect of macroeconomic conditions and their moderating/multiplicative 
effect on first level (i.e. employment status) explanatory variables, net of other state specificities. All 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
116	  The	  same	  argument	  applies	  also	  to	  the	  next	  chapter.	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in all, a multilevel model would have increased complexity without yielding significant gains in terms 
of estimation.117 
In conclusion, the model I will test in the multivariate regression analyses in Section 6 is the Fixed 
Effects LPM model of the probability of first birth. Standard errors are panel-corrected robust SE to 
account for the autocorrelation of the panel data structure.  
As a benchmark to evaluate the FE model estimates, and to identify if there is a selection effect into 
the estimates, I illustrate, first, the naïve cross-sectional estimates pooling observations together (and 
also separate by periods) and, second, the estimates of a Between Model (BE) to compare the 
estimates coming from the variation between individuals to the variation within individuals of the FE 
models. The BE model, in fact, controls for omitted variables that change over time but that are 
constant between cases (contrary to the FE model that controls for omitted units characteristics 
constant over time). In practice it averages variables over time within each individual. Comparing the 
BE and FE models is useful to grasp the complete picture, also regarding the argument above on the 
hierarchical structure of the hypothesis involving cross-level interaction. 
  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
117	  To	  control	  for	  geographical	  differences	  and	  since	  within	  migration	  in	  the	  US	  is	  quite	  frequent,	  following	  Oesch	  and	  Lipps	  (2012),	  I	  add	  to	  the	  fixed	  
effect	  model	  a	  dummy	  variable	   for	   state	  of	   residence	   in	   the	  US.	  See	   the	   results	   in	  Section	  6	  and	   footnotes	  138-­‐140,	   for	  a	  detailed	   illustration	  of	   the	  
robustness	  checks	  conducted	  in	  this	  respect.	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I used the Panel Survey of Income Dynamics (PSID) as a dataset. This is a biennial 
longitudinal survey that started in 1968. The PSID originates from the antecedent Survey of Economic 
Opportunity (SEO)118, whose original aim was to study the dynamics of income and poverty, from 
which 1872 low-income families were selected and to which a nationally representative group of 2930 
families119 was added. In total 18000 individuals were living in these families selected in 1968, 
constituting the core of the sample. Before 1997 the survey was annual, while it became biennial 
thereafter. The way subsequent waves are constructed is the following: any individual born to, adopted 
by, or married to a member of the original sample becomes part of the PSID study and, as members 
(children) move out of parental house and establish their independent units, they are interviewed as 
new families.120 Following children as they become adults is a unique survey design that helps 
maintaining the national representativeness of the survey, together with facilitating intergenerational 
studies (McGonagle et al., 2012).  
A single primary adult is the main respondent to the questionnaire and he (or she in the case of a 
single woman) is defined as the Head of the family. The Wife is defined so if she is married to the 
Head, otherwise she is defined as Cohabiting Wife. Demographic, educational and labor market 
information is available for every member of the family, classified in terms of his/her relationship to 
the Head of the family. To maximize consistency over time in the PSID survey the same family 
member is interviewed in each wave121. Response rates are equal or higher than comparable panel 
surveys worldwide (McGonagle et al. 2012: 270)122123. Despite the modest wave-to-wave attrition, the 
representativeness of PSID of the US population is supported by the close alignment of weighted 
estimates with those from other surveys like the March Current Population Survey for income, the 
Survey of Consumer Finances for wealth or the American Time Use Survey. PSID has also low item 
non-response, with only a few items with missing responses for more than 3-4% of the individuals 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
118	  Conducted	  by	  the	  Office	  of	  Economic	  Opportunity	  directed	  by	  the	  U.S.	  Bureau	  of	  the	  Census.	  
119	  The	  sample	  was	  designed	  by	  the	  Survey	  Research	  Center	  (SRC)	  at	  the	  University	  of	  Michigan.	  
120	  In	  1990,	  2043	  Latino	  households	  were	  added	  but	  because	  the	  group	  did	  not	  include	  all	  post-­‐1968	  immigrants,	  and	  because	  of	  funding	  reasons,	  the	  
Latino	  immigrant	  group	  was	  dropped	  in	  1995.	  In	  1997	  some	  families	  were	  dropped	  because	  of	  the	  rapid	  increase	  in	  the	  size	  of	  the	  PSID	  sample	  and	  the	  
financial	  costs	  implied	  by	  this	  escalation	  in	  size,	  while	  511	  immigrant	  families	  were	  added	  to	  maintain	  the	  representativeness	  of	  the	  sample.	  	  
121	  Approximately	  95%	  of	  families	  have	  the	  same	  respondent	  in	  successive	  waves.	  
122	  “Response	   rates	   are	   calculated	   for	   each	   of	   the	   "sample	   types"	  within	  PSID.	   The	   sample	   is	   defined	   across	   two	  different	   strata:	   first,	  whether	   it	   is	  
considered	  "core"	  versus	  "immigrant	  refresher",	  and	  second,	  whether	  in	  the	  previous	  wave,	  the	  sample	  type	  is	  "re-­‐interview"	  versus	  "split-­‐off"	  versus	  
"re-­‐contact."	   In	   regards	   to	   the	   first	   strata,	   the	   "core"	   sample	   consists	  of	   all	   families	   except	   those	  added	   in	   the	  1997	   immigrant	   refresher	   sample.	   In	  
regards	  to	  the	  second	  strata,	  the	  “re-­‐interview	  sample”	  includes	  families	  who	  were	  successfully	  interviewed	  in	  the	  previous	  wave.	  “Split-­‐off”	  families	  
consist	  of	  individuals	  who	  left	  a	  PSID	  family	  unit	  and	  established	  their	  own	  economically	  independent	  unit.	  Finally,	  the	  “re-­‐contact”	  sample	  consists	  of	  
families	  who	   did	   not	   respond	   in	   the	   previous	  wave,	   but	  were	   respondents	   in	   the	  wave	   before	   the	   previous	  wave.	   PSID	   attempts	   to	   re-­‐contact	   and	  
interview	   these	   families	   in	   subsequent	  waves,	   as	   a	  way	   to	  minimize	   attrition	  and	  maintain	   the	   representativeness	  of	   the	   sample”	   (McGonagle	   et	   al,	  
2012:	  270).	  
123	  “Despite	  consistently	  high	  response	  rates,	  there	  is	  evidence	  that	  lower-­‐income	  families	  have	  higher	  cumulative	  attrition	  (e.g.	  Fitzgerald	  et	  al	  1998;	  
Fitzgerald	  2011).	  However,	  parameter	  estimates	  of	  interest	  have	  not	  been	  found	  to	  be	  biased.	  In	  a	  recent	  analysis	  of	  the	  effects	  of	  cumulative	  attrition	  in	  
PSID	  up	  to	  2007,	  Fitzgerald	  (2011)	  finds	  little	  or	  no	  evidence	  of	  biased	  estimates	  of	  sibling	  correlations,	  or	  of	  parameters,	  in	  inter-­‐generational	  models	  
of	  health	  outcomes.”	  (McGonagle	  et	  al,	  2012:	  272).	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(Killewald et al 2011)124. Finally, the PSID data are publicly available125 with nearly 70000 variables 
from over 70000 individuals, and covering over 44 years (McGonagle et al. 2012: 272)126. 
 
For the construction of the sample, I started with the panel from 2003 to 2011 (last 5 waves) 
with 4631 Heads. I dropped widowed and individuals without a wife or a cohabiting woman in the 
family unit since I do not have any information on the non-cohabiting partner characteristics127. From 
them I also excluded those residing outside the US, to whom I could not attach any macroeconomic 
variable. The remaining sample is composed of 2211 couples (5375 observations128), 59.2% of which 
are married at the time when they entered the survey129, 33.9% have never been married (are 
cohabiting) and 6.8% are either divorced or separated (0.1% have missing information on marital 




	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
124	  “Although	   families	   comprised	   entirely	   of	   post-­‐1997	   immigrants	   are	   not	   part	   of	   the	   sampling	   frame,	   this	   group	   is	   a	   small	   segment	   of	   the	   U.S.	  
population	  and	  over	  time	  joins	  the	  PSID	  sample	  through	  intermarriage.	  Nonetheless,	  the	  addition	  of	  a	  post-­‐1997	  immigrant	  refresher	  sample	  remains	  a	  
high	  priority	  for	  the	  project’s	  strategic	  plan”	  (McGonagle	  et	  al,	  2012:	  272).	  
125	  http://psidonline.isr.umich.edu	  
126	  The	  PSID	  sample	  design	  is	  similar	  in	  its	  basic	  structure	  to	  the	  multi-­‐stage	  designs	  used	  for	  major	  survey	  programs.	  The	  survey	  literature	  refers	  to	  
these	   samples	   as	   complex	   designs,	   since	   the	   sample	   incorporates	   special	   design	   features	   such	   as	   stratification,	   clustering	   and	   differential	   selection	  
probabilities	   (i.e.,	   weighting).	   Longitudinal	   individual	   weights,	   longitudinal	   family	   weights,	   and	   cross-­‐sectional	   individual	   weights	   are	   provided	   to	  
account	   for	   differential	   probabilities	   of	   selection.	   A	   standard	   statistical	   analysis	   typically	   assumes	   instead	   simple	   random	   sampling	   (SRS)	   or	  
independence	   of	   observations	   in	   computing	   standard	   errors	   for	   sample	   estimates.	   In	   general,	   the	   SRS	   assumption	   results	   in	   underestimation	   of	  
variances	   of	   survey	   estimates	   of	   descriptive	   statistics	   and	   model	   parameters.	   Confidence	   intervals	   based	   on	   computed	   variances	   that	   assume	  
independence	  of	  observations	  will	  be	  biased.	  Likewise,	  test	  statistics	  computed	  in	  complex	  survey	  data	  analysis	  using	  standard	  programs	  will	  tend	  to	  be	  
biased	  upward	  and	  overstate	  the	  significance	  of	  tests	  of	  effects.	  (Heeringa	  et	  al.	  2011:	  3)	  
However,	   the	   survey	   literature	   also	   has	   highlighted	   reasons	   for	   not	   using	  weights	   in	   the	   analysis:	   first	   of	   all,	   weights	   primarily	   adjust	  means	   and	  
proportions	   and	   therefore	   are	   useful	  mostly	   for	   descriptive	   purposes,	   while	   doing	   inference	   their	   results	   are	  more	   problematic.	   Second,	  weights	   -­‐	  
increasing	   the	   standard	   errors	   of	   estimates	   -­‐	   introduce	   quite	   a	   lot	   of	   instability	   into	   the	   data.	   There	   is	   thus	   a	   trade-­‐off	   between	   instability	   and	  
representativeness	  of	  the	  estimates.	  
Instead	  of	  directly	  using	  weights,	  an	  alternative	  would	  be	  to	  include	  in	  the	  model,	  as	  additional	  independent	  variables,	  all	  the	  variables	  used	  to	  generate	  
the	  weights.	   In	   this	  way	  results	  yield	  unbiased	  estimates	  and	  standard	  errors.	  Another	  option	   is	   to	   include	  directly	   in	   the	  model,	  as	  a	  regressor,	   the	  
weights:	   if	   they	  are	   found	  to	  be	  significant,	   it	  means	  there	   is	  endogenous	  weighting	  and	  you	  have	  to	  weight	  observations.	  Here,	  since	  weights	  result	  
substantially	  and	  statistically	  insignificant,	  and	  the	  model	  is	  already	  quite	  complex	  and	  fragile	  (see	  following	  paragraphs),	  I	  preferred	  not	  to	  use	  them.	  
Detailed	  information	  about	  weights	  is	  available	  at	  http://psidonline.isr.umich.edu/Guide/documents.aspx.	  
127	  Technically	  I	  do	  not	  even	  know	  if	  there	  is	  a	  non-­‐cohabiting	  partner.	  
128	  For	  the	  regression	  analysis	  I	  dropped	  the	  observations	  after	  the	  first	  child	  is	  born;	  therefore	  the	  final	  N	  in	  the	  regression	  models	  is	  4716.	  Moreover,	  
considering	  the	  missing	  values	  in	  the	  explanatory	  variables	  and	  the	  controls,	  and	  the	  necessity	  to	  lag	  those	  independent	  variables	  to	  the	  previous	  wave,	  
in	  the	  regression	  the	  sample	  size	  shrinks	  even	  further	  to	  around	  2500	  observations.	  
129	  The	  time	  of	  entry	  (wave)	  can	  be	  different	  for	  different	  couples.	  
130	  To	  restrict	  the	  sample	  to	  potential	  mothers.	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Table 3.1: Descriptive statistics on couples’ demographic composition. 
 Number of couples Percentage 
Marital Status   
Married 1309 59.2% 
Never Married 749 33.9% 
Separated or Divorced 151 6.8% 
Missing 2 0.1% 
Among racially homogamous   
Married 3532 75.3% 
Never Married 959 20.4% 
Separated or Divorced 200 4.3% 
Among racially Heterogamous   
Married 444 65.1% 
Never Married 197 28.9% 
Separated or Divorced 41 6% 
Ethnic Composition (Homogamous)   
Among married couples   
White  874 66.8% 
Black  238 18.2% 
Asian  11 0.8% 
Latino  11 0.8% 
Native Americans  4 0.3% 
Other races  14 1.1% 
Among cohabiting couples   
White  383 51.1% 
Black  216 28.84% 
Asian  1 0.1% 
Latino  1 0.1% 
Native Americans  2 0.3% 
Other races  18 2.4% 
Ethnic Composition (Heterogamous)   
Among married couples   
Black head – White wife 32 2.44% 
White head – Black wife 12 0.9% 
Other race head – White wife 69 7.3% 
White head – Other race wife 61 6.5% 
Among cohabiting couples   
Black head – White wife 46 6.1% 
White head – Black wife 5 0.7% 
Other race head – White wife 68 15% 
White head – Other race wife 33 7.9% 
Education°   
Heads with High Education 565 25.6% 
Wives with High Education 715 32.3% 
Educational Composition   
Among married couples   
Homogamous High Edu 329 25.1% 
Homogamous Low Edu 783 59.8% 
High Edu head – Low Edu wife 56 4.3% 
Low Edu head – High Edu wife 141 10.8% 
Among cohabiting couples   
Homogamous High Edu 128 17.1% 
Homogamous Low Edu 510 68.1% 
High Edu head – Low Edu wife 27 3.6% 
Low Edu head – High Edu wife 84 11.2% 
Source: Elaboration of the author based on PSID data. °High education is ‘at least some college’ and low education is completed high school or having some 
non-academic training besides high school. 
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Table 3.1 illustrates the descriptive composition of the couples in terms of demographic 
characteristics by marital status. White couples prevail in the ethnic composition of the racially 
homogamous married couples (67%), while among the homogamous cohabiters 50% are White 
couples and one-third of is African American. 
Mixed couples exist but they are rare, and among them cohabitation is more diffused that among 
homogamous couples (almost 30% of the heterogamous cohabit versus 20% of the homogamous). 
White women tend to marry interracially slightly more often than White men: 7.3% of White women 
married a man of a different race, while the opposite happens in 6.5% of the cases. A much larger 
gender difference exists among cohabiters: 15% of White women cohabit in a mixed couple while 
only 7.9% of White men cohabite with a non-White woman. 
In terms of education, both among married and cohabiting couples, the large majority of couples are 
homogamous with low education (around 60% and 70% respectively in the two groups), while only 
one-fourth of married couples and 17% of the cohabiters both have high education. Women marry 
educationally downward more often than men, confirming the recent trend in the US identified in 
Section 1 (Livingstone G., 2014, Pew Research Center; Bureau of Labor Statistics; OECD). In fact, 
10.8% of married women with high education (at least some college) have less-educated partners 
whereas for men this happens in only the 4.3% of the cases. These percentages do not change much 
looking at cohabiting couples, even though in the latter case the highlighted trend is slightly more 
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As illustrated in the data section (see Table 3.1), the sample of couples presents some 
heterogeneity in terms of racial, educational and marital status composition. Around 40% are non-
White, one-third are cohabiting couples, and women are more educated than men (one-third of women 
have at least some college while only 25% of men do) and tend to marry educationally upward and 
interracially more often than their male counterparts131. Bearing in minds these characteristics and 
before showing the main results of the analysis, it is worthwhile describing the distribution in the 
sample of the dependent variable, first births. 
Figure 3.4 depicts the percentage distribution of first births in the sample by mothers’ age. In the 
sample we find two peaks: a first one in the early twenties, and a second one around age 29. The mean 
wife age at birth in the sample is 26.6 years (the median is 27), slightly above the national average of 
almost 26 years (2012 estimate from CDC). 
 
Figure 3.4: Percentage distribution of first births by mothers’ age. 
 
Source: Elaboration of the author based on PSID data. 
 
Figure 3.5 illustrates the distribution of first birth episodes by Heads’ ethnicity: 68% (345) of 
the 514 total births in the sample, happen in couples where the head is White non-Hispanics, 24.5% 
(124) of births are to Black heads, around 2% (9) are to White Hispanics, and 1.2% are of Asian (6) 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  








16 18 20 22 24 26 28 30 32 34 36 38 40 42 44
Age
Wife age distribution at first birth
	   118	  
and Native American (6) heads (17 births are from couples with head of other ethnicities and 7 births 
are to couples of both head and wife of unknown ethnicity).  
Concerning couples’ ethnic composition (not shown): 65% first births are to White-White couples, 
18.5% are to Black-Black couples and 5% are to Black-head White-wife couples (the other 
combinations are all below 1%).  
 
Figure 3.5: Percentage distribution of first births by head’s race. 
 
Source: Elaboration of the author based on PSID data. 
 
  
Turning to the main individual-level explanatory variable, Figure 3.6 illustrates the 
distribution of couples’ working status combination132, by survey wave: bars indicate the proportion of 
couples in each of the eight combinations of dual earners, head or wife employed, out of labor force 
and unemployed, or both out of the labor force or both members unemployed (see also Table A2.2 in 
Appendix 2). Between 2003 and 2011 the proportion of dual-earner couples declines from more than 
73% to 59%, while the couples in which both members are out unemployed more than double, going 
from 0.8% to 1.95%. During the same period couples where only the head is working rise from 10% to 
17.5% with women going out of the labor force and from 4.7% to 6.5% with wives being unemployed. 
Wives are the only workers with an unemployed husband in 4% of the couples in 2003 but this 
proportion increases to 7.9% in 2009 and it goes down to 6.4% in 2011133. All in all, these descriptive 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
132	  Episodes	  in	  person-­‐years.	  
133	  The	  same	  figure	  (not	  shown)	  across	  educational	  levels	  indicate	  that	  this	  time	  trend	  is	  common	  to	  both	  types	  of	  households	  (high/low	  educated:	  high	  
education	   means	   having	   some	   college	   or	   more):	   between	   2003	   and	   2011	   the	   proportion	   (100%	   is	   year/education	   combination)	   of	   dual	   earners	  
declined	  while	  that	  of	  couples	  with	  both	  members	  out	  of	  the	  labor	  market	  increased	  (as	  did	  only	  head	  working).	  The	  changes	  over	  time	  are	  however	  
more	  pronounced	  for	  the	  low-­‐educated:	  the	  drop	  in	  dual-­‐earners	  couples	  was	  around	  20%	  (less	  than	  10%	  in	  highly	  educated)	  and	  the	  increase	  in	  non-­‐
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estimates confirm the increasing difficulties faced by households in the labor market during the years 
of the crisis. 
 
Figure 3.6: Percentage distribution of couples’ working status across waves. 
 
Source: Elaboration of the author based on PSID data. 
 
To get a more detailed idea of how these couples’ working combinations look like, Figure 3.7 
illustrates for each couples’ working status the detailed status of the wife. For instance, in only around 
15-17% of the cases when wife is unemployed, she is just temporarily laid-off (depending on the 
husband working status). More interestingly, when we consider women who are out of the labor force, 
in the majority of the cases they are housewives (72% in the couples where the husband is employed; 
68% when the husband is unemployed and 50% when both members are out of the labor force)134. 
Finally, in around 20% of the couples where the wife is out of the labor force, she is still a student. 
Since each category has a different probability of parenthood, this more detailed picture will help later 
on in interpreting the results of the analysis. 
 
  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
education	   levels	   in	  2003	  (around	  13/15%)	  but	   the	  difference	  grew	   larger	  and	  by	  2011	   in	   low	  educated	  couples	   the	  share	  got	   to	  almost	  25%	  (20	   in	  
highly	  educated).	  
134	  In	  42%	  of	  the	  couples	  where	  both	  husband	  and	  wife	  are	  out	  of	  the	  labor	  force,	  the	  wife	  is	  disabled,	  meaning	  that	  these	  couples	  are	  probably	  those	  
with	  the	  smallest	  probability	  of	  having	  a	  baby.	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Figure 3.7: Percentage distribution of wives’ working status by couple’s working status combinations. 
 
Source: Elaboration of the author based on PSID data. Cells size:333 couples are HD employed – WF out of LF; 101 couples are HD employed – WF 
unemployed; 83 couples are HD out of FL – WF employed; 7 couples are HD out of FL – WF unemployed; 22 couples are HD unemployed – WF out of LF; 115 
couples are HD unemployed – WF employed and finally in 26 couples both HD and WF are out of LF and in 18 they are both unemployed. 
 
Figure 3.8 (see also Table A2.3 in Appendix 2) depicts couples’ working-status combination 
around first births episodes, instead of pooling observations by survey wave. Here I use a less refined 
categorization of the couples’ working status combination (in four categories: dual earners, head or 
wife only working and both non-working) so as to not complicate the picture too much.  
The first group of bars from the left includes all episodes of childlessness in the sample, for couples 
who do not have children during the whole period of observation (the period of observation might be 
different for each individual)135. Almost 70% of childless couples are dual earners, more than 19% 
have only the head in the labor market (only wife is 7.8%) and 3.4% of them have both members not 
working.  
The second group of bars describes the working-status combination of couples who reported having 
had their first child 36 months later: 83% of those having a child in three years where in a dual-earner 
couple, and for 10% of them only the wife was working. The third group of bars reports the same 
combination around conception time: still in more than 80% of the couples both members are 
working, while only-husband-working couples grow to 9.6% and only-wife-working couples go down 
to slightly more than 8%.  
Despite being just descriptive and preliminary, these graphs are useful to understand how, on average, 
couples’ working-status combination might change around the first birth and to compare those to 
couples that do not have babies. For instance, compared to childless couples it seems that future 
parents around conception are more often both in the labor market. The closer we get to the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
135	  As	  before,	  observations	  are	  episodes,	  namely	  person-­‐years.	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conception date the more women seem to leave the market and the couples where only the head works 
increase.  
 
Figure 3.8: Percentage distribution of couples’ working status (before/after first birth). 
 




Finally, for comparison, I also included episodes after birth, and the results are interesting: 12 
to 36 months after the first child is born (last two groups on the right of Figure 3.8) the proportion of 
dual-earner couples goes down to 51% in favor of an almost 40% of couples where only the man is 
working. Wife-working couples drop to less than 5%. After the birth of the child the percentage of 
couples with working women seem to be less, in favor of a male-breadwinner household model where 
only the man works (although there is a small return of women to work after 3 years from birth).  
This process has been identified in many countries (Angrist and Evans 1998; Anon 2014; Chang and 
Wu 2009; Gutierrez-Domenech 2005; de Laat and Sevilla-Sanz 2011; Matysiak and Vignoli 2008, 
2010, 2013; Vignoli 2013; Vignoli and Salvini 2008) especially in traditional ones and in those 
countries that provide poor public child care and parental leave. 
In the US as already mentioned in Section 1, almost one-third of mothers are out of the labor force to 
take care of the family, 4% of whom are highly qualified women (opt-out mothers; Belkin 2003). A 
survey conducted in 2009 by the Center for Work and Life Policy, on the labor market participation of 
mothers shows that 89% of the stay-at-home moms plan to return to work and then around 70% of 
these actually manage to go back to the labor market, on average around two-and-a-half years after 
childbearing (US Census Bureau 2011 and Livingstone 2014, Pew Research Center Report). This 
evidence is line with the results found in the PSID sample and shown in Figure 3.8. 
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The analyses that follow investigate more rigorously the role of the labor market status of the 
couples on the probability that they have their first child. Also particular attention is devoted to the 
cross-level interaction between the micro-level couples’ working status and the aggregate, state-wise, 
employment conditions, namely the state-level rate of unemployment (in both formulations: linear136 
and non-linear). The analysis starts from the naïve cross-sectional models, and the BE models, whose 
results will be used as a benchmark for the Fixed Effects (FE) linear probability model, as described in 
the previous sections. 
Tables 2 and 3 show the results of the naïve cross-sectional analyses. The former reports findings by 
pooling all the observations in the waves 2003-2011 together, while the latter shows the results of 
pooling observations two-by-two waves (2003/05, 2007/09 and 2009/11). Pooling observations on 
pairs of survey waves largely reduces the sample size but allows me to separate the pre- and post- 
recession periods: a first attempt to test whether patterns differ in different periods137.  
First of all, the cross-sectional analyses show no relationship between the level of aggregate 
unemployment and the probability of first birth. In both specifications, linear and categorical of the 
state-level explanatory variable, coefficients in most cases have the expected sign (greater 
unemployment reduces the likelihood of first child) but the point estimates are substantially and 
statistically not significant. The only exception is in Table 3.3 where low unemployment (2nd quartile: 
4.8%-5.8%) in 2009 is associated, compared to high unemployment (4th quartile: >7.5%) to a 10% 
smaller probability of couples having their first child by 2011. Recalling from Figure 3.2 that 
previously showed the map of unemployment rates in the US states, in 2009 low unemployment was 
concentrated on the north-central states – traditionally low-fertility states; while very high 
unemployment was registered in the Pacific and the South-East – traditionally high-fertility states. I 
would interpret then the estimate in Model 6 in Table 3.3 as a geographical variation effect that 
emerged with the crisis. 
This claim is confirmed in the BE models in Table 3.4, which uses explicitly only the cross-sectional 
variation between units. Comparing couples living in states with different unemployment levels in 
general, namely averaging over the time trend in 2003-2011, it is clear that higher rates of 
unemployment are detrimental for the transition to the first child, even controlling for couples’ 
employment status. The probability of first birth is around 10% higher in states with unemployment 
rates lower than 7.5%, compared to states where it is, on average, larger than 7.5%. Even though not 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
136	  Aggregate	  unemployment	  rate	  is	  mean	  centered.	  
137	  As	  said,	  the	  ultimate	  objective	  is	  to	  compare	  these	  naïve	  estimates	  with	  the	  fixed	  effect	  models,	  to	  attempt	  a	  more	  causal	   interpretation	  of	  the	  FE	  
model.	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controlling for any selection effect on the estimates, these cross-sectional findings on the impact of 
aggregate unemployment on fertility seem to suggest that the variation in unemployment is larger 
across US states than within them over the period 2003/2011, notwithstanding the onset of the Great 
Recession. 
 
Table 3.2: Pooled cross-sectional models (all waves) of the probability of first birth. 
 
Model Model Model 
 
(1) (2) (3) 
State Unemployment rate -0.001 
   (-0.006 - 0.004)   Very Low Unemployment (< 4.8%) 
 
0.018 
   
(-0.014 - 0.050) 
 Low Unemployment (4.8 - 5.8%) 
 
-0.004 
   
(-0.035 - 0.027) 
 Middle Unemployment (5.8% - 7.5%) 
 
0.026 
   
(-0.007 - 0.060) 
 High Unemployment (> 7.5%) Ref. Cat. - 
    
1 "HD Employed - WF Out of LF" 
  
-0.068*** 
   
(-0.095 - -0.040) 
2 "HD Employed - WF Unemployed" 
  
-0.046* 
   
(-0.099 - 0.007) 
3 "HD Out - WF Employed" 
  
-0.030 
   
(-0.097 - 0.036) 
4 "HD Out - WF Unemployed”  
  
-0.094*** 
   
(-0.132 - -0.055) 
5 "HD Unemployed - WF Out of LF" 
  
-0.131*** 
   
(-0.158 - -0.103) 
6 "HD Unemployed - WF Employed" 
  
0.011 
   
(-0.049 - 0.071) 
7 "Both Out of LF"  
  
-0.017 
   
(-0.117 - 0.084) 
8 "Both Unemployed” 
  
-0.041 
   
(-0.155 - 0.073) 
Race: White (Ref. Cat.) - - - 
    
Race: African American -0.004 -0.006 -0.003 
 (-0.032 - 0.024) (-0.034 - 0.023) (-0.032 - 0.026) 
Race: Other 0.035 0.036 0.040 
 
(-0.027 - 0.097) (-0.026 - 0.098) (-0.022 - 0.102) 
Wife Age -0.006*** -0.006*** -0.007*** 
 (-0.008 - -0.005) (-0.008 - -0.005) (-0.008 - -0.005) Married (Ref Cat) - - - 
    
Cohabiting -0.071*** -0.070*** -0.070*** 
 (-0.100 - -0.043) (-0.098 - -0.042) (-0.099 - -0.041) Divorced/Separated -0.054** -0.053** -0.044* 
 (-0.101 - -0.007) (-0.101 - -0.006) (-0.093 - 0.006) Head High Education 0.022 0.021 0.021 
 (-0.010 - 0.055) (-0.011 - 0.054) (-0.012 - 0.054) Wife High Education 0.016 0.017 0.011 
 
(-0.013 - 0.046) (-0.013 - 0.046) (-0.019 - 0.041) 
Constant 0.107*** 0.097*** 0.122*** 
 
(0.089 - 0.125) (0.072 - 0.122) (0.102 - 0.142) 
N 2,489 2,489 2,471 
R-squared 0.024 0.025 0.031 
Source: Elaboration of the author based on PSID data. 
Note: Robust Confidence Intervals in parenthesis. ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.10. State unemployment rate centered at the 
mean. Wife Age also mean-centered. Reference categories are High unemployment rate (>7.5%), being in a dual earner 
couple, being White non-Hispanic and being married. 
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Table 3.2 cont’d: Pooled cross-sectional models (all waves) of the probability of first birth. 
 
Model Model Model Model 
 
(4) (5) (6) (7) 
State Unemployment rate -0.000 
 
-0.001 
  (-0.005 - 0.005)  
(-0.007 - 0.005) 






(-0.017 - 0.046) 
 
(-0.019 - 0.064) 






(-0.041 - 0.022) 
 
(-0.052 - 0.027) 






(-0.014 - 0.053) 
 
(-0.027 - 0.058) 
High Unemployment (> 7.5%) Ref. Cat.   
     
1 "HD Employed - WF Out" -0.068*** -0.068*** -0.067*** -0.088*** 
 
(-0.096 - -0.040) (-0.095 - -0.040) (-0.095 - -0.039) (-0.124 - -0.051) 
2 "HD Employed - WF Unemployed" -0.046* -0.046* -0.050* -0.044 
 
(-0.099 - 0.007) (-0.099 - 0.007) (-0.102 - 0.002) (-0.126 - 0.038) 
3 "HD Out - WF Employed" -0.030 -0.029 -0.033 0.007 
 
(-0.096 - 0.036) (-0.096 - 0.037) (-0.099 - 0.033) (-0.128 - 0.143) 
4 "HD Out - WF Unemployed”  -0.094*** -0.097*** -0.095*** -0.088*** 
 
(-0.132 - -0.055) (-0.136 - -0.058) (-0.136 - -0.053) (-0.121 - -0.056) 
5 "HD Unemployed - WF OUT" -0.131*** -0.128*** -0.137*** -0.114*** 
 
(-0.160 - -0.101) (-0.157 - -0.100) (-0.169 - -0.105) (-0.154 - -0.073) 
6 "HD Unemployed - WF Employed" 0.011 0.011 0.015 0.013 
 
(-0.050 - 0.071) (-0.049 - 0.071) (-0.054 - 0.085) (-0.073 - 0.099) 
7 "Both Out"  -0.017 -0.016 -0.019 0.054 
 
(-0.117 - 0.084) (-0.118 - 0.086) (-0.117 - 0.078) (-0.163 - 0.271) 
8 "Both Unemployed” -0.041 -0.041 -0.081** 0.004 
 
(-0.155 - 0.074) (-0.156 - 0.074) (-0.155 - -0.006) (-0.169 - 0.176) 
1 "HD Employed - WF Out"* Unemployment rate 
  
-0.002 
    
(-0.012 - 0.008) 
 2 "HD Employed - WF Unemployed”* 
Unemployment rate   
0.007 
    
(-0.013 - 0.028) 
 3 "HD Out - WF Employed"* Unemployment rate 
  
0.009 
    
(-0.016 - 0.035) 
 4 "HD Out - WF Unemployed”* Unemployment 
rate   
0.005 
    
(-0.020 - 0.030) 
 5 "HD Unemployed - WF OUT"* Unemployment 
rate   
0.004 
    
(-0.005 - 0.013) 
 6 "HD Unemployed - WF Employed"* 
Unemployment rate   
-0.002 
    
(-0.024 - 0.019) 
 7 "Both Out"* Unemployment rate 
  
0.021 
    
(-0.026 - 0.069) 




   
(-0.004 - 0.041) 
 1 "HD Employed - WF Out"*Very Low 
Unemployment (< 4.8%)    
-0.003 
    
(-0.067 - 0.062) 
1 "HD Employed - WF Out"*Low Unemployment 
(4.8 - 5.8%)    
0.045 
    
(-0.025 - 0.116) 
1 "HD Employed - WF Out"*Middle 
Unemployment (5.8% - 7.5%)    
0.050 
    
(-0.032 - 0.132) 
2 "HD Employed - WF Unemployed”*Very Low 
Unemployment (< 4.8%)    
-0.043 
    
(-0.157 - 0.071) 
2 "HD Employed - WF Unemployed”*Low 
Unemployment (4.8 - 5.8%)    
-0.059 
    
(-0.147 - 0.030) 
2 "HD Employed - WF Unemployed”*Middle 
Unemployment (5.8% - 7.5%)    
0.098 
    
(-0.098 - 0.293) 
3 "HD Out – WF Employed"* Very Low 
Unemployment (< 4.8%)    
-0.114 
    
(-0.284 - 0.056) 
3 "HD Out – WF Employed"* Low 
Unemployment (4.8 - 5.8%)    
0.032 
    
(-0.173 - 0.236) 
3 "HD Out - WF Employed"* Middle 
Unemployment (5.8% - 7.5%)    
-0.078 
    
(-0.254 - 0.099) 
4 "HD Out - WF Unemployed” *Very Low 
Unemployment (< 4.8%)    
-0.025 
    
(-0.153 - 0.103) 
4 "HD Out - WF Unemployed” *Middle 
Unemployment (5.8% - 7.5%)    
-0.009 
    
(-0.063 - 0.045) 
5 "HD Unemployed - WF OUT"* Very Low 
Unemployment (< 4.8%)    
-0.016 
    
(-0.075 - 0.042) 
5 "HD Unemployed - WF OUT"* Low 
Unemployment (4.8 - 5.8%)    
-0.042 
    
(-0.124 - 0.041) 
5 "HD Unemployed - WF OUT"* Middle 
Unemployment (5.8% - 7.5%)    
-0.042 
    
(-0.107 - 0.023) 
6 "HD Unemployed - WF Employed"* Very Low 
Unemployment (< 4.8%)    
0.027 
    
(-0.187 - 0.241) 
6 "HD Unemployed - WF Employed"* Low 
Unemployment (4.8 - 5.8%)    
-0.035 
    
(-0.196 - 0.126) 
6 "HD Unemployed - WF Employed"* Middle 
Unemployment (5.8% - 7.5%)    
0.002 
    
(-0.147 - 0.150) 
7 "Both Out"* Very Low Unemployment (< 4.8%) 
   
-0.150 
    
(-0.375 - 0.074) 
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7 "Both Out"* Low Unemployment (4.8 - 5.8%) 
   
0.013 
    
(-0.355 - 0.380) 
7 "Both Out"* Middle Unemployment (5.8% - 
7.5%)    
-0.170 
    
(-0.391 - 0.050) 
8 "Both Unemployed”* Very Low Unemployment 
(< 4.8%)    
-0.141 
    
(-0.327 - 0.044) 
8 "Both Unemployed”* Middle Unemployment 
(5.8% - 7.5%)    
-0.115 
    
(-0.292 - 0.062) 
Race: White (Ref. Cat.)  
     
Race: African American -0.003 -0.004 -0.002 -0.004 
 (-0.032 - 0.026) (-0.033 - 0.025) (-0.031 - 0.027) (-0.033 - 0.025) 
Race: Other 0.040 0.042 0.040 0.040 
 
(-0.022 - 0.102) (-0.020 - 0.104) (-0.023 - 0.102) (-0.022 - 0.102) 
Wife Age -0.007*** -0.006*** -0.007*** -0.006*** 
 (-0.008 - -0.005) (-0.008 - -0.005) (-0.008 - -0.005) (-0.008 - -0.005) Married (Ref Cat)     
     
Cohabiting -0.070*** -0.069*** -0.071*** -0.070*** 
 (-0.099 - -0.041) (-0.098 - -0.040) (-0.101 - -0.042) (-0.100 - -0.041) Divorced/Separated -0.044* -0.043* -0.044* -0.044* 
 (-0.093 - 0.006) (-0.093 - 0.007) (-0.094 - 0.006) (-0.095 - 0.008) Head High Education 0.021 0.020 0.022 0.020 
 (-0.012 - 0.054) (-0.013 - 0.053) (-0.011 - 0.055) (-0.013 - 0.054) Wife High Education 0.011 0.012 0.011 0.010 
 
(-0.019 - 0.042) (-0.018 - 0.042) (-0.020 - 0.041) (-0.020 - 0.040) 
Constant 0.122*** 0.116*** 0.122*** 0.116*** 
 
(0.101 - 0.142) (0.088 - 0.144) (0.102 - 0.142) (0.084 - 0.148) 
N 2,471 2,471 2,471 2,471 
R-squared 0.031 0.033 0.032 0.037 
Source: Elaboration of the author based on PSID data. 
Note: Robust Confidence Intervals in parenthesis. ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.10. State unemployment rate centered at the mean. Wife Age also mean-




Going back to the cross-sectional models in Tables 2-3, the estimates at the individual level 
seems much larger and robust to model specifications: compared to the dual earners, all other couples’ 
combination have a smaller probability of first birth (except when the head is unemployed but the wife 
is working, where the point estimate are positive though very small in magnitude and they do not 
reach statistical significance). The largest negative correlation to first birth, compared to dual-earner 
couples is among unemployed-head, out of labor force-wife couples (-13%, Table 3.2) followed by the 
reversed combination (head out of labor force and wife unemployed: -10%, Table 3.2). The negative 
correlation for these couples is present before, during and after the recession (Table 3.3). When 
instead both members are non-working (either unemployed or out of labor force) the correlation to 
first birth is negative, and strongly so, only before the recession (Table 3.3).  
Once we introduce the interaction between the macro- and micro-levels (Models 6-7 in Table 3.2) the 
interpretation of the constitutive terms of unemployment and couples’ working status changes. In 
Model 6 the coefficient of aggregate unemployment now represents the effect of unemployment on 
first births for dual-earner couples, and the working-status combinations now represent the effect of 
the different combinations (compared to dual earners) when unemployment is at the mean (state 
unemployment rate is mean-centered). In Model 7 the reasoning is the same except that the reference 
category of unemployment now is high unemployment so that couples’ working status coefficients 
now represent the effect of working combinations (compared to dual earners) on first birth, at high 
levels of unemployment.  
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When aggregate unemployment is at the average (Model 6 in Table 3.2) the negative 
correlations between couples’ working-status combinations (different from dual earners) and first 
birth, illustrated before, peak (and being both unemployed becomes a significantly negative condition 
for childbearing compared to dual earners). In contrast, at very high levels of unemployment (Model 7 
in Table 3.2) those same negative correlations are all reduced in magnitude.  
The interaction terms, though very small and never statistically different from zero seem to also 
suggest some kind of moderator effect of aggregate unemployment, but given the complexity of the 
model, the lack of precision in the estimate and the cross-sectional nature of the analysis, it is difficult 
to draw definite conclusions on this point. 
The same pattern is confirmed in the two-by-two years (Table 3.3): being both unemployed (or both 
out of the labor market) is negatively associated to first birth, compared to dual earners couples, in 
2003/05 (-20%) - a period when unemployment was very low in the US - while the effect is halved 
four years later (-12% in 2007/09) and becomes zero (and imprecisely estimated) in 2009/11.  
The only negative effect that seems to increase over time is that of couples where only the husband 
works (especially if the wife is out of the labor force). 
Finally, since the constitutive terms of unemployment rates are very similar in Models 6-7 to the 
previous ones, it seems like the there is no specific effect on unemployment on dual earners compared 
to other typologies of couples’ working status. 
 
These findings are obtained controlling for couples observable characteristics: head’s 
ethnicity, wife’s age, head and wife’s educational level and their marital status. 
Being married is associated with a higher likelihood of first births compared to cohabiters, even 
though this is less so during the crisis (for cohabiters the likelihood of first birth is -10% 2003/05 
versus -7% in 2009/11 compared to married couples) while surprisingly there is no significant 
association between race, or high education and the probability of becoming parents in the cross-
sectional models. The only exception is in the period 2009/11 when couples where the husband is 
highly educated are associated with a greater probability of childbearing (+5%). 
The results of the individual-level variables in the BE models (Table 3.4) are substantially very similar 
to the pooled cross-sectional regressions although the size of the point estimates is generally larger but 
in fewer cases they reach statistical significance. However, looking at the interaction models (Model 
3-4 in Tab. 3.4) the estimates look quite different from the cross-sectional model and the recession 
seems to have a multiplicative negative effect of couples’ working conditions on first births (even 
though the estimates are not statistically significant). In fact, if we compare the couple-variable 
correlations when unemployment rates are at the average (Model 3) to the estimates at high levels of 
unemployment (Model 4), in the latter the point estimates are always negative but larger compared to 
Model 3. The interaction terms seem to suggest the same even though, as said, they almost never reach 
statistical significance. 
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Table 3.3: Cross-sectional models of the probability of first birth combining waves before/after the crisis. 
Dependent variable (Have First Child last year) in Year t - Independent variables lagged to Year t-2 
 2003/2005 2007/2009 2009/2011 
 
Model Model Model Model Model Model 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 





  (-0.029 - 0.057)  
(-0.013 - 0.024) 
 
(-0.007 - 0.014) 








(-0.231 - 0.283) 
 
(-0.040 - 0.099) 
 
(-0.185 - 0.073) 








(-0.302 - 0.192) 
 
(-0.062 - 0.086) 
 
(-0.147 - -0.054) 
Middle Unemployment (5.8% - 7.5%) 
 
0.002 
   
0.000 
  
(-0.239 - 0.243) 
   
(-0.047 - 0.047) 
High Unemployment (> 7.5%) Ref. Cat. - - 
       
1 "HD Employed - WF Out" -0.087 -0.091 -0.066*** -0.066*** -0.073*** -0.074*** 
 
(-0.202 - 0.029) (-0.209 - 0.027) (-0.116 - -0.017) (-0.115 - -0.016) (-0.111 - -0.034) (-0.112 - -0.035) 
2 "HD Employed - WF Unemployed" -0.018 -0.028 -0.074* -0.076* -0.050 -0.049 
 
(-0.197 - 0.162) (-0.214 - 0.159) (-0.158 - 0.010) (-0.159 - 0.008) (-0.124 - 0.023) (-0.123 - 0.025) 
3 "HD Out - WF Employed" -0.017 -0.019 -0.128*** -0.127*** -0.036 -0.033 
 
(-0.213 - 0.180) (-0.216 - 0.178) (-0.165 - -0.090) (-0.165 - -0.089) (-0.142 - 0.070) (-0.140 - 0.075) 
4 "HD Out - WF Unemployed”  
  
-0.094** -0.109** -0.082*** -0.088*** 
   
(-0.186 - -0.001) (-0.202 - -0.015) (-0.114 - -0.050) (-0.120 - -0.056) 
5 "HD Unemployed - WF OUT" 
  
-0.147*** -0.138*** -0.113*** -0.109*** 
   
(-0.216 - -0.077) (-0.204 - -0.071) (-0.151 - -0.075) (-0.147 - -0.070) 
6 "HD Unemployed - WF Employed" -0.059 -0.054 0.021 0.023 0.004 0.003 
 
(-0.220 - 0.102) (-0.214 - 0.105) (-0.151 - 0.193) (-0.149 - 0.196) (-0.071 - 0.078) (-0.071 - 0.078) 
7 "Both Out"  -0.207*** -0.202*** -0.074*** -0.075*** 0.038 0.037 
 
(-0.276 - -0.138) (-0.273 - -0.131) (-0.120 - -0.029) (-0.119 - -0.031) (-0.164 - 0.240) (-0.166 - 0.240) 
8 "Both Unemployed” -0.202*** -0.204*** -0.124*** -0.119*** 0.003 0.005 
 
(-0.278 - -0.126) (-0.278 - -0.131) (-0.189 - -0.058) (-0.194 - -0.043) (-0.178 - 0.184) (-0.176 - 0.186) 
Race: White (Ref. Cat.) - - - - - - 
       
Race: African American -0.028 -0.033 0.010 0.009 0.013 0.013 
 (-0.127 - 0.071) (-0.130 - 0.063) (-0.042 - 0.062) (-0.044 - 0.062) (-0.033 - 0.059) (-0.034 - 0.060) 
Race: Other 0.104 0.108 0.044 0.047 -0.008 -0.007 
 
(-0.071 - 0.278) (-0.064 - 0.280) (-0.069 - 0.156) (-0.067 - 0.160) (-0.104 - 0.088) (-0.102 - 0.089) 
Wife Age -0.009*** -0.008*** -0.007*** -0.006*** -0.006*** -0.006*** 
 
(-0.014 - -0.003) (-0.014 - -0.003) (-0.009 - -0.004) (-0.009 - -0.004) (-0.009 - -0.004) (-0.009 - -0.004) 
Married (Ref Cat) - - - - - - 
       
Cohabiting -0.101* -0.102* -0.045 -0.042 -0.069*** -0.070*** 
 (-0.209 - 0.006) (-0.209 - 0.004) (-0.102 - 0.012) (-0.100 - 0.015) (-0.113 - -0.024) (-0.115 - -0.025) Divorced/Separated -0.171*** -0.181*** -0.027 -0.030 0.041 0.041 
 (-0.243 - -0.100) (-0.259 - -0.103) (-0.114 - 0.061) (-0.118 - 0.059) (-0.104 - 0.186) (-0.104 - 0.187) Head High Education 0.042 0.044 -0.002 -0.003 0.044* 0.045* 
 (-0.059 - 0.143) (-0.057 - 0.145) (-0.068 - 0.064) (-0.069 - 0.064) (-0.006 - 0.094) (-0.005 - 0.095) Wife High Education 0.013 0.006 0.023 0.025 0.010 0.011 
 
(-0.077 - 0.104) (-0.084 - 0.096) (-0.039 - 0.085) (-0.037 - 0.087) (-0.034 - 0.054) (-0.033 - 0.055) 
Constant 0.193*** 0.199* 0.120*** 0.088** 0.092*** 0.102*** 
 
(0.129 - 0.257) (-0.037 - 0.434) (0.068 - 0.172) (0.013 - 0.163) (0.049 - 0.135) (0.067 - 0.138) 
Observations 390 390 705 705 836 836 
R-squared 0.045 0.049 0.035 0.036 0.040 0.041 
Source: Elaboration of the author based on PSID data. 
Note: Robust Confidence Intervals in parenthesis. ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.10. State unemployment rate centered at the mean. Wife Age also mean-centered. 
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Table 3.4: Linear probability Between Effect models of the probability of first birth. 
 
Model Model Model Model 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
State Unemployment rate -0.012*** 
 
0.006 
  (-0.021 - -0.004)  
(-0.004 - 0.017) 






(0.040 - 0.157) 
 
(-0.046 - 0.090) 






(0.031 - 0.164) 
 
(-0.085 - 0.054) 






(0.064 - 0.182) 
 
(-0.055 - 0.083) 
High Unemployment (> 7.5%) Ref. Cat.   
     
1 "HD Employed - WF Out" -0.109*** -0.109*** -0.098*** -0.143** 
 
(-0.163 - -0.056) (-0.162 - -0.056) (-0.152 - -0.043) (-0.257 - -0.029) 
2 "HD Employed - WF Unemployed” -0.047 -0.050 -0.029 -0.079 
 
(-0.146 - 0.052) (-0.148 - 0.049) (-0.122 - 0.064) (-0.247 - 0.089) 
3 "HD Out - WF Employed" -0.024 -0.031 -0.018 -0.154 
 
(-0.125 - 0.076) (-0.131 - 0.069) (-0.113 - 0.077) (-0.379 - 0.071) 
4 "HD Out - WF Unemployed”  -0.243 -0.220 -0.319 -0.605 
 
(-0.639 - 0.153) (-0.615 - 0.176) (-0.931 - 0.292) (-1.858 - 0.648) 
5 "HD Unemployed - WF OUT" -0.188* -0.183* -0.177 -0.170 
 
(-0.381 - 0.006) (-0.376 - 0.010) (-0.398 - 0.043) (-0.447 - 0.106) 
6 "HD Unemployed - WF Employed" 0.038 0.037 0.047 0.038 
 
(-0.053 - 0.128) (-0.054 - 0.127) (-0.047 - 0.141) (-0.100 - 0.177) 
7 "Both Out"  0.009 0.013 0.003 0.148 
 
(-0.160 - 0.178) (-0.155 - 0.182) (-0.167 - 0.173) (-0.141 - 0.437) 
8 "Both Unemployed” -0.083 -0.066 -0.104 -0.085 
 
(-0.317 - 0.150) (-0.299 - 0.166) (-0.373 - 0.165) (-0.409 - 0.239) 
1 "HD Employed - WF Out"* Unemployment rate 
  
-0.018 
    
(-0.043 - 0.007) 
 2 "HD Employed - WF Unemployed”* Unemployment rate 
  
-0.018 
    
(-0.057 - 0.022) 
 3 "HD Out - WF Employed"* Unemployment rate 
  
-0.027 
    
(-0.070 - 0.016) 
 4 "HD Out - WF Unemployed”* Unemployment rate 
  
-0.078 
    
(-0.311 - 0.154) 
 5 "HD Unemployed - WF OUT"* Unemployment rate 
  
-0.010 
    
(-0.066 - 0.046) 
 6 "HD Unemployed - WF Employed"* Unemployment rate 
  
-0.012 
    
(-0.044 - 0.021) 
 7 "Both Out"* Unemployment rate 
  
0.013 
    
(-0.066 - 0.091) 




   
(-0.081 - 0.072) 
 1 "HD Employed - WF Out"*Very Low Unemployment (< 4.8%) 
   
-0.023 
    
(-0.189 - 0.144) 
1 "HD Employed - WF Out"*Low Unemployment (4.8 - 5.8%) 
   
0.110 
    
(-0.087 - 0.308) 
1 "HD Employed - WF Out"*Middle Unemployment (5.8% - 7.5%) 
   
0.103 
    
(-0.069 - 0.276) 
2 "HD Employed - WF Unemployed”*Very Low Unemployment (< 4.8%) 
   
-0.021 
    
(-0.297 - 0.256) 
2 "HD Employed - WF Unemployed”*Low Unemployment (4.8 - 5.8%) 
   
0.018 
    
(-0.306 - 0.342) 
2 "HD Employed - WF Unemployed”*Middle Unemployment (5.8% - 7.5%) 
   
0.187 
    
(-0.088 - 0.462) 
3 "HD Out - WF Employed"* Very Low Unemployment (< 4.8%) 
   
0.069 
    
(-0.286 - 0.424) 
3 "HD Out - WF Employed"* Low Unemployment (4.8 - 5.8%) 
   
0.363* 
    
(-0.001 - 0.728) 
3 "HD Out - WF Employed"* Middle Unemployment (5.8% - 7.5%) 
   
0.162 
    
(-0.205 - 0.529) 
4 "HD Out - WF Unemployed” *Very Low Unemployment (< 4.8%) 
   
0.556 
    
(-1.018 - 2.130) 
4 "HD Out - WF Unemployed” *Middle Unemployment (5.8% - 7.5%) 
   
-0.234 
    
(-1.318 - 0.850) 
5 "HD Unemployed - WF OUT"* Very Low Unemployment (< 4.8%) 
   
-0.036 
    
(-0.540 - 0.469) 
5 "HD Unemployed - WF OUT"* Low Unemployment (4.8 - 5.8%) 
   
-0.109 
    
(-0.900 - 0.682) 
5 "HD Unemployed - WF OUT"* Middle Unemployment (5.8% - 7.5%) 
   
-0.085 
    
(-0.693 - 0.523) 
6 "HD Unemployed - WF Employed"* Very Low Unemployment (< 4.8%) 
   
-0.011 
    
(-0.319 - 0.297) 
6 "HD Unemployed - WF Employed"* Low Unemployment (4.8 - 5.8%) 
   
-0.210 
    
(-0.589 - 0.168) 
6 "HD Unemployed - WF Employed"* Middle Unemployment (5.8% - 7.5%) 
   
0.071 
    
(-0.158 - 0.300) 
7 "Both Out"* Very Low Unemployment (< 4.8%) 
   
-0.168 
    
(-0.649 - 0.314) 
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7 "Both Out"* Low Unemployment (4.8 - 5.8%) 
   
0.228 
    
(-0.302 - 0.759) 
7 "Both Out"* Middle Unemployment (5.8% - 7.5%) 
   
-0.676* 
    
(-1.432 - 0.081) 
8 "Both Unemployed”* Very Low Unemployment (< 4.8%) 
   
-0.085 
    
(-0.789 - 0.618) 
8 "Both Unemployed”* Middle Unemployment (5.8% - 7.5%) 
   
-0.040 
    
(-0.934 - 0.854) 
Race: White (Ref. Cat.)  
     
Race: African American 0.005 0.002 0.000 -0.003 
 (-0.033 - 0.043) (-0.036 - 0.041) (-0.039 - 0.039) (-0.042 - 0.037) 
Race: Other 0.041 0.037 0.043 0.042 
 
(-0.025 - 0.108) (-0.029 - 0.103) (-0.024 - 0.110) (-0.026 - 0.111) 
Wife Age -0.009*** -0.009*** -0.009*** -0.009*** 
 (-0.012 - -0.006) (-0.012 - -0.007) (-0.012 - -0.006) (-0.012 - -0.006) Married (Ref Cat)     
     
Cohabiting -0.070*** -0.062** -0.075*** -0.071*** 
 (-0.118 - -0.023) (-0.110 - -0.015) (-0.123 - -0.027) (-0.120 - -0.023) Divorced/Separated -0.050 -0.049 -0.054 -0.047 
 (-0.144 - 0.045) (-0.143 - 0.046) (-0.149 - 0.042) (-0.143 - 0.050) Head High Education 0.022 0.023 0.021 0.020 
 (-0.022 - 0.065) (-0.020 - 0.066) (-0.023 - 0.064) (-0.024 - 0.063) Wife High Education 0.012 0.012 0.011 0.008 
 
(-0.029 - 0.053) (-0.028 - 0.053) (-0.030 - 0.052) (-0.033 - 0.050) 
Constant 0.130*** 0.051** 0.131*** 0.124*** 
 
(0.105 - 0.155) (0.005 - 0.098) (0.106 - 0.156) (0.067 - 0.181) 
N 2,471 2,471 2,471 2,471 
R-squared 0.065 0.073 0.059 0.070 
Number of numID 1,233 1,233 1,233 1,233 
Source: Elaboration of the author based on PSID data.  
Note: Robust Confidence Intervals in parenthesis. ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.10. State unemployment rate centered at the mean. Wife Age also mean-centered. 




Up to this point we still do not know whether the cross-sectional correlations are spurious and 
only due to couples selecting into employment conditions based on some unobserved characteristics or 
attitudes that influences as well their propensity to have children, or whether the negative correlation 
between having one, or both, partners out of the labor market, really diminishes the likelihood of 
parenthood. In the next set of analyses I check whether these patterns highlighted in the difference 
between couples’ typologies appear also within couples’ typology over time, controlling for individual 
fixed effect. 
Since the cross-sectional findings suggest that the effect of aggregate unemployment on first births 
seems to mask the large US states’ variation more than the effect of employment insecurity on 
childbearing, I add to the FE analysis a control for state effect; in this way I am sure I am not 
absorbing any state-related effects on fertility in my estimates.138 This is possible in the FE model 
because in the US internal migration is quite common. As such, state of residency is not a time- 
invariant variable and can be estimated. Moreover, there is a possibility that couples migrate from a 
high-unemployment rate state to a low-unemployment rate state to ameliorate their economic 
conditions and thus have their first child. As said, internal migration is quite common in the US, 
though the direction of the flow is traditionally from the northern East and Central regions to the 
southeast and West, but the latter are also the regions where unemployment grew larger in the years 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
138	  However,	  estimating	  the	  FE	  models	  without	  the	  state	  dummies	  does	  not	  change	  the	  results	  of	  the	  effects	  of	  the	  explanatory	  variables	  on	  first	  births.	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considered here, and there is no apparent change of flow between the two regions (US Census 2014 
report139). In the sample, in fact, there are 181 cases of migration, and 18 of them coincide with first 
birth episodes. Because these are significant numbers, besides including states’ dummies to control for 
state-related fixed effect on fertility, as a robustness check, all the models have been also tested adding 
a migration dummy, equal 1 in case the couple resides in a different state than in the wave before. 
Results are not shown since both the coefficients and the standard errors of the explanatory and 
control variables are equivalent.140 
 
 Table 3.5 reports the results of the Fixed Effects (FE) model141: the former part shows 
aggregate- and individual-level employment covariates separately (Models 1-3), while the latter shows 
the cross-level combination (Models 4-5) and interaction (Models 6-7 in Table 3.5).  
Controlling for couples’ (and US state) fixed effect allows me to control for omitted couples and 
states’ characteristics that are constant over time (this is also the reason why it is not possible now to 
control for ethnicity) in an attempt to moderate the selection effects in the estimates. However, 
increasing the complexity of the models reduces the precision of the estimates, especially given that 
the sample size is not very large (now around 2500). 
First of all, the results of the FE models show robustly, as in the cross-sectional analyses, that the 
increase in aggregate unemployment per se is not substantially related to first births (and it is 
statistically not significant).  
Second, the effect of the individual-level key explanatory variable – couples’ employment status – is 
not always precisely estimated and confidence intervals are quite large. The problem of certain 
categories is that the cell size is very small. For instance there are only 7 couples in the group of head 
out of labor force with an unemployed wife, 26 couples in the both out of labor force category and 18 
in the both unemployed one142. Notwithstanding the deterioration of the economy during the Great 
Recession these groups of couples where both members do not work remain quite rare and the cell size 
is too small to get statistically precise estimates. Regarding these couples the effect on first birth is 
difficult to comment on (they are the only groups for which the probability of childbearing gets larger 
compared to being dual earners).  
The probability of first birth for all the other categories is negative compared to when couples are dual 
earners. The point estimates are a bit more precise even though for many of them still not enough to 
get to statistical significance. The strongest and more precisely estimated negative effect is found for 
couples when the wife is out of the labor market and the husband loses his job (-4% in probability 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
139	  Available	  at	  http://www.census.gov/newsroom/press-­‐releases/2014/cb14-­‐232.html	  
140	  Apart	   from	   the	   very	   simple	  model	  with	   only	   aggregate	   unemployment,	  where	   the	  migration	   dummy	   is	   significant	   and	   positive	   for	   childbearing,	  
adding	  controls	  at	  the	  individual	  level	  erase	  the	  effect	  of	  migration.	  
141	  Since	   the	   between-­‐variation	   seems	   important,	   I	   also	   ran	   Random	   Effects	   models,	   which	   are	   more	   efficient	   because	   they	   combine	   within-­‐	   and	  
between-­‐estimates.	  However,	  the	  Hausman	  Test	  returned	  a	  chi-­‐square	  of	  121.71	  and	  a	  p-­‐value	  of	  0.000,	  meaning	  that	  the	  fixed	  and	  random	  coefficients	  
are	  systematically	  different	  (individual	  unobserved	  effects	  are	  correlated	  with	  regressors)	  and	  only	  the	  FE	  model	  returns	  unbiased	  estimates.	  
142	  Cells	   size:333	   couples	   are	   HD	   employed	   –	  WF	   out	   of	   LF;	   101	   couples	   are	   HD	   employed	   –	  WF	   unemployed;	   83	   couples	   are	   HD	   out	   of	   FL	   –	  WF	  
employed;	   7	   couples	   are	  HD	   out	   of	   FL	   –	  WF	   unemployed;	   22	   couples	   are	  HD	   unemployed	   –	  WF	   out	   of	   LF;	   115	   couples	   are	  HD	   unemployed	   –	  WF	  
employed	  and	  finally	  in	  26	  couples	  both	  HD	  and	  WF	  are	  out	  of	  LF	  and	  in	  18	  they	  are	  both	  unemployed.	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compared to when they are both employed in Models 3-5). Recalling from descriptive statistics 
(Figure 3.7 in Section 5) in these couples women are usually housewives (around 70%) or students 
(around 18%). The effect on first birth is also negative for couples when only the wife is employed 
compared to dual earners with a similar magnitude if the husband is unemployed or out of the labor 
force (-3% for categories 3 and 6 in Models 3-5) even though the point estimates are not statistically 
significant. Finally, if it is the wife who loses her job the likelihood of childbearing also declines 
compared to when both members of the couple are employed (around -3% for category 2 in Models 3-
5).  
 
But what happens at different levels of aggregate unemployment? As explained earlier, 
commenting on Table 3.2, from interaction Models 6-7 in Table 3.5, we can distinguish between the 
effect of couple-level employment status at average levels of unemployment143 (Model 6) and at high 
levels of unemployment (Model 7).  
Compared to periods of average (low) unemployment, when the latter increases to the highest quartile 
(>7.5%) the negative effect of an unemployed husband increases both if the wife is employed or is not 
(around -4-5% in categories 5 and 6). This is evident from the increase in the main effects in Model 7 
compared to Model 6 but also from the negative sign of the interaction terms. As unemployment rises 
the probability that a couple has a first child declines even faster compared to dual earners if the 
husband becomes unemployed (slightly more strongly when the wife is out of the labor force but this 
is true even when she is employed). The interaction terms with unemployment quartiles are a bit more 
complicated to interpret but I do find a confirmation of the results just described (the couples 
categories 5 and 6 have positive interaction terms): when unemployment is low (around 5-6%), for 
instance, the negative effect of an unemployed husband instead of a working one is ‘less negative’ 
compared to periods of large unemployment.  
This finding is in contrast to the cross-sectional results, which showed a moderator effect of aggregate 
unemployment. To recall, the results of the cross-sectional models (Table 3.2) showed that when, or 
where, unemployment rates are higher, the larger probability of having a first child for dual-earner 
couples - compared to other types of couples’ working-status combinations - is reduced, in comparison 
to periods, or states, where unemployment is lower.  
This indicates that, as suggested by the literature, a process of selection on unobserved characteristics 
is at play in the relationship between labor market outcomes and the transitions to first births. In the 
cross-sectional setting in fact, the estimates of the effect of aggregate unemployment on the effect of 
couples employment status on the probability of having the first child do not distinguish between, first, 
the case of different couples facing different aggregate labor market conditions and, second, the case 
of the same couple facing a change in the aggregate conditions over time. In the first case, some dual-
earner couples could, for instance, have moved to states where unemployment is lower because they 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
143	  Aggregate	  unemployment	  is	  mean-­‐centered.	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are particularly career oriented and less generally prone to have children. If this happens, the cross-
sectional estimate of a negative effect of unemployment rates on the (positive) correlation between 
being a dual-earner couple and having a first child would be explained by this attitude of dual-earner 
couples to prioritize work over family, rather than on the effect of aggregate unemployment itself on 
the relationship between couples’ working dynamics and childbearing.  
The fixed effect estimates, as already mentioned (see Section 3.2), suffer much less from this couples’ 
(work versus family) attitude-related confounders because they control for couples’ time-invariant 
characteristics that might affect both their likelihood of moving depending on the aggregate 
macroeconomic conditions or of being in a specific working-couples’ situation and their likelihood of 
having children. As mentioned earlier, there are two strong assumptions that I have to make here in 
order to identify the effect: first that couples are homogamous in those attitudes and controlling for the 
couple fixed effect is correct and, second, that those unobserved attitudes do not change over time. 
The bottom line of the FE results is that if the husband becomes unemployed the probability of first 
birth declines (especially if the wife is out of the labor force), and the negative effect increases at high 
levels of unemployment (see Model 7 in Table 3.5). Moreover, couples where the husband works but 
the wife does not also face a smaller probability of parenthood compared to dual-earner couples. This 
finding points to a predominant income effect over any opportunity-cost effect, namely that couples’ 
job insecurity is responsible for the decision to postpone childbearing, and this pattern seems to be 
more and more important as we enter into the recession period. I do not find support for hypothesis of 
a difficult reconciliation of family/work life for women: they have the largest probability of becoming 
mothers when they are at work, and their partner is employed too. 
 
Finally, as far as controls are concerned, in the FE models education, unlike in the BE and 
cross-sectional estimates, is quite relevant: if the head of the family moves to college the chances that 
the couple has their first child within the following two years increase by 3-4%, while the opposite is 
true if his partner, the wife, moves to higher education (the probability declines 5-6%). Once I 
introduce the employment status explanatory variable the effects of both wife’s and head’s education 
become stronger but the latter not statistically significant. Whether instead they move from cohabiting 
to marriage seems to increase the chances of parenthood but the point estimate is again imprecisely 
estimated and small in magnitude, compared to the cross-sectional and BE model results. The reason 
could be that marriage is still a very strong mechanism of selection, thus controlling for individual 
fixed effect moderates the impact of marriage itself on childbearing. However marriage rates are 
largely influenced by the recession and by employment insecurity in general, therefore, marital status 
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Table 3.5: Linear probability Fixed Effect models. Micro and macro employment variables (US States 
FE). 
 Model Model Model 
 (1) (2) (3) State Unemployment rate -0.001   
 (-0.006 - 0.004)   Very Low Unemployment (< 4.8%)  0.009  
  (-0.025 - 0.043)  Low Unemployment (4.8 - 5.8%)  -0.006  
  (-0.035 - 0.024)  Middle Unemployment (5.8% - 7.5%)  -0.001  
  (-0.035 - 0.034)  High Unemployment (> 7.5%) Ref. Cat.  -  
    
Dual Earners (Ref. Cat.)   - 
    
1 "HD Employed - WF Out"   -0.008 
   (-0.036 - 0.020) 2 "HD Employed - WF Unemployed”   -0.026 
   (-0.090 - 0.038) 3 "HD Out - WF Employed"   -0.035 
   (-0.132 - 0.063) 4 "HD Out - WF Unemployed”   0.004 
   (-0.050 - 0.059) 5 "HD Unemployed - WF OUT"   -0.036** 
   (-0.067 - -0.005) 6 "HD Unemployed - WF Employed"   -0.026 
   (-0.078 - 0.027) 7 "Both Out"   0.027 
   (-0.032 - 0.085) 8 "Both Unemployed”   0.067 
   (-0.072 - 0.205) WIFE AGE 0.017*** 0.016*** 0.016*** 
 (0.011 - 0.022) (0.010 - 0.022) (0.012 - 0.021) Married (Ref Cat)    
    
Cohabiting -0.018 -0.017 -0.019 
 (-0.085 - 0.049) (-0.084 - 0.051) (-0.086 - 0.049) Divorced/Separated 0.038 0.037 0.036 
 (-0.018 - 0.095) (-0.018 - 0.093) (-0.019 - 0.091) Head High Education 0.026*** 0.027*** 0.051 
 (0.009 - 0.043) (0.009 - 0.046) (-0.028 - 0.131) Wife High Education -0.046*** -0.054*** -0.061* 
 (-0.080 - -0.013) (-0.090 - -0.019) (-0.122 - 0.001) US State FE YES YES YES 
Constant -0.001 0.002 0.009 
 (-0.273 - 0.272) (-0.276 - 0.280) (-0.260 - 0.278) N 2505 2505 2487 
R-squared 0.089 0.090 0.091 
Number of numID 1,56 1256 1243 
Source: Elaboration of the author based on PSID data. 
Note: Robust Confidence Intervals in parenthesis. ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.10. State unemployment rate centered at the mean.  
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Table 3.5 cont’d: Linear probability Fixed Effect models. Micro and macro employment variables (US 
States FE). 
 Model Model Model Model 
 (4) (5) (6) (7) 
State Unemployment rate -0.001  -0.001  
 (-0.006 - 0.004)  (-0.007 - 0.005)  Very Low Unemployment (< 4.8%)  0.007  0.006 
  (-0.028 - 0.042)  (-0.039 - 0.051) Low Unemployment (4.8 - 5.8%)  -0.009  -0.015 
  (-0.038 - 0.021)  (-0.052 - 0.021) Middle Unemployment (5.8% - 7.5%)  -0.004  0.005 
  (-0.039 - 0.031)  (-0.037 - 0.048) High Unemployment (> 7.5%) Ref. Cat.  -  - 
     
Dual Earners (Ref. Cat.) - - - - 
     
1 "HD Employed - WF Out" -0.008 -0.009 -0.006 -0.040** 
 (-0.036 - 0.020) (-0.037 - 0.019) (-0.034 - 0.022) (-0.079 - -0.001) 2 "HD Employed - WF Unemployed” -0.026 -0.028 -0.027 -0.001
 (-0.089 - 0.038) (-0.092 - 0.036) (-0.090 - 0.036) (-0.095 - 0.093) 3 "HD Out - WF Employed" -0.034 -0.036 -0.040 0.098 
 (-0.131 - 0.063) (-0.132 - 0.061) (-0.136 - 0.056) (-0.079 - 0.274) 4 "HD Out - WF Unemployed” 0.007 0.011 -0.018 0.074 
 (-0.048 - 0.062) (-0.046 - 0.068) (-0.077 - 0.042) (-0.038 - 0.185) 5 "HD Unemployed - WF OUT" -0.035** -0.034** -0.007 -0.051* 
 (-0.065 - -0.004) 
(-0.067 - -
0.002) 
(-0.046 - 0.031) (-0.108 - 0.006) 
6 "HD Unemployed - WF Employed" -0.024 -0.025 -0.007 -0.039** 
 (-0.078 - 0.031) (-0.079 - 0.030) (-0.072 - 0.058) (-0.070 - -0.008) 7 "Both Out" 0.027 0.028 0.027 0.071 
 (-0.032 - 0.086) (-0.031 - 0.088) (-0.048 - 0.102) (-0.132 - 0.274) 8 "Both Unemployed” 0.069 0.065 0.046 0.104 
 (-0.069 - 0.207) (-0.074 - 0.205) (-0.033 - 0.126) (-0.185 - 0.393) 1 "HD Employed - WF Out"* Unemployment rate   -0.007*  
   (-0.015 - 0.001)  2 "HD Employed - WF Unemployed”* Unemployment rate   0.009  
   (-0.019 - 0.037)  3 "HD Out - WF Employed"* Unemployment rate   0.028*  
   (-0.002 - 0.059)  4 "HD Out - WF Unemployed”* Unemployment rate   0.021  
   (-0.009 - 0.051)  5 "HD Unemployed - WF OUT"* Unemployment rate   -0.014**  
   (-0.027 - -0.001)  6 "HD Unemployed - WF Employed"* Unemployment rate   -0.013  
   (-0.028 - 0.002)  7 "Both Out"* Unemployment rate   0.011  
   (-0.022 - 0.045)  8 "Both Unemployed”* Unemployment rate   0.010  
   (-0.034 - 0.054)  1 "HD Employed - WF Out" *Very Low Unemployment (< 4.8%)    0.032 
    (-0.022 - 0.086) 1 "HD Employed - WF Out" * Low Unemployment (4.8 - 5.8%)    0.081*** 
    (0.036 - 0.125) 1 "HD Employed - WF Out" *Middle Unemployment (5.8% - 7.5%)    0.033 
    (-0.027 - 0.093) 2 "HD Employed - WF Unemployed”*Very Low Unemployment (< 4.8%)    0.005 
    (-0.134 - 0.144) 2 "HD Employed - WF Unemployed”* Low Unemployment (4.8 - 5.8%)    -0.087 
    (-0.288 - 0.114) 2 "HD Employed - WF Unemployed”*Middle Unemployment (5.8% - 
7.5%)    
-0.034 
    (-0.172 - 0.104) 3 "HD Out - WF Employed"*Very Low Unemployment (< 4.8%)    -0.197* 
    (-0.410 - 0.015) 3 "HD Out - WF Employed"* Low Unemployment (4.8 - 5.8%)    -0.170 
    (-0.404 - 0.063) 3 "HD Out - WF Employed"*Middle Unemployment (5.8% - 7.5%)    -0.186* 
    (-0.388 - 0.015) 4 "HD Out - WF Unemployed”*Very Low Unemployment (< 4.8%)    -0.141 
    (-0.331 - 0.049) 4 "HD Out - WF Unemployed”* Low Unemployment (4.8 - 5.8%)    - 
     4 "HD Out - WF Unemployed”*Middle Unemployment (5.8% - 7.5%)    -0.106* 
    (-0.217 - 0.004) 5 "HD Unemployed - WF OUT"*Very Low Unemployment (< 4.8%)    0.047 
    (-0.029 - 0.123) 5 "HD Unemployed - WF OUT"* Low Unemployment (4.8 - 5.8%)    0.121** 
    (0.023 - 0.219) 5 "HD Unemployed - WF OUT"*Middle Unemployment (5.8% - 7.5%)    0.010 
    (-0.065 - 0.085) 6 "HD Unemployed - WF Employed"*Very Low Unemployment (< 4.8%)    0.140 
    (-0.048 - 0.329) 
	   136	  
6 "HD Unemployed - WF Employed"* Low Unemployment (4.8 - 5.8%)    0.115** 
    (0.023 - 0.208) 6 "HD Unemployed - WF Employed"*Middle Unemployment (5.8% - 
7.5%)    
-0.078 
    (-0.211 - 0.055) 7 "Both Out"*Very Low Unemployment (< 4.8%)    -0.057 
    (-0.265 - 0.151) 7 "Both Out"* Low Unemployment (4.8 - 5.8%)    -0.060 
    (-0.252 - 0.132) 7 "Both Out"*Middle Unemployment (5.8% - 7.5%)    -0.049 
    (-0.253 - 0.155) 8 "Both Unemployed”*Very Low Unemployment (< 4.8%)    -0.118 
    (-0.411 - 0.176) 8 "Both Unemployed”* Low Unemployment (4.8 - 5.8%)    - 
     8 "Both Unemployed”*Middle Unemployment (5.8% - 7.5%)    -0.069 
    (-0.364 - 0.226) WIFE AGE 0.017*** 0.016*** 0.017*** 0.016*** 
 (0.011 - 0.023) (0.010 - 0.022) (0.011 - 0.023) (0.010 - 0.022) Married (Ref Cat)     
     
Cohabiting -0.019 -0.017 -0.017 -0.017 
 (-0.086 - 0.049) (-0.085 - 0.051) (-0.086 - 0.052) (-0.086 - 0.052) Divorced/Separated 0.036 0.035 0.032 0.035 
 (-0.020 - 0.092) (-0.019 - 0.090) (-0.023 - 0.088) (-0.020 - 0.091) Head High Education 0.050 0.050 0.095 0.098 
 (-0.029 - 0.129) (-0.027 - 0.128) (-0.031 - 0.221) (-0.041 - 0.237) Wife High Education -0.056* -0.063* -0.083* -0.097* 
 (-0.121 - 0.010) (-0.127 - 0.001) (-0.176 - 0.011) (-0.197 - 0.003) US State FE YES YES YES YES 
Constant 0.002 0.007 -0.018 -0.012 
 (-0.270 - 0.273) (-0.270 - 0.284) (-0.297 - 0.261) (-0.279 - 0.254) N 2,487 2,487 2,487 2,487 
R-squared 0.092 0.092 0.100 0.109 
Number of numID 1,243 1,243 1,243 1,243 
Note: Robust CI in parenthesis. ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.10. State unemployment rate centered at the mean. Wife Age also mean-centered. Reference 










This third chapter addresses the impact at the micro-level of the Great Recession on the 
transition to the first child among couples in the US. At the macro-level, as pointed out in Chapter II, 
we observed a significant negative correlation between rising unemployment rates and TFR. From this 
starting point, Chapter III advances the analysis, looking at the micro-effects of the recession on 
childbearing. In particular it points at the manifest growing difficulties in the labor market in the 
period 2008-2010, and how they affect the entry into parenthood for American couples.  
The couples’ perspective has proven to be important in studies of family dynamics to which the 
traditional male-breadwinner model seems not to apply anymore, given the epochal societal changes 
that turned around women’s role and gender relations in the last decades. Today, women’s position in 
the labor market is in most cases as relevant as their partners’ position in shaping household behavior. 
Clearly, this does not mean that the mechanisms are equal: the two members and their labor market 
statuses might still matter in very different ways in the couple’s decision to become parents; but the 
latter is an additional reason for calibrating the analysis on the couple. 
Based on data from the last five waves (2003-2011) of the Panel Study of Income Dynamics, one of 
the longest and most detailed longitudinal household surveys existent, the analysis aims at 
disentangling the diverse effects of macro- and micro-labor market variations on the probability of 
having a first child. Some of the many individual-level mechanisms, described in detail in Section 2, 
are in the backdrop of the analysis, like the opportunity cost or income effects, but also the less-known 
adverse effect and the uncertainty-reduction mechanisms. The latter is the only one which predicts a 
counter-cyclical reaction of fertility to economic and employment insecurity. 
The analysis proceeds even further, testing whether the two levels interact. Two conflicting 
hypotheses follow: first, the macro- and micro-levels might affect first births in same direction or, 
second, they might operate in opposition to each other. In the former hypothesis, and assuming that 
insecurity in the labor market is harmful for fertility, there is a multiplicative negative effect of being 
out of the labor market during the recession when unemployment rates are large, most likely due to a 
pessimistic view of future job opportunities. In the opposite hypothesis, instead, the stigma of 
individual unemployment is mitigated by the fact that it is a widespread and shared condition 
(attenuation effect). 
 
The results are presented in Section 6 first from the naïve cross-sectional analyses and the 
Between Effects models, and subsequently from a linear probability fixed effects model of the 
	   138	  
likelihood for different typologies of couples to have their first child, to identify any mechanisms of 
selection on unobservable characteristics in the cross-sectional estimates. 
The deterioration in aggregate conditions, at least as measured here, in the time period analyzed, does 
not seem to have the negative effect on first birth found in the aggregate analysis on TFR of Chapter 
II. Increasing state-unemployment rate per se does not affect, either positively or negatively, the 
probability of having a first child, beyond the channel of individual-level employment status. The 
result is robust to any model specification (both if unemployment is introduced linearly or in quartiles) 
once controlling for couples’-level characteristics and their US state of residency. Similar results are 
found by Lange et al. (2014) for the Netherlands, where the negative effect of aggregate 
unemployment appears only for the likelihood of marriage but not for first births.  
Regarding couples’ employment combinations, the results between the cross-sectional, the BE and the 
FE analyses are very different.  
Comparing across couples typologies without taking into consideration the longitudinal structure of 
the date (cross-sectional and BE analyses) the estimates show that any couple’s working status 
combination, compared to the dual earners, have a lower likelihood of first birth (except when she 
works and he is unemployed) but these negative effects seem to be attenuated by the diffusion of 
unemployment (only in the cross-sectional analyses).  
These are naïve estimates, however, that do not take into consideration that couples select themselves 
into contextual and employment conditions according to some unobserved characteristics that might 
also influence their propensity to have children. 
 
For this reason I also conducted a FE analysis, exploiting the panel structure of the PSID 
dataset and controlling for couples (and state) fixed effect, to control as much as possible for time-
invariant factors that might affect both employment and childbearing. 
The results are indeed different: compared to dual earners, the couples showing the smallest 
probability of first birth are those where the husband becomes unemployed, independently of the 
wife’s status144. Moreover, the negative effect increases at high levels of aggregate unemployment, 
suggesting a multiplicative effect of the recession on top of individual job market insecurity. Finally, 
when unemployment rates rise, even in the case where the husband is employed, if the wife goes out 
of the labor force (starts studying or becomes a housewife are the two most common possibilities) 
their probability of parenthood also declines compared to the dual earners. 
In a previous study on the US, Lindo (2010) found, for the period from the seventies to the nineties, 
that male job loss decreases completed fertility (in the long run, 3-8 years after the job loss) of married 
couples but actually increases fertility for them in the short run. These results suggest that while the 
opportunity cost of childbearing might have been more relevant in the short term, the income effect of 
unemployment prevailed in long-term decisions. However, the present analysis, conducted on data of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
144	  The	  category	  of	  both	  unemployed	  is	  too	  small	  to	  draw	  substantial	  conclusions	  on	  this	  group	  of	  couples.	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a very different historical period compared to those of Lindo (2010), does not support the opportunity- 
cost hypothesis in the short-run either, according to which I should have found a positive effect for 
one of the two categories of head- or wife-only working (especially for the heads working couples 
with wives out of the labor force). I do find instead results similar to those of Vignoli et al. (2012) in 
Italy, where all couples’ job combinations different from the dual earners depress births. 
 
There also seems to be no support for the counter-cyclical fertility (or uncertainty-reduction) 
hypothesis since insecure positions lead to a smaller probability of parenthood, a result that, instead, 
suggests an explanation based on the income effect. The negative effect on childbearing of men (or of 
women but the estimates are smaller) losing their job points to a reduction of couple’s job insecurity, 
earnings and income, compared to dual earners, who in comparison might have less time but certainly 
have more money and better future economic prospects. This seems also to become more relevant as 
the aggregate employment conditions deteriorate. 
The income effect is usually very strong but since the Great Recession largely affected the young 
strata of the working population, I would not exclude the presence of the adverse effect too, maybe 
concentrated on the youngest couples145. A more detailed investigation of the effects across different 
age or tenure groups, maybe differentiating between the first and later occupations (young versus 
experienced workers) would be necessary to assess the relevance of the adverse-effect mechanism on 




	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
145	  For	  instance,	  found	  that	  young	  adults	  18-­‐24	  years	  old	  in	  Europe	  during	  the	  Great	  Recession	  faced	  the	  hardest	  time	  in	  the	  job	  market,	  being	  hit	  by	  the	  
strongest	   increase	   in	   youth	   unemployment	   rates,	   but	   also	   they	   faced	   an	   increase	   in	   poverty	   rates	   and	   an	   increase	   in	   the	   perceived	   economic	  
deprivation.	  This	  has	  also	  an	  impact	  in	  the	  proportion	  of	  young	  adults	  that	  can	  leave	  the	  parental	  house	  and	  establish	  a	  new	  independent	  household	  
(Aassve	  et	  al	  2013).	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CHAPTER IV 
 
INTERGENERATIONAL MOBILITY DURING THE GREAT 
RECESSION: THE EASTERLIN HYPOTHESIS. 











The interaction between the individual employment position and the aggregate job market 
environment, investigated in Chapter III, could be interpreted as a test of whether couples, especially 
in particular situations, tend to take decisions based not only on their own absolute status but also in 
relation to the larger community’s conditions. When uncertainty looms, individuals find it harder to 
evaluate costs and benefits of any given choice, or to evaluate the gravity of a situation. Therefore they 
might refer to other people’s conditions to evaluate their own, or to other people’s decisions to take 
theirs. Chapter III shows only modest evidence that individuals are conditioned by state-level 
aggregate structural conditions such as unemployment rates: the latter per se does not seem to 
influence the probability of first birth but I find indications of a (moderate) multiplicative negative 
income effect on first birth for couples in which one of the two partners loses the job. Rising aggregate 
uncertainty signal to couples that their employment difficulties might not be just a temporary shock 
but rather an enduring condition; therefore they tend to postpone family commitment and parenthood 
even further. 
Another comparison that individuals might make in the decision-making process of becoming parents 
is with respect to their past experience, most likely their experience as young adults in their family of 
origin. The expectations individuals have, or the role model with whom they naturally tend to identify 
and evaluate themselves is that provided by their parents. 
Moreover, individual uncertain economic and employment conditions might be viewed as normatively 
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and materially incompatible with the entry into parenthood146. For instance, Oppenheimer (1988) saw 
in the declining economic prospects of young men during the eighties and nineties an important reason 
for the decline in marriage rates (Kalmijn 2011). Deterioration in men’s economic potential reduces 
their attractiveness in the marriage market because an unstable career signals uncertainty (or 
immaturity) as to whether the potential husband will be able to financially maintain a family 
(Oppenheimer 1988; Kalmijn 2011). The broader argument is that couples might postpone marriage 
and parenthood until they have “established a relatively solid position in the labor market” (Vignoli et 
al. 2012:42; Bernardi and Nazio 2005)147.  
One possible view on this issue comes from social mobility theory and it also brings the argument 
back to my previous point on the formation of individuals’ future expectations and aspirations. What I 
refer to within the social mobility theoretical framework is the positional aspiration theory regarding 
the decision strategy (common to different social classes) to avoid downward mobility with respect to 
one’s own class of origin (Boudon 1974; Goldthorpe and Breen 1997; Goldthorpe 1996, 2000).  
The bottom line of these arguments, and the assumption at the basis of this chapter’s investigation, is 
that individuals see as a precondition to start a family to be at least in the socioeconomic position of 
their parents, seeing their standard of living as a threshold to reach before entering parenthood. 
The aim of this chapter is precisely to investigate whether women decide to have their first child based 
not in their absolute employment or socioeconomic placement, as was done in Chapter III, but on their 
intergenerational relative socioeconomic (occupational) position. 
 
 During the seventies, the American economist Richard A. Easterlin developed a theory to 
model the impact of the business cycle on fertility behavior. The original model hypothesized that 
changes in the age structure of a population influence fertility rates via the relative cohort size. 
Relative cohort size influences the degree of labor-market competition and therefore the disposable 
income of a cohort with respect to the previous one.  
The imbalance created between the possibilities of one generation compared to those of the previous 
generation, was deemed to be responsible for the fluctuations in the fertility rate after the Second 
World War in the US (Easterlin 1961, 1976, 1980). At the micro-level the argument is that fertility 
decisions are taken based on a relative measure of the individual’s socioeconomic status, which is the 
amount of disposable resources relative to his or her socioeconomic aspirations (or the alleged 
minimal threshold of standards of living), that are formed in the family of origin. When this 
intergenerational relative socioeconomic status is in favor of the younger generation, or at least stable, 
their fertility would increase, otherwise they will postpone childbearing until aspirations are fulfilled. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
146	  This	  argument	  is	  similar	  to	  the	  one	  at	  the	  basis	  of	  the	  ‘adverse	  effect’	  mechanism	  of	  transmission	  of	  uncertainty	  from	  the	  work	  to	  the	  family	  domain	  
illustrated	  in	  Chapter	  II.	  The	  same	  normative	  mechanism	  of	  reaching	  financial	  independence	  before	  setting	  up	  a	  family	  was	  defined	  as	  the	  ‘affordability	  
clause’	   by	   Rindfuss	   and	   VandenHeuvel	   (1990)	   in	   a	   study	   of	   marriage	   and	   cohabitation	   in	   the	   US	   (see	   Section	   2.1	   in	   Chapter	   II	   for	   a	   detailed	  
examination).	   However,	   in	  my	   investigation	   I	   do	   not	   only	   refer	   to	   young	   adults	   entering	   the	   labor	  market	   but	   to	   the	  more	   general	   economic	   and	  
employment	  uncertainty	  common	  to	  individuals	  with	  different	  working	  tenure	  during	  periods	  of	  financial	  and	  economic	  hardship.	  Therefore	  I	  do	  not	  
specifically	  refer	  to	  this	  mechanism	  throughout	  the	  chapter.	  
147	  However,	   the	   definition	   of	   what	   it	   means	   to	   afford	   the	   commitment	   to	   family	   and	   childbearing	   means	   very	   different	   things	   depending	   on	   the	  
individual’s	  characteristics	  such	  as	  religion,	  race	  and	  social	  class	  (Rindfuss	  and	  VandenHeuvel	  1990).	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 Exactly as it is assumed by the positional aspiration theory of social mobility mentioned 
above, the necessary condition to start a family is to avoid intergenerational downward socioeconomic 
mobility. However, the current economic downturn reduces individuals’ disposable income, compared 
to the ideal socioeconomic standard created during adolescence in their families. During a recession it 
is more arduous for adult children to reach the socioeconomic position of their parents and thus fulfill 
their own aspirations. The context in which young individuals begin their working careers is, in fact, 
much more complex; they face fewer and less-rewarding occupational opportunities compared to that 
of their parents, and their future financial and career prospects are not better. These adverse conditions 
are often cited as a reason why young adults postpone the exit from the family of origin and their own 
family formation (Meron and Widmer 2002).  
 
Before the onset of the Great Recession, findings concerning the trend in intergenerational 
mobility in the US were mixed. In a recent review of the literature, Florentia Torche (2015) suggests 
that in a context of growing inequality like the US, the most solid studies based on administrative data 
do not find any significant variation in the intergenerational mobility between the cohorts born 
between the seventies and the nineties (Chetty et al. 2014). In contrast, an increase in intergenerational 
mobility among men born in older cohorts (1950s-1970s) is found in studies using the Panel Study of 
Income Dynamics (PSID) (Fertig 2003; Mayer and Lopoo 2004; Hertz 2007; Lee and Solon 2009). 
However, other studies based on the National Longitudinal Surveys (NLS) show a decline in mobility 
for cohorts born between the 1940s and the 1960s (Levine and Mazumder 2002; Bloome and Western 
2011).  
Finally, to the best of my knowledge, there are no specific studies on households’ intergenerational 
mobility during the Great Recession, excepting the November 2013 issue of The Annals of the 
American Academy of Political and Social Science on the effects of the Great Recession. The latter 
includes articles from psychologists, economists, sociologists and political scientists (among others) 
dealing with the various effects of the recession for American households, workers and children. It is 
interesting for the present discussion because it addresses – though separately – issues like mobility, 
socioeconomic status and the effects of the recession. In particular, Cherlin et al. (2013) investigated 
the consequences of the economic and financial crisis on family dynamics. The authors find that the 
proportion of young married couples living in extended families with parents is very small although 
the authors also show that married young men (25-29 years old) living with their family of origin 
increase by about 5% between 2007 and 2011 (Cherlin et al. 2013; Danziger 2013). They also report 
the results from a Pew Research study of 2010 showing that 24% of young adults age 18-29 have 
moved back to their parents’ houses. Finally, the authors find a strong association with economic 
status: educated young adult with more resources and experiencing less unemployment are less likely 
to live with parents. These findings suggest that during the crisis it is difficult for young individuals 
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and couples to live independently of their family of origin, from which they seek assistance and find 
financial and practical help.  
In the same issue of The Annals, Pfeffer and colleagues (2013) investigated the changes in 
socioeconomic status of American families after the Great Recession. In their article, they show an 
extraordinary decline in household wealth due to the downfall of housing prices, stock prices, and the 
escalation in unemployment (see also Danziger 2013). They study in particular the distribution of 
wealth across different socioeconomic groups during the crisis and the first years of recovery. All 
groups suffered losses in wealth, but the more disadvantaged socioeconomic groups, in terms of 
ethnicity, education, pre-recession income and wealth, suffered the greatest losses. In the period 2007-
2011 one-fourth of American households lost at least 75% of their wealth, while more than a half of 
them lost at least 25% of their wealth. These losses were disproportionately concentrated among low-
educated, low-income minority households, generating a substantial and sudden rise in inequality. 
Notwithstanding the change in income and wealth, longitudinal studies, though, show little change in 
household mobility in the distribution.  
Studies of the interaction between employment or socioeconomic status and first birth usually proxy 
the socioeconomic status with education, which measures only part of it, leaving aside the 
occupational and earnings structure within educational levels. Moreover, the results of these studies on 
the differential educational effects of employment insecurity on childbearing are far from conclusive. 
For instance, Kreyenfeld and Andersson (2014) look at the transition to first birth and the impact of 
employment status interacted with education in Denmark and Germany. They find that unemployment 
reduces the risk of first birth for tertiary-educated women, while among low-educated, the risk is 50% 
higher for unemployed women, compared to employed ones. In contrast, Meron and Widmer (2002) 
find for France that as unemployment and intermittent employment become normal facts in life (as in 
younger cohorts) they tend to have the same negative effect on first birth for highly educated women, 
but the effect is also negative and stronger on the least educated (who are more severely hit by 
unemployment). 
 
 Empirical research regarding the effects for fertility of both the social mobility and the 
Easterlin hypotheses has been modest, especially in the last two decades, probably in light of the fact 
that early studies concerning both hypotheses received highly mixed support.  
The studies carried out around the time when the theories were developed seems to support the idea 
that mobility per se has no effect on fertility and, if anything, that intergenerational upward mobility 
negatively affects the likelihood of childbearing (in support of the status-enhancement mechanism). In 
contrast, more recent studies such as Bernardi (2007) find evidence that individuals do compare 
resources and aspirations formed in the family of origin and that upward occupational mobility with 
respect to the family of origin increases the likelihood for parenthood. However, in a very different 
setting and looking only at symmetric mobility Zang (2008) finds that mobility depresses complete 
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fertility. 
While the theoretical development of the link between social mobility and fertility has been very well 
established, it is impossible to draw definite conclusions on the basis of existing empirical evidence.  
The present chapter goes into this direction of trying to shed light on the link between mobility and 
fertility on the empirical grounds. The study attempts to do so by investigating the impact of 
intergenerational occupational mobility on the transition to first birth for American women in a period 
of increasing economic and employment uncertainty due to the onset of the Great Recession, thus 
adding another determinant to the model of fertility as a function of socioeconomic resources, 
aspirations and social mobility.  
After this introduction, the remainder of this chapter is organized as follows: the next section provides 
the theoretical background to the investigation of the nexus between intergenerational mobility and the 
Easterlin Hypothesis, and fertility. Section 2 further illustrates the empirical evidence available on this 
theoretical nexus. Section 3 presents the statistical model and the dataset on which the following 
analysis is based. The descriptive results are reported in Section 4, while the multivariate Event 
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The theoretical framework of this chapter is based on a similar concept coming from two 
different streams of research: social mobility theory (Boudon 1974; Goldthorpe 1996; Been and 
Goldthorpe 1997) and the aspiration and resources hypothesis developed by the American economist 
Richard Easterlin (1961; 1976). 
Both theoretical models make the crucial assumption that the individual makes strategic decisions (in 
education in the former theory and in childbearing in the latter) grounding their choices on their 
socioeconomic aspirations. Moreover, both theories also assume that these socioeconomic aspirations 
are formed in the individual’s family of origin. 
In this section I outline this main theoretical idea on which the analyses in this chapter is based and 
show how it has developed in the respective fields, starting from social mobility (in Section 2.1.1) and 
moving then to the Easterlin Hypothesis of aspirations and resources (in Section 2.1.2).  
In the following subsection (2.2) I further illustrate the main empirical findings in the research on 
social mobility and fertility, and the numerous applications in the literature of Easterlin’s model. 
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2.1.1. Intergenerational mobility 
 
 
The social mobility assumption I refer to in this chapter was developed (starting from the 
positional theory of aspiration by Keller and Zavalloni 1964) in an attempt to explain why, despite 
educational expansion, social class inequality in educational attainment remained constant148 over 
time, and similar across countries (Boudon 1974; Goldthorpe 1996, 2000; Breen and Goldthorpe 
1997). Breen and Goldthorpe (1997, 2000) identified three mechanisms in their rational action model 
through which class differentials in educational attainment arise (and persist): first, a common relative 
risk aversion but, second, social class differences in ability and, third, different class endowment of 
resources. The first assumption concerns the class-common formation of aspirations: families in all 
classes similarly seek to ensure that their children acquire a class position that is at least as 
advantageous as their class of origin; namely they seek to avoid downward mobility with respect to 
parents. This means families in all classes have the same relative risk aversion.  
In psychology, Kahneman and Tverky’s (1979) make a similar argument in developing the prospect 
theory149 according to which individuals’ utility curves are more sensitive to losses compared to gains. 
In other words, losses are valued more negatively than gains are positively valued. 
Even though not the focus of this specific study, it is worth mentioning that there are two other 
competing theoretical explanations regarding mobility strategies and the formation of aspirations in 
families of different classes. The first theory also views individuals’ strategies as identical across 
social classes, but more in general posits that individuals aim to move from less to more desirable 
positions; while the second theory asserts that there might be cultural reasons for not pursuing more 
individually desirable class positions. For instance individuals from the working class might not be 
seeking individual success and achievement because they pursue other values, such as the family or 
solidarity, and they see personal interest as hindering these community values (Goldthorpe 2000: 241-
2).  
In contrast, the positional or structural theory of aspirations (Keller and Zavalloni 1964; Boudon 1974; 
Goldthorpe 1996) argues that class differences in educational or occupational aspirations do not 
depend on class values, or class-specific culture, but rather on structural factors.  
This implies that individuals’ goals should not be measured in absolute terms (as cultural aspirations) 
but relative to the class position individuals occupy, in terms of their social class-accessibility. In other 
words, aspirations (i.e. avoiding intergenerational downward mobility) are equal between children of 
working and service classes, but the distance to cover to fulfil those aspirations differs a lot between 
the two classes. The choice of a specific educational or occupational career in fact entails different 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
148	  Boudon	  (1974)	  was	  led	  by	  the	  lack	  of	  appropriate	  data	  and	  analyses	  to	  think	  that	  the	  puzzle	  to	  explain	  was	  that	  despite	  educational	  expansion	  and	  
declining	  class	  differentials	  in	  educational	  attainment,	  rates	  of	  intergenerational	  mobility	  were	  constant.	  Boudon	  (1974)	  thought	  that	  the	  decline	  in	  the	  
influence	  of	  social	  class	  on	   the	   transition	  probabilities	   (secondary	  effects)	  consequent	   to	   the	  dramatic	  expansion	   in	  educational	  opportunities	  was	  a	  
general	  feature	  of	  modern	  societies.	  This	  actually	  has	  not	  materialized	  (Goldthorpe	  1996,	  2000).	  
149	  The	  authors	  develop	  the	  prospect	  theory	  in	  an	  open	  critique	  to	  the	  expected	  utility	  theory	  as	  a	  descriptive	  model	  of	  decision	  under	  risk.	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opportunities and constraints150 and thus a different perception of costs and benefits of that choice, 
depending on the class of origin (Goldthorpe 1996)151. In Goldthorpe’s words “educational decision-
making remains conditioned by the class situation in which it takes place” (Goldthorpe 1996: 494). 
 
This argument makes two fundamental assumptions: first, that education is a positional good 
and its returns in employment depend on the relative educational qualification of an individual 
compared to his/her competitors in the labor market; second, as mentioned above, that the principal 
concern of families is that their children reach the educational qualification that is enough to preserve 
the socioeconomic status of their parents, or at least enough to avoid downward mobility.  
The result is that children from lower classes look less ambitious than their higher-class counterparts 
even though they are not. An expression of this is that negative consequences of a failure in high-level 
educations are much larger for working class children compared to service-class children (Gambetta 
1987; Goldthorpe 1996). In his seminal work on class inequalities in educational attainment in Italy, 
Gambetta (1987) shows that middle-class families tend to more easily (‘light-heartedly’) expose their 
children to failures in post-compulsory education, in contrast to working class families, which play it 
safer152. 
This latter finding recalls the concept of compensatory advantage (Boudon 1998; Bernardi 2014) of 
individuals from upper classes compared to the working class, in making life-course trajectories less 
dependent on early failures or negative outcomes. The explanation for this advantage lies exactly in 
the assumption of risk aversion described before: if the goal is to avoid downward mobility a negative 
school outcome lowers the child’s future probability of success and consequently lowers the 
probability that he/she proceeds further in education. However, to avoid downward mobility children 
of the upper class would always find it optimal to continue education, independently of the probability 
of success, because their families have the resources (economic, social and cultural) to compensate for 
their eventual early failure and to make sure children maintain their advantage notwithstanding the 
negative school outcome. In contrast, for low-classes’ children the probability of success is 
determinant because, first, the family has limited resources and they might devote them to pupils who 
performs better at school and, second, because starting from a low socioeconomic position they do not 
really need to proceed in education to avoid downward mobility (Bernardi 2014). 
  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
150	  The	  second	  and	  third	  mechanisms	  of	  class	  differences	  in	  ability	  and	  resources	  identified	  by	  Breen	  and	  Goldthorpe	  (1997,	  2000)	  mentioned	  at	  the	  
beginning	  of	  this	  section.	  
151	  This	   further	   relates	   to	   Boudon’s	   distinction	   between	   primary	   and	   secondary	   effects	   of	   class	  membership	   on	   educational	   attainment,	   the	   former	  
regarding	  the	  class	  effect	  on	  achievement	  and	  the	   latter	  regarding	  the	  class	  effect	  on	  the	  choices	  students	  of	  different	  background	  make	  when	  faced	  
with	  transitions	  (leaving	  school	  or	  not,	  choose	  between	  vocational	  and	  academic	  degrees,	  etc.).	  Boudon	  (1974)	  further	  argues	  that,	  while	  educational	  
expansion	  reduced	  primary	  effects,	  it	  is	  when	  making	  the	  transitions	  (secondary	  effects)	  that	  families	  of	  different	  classes	  evaluate	  differently	  the	  costs	  
and	  benefits	  (and	  the	  perceived	  probability	  of	  success)	  of	  the	  different	  options	  their	  children	  face.	  
152	  The	  aim	  of	  Gambetta‘s	  (1987)	  study	  is	  to	  investigate	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  	  rational	  action	  theory	  can	  account	  for	  the	  class	  differentials	  in	  career	  within	  
the	  Italian	  educational	  system.	  Gambetta	  shows	  that	  there	  is	  a	  rational	  planning	  of	  educational	  career,	   filtered	  by	  class-­‐related	  resources	  constraints	  
and	   success	   expectations.	   He	   also	   shows,	   however,	   that	   there	   is	   also	   a	   sub-­‐rational	   inertia-­‐tendency	  within	   classes:	  working-­‐class	   families	   tend	   to	  
underestimate	   their	   children’s	   likelihood	   of	   success	   in	   education	   while	   middle-­‐class	   families	   tend	   to	   overestimate	   their	   children’s	   chances	   (see	  
Gambetta	  1987:	  86-­‐100).	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This discussion is useful to put into context the theoretical assumption of relative risk aversion 
across different classes that I will adopt in the present study of fertility behavior. I will assume in fact 
that non-downward intergeneration mobility is a precondition for women to become mothers. 
However, this is not the sole theoretical link between social mobility and fertility. I review here the 
other mechanisms identified in the literature. 
The theoretical interest in the relationship between social mobility and fertility has a long-standing 
record. Already at the end of the nineteenth century Arsene Dumont (1880) argued that individuals 
have a natural inclination to move upward in the social scale and that in the process they become less 
and less likely to have children153 (Kasarda, Billy, and West 1986). 
In the chapter on mobility in Boudon’s (1992) book Traité de Sociologie, M. Cherkaoui illustrates the 
four main mechanisms linking social mobility and fertility suggested by the literature (Duncan 1966; 
Blau and Duncan 1967; Kasarda 1985, Kasarda, Billy, and West 1986). More recently, and more 
systematically, also Zhang (2008) makes a similar effort 154  describing those four theoretical 
hypotheses: social isolation, stress and disorientation, status enhancement and relative economic 
status.  
The first ‘social isolation’ hypothesis argues that both upwardly and downwardly mobile individuals 
have a higher fertility level with respect to immobile individuals (Blau and Duncan 1967). The reason 
is that moving from one class to another implies entering into a new environment, with lack of support 
and few social ties, for which individuals tend to compensate with higher fertility, to increase their 
social connections. The second hypothesis of stress and disorientation starts from the same premises of 
weak integration and lack of support in the class of destination but predicts exactly the opposite result, 
namely that mobile individuals have lower fertility than non-mobile exactly because they are 
disoriented.  
These two hypotheses are symmetric for upward and downward mobile individuals while the next two 
mechanisms are asymmetric such that they predict opposite fertility outcomes for upward versus 
downward mobile people (Blau 1967). 
The status enhancement hypothesis argues that ameliorating one’s own occupational status implies 
having fewer children than being non-mobile, while downward mobile individuals have high fertility 
compared to both upward mobile and immobile individuals155. The argument is that couples that aspire 
to a higher occupational and social status devote their resources to their careers and invest in the 
domains that allow them to maintain the higher status. The opposite is true for the downward mobile 
individuals, who put more resources into the family156.  
The last hypothesis is the one this chapter specifically refers to: the Easterlin Hypothesis of relative 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
153	  Note	  that	  this	  is	  the	  exact	  opposite	  mechanism	  of	  the	  one	  tested	  here.	  
154	  Among	  the	  many	  other	  effects	  that	  occupational	  mobility	  has	  on	  different	  political	  and	  social	  outcomes.	  
155	  This	  is	  the	  same	  mechanism	  that	  Arsene	  Dumont	  (1880)	  refers	  to.	  
156	  Social	  mobility	  here	  is	  defined	  by	  the	  aspirations	  and	  the	  social	  promotion	  that	  the	  individual	  pursues.	  The	  consequence	  of	  this	  theory	  for	  downward	  
mobile	  individuals	  is	  not	  clear:	  on	  the	  one	  hand	  they	  should	  have	  a	  higher	  fertility	  because	  their	  subjective	  perception	  of	  mobility	  is	  different	  from	  the	  
upward	  mobile	   (less	  or	  no	  aspirations),	  however,	  on	   the	  other	  hand,	   they	  might	  have	  a	   lower	   fertility	   compared	   to	   the	   immobile	   if	   they	  attempt	   to	  
regain	  the	  lost	  social	  position	  (Cherkaoui	  1992).	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economic status. I illustrate the theory extensively in the next section but, to put it briefly, the 
argument is that individuals who have reached the socioeconomic position of their family of origin are 
more likely to feel that they can afford a family and parenthood, and thus are predicted to have higher 
fertility, compared to downward mobile couples who, comparing their social status to that of their 
parents during childhood, are less likely to feel they are in an adequate position to have children. 
The relative economic status and status enhancement predict opposite results for fertility for upward 
and downward mobile individuals; however, they differ in their position on immobile individuals: 
while Easterlin assimilates the behavior of all non-downward mobile individuals (they have a higher 
fertility compared to the downward mobile), the status enhancement hypothesis states that immobile 
and upward mobile individuals behave differently, namely the latter have a lower fertility compared to 
the former who do not need to devote resources away from the family to maintain an higher 
socioeconomic status. This is an important point for the present investigation, as will be illustrated 
later on in this chapter. 
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2.1.2. The Easterlin Hypothesis 
 
 
During the seventies, the American economist Richard A. Easterlin developed a 
comprehensive model relating business cycles to fertility behavior.  
Diane J. Macunovich (1998) gives a very detailed overview of Easterlin’s theory and of the streams of 
literature that followed his model. According to Macunovich, the theory “challenged the orthodox 
neoclassical economic model of fertility originally suggested by Becker (1960)” (Macunovich 1998: 
54). As previously described in Chapter III of this thesis, Becker assumes that the demand for children 
is analogous to the demand for ‘durable goods’ from which parents expect a direct utility, and argues 
that prices and incomes only explain fertility fluctuations. Despite also taking an economic (and 
rational action theory) approach to fertility, Easterlin bases his model of fertility on the assumption of 
‘shifting preferences’; meaning that he treats preferences as endogenous to the process and not as 
given.  
The Easterlin Model (1961; 1976) hypothesizes that changes in the age structure of populations 
influence fertility in the sense that relative cohort size, through its impact on labor market possibilities 
of young adults, and disposable income, relative to their consumption aspirations and preferences 
formed in the family of origin, affect fertility choices. In its initial formulation (Easterlin 1961) was 
applied to explain the World War II “Baby Boom”, and relative cohort size was used to explain the 
marriage squeeze and its subsequent effect on fertility. Later on Easterlin (1976) moved from using 
relative cohort size to the use of relative income (age-specific family income of younger cohorts 
relative to older cohorts) as a measure of consumption aspiration, arguing for a negative impact of 
those aspirations on fertility. Subsequent interpretations (Easterlin 1987) emphasized instead 
economic status, and how one’s own status is identified relative to the level of parental influence 
during the formative teen years. The central point became that individuals evaluate their own 
disposable socioeconomic resources relative to their aspirations or, at least, to the idea they have about 
acceptable standards of living. The latter are based on the resources and the socioeconomic status of 
their family of origin. Individual strategies and the decision-making process depend, according to 
Easterlin, on the comparison between the available resources and the socioeconomic conditions in 
which individuals grow up, namely those of the family of origin. Within this theory thus the decision 
to have children depends, not on the individuals’ absolute socioeconomic status, but on their relative 
status compared to that of their parents; the more the latter comparison is satisfactory, the more 
children they will have157158. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
157	  The	  argument	  is	  clearly	  linked	  to	  the	  assumption	  of	  social	  mobility	  theory	  (Boudon	  1974;	  Breen	  and	  Goldthorpe	  1997;	  Goldthorpe	  2000)	  illustrated	  
above	  according	  to	  which	  individuals,	  when	  making	  life	  choices,	  aim	  to	  avoid	  downward	  mobility	  with	  respect	  to	  their	  parents’	  position.	  
158	  The	  publication	  of	  Easterlin’s	  studies	  (1961;	  1976;	  1987)	  gave	  new	  impulse	  to	  research	  on	  the	  topic	  of	  economic	  conditions	  and	  fertility,	  and	  many	  
scholars	   subsequently	   extended,	   empirically	   tested	   and	   criticized	   the	   Easterlin	   Hypothesis.	   The	  most	   frequent	   objections	   are	   that	   the	   theory	   fits	   a	  
macro-­‐explanation	  but	  not	  micro-­‐level	  ones,	  and	  that	  the	  model,	  as	  it	  is	  developed,	  lacks	  short-­‐term	  predictive	  power	  (Olsen	  1994).	  	  
One	  of	  the	  most	  convincing	  and	  interesting	  elaborations	  of	  Easterlin’s	  theory	  is	  provided	  by	  F.C.	  Pampel	  (1993,	  1995,	  2001).	  Pampel’s	  thesis	  is	  that	  the	  
influence	  of	  cohort	  size	  and	   female	  work	  on	  demographic	  outcomes	  varies	  across	  nations	  and	   time	  periods	   largely	  because	  of	  different	   institutional	  





	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
environments.	  The	  author	  incorporates,	  together	  with	  the	  Female	  Labor	  Force	  Participation	  (FLFP)	  rate,	  a	  series	  of	  variables	  to	  control	  for	  institutional	  
differences	  among	  countries.	  Relative	  cohort	  size	  is	  found	  to	  have	  a	  stronger	  effect	  in	  countries	  with	  the	  lowest	  ‘collectivism’	  ratings	  (Canada	  and	  the	  
Unites	  States)	  and	  particularly	  in	  the	  1950s	  and	  1960s.	  According	  to	  the	  author,	  the	  reason	  why	  relative	  cohort	  size	  is	  less	  determinant	  in	  collectivist	  
institution	  countries	  (European	  Nordic	  countries)	  is	  that	  they	  do	  more	  to	  distribute	  the	  cost	  of	  children	  across	  generations	  through	  social	  programs.	  
Pampel	  argues	  that	  rather	  than	  directly	  affecting	  fertility,	  collectivist	  family	  support	  reduces	  the	  impact	  of	  economic	  circumstances	  across	  cohorts	  on	  
fertility,	  so	  that	  private	  income,	  employment	  and	  cohort	  size	  are	  less	  crucial.	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The earliest study on intergenerational mobility and fertility was conducted in the US by 
Baltzell (1953). The author compared total family size of upwardly mobile and non-mobile individuals 
and found that the latter had larger families and were less likely to have an only child (Kasarda et al. 
1986). Baltzell explained the difference with the financial limitation to which the upward mobile 
families are subject and with the smaller prevalence of family norms in the higher class of destination 
(Kasarda et al 1986: 11). His argument is, opposite to Easterlin’s, reminiscent of Arsene Dumont 
(1880) idea of renouncing to children to move up on the social ladder (and the mechanism of status 
enhancement that was formalized later on).  
During the sixties Tien (1965) also studied the effects of intergenerational mobility on fertility among 
full-time professors in two Australian universities in 1957. Contrary to Baltzell (1953) the author did 
not find any complete fertility differences between the non-mobile and the upward mobile. He did 
find, however, an effect on the spacing between marriage and first birth: controlling for age at 
marriage, upward mobile men tend to wait longer after marriage to become fathers. Moreover, wives 
in the mobile households worked before and after marriage while none of the non-mobile wives did, 
this being, according to the author, a strong intervening variable in explaining the delay in 
childbearing. 
Depending on the methods, the operationalization of social mobility and the samples used, the early 
literature on mobility and fertility found very different results (Dalla Zuanna 2007; Zhang 2008; 
Kasarda et al. 1986). The great majority of studies found no effect, a few found a negative effect of 
upward mobility supporting the status enhancement hypothesis, and some found that total fertility of 
upward mobile individuals lies between that of the class of origin and that of the class of destination, 
thus being higher compared to the non-mobile individuals and supporting the social isolation 
hypothesis (for a detailed illustration see Kasarda et al 1986). 
The great majority of relevant research (Blau and Duncan 1967; Boyd 1971, 1973; Bean and 
Swicegood 1979; Stevens 1981) has confirmed a significant effect on fertility of both the status of 
origin and of destination, but no effect of the mobility itself.  
The intuition (Duncan 1966) is that there are three separate effects on fertility: the levels of fertility in 
the class (or occupational status) of origin, those of the class of destination, and a third and different 
effect on fertility of mobility on its own159. Blau and Duncan (1967) explained the intermediate 
fertility result of mobile individuals between the origin and destination class, via the reference group 
theory.160 They argue that mobile individuals are not fully integrated in neither of the two groups, but 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
159	  The	  additive	  model	  includes	  the	  first	  two	  but	  not	  the	  mobility	  effect	  per	  se,	  which	  is	  given	  by	  the	  interaction	  model	  (Blau	  and	  Duncan	  1967).	  
160	  Later	  on	  named	  the	  “Acculturation	  Hypothesis”;	  see	  Kasarda	  et	  al.	  1986	  for	  details.	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that both groups exert some influence over those individuals, therefore they are expected to behave in 
an intermediate way (Blau 1956: 291). 
The latter result is confirmed by Zimmer (1979) who conducted a study in Scotland using various 
measures of mobility (e.g. different combinations of father/children occupational outcomes at different 
time points) and of fertility (e.g. number of pregnancies, spacing). The author found that regardless of 
the measures used, upwardly mobile women’s fertility is lower than non-mobile in the original status 
and of downward mobile women, while on the contrary, those downwardly mobile have a consistently 
higher fertility compared to non-mobile at the origin and to upward mobile women. 
More recent research on the topic is rare as the richness of studies and theoretical developments of the 
seventies and eighties did not drive substantial empirical results (Zhang 2008). In the past decades 
scholars have left aside the topic by concluding that social mobility does not affect fertility (Zhang 
2008).  
 
Empirical research following the publication of Easterlin’s study on the relationship between 
economic resources, aspirations and fertility is rich but the evidence is mixed and, as suggested by 
Pampel (1993, 1995, 2001), quite country-specific.  
Aggregate cross-country analyses, generally investigating the impact of relative cohort size and 
fertility rate, find support for the Easterlin Hypothesis especially in Anglo-Saxon countries, while they 
find little or no support in Germany and southern European countries. 
Evidence from individual-country macro-studies is controversial, and studies do not always back the 
original model because, for example, most of these studies use period income measures instead of age-
specific variables of relative income. The measure to compare relative economic status in fact should 
be, according to Easterlin, the relative market position (in terms of earning, employment status, etc.) 
of the young adult versus the market position of his family of origin at the time of the formation of his 
consumption aspirations, namely his adolescence. Moreover, many studies do not add control 
variables, and they use family income and male earnings indiscriminately.161 
Similarly, micro-model applications of the Easterlin Hypothesis have been extremely various in their 
interpretation of the relative income measure, yielding very different results. According to 
Macunovich (1998) fifteen micro-studies in the US supported Easterlin’s thesis, while seven were did 
not. Among the latter, however, five relied on survey-based self-assessed objective and subjective 
measures of relative economic status, which clearly do not mirror the original hypothesis. The other 
two studies - Olneck and Wolf (1978) and Thornton (1980) - obtained mixed results. Thornton (1980) 
used the husband’s annual income relative to the parental head’s annual income or to the parental 
welfare indicator, but without clarifying whose parental head (wife or husband) was employed. Olneck 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
161	  Macunivich	   (1998)	   further	  wrote	   that	   “a	   central	  mechanism	   in	   the	  Easterlin	   hypothesis	   is	   imperfect	   substitutability	   between	  older	   and	   younger	  
workers,	  which	  leads	  to	  a	  widening	  of	  the	  gap	  between	  the	  earning	  potential	  of	  older	  and	  younger	  workers	  at	  a	  given	  point	  in	  time,	  or	  at	  points	  very	  
close	   in	   time,	   rather	   than	   at	   a	   given	   age”.	   Period	   income	   measures	   (comparing	   different	   points	   in	   time	   of	   young	   adults’	   average	   income	   or	  
unemployment	  or	  GDP	   time	  series,	  as	  often	  done	   in	   these	  macro	  studies)	  do	  not	   tell	  us	  anything	  about	   the	   intergenerational	   comparison	   in	  a	  given	  
period,	  which	  is	  the	  focal	  point	  within	  Easterlin’s	  theory.	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and Wolf (1978) used a sample of brothers to investigate whether differences in sibling earnings were 
correlated with sibling differences in number of children, assuming that parental influence was the 
same for each sibling. However, the study was conducted without taking into consideration other non-
parental differences between brothers. Neither study found that relative economic resources are 
correlated to higher fertility. 
Among supportive micro-analyses, measures of relative economic status also vary a lot: eight out of 
fifteen used the measure of relative economic status as defined by Easterlin, namely a husband’s 
actual income relative to the parental income (or relative occupational status) while the other seven 
used husband’s actual income relative to some measures of ‘predicted’ income based on 
characteristics like age, age at marriage, education, place of birth and occupation162. 
 
A more recent example of how social mobility affects fertility is carried out by Zang (2008) in 
his PhD dissertation at the University of Chicago. The author in particular analyzes the impact on 
men’s completed fertility of intergenerational mobility (using occupational prestige) in the US in the 
period 1974-2004. Focusing on mobility per se, Zang does not distinguish between upward and 
downward mobility and finds that mobility depresses completed fertility thus supporting the stress and 
disorientation hypothesis. 
Another recent but very different example of an analysis of social mobility effects on fertility is done 
by Bernardi (2007) who studied the effect of social mobility on the transition to first birth for Italian 
men163. Following the Easterlin’s hypothesis, Bernardi (2007) explains the transition to the first child 
by the comparison between available resources and socioeconomic aspirations regarding an acceptable 
standard of living. The study focuses on men and the two variables are operationalized as the 
individual’s occupational prestige over his father’s occupational prestige when he was 14 years old. 
The interesting implication of this model explicitly expressed in Bernardi’s paper is that the higher the 
socioeconomic level of the family in which an individual grew up – in other words, the luckier he was 
during childhood – the higher his minimum income aspirations will be on entering adulthood and 
consequently the more difficult will be to realize those aspirations. The theory predicts that those 
discouraged individuals will restrain from long lasting commitment, for instance postponing or 
renouncing to marriage and childbearing.  
Bernardi (2007) finds support for the Easterlin hypothesis (and also an increasing relevance over time) 
of the relationship between resources and aspirations on family formation in the Italian context: the 
socioeconomic condition of the family of origin is seen as sort of threshold to reach before having a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
162	  As	   importantly	   pointed	   out	   by	  Macunovich	   (1998),	  many	   of	   the	   studies	   that	   used	   the	   ‘correct’	  measure	   of	   relative	   income	   suffered	   instead	   of	   a	  
technical	  drawback:	   they	  used	  a	  categorical	  variable	   instead	  of	  a	   continuous	  variable	  of	   relative	   income,	  assuming	   that	   income	  aspirations	  of	  actual	  
households	   are	   equal	   to	   the	   economic	   status	   of	   the	   family	   of	   origin,	   and	   not,	  more	   generally,	   a	   function	   of	   parental	   income.	   However,	   solving	   this	  
limitation	   could	   only	   improve	   the	   results	   in	   favor	   of	   Easterlin’s	   model,	   being	   this	   assumption	   implicitly	   made	   by	   categorical	   variable,	   even	   more	  
restrictive	  than	  the	  original	  one.	  For	  a	  detailed	  description	  of	  these	  studies	  see	  Macunovich	  (1998).	  
163	  Together	  with	  the	  Easterlin’s	  theory	  and	  the	  social	  mobility	  theory	  -­‐	  described	  in	  section	  2.1	  of	  this	  chapter	  -­‐	  according	  to	  which	  there	  is	  a	  minimum	  
objective	   in	   social	   mobility	   strategies,	   that	   is	   avoiding	   downward	   mobility	   with	   respect	   to	   one’s	   own	   parents;	   Bernardi	   (2007)	   also	   refers	   the	  
Oppenheimer’s	   (1988;	  1997)	   theory	  of	   risk	  aversion	   (or	  uncertainty	  or	   immaturity	   theory)	   -­‐	   cited	   in	   the	   introduction	   to	   this	   chapter	   -­‐	   according	   to	  
which	  uncertain	  conditions	  in	  one	  dimension	  of	  the	  life	  course	  are	  mirrored	  in	  other	  domains,	  having	  a	  negative	  impact	  on	  the	  propensity	  to	  commit	  to	  
long	  lasting	  obligations,	  among	  which	  the	  formation	  of	  a	  family	  and	  parenthood.	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child. The probability of fatherhood actually increases around 10% if the individual is non-downward 
mobile with respect to his parents. However, being in search of the first job is by far the most relevant 
factor in reducing the chances of entry into parenthood but, as Bernardi concludes, in a country like 
Italy where social mobility is extremely low, the time spent in search of the first occupation is already 
a signal that the resources relative to aspiration mechanism is at play. Knowing that social mobility 
during the career is rare, young adults in Italy wait longer to enter into the labor market until they get a 
job that is already in an occupational position very close to that of their aspirations (assumed to be a 
function of the parental socioeconomic status). The longer they wait to accept their first occupation, 
the higher their aspirations are, and the lower is the likelihood of setting up a family. 
This might not be only an Italian feature since it has been shown also for the UK, by Aassve et al. 
(2004): the higher the parental socioeconomic status the slower is the entrance into the labor market, 
even controlling for education (Aassve et al. 2004: 10). 
 
 In sum, empirical research regarding the effects for fertility of both the social mobility and the 
Easterlin hypotheses has been modest especially in the last two decades, probably in light of the fact 
that early studies concerning both hypotheses received highly controversial support. Despite the large 
theoretical development of the topic, empirical research is little, very diverse and studies are not often 
comparable. All in all there is no indication from the literature about which mechanism linking social 
mobility and fertility among the four described in the previous section should prevail, or under which 
empirical conditions (e.g. the different institutional context).  
There are few positive indications of the existence of an effect but the direction and the magnitude is 
far from having been clearly identified by scholars. Older studies carried out around the time when the 
theories were developed seems to support the idea that mobility per se has no effect on fertility and, if 
anything, that intergenerational upward mobility negatively affects the likelihood of childbearing 
(supporting the status-enhancement mechanism). In contrast, more recent studies such as Bernardi 
(2007) find evidence that individuals do compare resources and aspirations formed in the family of 
origin and that upward occupational mobility with respect to the family of origin increases the 
likelihood for parenthood. However, in a very different setting and looking only at symmetric mobility 
Zang (2008) finds that mobility (of any kind) depresses complete fertility. 
The present chapter investigates the nexus between resources and aspirations, and fertility during a 
period of high economic and employment uncertainty that depresses the chances of the children to 
reach the socioeconomic position of their parents. In particular, I focus on testing the asymmetric 
mechanism of relative economic status (Easterlin)164.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
164	  Notice	   though	   that	   here	   I	   do	   not	   specifically	   address	   the	   issue	   of	   mobility	   per	   se	   because	   I	   only	   concentrate	   on	   non-­‐downward	   mobility,	   thus	  
assimilating	   the	   categories	   of	   immobile	   and	   upward	   mobile,	   as	   done	   by	   Easterlin.	   The	   two	   mechanisms	   of	   relative	   economic	   status	   and	   status	  
enhancement	   differ	   exactly	   on	   this:	   while	   Easterlin	   argues	   that	   immobile	   and	   upward	   mobile	   behave	   in	   the	   same	   way,	   the	   status	   enhancement	  
hypothesis	  states	  that	  upward	  mobile	  individuals	  have	  a	  smaller	  fertility	  compared	  to	  downward	  and	  immobile	  individuals.	  In	  this	  sense	  when	  I	  refer	  to	  
the	  status	  enhancement	  mechanism	  I	  am	  –	  slightly	  incorrectly	  –	  referring	  to	  both	  immobile	  and	  upward	  mobile	  women	  having	  a	  smaller	  hazard	  of	  first	  
birth	  compared	  to	  downward	  mobile	  women.	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The dataset used in this analysis is again the Panel Survey of Income Dynamics (PSID), 
described in the previous chapter (see Section 4 of Chapter III). Notwithstanding the already-noted 
complexity of the survey, this dataset is particularly useful in the case of this chapter because it traces 
in detail the occupational trajectories of individuals, up to the last four jobs they had since the last 
interview, two years before, with information on type of occupation, and the start and end date of each 
job165. In this way, the effect on fertility of both the kind of occupation and the time and duration of 
each job can be estimated. The consequences of employment and occupational mobility for 
childbearing do not depend only on the mere manifestation of these events but also on their timing and 
their duration. Moreover the effect that they have on births might relate also to the timing of 
childbearing and not only to the fact of having or not having a baby (Meron and Widmar 2002). These 
factors are not efficiently specified and completely exploited in the panel fixed effect model of the 
probability of first birth - in spite of its greater simplicity and ease of interpretation - that was used in 
the analysis of Chapter III. Therefore, in this chapter, the model is estimated using Event History 
Analysis (EHA) with time-dependent variables166. The EHA biographical approach makes it possible 
in fact to analyze individual histories more precisely and to more accurately model the transition to 
parenthood (Meron and Widmer 2002).  
The analysis thus focuses on 15-45 year-old American women167 followed, as before, in the last five 
waves of the panel (2003-2011)168. Beyond the statistical model of estimation and the focus of the 
explanatory variables on social mobility, a third novelty of this chapter with respect to the previous 
one is that I abandon the couple-perspective adopted in Chapter III, to include in the analysis also non-
partnered women169. This allows me to compare the estimates on partnered women to the findings of 
the previous chapter but also to differentiate the impact of economic conditions on first births inside 
and outside of ‘formal’ partnering. In fact, the results on single women can be interpreted as the 
hazard of premarital or out-of-wedlock fertility.  
Although these crucial differences will have a strong impact on the estimates, which I expect to be 
quite different from those in the previous chapter, I try as much as possible to keep the models similar 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
165	  Moreover,	  as	  was	  the	  case	  in	  the	  previous	  chapter,	  for	  each	  individual	  the	  survey	  reports	  the	  US	  state	  of	  residence	  at	  the	  time	  of	  the	  interview,	  so	  
that	  individual-­‐level	  information	  can	  be	  linked	  to	  local	  state	  macroeconomic	  conditions.	  
166	  Also	  in	  light	  of	  the	  life	  course	  approach	  described	  in	  the	  previous	  chapter,	  the	  natural	  methodology	  to	  describe	  life	  course	  events,	  transitions	  and	  
trajectories	  is	  EHA.	  
167	  Both	  black	  and	  White	  women	  included,	  but	  no	   immigrants.	  The	  distribution	  of	   the	  race	  of	   the	  head	  of	   the	   families	   in	  the	  PSID,	   in	   individual	  data,	  
between	  2001	  and	  2011,	  went	  from	  33%	  Black,	  67%	  Non-­‐Black	  in	  2001,	  to	  36.65%	  Black,	  63.35%	  Non-­‐Black	  in	  2011	  (Technical	  Report,	  2013).	  
168	  The	   initial	  dataset	  was	   composed	  by	  154.665	  person-­‐family	  years	  observations	   (30933	  person-­‐family	   in	  each	  of	   the	  5	  waves).	  From	   this	  dataset	  
17823	  observations	  were	  cut	  because	  these	  women	  were	  mover-­‐out	  non-­‐response	  or	  mover-­‐out	   that	  entered	  again	  on	  subsequent	  waves.	  From	  the	  
117755	  person-­‐family	  year	  observations	  left,	  only	  women	  that	  were	  Heads,	  Wives	  or	  Cohabiters,	  were	  selected	  so	  that	  they	  constitute	  an	  independent	  
family.	  Finally,	  from	  those,	  I	  selected	  women	  without	  children	  at	  the	  time	  of	  the	  first	  interview,	  being	  left	  with	  a	  panel	  of	  2811	  women	  in	  the	  age	  range	  
of	  16-­‐45,	  with	  their	  first	  child	  born	  between	  04/2003	  and	  12/2011,	  and	  8128	  person-­‐years	  observations.	  
169	  As	  the	  model	  was	  already	  quite	  complex	  and	  the	  dataset	  not	  too	  big,	  I	  preferred	  to	  simplify	  and	  not	  to	  include	  partners’	  characteristics.	  
	   160	  
with respect to the analyses in the previous chapter, so that estimates can be somehow comparable. 
Beyond the sample and the time period that are the same, for instance, I keep the same macro-level 
indicators (unemployment and period effect), the controls170 and, as before, I include a state fixed 
effect. 
 
The Cox Proportional Hazard Model is used to study the hazard of having the first child for 
those women across the Great Recession years. The Cox model belongs to the family of the 
proportional hazard models and it has the advantage of being very flexible, imposing no assumption 
on the time function. The only assumption implied by the Cox model is that units’ characteristics 
affect the hazard of first birth proportionally. 
Those women in the PSID data are observed from age 17 until they either have their first child or they 
exit the survey. In studies of fertility in developed countries, the time at which women become at risk 
of motherhood is conventionally set at the beginning of reproductive age, the 15th birthday. However, 
for two reasons in the present analysis the origin is set to the time when each woman turns 17. First, 
teenage pregnancies are rare in the sample and measurement errors are large; second, the focus of the 
analysis is on intentional births and their nexus to occupational mobility, while pregnancies during 
adolescence are usually unintended and not linked to employment itself or socioeconomic mobility. 
The failure event is set to 12 months before the birth of the first child and not to 9 months before 
(conception date), as usually done, so as to capture the moment around the time when the decision to 
have the child takes place. I assume the decision to become mothers is reasoned and that sometimes 
some attempts are necessary before becoming pregnant. 
Setting the failure event 12 months before the actual birth allows for measuring the explanatory 
variables at the time of the event (they are not lagged). 
 
Another important issue is that women do not enter the study all at the same time: some 
women are present since the first wave in 2003 while others enter later on. Moreover women do not 
enter all at the same age: some women are observed since they become at risk, but others enter into the 
study much later, after having been at risk for a while. These spells that come under observation after 
exposure are left-truncated171 and they create a problem of sample selection: women that enter the 
study later in life are women that reached that age without having children and are less likely to have 
children in general. This means that if we treat them like all the others we will over-represent low-risk 
cases. Since older cohorts are more and more over-represented by women with a larger survival time, 
if we do not take into account this bias we will underestimate the hazard rate of first birth.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
170	  Though	  I	  could	  include	  in	  the	  EHA	  time	  invariant	  controls	  that	  I	  could	  not	  include	  in	  the	  FE	  model	  such	  as	  race	  and	  number	  of	  siblings.	  
171	  Left-­‐truncation	  is	  different	  from	  left-­‐censoring:	  the	  latter	  arises	  in	  fact	  when	  the	  event	  of	  interest	  happens	  before	  or	  after	  the	  observation	  window,	  
so	  that	  the	  investigator	  cannot	  observe	  the	  event	  but	  he/she	  knows	  that	  it	  has	  happened	  before	  (it	  can	  only	  appear	  for	  repeated	  events,	  i.e.	  if	  we	  were	  
studying	  births	   in	  general)	  while	  with	   truncation	  there	   is	  no	  observation	  of	   the	  events	  before	   the	  period	  of	  study	  because	  women	  with	  children	  are	  
automatically	  excluded	  from	  the	  sample.	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One potential solution cited in the literature (mostly from epidemiology) would be to collect 
information on the excluded sample (Cain 2011) but this seems unfeasible in my case. 
An alternative solution to control for the selection bias is, when the actual start time of exposure of 
each woman to the study is available, to correct the likelihood function by conditioning the hazard172 
on the length of exposure to risk of each woman (Allison 1984, 2010; Guo 1993).173174 In other words, 
in the likelihood function each observation is weighted by a function of the delayed entry into the 
survey (a sort of inverse probability of being sampled and interviewed). In practice this is done in 
Stata, when setting the data, by specifying the entry date. This method gives unbiased estimates of the 
hazard of the event175, however, they can be quite imprecise if the lowest age at entry under 
observation in the survey (15 years old here) happens shortly before the earliest possible manifestation 
of the event (the origin is set at age 17 here) because the risk-set of observations between the two ages 
is small (Cain 2011)176. This is, admittedly, probably the case here because I have only 5 women aged 
17 who did not give birth and I have already at 18 years old the first births. This is a caveat of the 
analysis that needs to be taken into consideration in interpreting the results. 
 
As mentioned, the statistical model tests whether women’s transition (hazard rate) to first birth 
is affected by intergenerational occupational mobility during the Great Recession. The pillar 
hypotheses of the analysis to test are two: the Easterlin Hypothesis of relative (intergenerational) 
socioeconomic status and the cross-level interaction of individual social mobility status with indicators 
of the economic and financial crisis.  
Intergeneration mobility has been operationalized very differently in the literature. In a recent review, 
Torche (2015) describes it as the “extent and pattern of association between parents’ and adult 
children’s socioeconomic standing, where higher association means less mobility” (Torche 2015: 37-
38). The most common measures of mobility are social class, occupation, earnings or income, and 
education, depending on the discipline that studies mobility pattern: for instance, sociologists tend to 
prefer occupational or educational measures while economists tend to prefer earnings and income.  
Occupational status is a weighted average of the mean level of earnings and education linked to each 
occupation. Its advantages, compared to earnings and income, are the ease of collection and recall, the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
172	  “Let	  Ti	  be	  a	  continuous	  variable	  representing	  the	  duration	  time	  that	  a	  subject	  of	  interest	  has	  been	  exposed	  to	  the	  risk	  of	  an	  event;	  ti	  be	  the	  observed	  
duration	  that	  a	  subject	  of	  interest	  has	  been	  exposed	  to	  the	  risk	  of	  an	  event;	  and	  ui	  be	  the	  duration	  time	  that	  a	  subject	  of	  interest	  has	  been	  exposed	  to	  the	  
risk	  of	  an	  event	  at	  the	  sample	  selection	  time.	  To	  be	  eligible	  for	  a	  prospective	  study	  […],	  we	  require	  that	  subjects	  are	  at	  risk	  of	  exposure	  to	  the	  event	  at	  the	  
time	  of	  selection	  and	  thus	  we	  have	  ti≥ui	  and	  ui>0.	  For	  a	  subject	  which	  has	  been	  exposed	  to	  the	  risk	  and	  is	  currently	  eligible	  for	  the	  study,	  its	  duration	  
time	  Ti	  is	  left	  truncated	  at	  the	  sample	  selection	  time	  ui.	  Whereas	  the	  original	  hazard	  function	  is	  Pr(Ti	  =	  ti	  |	  Ti	  >	  ti)	  where	  ti	  >0,	  the	  hazard	  function	  for	  a	  
left-­‐truncated	  Ti	  is	  Pr(Ti	  =	  ti	  |	  Ti	  >	  ti,	  Ti	  ≥	  ui)=Pr(Ti	  =	  ti	  |	  Ti	  >	  ti)	  where	  ti	  ≥	  ui.”	  (Yang	  and	  Aldrich	  2012:	  482)	  
173	  The	  entry	  point,	  when	  observation	  begins,	  was	  set	  at	  24	  months	  before	  the	  first	  interview	  in	  which	  the	  woman	  entered	  into	  the	  panel,	  because	  the	  
dataset	  gives	  retrospective	  information	  on	  the	  job	  history	  of	  the	  last	  two	  years	  before	  the	  interview.	  In	  this	  way	  the	  complete	  history	  of	  each	  woman	  is	  
precisely	  observed,	  independent	  of	  when	  she	  enters	  the	  study.	  
174	  After	   setting	   the	  data,	  episodes	  are	  split	  according	   to	  our	   time-­‐dependent	  covariate:	  entry	  and	  exit	   into	   the	   labor	   force,	  or	  occupational	   changes.	  
Finally,	  since	  the	  aim	  of	  the	  study	  is	  to	  analyze	  the	   interaction	  between	  the	   individual	   job-­‐market	  position	  and	  the	  aggregate	  conditions	  of	  the	   labor	  
market,	  I	  further	  expanded	  the	  dataset,	  splitting	  episodes	  every	  6	  months	  and	  merged	  the	  dataset,	  based	  on	  calendar	  dates	  and	  the	  US	  state	  of	  residence	  
of	  the	  woman,	  with	  the	  State	  Monthly	  Unemployment	  Rates	  (Federal	  Reserve	  Bank	  of	  St.	  Louis	  data).	  
175	  The	  procedure	   gives	   an	  unbiased	   estimate	  of	   the	  hazard	  of	   the	   event	   only	   if	   the	   lowest	   age	   at	   entrance	   to	   the	   study	   is	   smaller	   than	   the	   earliest	  
possible	  age	  at	  which	  the	  event	  can	  happen	  (Cain	  2011).	  In	  the	  present	  case	  the	  lowest	  age	  at	  entrance	  to	  the	  study	  is	  15	  years	  old	  (24	  months	  before	  
turning	  17,	  see	  footnote	  #173)	  and	  the	  earliest	  possible	  event	  (first	  birth),	  the	  origin,	  is	  set	  at	  17	  years	  old;	  thus,	  the	  estimates	  are	  unbiased.	  
176	  To	  my	  knowledge	  at	  the	  time	  of	  writing	  the	  only	  reference	  to	  this	  problem	  is	  made	  in	  the	  epidemiology	  literature	  (see	  Cain	  2011).	  I	  did	  not	  find	  any	  
study	  in	  the	  disciplines	  of	  sociology,	  demography	  or	  economics	  referring	  to	  this	  issue.	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smaller extent of refusal in communicating it, and its reliability and stability over time (Hauser and 
Warren 1997). Moreover, children can easily report information on parents’ occupation 
retrospectively. Occupational status correlates highly to other social and economic measures but it is 
usually more stable over time compared to them, providing a more accurate measure of life-long 
standing than average earnings or one-year income. The limitations of occupational status concern 
mainly gender specificities of education and earnings occupational paths (Torche 2015). Hauser and 
Warren (1997) also showed that education rather than earnings constitutes the main effect of the 
intergenerational association of occupational status over time177.  
 
In this analysis social mobility at time t is measured through the Socioeconomic Index (SEI) 
linked to the woman’s occupational trajectory and the average index of the parents’ occupation when 
she was growing up178. The variable is calculated based on the Occupation classification of Census 
2000 (3-digit occupation code)179. First, I linked to every occupation episode its absolute SEI, 
following Hauser and Warren (1997)180 and the updated indexes provided by Frederick, C., 2010181. 
Second, I calculated the average SEI of the woman’s parents and then took the ratio between the 
woman’s SEI and the average of her parent’s SEI, for each occupation episode reported in the survey. 
The absolute SEI varies in the sample in the range 8.84-80.5, with a mean of 40.9 and the average 
parents’ SEI is slightly lower, with an average of 37.4 (range 7.55-80.5). The relative SEI ranges 
between 0.21 and 6.22, with a mean of 1.17 (see descriptive statistics and Table A3.1-A3.3 in 
Appendix 3). The variable is then recoded as categorical: 1 if the relative SEI is smaller than 1, when 
the woman’s occupational episode is of intergenerational downward mobility, 2 if the relative SEI is 
greater or equal to 1, implying an immobile or an upward mobile occupation for the woman in that 
episode. 
Using the relative SEI as a categorical variable is quite a restrictive assumption, because 
socioeconomic aspirations of women are set equal to the socioeconomic conditions of the family of 
origin, and not in general as a function of parental economic conditions (Macunovich 1998). Finding a 
result with this variable specification therefore means finding a lower bound of the effect of relative 
resources on first birth. The reason for choosing the categorical specification is that results are more 
straightforward to interpret in an already complex interaction model. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
177	  While	  absolute	  mobility	  is	  measured	  as	  the	  change	  in	  average	  occupational	  status	  over	  time,	  and	  in	  the	  US	  it	  has	  been	  relatively	  stable	  in	  the	  cohorts	  
born	   in	   the	  second	  half	  of	   the	   twentieth	  century	  (Hauser	  et	  al.	  2000),	   relative	  mobility	   is	  slightly	  more	  complex.	   It	   is	  measured	  by	   the	  coefficient	  of	  
parental	  occupational	  status	  in	  a	  regression	  of	  the	  status	  of	  the	  child.	  Intergenerational	  mobility	  operationalized	  in	  this	  way	  for	  White	  men	  in	  the	  US	  has	  
varied	   in	  the	   last	  decades	  between	  0.3	  and	  0.45,	  while	   it	   is	  much	  weaker	   for	  African	  American	  men	  (Torche	  2015).	  There	   is	  some	  weak	  evidence	  of	  
occupational	  status	  intergenerational	  mobility	  increase	  between	  the	  60s	  and	  the	  80s,	  but	  formal	  tests	  are	  usually	  lacking	  (Torche	  2015:	  39).	  	  
178	  The	  question	  posed	  to	  the	  Head	  in	  the	  survey,	  for	  both	  the	  Head’s	  and	  Wife’s	  father	  was	  the	  following:	  “What	  was	  (your/her)	  father’s	  usual	  occupation	  
when	  (you/she)	  (were/was)	  growing	  up?	  What	  kind	  of	  work	  did	  he	  do?”	  The	  same	  question	  was	  posed	  regarding	  the	  mother’s	  occupation.	  In	  case	  one	  of	  
the	  two	  was	  missing	  I	  used	  the	  available	  one.	  
179	  Census	  of	  Population	  and	  Housing:	  Alphabetical	  Index	  of	  Industries	  and	  Occupations	  issued	  by	  the	  U.S.	  Department	  of	  Commerce	  and	  the	  Bureau	  of	  
the	  Census	  was	  used	  for	  this	  variable.	  Please	  refer	  to	  www.census.gov/hhes/www/ioindex/ioindex.html	  for	  complete	  listings.	  
180	  Hauser	  and	  Warren	  (1997)	  use	   techniques	  similar	   to	  Duncan	  (1961)	  using	  national	  data	   from	  the	  1990	  Census	  5	  percent	  public	  use	  sample.	  The	  
H&W1997	  Index	  goes	  from	  7.55	  in	  Production	  Occupations	  to	  80.5	  for	  Physicians	  and	  Surgeons.	  Theoretically	  then	  the	  relative	  (to	  the	  parents’	  average)	  
socioeconomic	  index	  of	  women	  in	  the	  sample	  could	  range	  from	  0.094	  (min\max)	  to	  10.66	  (max\min).	  	  
181	  The	  original	  H&W	  Index	  is	  based	  on	  the	  occupational	  classification	  system	  of	  1990;	  the	  Census	  Bureau	  updated	  the	  system	  in	  2000,	  and	  this	  is	  the	  
classification	   used	   in	   the	   PSID.	   Frederick’s	  working	   paper	   explains	   the	   calculations	   to	   update	   occupational	   status	   indexes	   and	  makes	   available	   the	  
updated	  H&W	  index	  at	  http://www.ssc.wisc.edu/cde/cdewp/OccCodes.zip.	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In addition, to make the estimates comparable with those of Chapter III, the variable is 
operationalized to include also women that do not work. I use employment status (1 if she is employed 
in that episode, 0 if she is out of the labor force or unemployed) to construct the final explanatory 
variable of activity status: the combination of employment status and intergenerational mobility. 
Activity status is equal to 0 in episodes of non-employment, equal to 1 if the woman is in a 
downwardly mobile job and equal to 2 if she is in an immobile or upwardly mobile job (with respect 
to her parents’ average job). 
A crucial drawback of this analysis is that in the dataset it was not possible to separate the categories 
of unemployed and non-employed, because unemployment spells other than the ones coinciding with 
the interview had to be constructed based on the occupational trajectories reported. However, having 
no other information signaling what the woman was really doing in between jobs, it would have been 
too risky to assume that they were unemployed instead of being out of the labor force, or vice versa. 
This is an important problem, but, due to data limitations, it is common to many studies on female 
employment (Matysiak and Vignoli 2008, 2013; Kreyenfeld and Andersson 2014). This further 
implies that not all the results of this analysis can be compared to those of the previous chapter, where 
it was possible to make this distinction. 
The model is represented in equation (1) where the hazard of having the first child at time t depends 
on the individual activity status, the aggregate effect of the recession and the interaction of the two at 
time t-1 (to avoid issues of reverse causation). 
 
 
𝐻𝑅  𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑠𝑡𝐶ℎ𝑖𝑙𝑑  !,! =   𝛽𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑡𝑦  𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑠!,!!! + 𝛾𝐶𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐼𝑆!!! + 𝛿𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑡𝑦  𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑠!,!!! ∗ 𝐶𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐼𝑆!!! + θ𝑋!!! + 𝜀!,!!! 
 
𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑡𝑦  𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑠!,! =
𝐷𝑜𝑤𝑛𝑤𝑎𝑟𝑑  𝑀𝑜𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑒              𝑖𝑓  𝐸𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑒𝑑 = 1  ;   
𝑂𝑐𝑐𝑢𝑝𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙  𝑆𝐸𝐼  𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑠!,!
𝑃𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠  𝐴𝑣𝑔  𝑂𝑐𝑐𝑢𝑝𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙  𝑆𝐸𝐼  𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑠!
< 1
𝑂𝑢𝑡  𝑜𝑓  𝑙𝑎𝑏𝑜𝑟  𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑐𝑒            𝑖𝑓  𝐸𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑒𝑑 = 0  ;   
𝑂𝑐𝑐𝑢𝑝𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙  𝑆𝐸𝐼  𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑠!,!
𝑃𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠  𝐴𝑣𝑔  𝑂𝑐𝑐𝑢𝑝𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙  𝑆𝐸𝐼  𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑠!
= 0
𝐼𝑚𝑚𝑜𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑒  𝑜𝑟  𝑈𝑝𝑤𝑎𝑟𝑑  𝑀𝑜𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑒                  𝑖𝑓  𝐸𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑒𝑑 = 1  ;     
𝑂𝑐𝑐𝑢𝑝𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙  𝑆𝐸𝐼  𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑠!,!







The recession is operationalized in two ways: first, with a period variable capturing, 
theoretically, the total effect of the Great Recession. This is the categorical variable CRISIS in 
equation (1) which takes value 1 for episodes (starting and ending) before Dec. 2007 (excluded); value 
2 between Dec. 2007 and June 2009, plus episodes starting before and finishing during the recession 
(963 episodes starting between Sept. 2007 and Jan. 2008 and finishing between Feb. and March 2008) 
and finally, it takes value 3 for episodes starting after June 2009. 
The second way the recession is measured – as was done as well in Chapter III – is through the 
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monthly unemployment rate of the state of residence of the woman at the time of the interview, which 
should proxy the pace of the recession and the labor-market effects of the crisis. Since unemployment 
data cover a 10-year period (Jan 2001-Dec 2011) and 56 US states, women in the sample are exposed 
to different degrees of severity of the recession across time and location. This variance in employment 
conditions and economic uncertainty can be exploited in the analysis to grasp the effect of being 
exposed to this different scale of economic downsizing, beyond individual economic and working 
conditions. Unemployment ranges from 2.4 in Utah in January 2007 and 14.2 in Michigan in August 
2009. As mentioned, I also control for state differences, other than unemployment, with state 
dummies. 
 
The first control variable in the vector X in equation (1) is race, distinguishing between White 
non-Hispanic women, Black and women of other ethnicity. The second control is cohort, a categorical 
variable that differentiates between women born before Dec. 1973 (roughly around 28-30 years of age 
at the beginning of the survey), between Jan. 1974 and Dec. 1980 (around age 20-25 at the beginning 
of the survey) and women born after Jan. 1981 (younger than age 20 at the beginning of the survey).  
I also include the number of siblings as a proxy for preferences for children, since coming from a large 
family is usually associated with a higher desire of having children182. 
Another control is years of completed education, which is included linearly in the analysis and goes 
from 6 years (primary school) to 17, which corresponds to having done at least part of a master’s 
degree (see summary statistics in Table A3.3 in Appendix 3). More than one quarter of the women in 
the sample completed high school (27%) and the percentage is almost the same in all the three cohorts, 
while around 16% were in vocational training at some point in time. Larger differences across cohorts 
in education arise at higher levels of education: less than 20% of the older cohort held a bachelor’s 
degree and slightly more than an additional 10% held some master’s degree. As expected, the younger 
cohort (especially because many of these women are still in school or might go back more easily) is 
more educated, with almost 26% of the young women holding a bachelor’s degree and an additional 
10% holding a master’s. 
The last control is marital status: a categorical variable ranging from 0 to 2 (0 being unmarried, 1 
being married and 2 being divorced or separated)183.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
182	  An	  additional	  remark:	  all	  covariates	  change	  over	  time,	  but	  since	  the	  date	  of	  the	  variation	  is	  not	  reported	  the	  only	  information	  we	  have	  is	  that	  the	  
change	  happened	  between	  those	  two	  waves.	  What	  was	  done	  during	  the	  episode	  splitting	  was	  to	  assume	  that	  the	  change	  happened	  in	  the	  last	  episodes	  
before	  the	  last	  wave,	  since	  Stata	  automatically	  organized	  it	  in	  this	  way	  during	  the	  splitting	  and	  we	  had	  no	  other	  insights	  to	  assume	  differently.	  This	  is	  a	  
drawback	  of	  the	  analysis	  since	  we	  are	  imputing	  a	  change	  in	  a	  variable	  in	  a	  point	  in	  time	  that	  might	  not	  be	  the	  correct	  one.	  While	  this	  might	  be	  of	  smaller	  
relevance	  for	  the	  controls,	  it	  is	  a	  main	  issue	  regarding	  the	  principal	  explanatory	  variable,	  the	  unemployment	  rate,	  for	  two	  reasons:	  first,	  since	  we	  are	  
directly	  interested	  in	  the	  effect	  of	  the	  monthly	  unemployment	  level	  at	  the	  time	  of	  first	  birth,	  if	  the	  variable	  is	  misreported	  in	  the	  crucial	  period	  because	  
the	  woman	  actually	  moved	  at	  a	  different	  point	  in	  time,	  this	  would	  yield	  wrong	  estimates.	  Secondly,	  and	  more	  importantly,	  there	  might	  be	  an	  issue	  of	  
endogeneity	  since,	  mobility	  is	  quite	  high	  in	  the	  US,	  and	  especially	  during	  downsides	  of	  the	  business	  cycle	  people	  move,	  looking	  for	  better	  opportunities	  
in	  places	  where	  the	  economy	  is	  doing	  better.	  We	  cannot	  be	  sure	  therefore	  that	  there	  is	  no	  endogeneity	  with	  regard	  to	  this,	  since	  women	  might	  move	  to	  
a	  state	  where	  the	  unemployment	  rate	  is	  lower	  to	  find	  a	  better	  job,	  and	  this	  in	  turn	  might	  affect	  her	  likelihood	  of	  becoming	  a	  mother.	  Moreover	  women	  
that	  migrate	  to	  another	  state	  might	  be	  selected	  in	  some	  way	  and	  might	  be	  different	  from	  the	  women	  who	  do	  not	  move.	   In	  the	  sample	  there	  are	  247	  
women	  moving	  once,	  41	  moving	  twice,	  and	  7	  moving	  more	  than	  twice:	  altogether	  they	  are	  12%	  of	  the	  sample.	  In	  an	  attempt	  to	  control	  for	  this,	  I	  include	  
the	  state	  dummies	  as	  was	  done	  in	  Chapter	  II.	  
183	  This	  variable	  is	  to	  be	  interpreted	  with	  some	  caution	  since	  it	  has	  been	  derived	  from	  a	  different	  variable,	  namely	  the	  Change	  in	  Marital	  Status	  of	  the	  
Head	  of	  the	  family.	  I	  attributed	  to	  the	  wife	  the	  same	  marital	  status	  of	  the	  Head,	  when	  the	  woman	  is	  not	  the	  head	  of	  the	  house	  (which	  can	  be	  plausible)	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Finally, before moving to the results it is worthwhile mentioning that both education and 
marital status might actually mediate the effect of the crisis on fertility. On the one hand, recessions 
might influence negatively the propensity to marry, first, because marriages are costly and couples 
might want to reduce expenditures during periods of economic uncertainty, and second, because 
financial strains might generate stress and tensions within the couple that might induce them to decide 
to postpone the marriage. On the other hand, married couples might enjoy some economies of scale 
and a more favorable taxation scheme, which might induce couples to accelerate marriages during 
recessions (Morgan et al 2011). In both cases childbearing would be affected by the crisis via the 
lower or higher number of marriages. 
Nevertheless, empirical research does not support either of the hypotheses: aggregate trends suggest 
only moderate changes in marriage and cohabitation in the last years (Morgan et al. 2011; Cherlin et 
al. 2013) that are more likely attributable to long-term trends rather than to the Great Recession184. 
Marriage rates have been declining since the 1980s and they continued to decline at the same pace 
during the crisis, in 2007-2010 (US National Center for Health Statistics, CDC NCHS, 2012 and 
Cherlin 2013)185. 
Education could also be mediating the effect of the economic crisis on childbearing negatively, on the 
one hand, if young adults were postponing their exit from (or returning to) the educational system 
because of the harsh conditions of the labor market after the onset of the recession (the opportunity 
cost of education declines when unemployment rates are high), and if this longer permanence into 
education in turn were to create a delay in parenthood (due to an enrollment or an attainment effect186). 
On the other hand, education in the US is extremely expensive and individuals might find it even 
harder to afford it during economic downturns, or might not want to take the risk of incurring debt to 
pay for more years of education. The evidence on the effect of the Great Recession on educational 
attainment is scarce but more in favor of the first hypothesis of a positive correlation between high 
(youth) unemployment and post-compulsory education (Clark 2011; Bell and Blanchflower 2011). 
Even though I do not directly test these hypotheses in the thesis I think it is important to acknowledge 
the existence of these mediating mechanisms and to keep these facts in the back of our mind while 




	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
and	  I	  put	  together	  in	  the	  same	  category	  of	  married	  the	  woman	  who	  remained	  married	  in	  one	  wave	  with	  respect	  to	  the	  wave	  before,	  and	  those	  women	  
who	  married	  between	  waves,	  since	  I	  do	  not	  have	  the	  date	  of	  the	  marriage.	  
184	  Morgan	  and	  colleagues	  (2011)	  did	  not	  find	  any	  effect	  across	  educational	  or	  ethnic	  groups	  in	  the	  US.	  
185	  The	  issue	  of	  mediation	  of	  marital	  status	  was	  also	  mentioned	  in	  Chapter	  II	  but	  since	  there	  I	  was	  analyzing	  only	  partnered	  women	  the	  mediation	  issue	  
was	  less	  critical	  and	  confined	  to	  the	  difference	  between	  cohabiting	  and	  being	  married.	  
186	  	  Whether	   the	   effect	   on	   birth	   transition	   is	   due	   to	   educational	   level	   or	   on	   educational	   enrollment	   is	   still	   debated	   in	   the	   literature	   (Blossfeld	   and	  
Huinink	  1991;	  Blossfeld	  and	  Rohwer	  1995;	  Blossfeld	  and	  Timm	  2003;	  Bhrolcháin	  and	  Beaujouan	  2012)).	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Figure 4.1187 illustrates the Kaplan-Meier estimates of the survival functions to first births188 
for women born in three different cohorts: the old (continuous line) in which women are born on or 
before December 1973, the middle cohort (dashed line) in which women are born in 1974-1980 and 
the young cohort (dotted line) in which women are born on or after January 1981 (shaded areas are 
95% confidence intervals). Women in the old cohort enter into the study when they are at least 28-30 
years old, and their survival time is much higher than in the other two cohorts: 50% of women born 
before 1974 survive without deciding to have a child until around 250 months after turning 17. In 
other words, half of the women in the older cohorts are still childless at age 37-38 while 50% in the 
youngest cohort have kids by 21 and 50% have kids by age 29 in the middle cohort. 
The reason is, as already pointed out, that the two older groups are selected women who entered the 
survey childless at older ages. The oldest cohort is comprised of women who entered at age 30 without 
children, while the women in the middle cohort entered the sample childless at age 23.  
Figure 4.2 shows the Kaplan-Meier estimates of the survival functions to (the year before) first births 
for women of different ethnicities: White non-Hispanic, African American and other races combined. 
African American women tend to have a smaller survival time to first birth compared to White 
Caucasian women around the origin date, seventeen years old, but a larger survival at older ages. This 
is in line with the evidence on the larger number of teenage pregnancies among Black women 
compared to those in other ethnicities, and the lower mean age at childbirth (21 years old for Black 
women, CDC 2012). However, excluding teenage pregnancies, the survival functions are actually 
pretty similar across ethnicities, and confidence intervals (not shown) are quite large and overlapping. 
Figure 4.3 illustrates instead the distribution of the individual level explanatory variable Activity 
Status described before, combining the employment and mobility status of women in the sample, 
across periods around the Great Recession. In all three periods, before, during and after the recession 
in the majority of episodes – in more than 40% of them - women are employed and immobile or 
upward mobile with respect to their parents. Nonetheless comparing the years prior to December 2007 
with the post-recession years after June 2009, the percentage of immobile and upwardly mobile 
episodes declines by roughly 2%, while the proportion of non-employment episodes increases by more 
than 5%, from less than 20% to more than 25%. Downwardly mobile episodes also decline more than 
3.5%. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
187	  Figure	  A3.1	  in	  Appendix	  3	  reports	  the	  general	  Kaplan-­‐Meier	  survival	  function.	  
188	  Note	  that	  the	  event	  is	  set	  to	  12	  months	  before	  first	  birth.	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Figure 4.1: Kaplan-Meier survival function by women’s cohort. 
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Figure 4.2: Kaplan-Meier survival function by women’s race. 
 
Source: Elaboration of the author based on PSID survey. 
 
 
Figure 4.3: Distribution of women’s activity status across periods. 
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The results of the Cox Proportional Hazard model of first birth are reported in Tables 4.1-4.3 
below. Table 4.1 shows the odds ratios of the transition to motherhood using the crisis period indicator 
together with individual activity status explanatory variable, while Table 4.2 reports similar estimates 
but using instead states’ aggregate unemployment rates (as in Chapter III). Finally, Table 4.3 puts 
together the two crisis macro-indicators, time periods and unemployment rates, with individual-level 
variables. 
The first result is that at the aggregate level there is a substantial negative period effect of the Great 
Recession on first births (net of state fixed effect): the odds ratios of having the first child are around 
30% less during the period of the crisis, regardless of the model specification (Table 4.1) and range 
between -20% and -30% in the period after June 2009, compared to the pre-recession years. However, 
as also found in Chapter III, aggregate unemployment rate does not affect the transition to first birth 
(Table 4.2) when individual-level control variables such as education, marital status and birth cohort 
are included: the point estimates are negative but very small and often not statistically significant. 
Before turning to the results on the individual-level employment and occupational mobility 
explanatory variable, it is worthwhile addressing briefly the already-mentioned issue of the mediating 
variables. As explained, the Great Recession affects fertility also indirectly through the effect that it 
has on the propensity to marry and to stay in education. 
Even though not the focus of this investigation, I checked this mediation effect of education and 
marital status on the aggregate effect of the crisis on the odds of the first birth and I do find a slight 
reduction of the period effect of the recession when I introduce marital status as a control variable but 
no change at all in the effect when education is introduced in the model (results are available in Table 
A3.4 in Appendix 3). The reduction in the negative effect of the crisis on childbearing when marital 
status is controlled for seems to be concentrated on the period post-June 2009 and the difference is of 
around 10 percentage points less in the odds ratio (see Models 2-3 in Table A3.4). 
As far as the controls are concerned, the number of siblings, as suggested by the literature, positively 
affects the odds of first birth. African American women have slightly higher odds ratios of first birth 
compared to White non-Hispanic while women of other ethnicities have smaller odds of becoming 
mothers, although the point estimates are not statistically different from zero. This confirms the results 
from official statistics that Black women tend to have more children than White non-Hispanic women 
(CDC 2012). Controlling for marital status, cohort, race and employment and occupational mobility, 
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higher education still correlates positively to a faster transition to the first child, but the point estimate 
is small (besides Tables 4.1-4.2 see also Table A3.4 in Appendix 3)189. 
 
I now turn to the impact on the transition to first birth of the individual-level explanatory 
variable, namely women’s employment and intergenerational occupational mobility. Besides the 
negative aggregate effect of the crisis in its period specification, in fact, I find a significant effect on 
childbearing of the individual-level activity status: compared to downward mobile women, the odds 
ratio of first birth for both (immobile and) upward mobile and non-employed women are larger. The 
odds are more than twofold for women out of the labor force or unemployed and 25-30% larger for 
upward mobile women (see Models 2-3 in Tables 4.1 and 4.2).  
  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
189	  We	  do	  not	  know,	  however,	  whether	  these	  higher	  births	  to	  more	  educated	  women	  are	  births	  to	  married,	  cohabiting	  or	  single	  women.	  The	  empirical	  
evidence	  on	  this	  issue	  is	  mixed.	  Aassve	  (2003)	  finds	  that	  both	  women’s	  high	  education	  and	  high	  predicted	  wages	  (variables	  strongly	  correlated	  with	  
upward	  mobility)	  reduce	  the	  hazard	  of	  premarital	  childbearing.	  Other	  studies	  show	  that	  in	  North	  America	  a	  higher	  socioeconomic	  status	  is	  associated	  
with	  a	  less	  complex	  life-­‐course	  (de-­‐standardized)	  trajectory	  where	  men	  and	  women	  tend	  to	  follow	  more	  traditional	  pattern.	  Highly	  educated	  American	  
women	   tend	   to	  have	  a	  smaller	  probability	  of	   living	  alone,	   informal	  cohabitation	  and	  out-­‐of-­‐wedlock	  births	   (Rajulton	  et	  al.	  2010).	  However,	  a	   recent	  
sequence	  analysis	  study	  concentrating	  on	  the	  US	  shows	  that	  coming	  from	  a	  higher	  social	  class	  (parental	  education)	  instead	  reduces	  the	  likelihood	  of	  
experiencing	  a	  traditionally	  structured	  life	  course	  (Sironi	  et	  al.	  2015).	  	  Accordingly	  women	  with	  a	  higher	  socioeconomic	  status	  should	  be	  more	  likely	  to	  
experience	  premarital	  births.	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Table 4.1: Period effect of the Great Recession on the transition to first birth. 
 
Model Model Model 
 
(1) (2) (3) 
Pre- Recession: <Dec 2007 (Ref. Cat) - - - 
    
Recession: Dec2007-Jun2009 0.67*** 0.71*** 0.92 
 
(0.55 - 0.82) (0.56 - 0.91) (0.61 - 1.39) 
Post-Recession: >Jun2009 0.80* 0.71** 0.71 
 
(0.64 - 1.01) (0.53 - 0.96) (0.44 - 1.14) 
Downward mobile (Ref. Cat)  - - 





(1.02 - 1.55) (0.97 - 1.74) 




(1.70 - 2.80) (1.84 - 3.55) 
    
Recession x Out of Labor Force 
  
0.63 
   
(0.35 - 1.12) 
Recession x Upward mobile 
  
0.73 
   
(0.44 - 1.19) 
Post-Recession x Out of Labor Force 
  
0.79 
   
(0.44 - 1.44) 
Post-Recession x Upward mobile 
  
1.17 
   
(0.69 - 2.01) 
Cohort <1974 (Ref. Cat) - - - 
    
Cohort 1974-1980 1.93*** 2.00*** 2.01*** 
 
(1.40 - 2.66) (1.37 - 2.93) (1.37 - 2.95) 
Cohort >1980 3.64*** 3.97*** 3.97*** 
 
(2.30 - 5.77) (2.31 - 6.80) (2.31 - 6.83) 
Single (Ref. Cat.) - - - 
    
Married 5.92*** 6.44*** 6.44*** 
 
(4.47 - 7.84) (4.66 - 8.90) (4.65 - 8.90) 
Cohabiting 3.27*** 2.91*** 2.90*** 
 
(2.34 - 4.58) (1.95 - 4.34) (1.94 - 4.33) 
Divorced/Separated 1.24 1.63 1.66 
 
(0.67 - 2.30) (0.82 - 3.24) (0.84 - 3.29) 
Years completed Education 1.01 1.05** 1.05** 
 
(0.97 - 1.06) (1.00 - 1.11) (1.00 - 1.10) 
Number of Siblings 1.06*** 1.05* 1.05* 
 
(1.02 - 1.10) (1.00 - 1.10) (1.00 - 1.10) 
White non-Hispanic (Ref. Cat) - - - 
    
African American 1.04 1.05 1.06 
 
(0.90 - 1.21) (0.87 - 1.27) (0.88 - 1.28) 
Other race 0.93 0.83 0.83 
 
(0.68 - 1.27) (0.53 - 1.30) (0.53 - 1.29) 
US State FE YES YES YES 
N 19354 15245 15245 
Source: Elaboration od the author based on PSID data. 
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Table 4.2: Unemployment effect on the transition to the first birth. 
 Model Model Model 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Unemployment Rate (Cent.) 0.97 0.96* 0.94 
(0.93 - 1.01) (0.91 - 1.01) (0.87 - 1.02) 
Downward mobile  (Ref. Cat)  - - 
   
Upward mobile  1.26** 1.18   (1.03 - 1.56) (0.93 - 1.51) Out of Labor Force  2.18*** 2.17***   (1.69 - 2.80) (1.63 - 2.89)     
Out of Labor Force*Unemployment Rate (Cent.)   1.00 
  (0.90 - 1.12) Upward mobile*Unemployment Rate (Cent.)   1.05 
  (0.96 - 1.15) Cohort <1974 (Ref. Cat) - - - 
   
Cohort 1974-1980 1.68*** 1.71*** 1.71*** 
 (1.24 - 2.28) (1.20 - 2.44) (1.20 - 2.44) 
Cohort >1980 2.78*** 2.93*** 2.93*** 
 (1.85 - 4.18) (1.84 - 4.68) (1.84 - 4.67) 
Single (Ref. Cat) - - - 
    
Married 6.01*** 6.65*** 6.65*** 
 (4.52 - 7.99) (4.78 - 9.24) (4.79 - 9.25) 
Cohabiting 3.34*** 3.03*** 3.03*** 
 (2.38 - 4.69) (2.03 - 4.53) (2.03 - 4.53) 
Divorced/Separated 1.28 1.69 1.70 
 (0.70 - 2.37) (0.85 - 3.36) (0.86 - 3.37) 
Years completed Education 1.01 1.05** 1.05** 
(0.97 - 1.05) (1.00 - 1.10) (1.00 - 1.10) 
Number of Siblings 1.07*** 1.05** 1.05** 
 (1.03 - 1.11) (1.00 - 1.10) (1.00 - 1.10) 
White non-Hispanic (Ref. Cat) - - - 
   
African American 1.05 1.06 1.07 
 (0.90 - 1.22) (0.88 - 1.28) (0.88 - 1.29) 
Other race 0.93 0.82 0.82 
 (0.67 - 1.27) (0.53 - 1.28) (0.53 - 1.28) 
US State FE YES YES YES 
N 19265 15190 15190 
Source: Elaboration od the author based on PSID data. 




Table 4.3 merges the two indicators of the crisis, the period effect and the unemployment rate 
effect (net of state fixed effect). The table, first, confirms that individual-level characteristics – in 
particular birth cohort and marital status – cancel the effect of aggregate unemployment (Models 1-2). 
Second, the table confirms that the positive effect of the period after June 2009 in Model 1 masks in 
fact a cohort effect (the youngest cohort turns around 28-29 years old in 2009, the peak age of first 
birth in the US): net of birth cohort, marital status, education, race and number of siblings there is a 
negative period effect on the odds of the first child especially in the recession months between 
December 2007 and June 2009 compared to the pre financial crisis period, that goes beyond the rise in 
unemployment rates (Model 2). The negative crisis-period impact remains the same even controlling 
for individual-level employment and mobility conditions (Model 4), moreover adding the individual-
level employment covariates seems to increase the negative effect in the period after mid-2009, but the 
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point estimates are not precise. All in all, the results in Table 4.3 are almost identical to those of Table 
4.1, meaning that including aggregate unemployment rates beyond the period specification of the 
Great Recession does not add much to the analysis. 
 
 
Table 4.3: Unemployment and period effect on the transition to the first birth. 
 
Model Model Model Model 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Unemployment Rate (Cent.) 0.94** 0.97 0.99 0.99 
 
(0.89 – 0.99) (0.91 - 1.03) (0.92 - 1.06) (0.92 - 1.06) 
Pre- Recession: <Dec 2007 (Ref. Cat) - - - - 
 0.90    
Recession: Dec2007-Jun2009 (0.76 – 1.07) 0.70*** 0.73** 0.94 
 
1.31* (0.56 - 0.86) (0.56 - 0.94) (0.61 - 1.44) 
Post-Recession: >Jun2009 (0.99 – 1.74) 0.91 0.76 0.75 
 
 (0.64 - 1.31) (0.49 - 1.16) (0.43 - 1.30) 
Downward mobile (Ref. Cat)   - - 
     






(1.02 - 1.55) (0.98 - 1.75) 






(1.70 - 2.80) (1.83 - 3.55) 






(0.36 - 1.13) 






(0.44 - 1.19) 






(0.44 - 1.44) 






(0.68 - 1.99) 
Cohort <1974 (Ref. Cat)  - - - 
     
Cohort 1974-1980  1.91*** 1.99*** 1.99*** 
 
 (1.38 - 2.63) (1.35 - 2.91) (1.36 - 2.93) 
Cohort >1980  3.51*** 3.87*** 3.88*** 
 
 (2.21 - 5.57) (2.26 - 6.64) (2.26 - 6.66) 
Single (Ref. Cat)  - - - 
     
Married  5.99*** 6.59*** 6.59*** 
 
 (4.50 - 7.96) (4.74 - 9.17) (4.74 - 9.17) 
Cohabiting  3.35*** 3.02*** 3.01*** 
 
 (2.39 - 4.70) (2.02 - 4.52) (2.01 - 4.50) 
Divorced/Separated  1.27 1.68 1.71 
 
 (0.69 - 2.34) (0.84 - 3.33) (0.86 - 3.39) 
Years completed Education  1.01 1.05** 1.05** 
 
 (0.97 - 1.06) (1.00 - 1.11) (1.00 - 1.11) 
Number of Siblings  1.06*** 1.05** 1.05* 
 
 (1.02 - 1.11) (1.00 - 1.10) (1.00 - 1.10) 
White non-Hispanic (Ref. Cat)  - - - 
     
African American  1.05 1.06 1.07 
 
 (0.90 - 1.22) (0.88 - 1.28) (0.88 - 1.29) 
Other race  0.93 0.83 0.83 
 
 (0.68 - 1.27) (0.53 - 1.29) (0.53 - 1.29) 
US State FE YES YES YES YES 
N 24668 19265 15190 15190 
Source: Elaboration od the author based on PSID data. 
Note: Odds rations with Confidence Intervals in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. State unemployment centered at the mean 
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Finally, I conclude the analysis looking at the cross-level interactions.  
The interaction terms between aggregate and individual explanatory variables (Model 3 in Tables 4.1-
4.2) are never statistically significant, and their interpretation in event history models is not 
straightforward as it is in linear models190. A useful tool for a more intuitive interpretation of results is 
given by predicted survival curves depicted in Figures 4.4-4.5. The use of predicted survival curve as a 
post-estimation tool to graphically illustrate models’ estimate is very common in epidemiology and 
medial studies but it has been used also in sociology, demography and economics studies (see for 
instance Rondinelli, Aassve and Billari 2006, 2010; Guzzo and Furstenberg 2007).  
Predicted survival curves plot the Cox model estimated survival function at specific values of the 
covariates (or at the mean if no value is specified). The estimation command191 in Stata first compute 
the baseline survival function (all covariates at zero) and then modifies it based on the values imputed 
for the covariates. In practice I specified, and plotted together, nine profiles of women combining the 
phases of the recession (pre-, during and post-) with the employment and occupational mobility 
statuses (out of the labor force, downward and upward mobile episodes).  
Results have to be interpreted cautiously though since the cross-level interactions are very imprecisely 
estimated in the models (never statistically significant, see Tables 4.1-4.2). 
 
Figure 4.4: Predicted survival curves of activity status and period effects. 
  
Source: Elaboration of the author based on PSID survey. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
190	  Substantial	  profiles	  with	  different	  combinations	  of	  the	  interacting	  variables	  should	  be	  calculated	  from	  beta	  coefficients	  (not	  the	  odds	  ratios	  reported	  
in	  the	  tables)	  and	  then	  re-­‐transformed	  into	  odds	  ratios.	  
191	  Easy	  to	  get	  in	  Stata	  with	  the	  command	  stcurve.	  
	   177	  
Figure 4.4 shows the predicted survival curve of substantial profiles of women in different 
combinations of employment and mobility status and periods. The origin is set to 17 years old (zero in 
the x axis). The solid lines indicate women in non-working episodes, the dashed lines indicate 
downward mobile women and dotted lines the upward mobile. The darker color of the lines indicates 
earlier periods.  
According to the Cox model tested in the analyses, the survival probability to first birth among women 
in the sample (Model 3 in Table 4.1) is the lowest for upward mobile women before the onset of Great 
Recession (dotted thick black line at the bottom in Fig. 4.4, indicated by the arrow). Upward mobile 
women before December 2007 thus tend to have the first child faster: for instance, by the age of 30 
(156 months after turning 17), only 40% of the upward mobile women in the pre-crisis period were 
still childless compared to the 70% of the non-working women in the post June 2009 period (the solid 
grey line at the top in Fig. 4.4, indicated by the thick arrow). The latter is in fact the group with the 
slowest transition to childbearing (non-working women in the post-recession period).  
Between the two extreme profiles, there is a gradient within each employment and mobility status of 
slower transition to first birth the further we enter into the recession and post-recession periods. In 
other words, keeping constant the employment or mobility status, women tend to become mothers 
later after the onset of the crisis compared to the pre-recession period. Furthermore, there is a gradient 
also within each period, with smaller risk of first child of non-working women (solid lines), followed 
by those downward mobile (dashed lines), and finally the highest risk of first birth is that of upward 
mobile women (dotted lines).  
Importantly, note that there seems to be no recuperation in completed fertility of first birth between 
these groups of women. At 44 years old still 50% of women out of the labor force after June 2009 are 
childless while only 20% of the upward mobile women before December 2007 had no children by the 
age of 44. This last result seems surprising and might mask the cohort effect illustrated in Figure 4.1. 
 
To check this, Figure 4.5 plots the predicted survival curves (for simplicity’s sake for 
employed women only) for different combinations of occupational-mobility status and crisis periods, 
by cohorts.  
Within each cohort the pattern identified is the same: positive intergenerational mobility (solid lines) 
is associated with a faster transition to first birth compared to downward mobility (dotted lines), 
especially before the onset of the economic and financial crisis at the end of 2007.  
However, younger cohorts have in general lower survival functions, meaning that women born after 
1974, and especially those born after 1980, independent of their mobility status and the recession 
period, at the same age have a greater probability of having their first child earlier compared to women 
born before 1974. As mentioned, this is due to a process of selection192: since women enter the survey 
at different ages, but they have to be childless to enter my sample, those in the older cohort are women 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
192	  Only	  partially	  handled	  by	  specifying	  the	  entry	  date	  into	  the	  survey	  of	  each	  observation.	  See	  Section	  3	  for	  details.	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that are childless in 2001, when they are at least 27 years old, clearly a particularly selected group of 
women. This is also the reason why I do find the recuperation of first births (complete fertility of first 
births is the same at the end of the reproductive period) between women of different occupational and 
period profiles, only in the youngest cohort (the less-selected). 
 
In sum, the cross-level interactions seem to confirm the results of the analysis conducted on 
couples in the previous chapter, where the probability of first birth for couples with non-working 
women was found to be lower compared to dual-earner couples. The two models are very different 
since in one we compare couples, and only the status of working versus non-working of the two 
partners, while here we look only at women but we compare occupationally upward mobile versus 
downward mobile women to non-working women. 
The two analyses suggest a similar answer to the question of the cross-level interaction effect on the 
transition to parenthood, namely that the crisis had a multiplicative negative effect on the probability 
of making this transition, on top of couples, or individual, labor market uncertainty. 
 
  
	   179	  
Figure 4.5: Predicted survival curves of activity status and period effects, by cohort. 
 














The aim of this chapter was to investigate the role of women’s employment status and 
intergenerational occupational mobility on the transition to first births in the United States during the 
Great Recession. Compared to the previous chapter, here I focus only on women and I measure the 
effects on the transition to motherhood for non-working193 women compared to those who work and 
have either moved up (or are immobile) or down in the occupational socioeconomic scale with respect 
to their parents.  
The first hypothesis tested through the model described by equation (1) in Section 3 is Easterlin’s 
relative economic status hypothesis, which assumes that the hazard of the transition to the first child 
depends on the ratio between resources, i.e. the socioeconomic (occupational) status achieved and 
women’s aspirations, i.e. the socioeconomic status of the family of origin at the time when they were 
growing up. Easterlin’s argument is that the transition to the first birth is determined not by women’s 
absolute socioeconomic status but on the ratio between that and her aspirations. The latter are formed 
during adolescence and are based on the socioeconomic status of the parents. 
The Great Recession affects this process by altering the numerator of this ratio, women’s occupational 
achievements. This implies a drop in the income streams but it might also imply that in economically 
insecure periods individuals are more likely to accept jobs for which they are over-qualified and thus 
might be more likely to find themselves socioeconomically downward mobile with respect to their 
aspirations. In the analyses I test whether this hypothesis holds for American women. 
 
The second hypothesis I investigate in this chapter (as in the previous one) is the interplay 
between the change in individual-level occupational status and the change in the aggregate conditions 
of the economy, on women’s transition to the first birth. As described in Chapter III (Section 2.2), on 
the one hand, the crisis might have the additional consequence of multiplying the feeling of 
uncertainty and thus adding to the negative individual-level consequences of job insecurity for 
childbearing. On the other hand, it is possible that when opportunities decline in parallel for everyone 
in the labor market, one’s own relative socioeconomic position may matter less, reducing the burden 
of personal difficulties in the labor market on childbearing decisions. In the latter case, I would have 
expected to see a smaller negative effect of downward mobility or unemployment during the economic 
crisis compared to the years prior to that. The intuition is the following: if a person is the only one 
worse off in a world of large opportunities, his/her ‘misfortune’ (or inability) might weigh heavily in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
193	  An	  important	  drawback	  of	  this	  third	  chapter	  is	  that,	  due	  to	  the	  survey	  design	  I	  could	  not	  separate	  the	  episodes	  of	  unemployment	  from	  those	  of	  non-­‐
employment	  (mainly	  represented	  by	  housewives	  and	  student)	  as	  instead	  I	  could	  do	  in	  Chapter	  III.	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making a decision such as that of having a child. In contrast, if one sees that a lot of other people are 
facing the same imbalance between resources and aspirations as he/she is, when making decisions 
he/she might be less concerned with his individual position194.  
 
Using the Panel Survey of Income Dynamics (PSID) as in the previous chapter, I applied a 
Cox Proportional model to the hazard of having the first child among women older than age 17 in the 
period 2001-2011. 
The first main finding of this chapter is that there is a substantial negative period effect on the 
transition to motherhood (net of state fixed effect) both during the eighteen months of formal recession 
and in the two years after June 2009, when the odds of first birth are around 30% less compared to the 
previous pre-crisis period. This is a very robust result across all model specifications (see Tables 4.1-
4.4). 
However, as also found in Chapter III, aggregate unemployment rate does not affect the transition to 
first birth (Table 4.2), when individual-level control variables such as education, marital status and 
birth cohort are included: the point estimates are negative but very small and often not statistically 
significant.  
At the individual level the estimates of the effect on first births of the variable of activity status, 
operationalized as a combination of employment status (whether the woman is employed or non-
employed) and intergenerational occupational socioeconomic mobility, support the Easterlin 
Hypothesis. Intergenerationally upward mobile women have a higher risk of first birth compared to 
downward mobile women of around 25-30%.  
The results also show that non-working women too have a much higher risk of first birth than 
downward mobile women. However, the estimates have to be interpreted with some caution. What is 
crucial with this respect is that the composition of the non-working group of women changes over 
time, with the proportion of them being unemployed increasing during the recession and the number 
of out of labor force shrinking.  
Looking at the estimates of the Bureau of Labor Statistics195, reported in Figure 4.6, between 2007 and 
2011, in fact, female unemployment rate (right axis scale) increased by more than 4% while the 
percentage of women not in the labor force (left axis scale) increased by only 1.5%.  
For my findings this means that when we consider the effect of the non-employment condition on the 
transition to first birth we are not taking into consideration this change in the composition of the group 
over time. The two subgroups of women have very different propensities to childbearing and also, as 
demonstrated in the previous chapter, the effects on childbearing for non-working women depend on 
their partners’ working status. This is likely the reason why I find different results when I plot the 
substantive profiles of women in different employment status across the recession periods. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
194	  Relative	  Deprivation	  (Crosby	  1976;	  Gambetta	  1996;	  Olson,	  Herman	  and	  Zanna	  1986;	  Stouffer	  1949).	  
195	  Also	  recall	  the	  descriptive	  statistics	  in	  Chapter	  III.	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Figure 4.6: Trends in women labor force participation and unemployment rate. 
 




As explained, the interpretation of the interactions in the Cox model is not straightforward 
since the model is not linear. In an attempt to draw clearer conclusions Figure 4.4 illustrates 
substantive profiles of women in different activity status across different phases of the business cycle 
via their predicted survival curves. 
Within each period, the largest survival time to first birth is that of women in non-working episodes, 
while the smallest survival is for women when they are employed and non-downward mobile with 
respect to their parents196. Women out of the labor force are the slowest to have their first child while 
upward mobile (or immobile) women are the fastest, independent of the period. 
The Great Recession has a multiplicative negative effect increasing the survival time to first birth all 
the activity statuses (employment and mobility). However, recalling that non-working women in the 
non-interaction model had the highest risk of first birth (Table 4.1) and then, in the interaction model 
(Figure 4.3) they become the slowest during and after the recession, we see that the crisis had a much 





	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
196	  I	  do	  not	  find	  different	  results	  on	  the	  interactions	  and	  the	  survival	  curves	  when	  I	  plot	  two	  separate	  figures	  for	  single	  and	  partnered	  women.	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In conclusion this fourth chapter shows first that there is a negative period effect of the 
economic crisis that goes beyond the rise in aggregate unemployment and the individual-level 
occupational status of women. As much as in Chapter III, aggregate unemployment rate is not a good 
proxy in micro-level analyses of the negative impact of the Great Recession on first births (at least for 
nonspecific age-groups).  
Second, the empirical findings demonstrate that intergenerational mobility matters for the transition to 
motherhood and women do actually take into consideration their personal socioeconomic aspirations 
when they decide to have the first child (Easterlin Hypothesis).  
Finally, both findings in Chapter III and IV tend to exclude the possibility of any moderating effect of 
aggregate macroeconomic conditions, supporting instead the opposite hypothesis of a negative 
multiplicative effect of individual-level employment insecurity on the transition to the first child, 
especially for non-working women. 
In the next chapter I start from the results obtained in Chapters II-IV and in particular from the cohort 
differences highlighted here (recall Fig. 4.5 in this chapter). Turning the subject around, the focus of 
Chapter V is, in fact, cohort childlessness among women close to end of their reproductive life, and 
how the Great Recession has affected it. 
 
  




THE CAUSAL EFFECT OF THE GREAT RECESSION ON 
CHILDLESSNESS OF WHITE AMERICAN WOMEN.  











The central idea of this dissertation is that economic and labor market uncertainties are 
important determinants of the postponement of childbearing in contemporary society (Goldstein et al. 
2013; Kreyenfeld and Andersson 2014; Sobotka et al. 2010, 2011).  
Despite being of small magnitude and mostly entailing only a postponement of births, the negative 
effect of economic hardship on fertility is an established finding in the literature (G.S. Becker 1960; 
Ermisch 1988; Rindfuss et al. 1988; Macunovich 1996; Giersbergen and de Beer 1997; Meron and 
Widmer 2002; Adsera 2004; Dehejia and Lleras-Muney 2004; Fokkema et al. 2008; Adsera 2011; 
Morgan et al. 2011; Sobotka et al. 2010, 2011; Currie and Schwandt 2014; Del Bono et al. 2014; 
Kreyenfeld and Andersson 2014; Inanc 2015).  
The investigation conducted up to now in the first three empirical chapters has already added to this 
literature in different ways.  
Chapter II of this thesis shows that at the aggregate level there is a strong negative correlation between 
both rising unemployment and financial and policy uncertainty and fertility rates both in the US and in 
Europe. The two following chapters (III-IV) address some of the potential mechanisms through which 
the Great Recession could have had an impact on first births in the United States: first, whether 
aggregate employment conditions and couples’ occupational status affect the probability of having the 
first child and whether the two levels interact in shaping parenthood (Chapter III). The second 
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mechanism that is investigated is the Easterlin Hypothesis of relative socioeconomic status (Easterlin 
1961, 1976, 1987) and its impact on the hazard of transition to the first birth for American women 
(Chapter IV)197.  
The micro-level results seem to highlight a negative period effect of the crisis on the transition to the 
first birth, not fully accounted for when using aggregate unemployment rates rather than a more 
comprehensive pre/post-recession specification. At the individual level, couples’ employment status 
combination matters substantially in all periods but there seems to be a moderate multiplicative 
negative effect on the first birth of the Great Recession on top of couples’ employment insecurity 
(Chapter III). Any couple in an occupational combination different from that of the dual earners has a 
significantly lower probability of becoming parents, even though the effect is particularly negative in 
case of the husband’s job loss (independent of whether the wife is working or not).  
In addition, the empirical analysis conducted in Chapter IV supports the Easterlin Hypothesis of the 
impact of relative socioeconomic status on the transition to motherhood. The odds of first birth for 
downward mobile American women are lower than those of immobile or upward mobile women.  
 
 As already stressed in previous chapters, the literature addressing the impact of economic 
crises on childbearing behavior is extensive but it is still dubious whether the negative association 
observed at the aggregate level, and confirmed in many micro-level studies (including the findings in 
Chapters II-IV of this dissertation), is causal or not. With few exceptions (Del Bono, Weber, and 
Winter-Ebmer 2014; Dehejia and Lleras-Muney 2004; McKenzie 2003), most studies in fact are based 
on associational evidence of macroeconomic indicators to fertility and it is risky to interpret the 
observed relationship as causal. 
For this reason, in this chapter I move forward the debate on the fertility response to business cycles 
fluctuations, taking a necessary step back with respect to the mechanisms addressed in the previous 
chapters and investigating the existence of a causal effect of the Great Recession on fertility, 
exploiting a design-based, instead of a model-based, analysis (Angrist and Pischke 2010; Rosenbaum 
and Rubin 1983; Rubin 1974, 2007).  
In particular, here I make two important contributions to the existing literature198. First, I focus on the 
effect of the Great Recession on the childbearing behavior of childless women at age 34-36 at the 
beginning of the economic crisis in 2007. Previous studies have shown that economic downturns are 
typically associated with a postponement of fertility, but a postponement of the first child for these 
women is critical because after 40 it becomes increasingly difficult to conceive. By focusing on this 
specific age group we can then approximate the effect of Great Recession on permanent childlessness, 
at least for a given cohort of White American women, born between 1971 and 1973. First birth rates 
after age 40 have notably increased since the 70s in the US and in other western countries, but it is still 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
197	  The	  analyses	  in	  the	  two	  chapters	  are	  conducted	  using	  different	  statistical	  methods	  (Linear	  Probability	  Panel	  Fixed	  Effect	  model	  and	  Event	  History	  
Analysis	  Cox	  Proportional	  model	  respectively).	  
198	  A	  reduced	  version	  of	  this	  chapter,	  co-­‐authored	  with	  Fabrizio	  Bernardi,	  has	  been	  published	  in	  the	  IZA	  Journal	  of	  Labor	  Economics	  in	  November	  2015.	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so low (2.3 births for 1000 women aged 40-44 in 2013, CDC) that any major catch-up process after 
age 40 is unlikely. 
Second, the chapter presents a novel identification strategy that can be profitably applied to investigate 
the causal effect of the Great Recession (or of any other aggregate shock or period effect) in other 
countries and to other outcomes, circumventing the problem of identifying a control group in cases 
where the treatment has spread across space and social groups.  
As a matter of fact, it is particularly cumbersome to identify the causal link between the Great 
Recession and childbearing for many reasons. The complexity of the decision-making process leading 
to parenthood - highlighted also in the previous chapters - is one of those reasons. Fertility choices are 
related to many other life domains and endogenous to many other life-course decisions, making it 
extremely arduous to single out the effect of one factor (in our case the economic environment) on the 
choice of having a baby or not. Moreover, also reasoning within the causal inference framework, the 
identification of an effect is made burdensome by the fact that it is extremely hard to find an 
appropriate control group. As described in the previous chapters, the Great Recession spread – though 
with different intensity – all over developed countries, within the US over all states, and all over socio-
demographic groups, which makes it difficult to find two comparable groups of individuals, one hit by 
the crisis and the other not. 
 
The solution I adopt in this chapter is to compare similar groups of women, not across space, 
but across time, combining the difference-in-difference (DD) method (Angrist and Pischke 2009; 
Bertrand, Duflo, and Mullainathan 2004; Donald and Lang 2007; Lechner 2010), with the synthetic 
cohort approach (Deaton 1985; Duncan et al. 2007; Russell and Fraas 2005; Verbeek 2008). 
The research-design exploits the fact that the socialization environment of some women, at a certain 
point in their life cycle, shifts due to the crisis (Dinas and Stoker 2014)199. The specific point in the life 
course I refer here is women’s last years of reproductive life, and the treatment and control groups of 
women differ with regard to the time period at which they turn a specific age. I focus on childless 
women close the their forties and differentiate between the treated women, who spent the last years of 
their reproductive life during the Great Recession, and the control group’s women who spent the last 
years of their reproductive life before the onset of the crisis. This design can be described as 
‘treatment at a specific age’ 200  where women are grouped according to some time-invariant 
characteristics, like year of birth and race, and then with difference-in-difference we compare the 
probability of being childless at the beginning and at the end of the last reproductive years in the two 
groups, treatment and control. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
199	  As	  Dinas	  and	  Stoker	  (2014)	  put	  it	  “those	  women	  going	  through	  their	  impressionable	  years	  in	  the	  new	  environment	  would	  end	  up	  distinctive	  relative	  
to	   those	  going	   through	   their	   impressionable	  years	   in	   the	  old	   environment”	   (Dinas	   and	  Stoker	  2014:	  30).	  Although	   I	   exploit	   this	  broad	   concept	   that	  
spending	   a	   particular	   period	   of	   the	   life	   cycle	   in	   a	   specific	   environment	   entails	   particular	   behavioral	   consequences	   (in	   my	   case	   for	   fertility),	   the	  
impressionable	  years	  hypothesis	  (typically	  used	  in	  political	  sociology	  and	  here	  cited	  by	  Dinas	  and	  Stoker	  2014)	  refers	  to	  the	  impact	  of	  socialization	  of	  
adolescents	   and	  young	  adults	   in	   a	   specific	   context	   (historical,	   political,	   economic,	   cultural	   etc.)	   that	   shapes	   their	   attitudes,	   preferences	   and	  political	  
identification.	  In	  my	  investigation	  though	  I	  do	  not	  refer	  to	  this	  specific	  theory	  nor	  to	  the	  part	  of	  the	  life	  cycle	  pertaining	  to	  adolescence	  but	  to	  the	  group	  
of	  women	  approaching	  the	  limits	  of	  biological	  fertility.	  
200	  Or	  ‘at	  a	  single	  point	  in	  the	  life	  cycle’	  as	  in	  Dinas	  and	  Stoker	  (2014).	  
	   188	  
More precisely, we apply a DD approach to the probability of childlessness in two pseudo-cohorts of 
women: those who reached the age of 34-36 being childless before the crisis, in 2004, and those 
turning 34-36 and being childless in 2007, at the onset of the crisis201. We then study how many of 
these childless women had a child by the age of 37-39, i.e. between the years 2004 and 2007 for the 
control group and between the years 2007 and 2010 for the treatment group. Our identification 
strategy relies on the assumption that these two adjacent cohorts of women differ only because the 
latter cohort lived some critical years of their reproductive life, those between age 34 and 39, during 
the Great Recession period. Pre-treatment differences in fertility trends in the two cohorts can be taken 
into account using a DD design202. 
 
To test the robustness and to further strengthen the credibility of the results, we conduct 
identical analyses on two parallel US census datasets: the American Community Survey (ACS) and 
the Fertility Supplement of the Current Population Survey (June CPS). Internal replication is still rare 
in the social sciences literature; nonetheless it is a fundamental tool to substantiate findings and 
validate results as with repeated trials. Internal replication is especially useful in the case of large 
datasets, like the ones we use in this paper, where sampling error - the only source of uncertainty that 
confidence intervals (standard errors) engage with - is less worrisome compared to other sources of 
uncertainty deriving from the data collection process (Firebaugh, 2008). In this specific case the 
source of uncertainty addressed is measurement error in the dependent variable, since childlessness is 
measured with some noise in the ACS sample. Finding analogous results in the two surveys would 
suggest that our causal estimate of the effect of the Great Recession on childlessness is not an artifact 
of specific survey questionnaire attributes. 
As complementary analyses, we have also applied the same DD design to different age groups and 
used a different identification scheme studying the effect of unemployment rates on childlessness rates 
of 37-39 year-old women in the last twelve years, controlling for state and year fixed effects203. 
 
After this introduction, the rest of the chapter is organized as follows: Section 2 positions the 
study into the theoretical, methodological and empirical background of reference, concerning in 
particular the causal inference framework and the application of such research designs to studies on 
fertility204. Section 3 illustrates the research design, the identification strategy and the two census 
datasets used to replicate the analysis, the American Community Survey (ACS) and the Fertility 
supplement of the Current Population Survey (CPS). The results of the analyses conducted on the 
ACS and on the CPS are shown respectively in Section 4 and 5. The further complementary analysis 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
201	  We	  follow	  the	  already-­‐cited	  official	  declaration	  of	  the	  business	  cycle	  dating	  committee	  of	  the	  US	  National	  Bureau	  of	  Economic	  Research	  (NBER)	  that	  
the	  Great	  Recession	  in	  the	  US	  began	  in	  December	  2007	  and	  ended	  in	  June	  2009.	  Therefore	  we	  take	  2007	  as	  the	  last	  non-­‐recession	  year	  and	  2009	  as	  the	  
last	  recession	  year	  (as	  done	  for	  instance	  in	  Starr	  2014)	  and,	  as	  usually	  done	  in	  the	  literature,	  we	  measure	  childlessness	  with	  a	  one-­‐year	  delay	  in	  2010.	  
202	  We	   also	   conducted	   in-­‐depth	   descriptive	   comparisons	   of	   the	   treatment	   and	   control	   cohorts	   to	   check	  whether	   this	   assumption	   is	   correct	   and	  we	  
repeated	  the	  analysis	  varying	  the	  age	  range	  of	  the	  cohorts	  as	  a	  further	  robustness	  check	  of	  our	  findings.	  See	  the	  next	  sections	  for	  details.	  
203	  As	  a	  further	  robustness	  check	  we	  also	  varied	  the	  age	  range	  (20-­‐24;	  25-­‐29;	  30-­‐34)	  and	  the	  age	  bandwidth	  (36-­‐40;	  36-­‐41;	  37-­‐40).	  
204	  For	  an	  in-­‐depth	  review	  of	  the	  literature	  concerning	  the	  relationship	  between	  business	  cycle	  fluctuations,	  economic	  uncertainty	  and	  fertility	  behavior	  
see	  Section	  1	  in	  Chapter	  I	  and	  Sections	  2	  of	  Chapters	  II-­‐III	  of	  this	  thesis.	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reported in Section 6 illustrates the results obtained varying the bandwidth and changing the age range 
as an additional check of the validity of the estimates. Finally Section 7 draws the conclusions.  
In the conclusions I discuss some of the potential mechanisms driving the results and briefly highlight 
the socioeconomic implications of increasing childlessness. Finally I also suggest some possible 
applications of the “treatment at specific age with pseudo cohorts” design presented in this paper to 
other demographic outcomes and to other treatment beyond the Great Recession. 
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The streams of literature in which this chapter fits in are diverse. Besides the already- 
mentioned theoretical and empirical studies (see Section 1 in Chapter II and Sections 2 in Chapter III-
IV) on the impact of economic conditions and business cycles on fertility, there are additional topics 
that frame and speak to the analyses conducted in this fourth empirical chapter. Two of them are more 
methodological in nature and concern; first, the causal inference framework, and the difference-in-
difference approach and, second, the pseudo-panels (or synthetic cohorts) approach. Sections 2.1 and 
2.2 illustrate these two topics. The empirical research on the application of these study designs to 
fertility is illustrated in Section 2.3. 
Since this chapter further addresses, more specifically than the previous ones, childlessness and its 










2.1.1 The Fundamental Problem of Causal Inference 
 
 
Without entering too much into the details of the causal inference and potential outcome 
frameworks, it is worthwhile briefly introducing them before treating in depth difference-in-
difference, the latter being one of the most frequently used quantitative methods to estimate causal 
effects.  
Since the late eighties, following critiques on the lack of robustness of statistical inference to changes 
in key assumptions (Leamer 1983), a fundamental change in the paradigm of empirical analysis 
(starting from the discipline of economics) occurred; a ‘credibility revolution’ according to Angrist 
and Pischke (2010): the shift from associational statistical inference to causal inference. In the former 
paradigm, the estimation of the parameters of a distribution and of the joint distribution of variables, 
allows one to assess the association (correlation) between the two, everything else equal, or in other 
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words, provided that the environment doesn’t change. However there is nothing from a joint 
distribution informative on how this joint distribution would change if external conditions changed, or 
that guarantees a causal link between the two variables: correlation does not imply causation. Causal 
inference aims instead at inferring whether a relationship stays the same when these external 
conditions change (Pearl 2009). Causal inference investigates what observational studies cannot 
identify. “Without an experiment, natural experiment, a discontinuity, or some other strong design, no 
amount of econometric or statistical modeling can make the move from correlation to causation 
persuasive. This conclusion has implications for the kind of causal questions we are able to answer 
with some rigor. Clear, manipulable treatments, and rigorous designs are essential” (Sekhon 
2008:272). 
 
In the early 20th century Ronald Fisher (1890-1962) established randomization as the 
“reasoned basis for inference” (Fisher 1935). Randomization is useful because it makes the systematic 
sources of bias random, and it is absent in observational studies because in the latter units are not 
randomly assigned to a certain condition. The causal inference problem is fundamentally a missing 
data problem, as defined in the potential outcome framework designed by the Neyman-Rubin causal 
model (Neyman 1923, Rubin 1974, Holland 1986). In other words, units are not observable in all 
potential situations, thus not all potential outcomes or counterfactuals are observed. The basic 
components of the Neyman-Rubin model are a causal state called treatment, a population within which 
all units could in principle be affected by the treatment, and an outcome of interest. Let 𝐷!(1) denote 
the units that are subject to treatment and 𝐷!(0) those that are not (control group), and 𝑌! 1  being the 




𝑌! 1   𝑖𝑓  𝐷!(1)
𝑌! 0   𝑖𝑓  𝐷!(0)
 
 
then the observed outcome of each unit is: 
 
𝑌! = 𝐷!𝑌!(1) + (1 − 𝐷!)𝑌!(0) 
 
therefore, a causal effect for unit i exists if the event 𝐷! 1  instead of 𝐷!(0) implies 𝑌! 1 instead of 
𝑌! 0 , and it is equal to: 
 
                                                      𝜏! = 𝑌! 1 − 𝑌! 0                                       (1)  
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Now the Fundamental Problem of Causal Inference (Holland 1986) is evident: it is impossible 
to observe unit i in both conditions. We observe the treated and the control units after the treatment but 
not the treated and control units had the treatment not happened. 
Randomization of the assignment to treatment and control solves this issue by means of 
exchangeability of units between the two groups: units in T and C are not exactly the same but they 
are interchangeable. This also means that the potential outcomes and the treatment assignment are 
independent. The problem with observational studies is that the units are not randomly drawn, and 
assigned to treatment, from the same population, therefore the potential outcome between the two 
groups might be different under the no-treatment condition. This means that very likely there is a 
selection bias in the naïve regression estimates. 
 
Economists, and more recently scholars from other disciplines in social science, are today 
more reluctant to base their causal claims on econometric methodology alone, realizing that design- 
based studies are much more ex ante credible because they are not data-driven only, and assumptions 
are made on the assignment conditions and not on the outcomes. 
However, randomization is not easy to achieve outside a laboratory. As randomized experiments are 
time-consuming and costly, scholars turned to natural or institutional circumstances that created 
natural or quasi-experiments, where the perturbation of the external condition is random enough to 
resemble a laboratory experiment.  
One of the first influential examples is the paper by Card (1990) who exploited the Mariel boatlift 
from Cuba to Florida as a natural experiment to study immigration. Many other examples exist of 
studies using natural disasters or institutional reforms, quasi-experimental designs, to identify causal 
effects from random assignment to treated and control groups.  
Though far from offering an exhaustive list, I hereby cite some examples using various methods and 
from different disciplines like economics, sociology and political science. 
Solon (1985) estimated the effects of unemployment insurance on the duration of unemployment by 
exploiting the reform carried out in some US states tightening eligibility criteria for unemployment 
insurance, comparing the change in job-finding rates there with those that had not changed their rules. 
Gruber’s (1994) applied the same idea to study the incidence of state-mandated maternity benefits on 
public finance. Angrist (1990) and Angrist and Krueger (1991) used the quarter of birth as an 
instrumental variable to investigate the effects of Vietnam-era military service and schooling on 
earnings. 
Card and Krueger (1992) also studied school quality, exploiting the variation in education spending 
between northern and southern US states as a natural experiment, using cohort-state aggregation as in 
instrumental variable.  
Conley and McCabe (2011) used the sex composition of Congress members’ offspring as an 
instrument for political contributions to study the voting behavior of legislators. Along similar lines, 
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Angrist and Evans (1998) used sex composition of children as an instrument of fertility to assess the 
impact of family size on parents’ labor market supply. 
Angrist and Levy (1999) used Regression Discontinuity Design (RDD) to study the effect of class size 
on students’ achievement. The RDD method has been very popular in political science in the last 10 to 
15 years, and in particular has been applied to the study of election outcomes (Lee at al. 2004; Lee 
2008; Hainmueller and Kern 2008; Titiunik 2009; Eggers and Hainmueller 2009; Sekhon 2011). 
These researchers have exploited the existence of a threshold for being elected, arguing that candidates 
who barely made it are very similar to those who barely did not make it (as if in this group of 
candidates winners and losers were randomly assigned to one of the two conditions) 205. 
As briefly shown, the causal inference paradigm is a theoretical framework that can be applied 
through very different quantitative methods: Matching, Instrumental Variable (IV), Regression 
Discontinuity Design (RDD), Panel Fixed Effects, and Difference-in-Difference (DD). The latter, 





	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
205	  For	  a	  more	  detailed	  description	  and	  critique	  of	  RDD	  papers	  on	  election	  outcomes	  see	  Caughey	  and	  Sekhon	  (2011).	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The difference-in-difference (DD) estimator is probably the most popular among the empirical 
methods to assess causal relations. The great appeal of DD is its great computational simplicity and 
intuitiveness, coupled with its potential to solve endogeneity issues arising when comparing 
heterogeneous groups (Bertrand et al. 2004). As Angrist and Krueger (1998) explain: “DD strategies 
are simple panel data methods applied to sets of group means in cases when certain groups are 
exposed to the causing variable of interest and others are not. […] it is well suited to estimate the 
effect of sharp changes in the economic environment or changes in government policies” (Angrist and 
Krueger 1998: 1296). In its simplest setup, outcomes of the variable of interest are observed for two 
groups in two time periods. One of the two groups is exposed to some treatment in the second period, 
while the other (the control group) is not. The fixed-effect association comes from the fact that the net 
effect of the intervention (or treatment) is estimated across time within each group (netting out any 
period effects) and between groups (netting out any systematic difference between the two).  
If Y denotes the outcome and the subscript T and C the treatment and control groups respectively, the 
DD estimate is thus: 
 
𝛿!! = 𝑌!! − 𝑌!! − 𝑌!! − 𝑌!!                                                                                         (2) 
 
or, in regression formulation where, rewriting the notation for simplicity, D is the treatment group, 
Post is the period post-intervention, and X the eventual conditioning variables (Y is the outcome of 
interest as before): 
 
𝑌 =∝ +𝛽𝑋 + 𝛿!𝐷 + 𝛿!𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 + 𝛿! 𝐷 ∗ 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 + 𝜖                                        (3) 
 
In (3), 𝛿! captures eventual differences between the treatment and control group before treatment, 𝛿! 
captures eventual period effects common to both groups that could affect the outcome Y, and 𝛿! is the 
DD estimate analogous to 𝛿!! in equation (2). 
The advantages of a regression formulation is that estimates and relative standard errors are easy to get 
(even though there are some problems related to inference, especially in the two-by-two model, treated 
later on in Section 2.1.5) and the model can be easily extended to include more periods, more 
covariates or more treatments (see Section 2.1.4 for details). In the two periods, two groups case 
without conditioning covariates, precisely like computing group means as described in (2). 
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However, independent of the econometric formulation that is chosen, the core identifying assumption 
of a parallel trend doesn’t change206: in the absence of the intervention, the outcome paths of the two 
groups should not be systematically different. In more formal terms, we are assuming the additive 
structure of the potential outcomes in the no-treatment state. This means that in absence of the reform 
(or any treatment) the outcome of interest is determined by the sum of a fixed-state effect (time 
constant) and a period effect constant to both states. This is necessary because the DD estimate 
attributes the entire effect to the intervention. Ideally, to convincingly prove the parallel trend 
assumption, the more time points available the better so that the pre-treatment trend can be 
extrapolated into the post-treatment period as the counterfactual. Figure 5.1 illustrates graphically the 




Figure 5.1: Identification strategy of causal effect in DD. 
 







	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
206	  See	  section	  2.1.3	  for	  a	  more	  detailed	  description.	  





As would any other methodological approach to assess causality, the internal207 validity of a 
study using DD has to satisfy various assumptions, some of which are common to any other causal 
inference quantitative method, while some are specific to DD. Here I provide a very concise review of 
them. 
The first assumption is the Stable Unit Treatment Value Assumption (SUTVA, or Observation rule), 
which states that the treatment status of any unit does not affect the potential outcomes of the other 
units (non-interference) and that the treatments for all units are comparable (there is no variation in 
treatment). In other words, the control’s outcome would have been the same had the treatment not 
existed, and all units in the treatment group were affected by the intervention in the same way. 
The second assumption concerns the conditioning variables X, under which the causal link is supposed 
to exist, which have to be exogenous to the treatment. Conditioning on variables measured before the 
treatment ensures exogeneity only if there is no anticipation of the intervention. 
The third assumption is specific to DD: the No Effect of Pre-Treatment (NEPT) assumption, namely 
that in the pre-treatment period, the treatment had no effect on the pre-treatment population (neither on 
the treated nor in the control group). In other words, we need to rule out any anticipation of the 
intervention. 
Finally, the key assumption to identify the causal effect in DD is the existence of a common trend (or 
Constant Bias): the non-treatment outcome overtime (conditional on X) is unrelated to belonging to 
the treatment or control group post-treatment. This means assuming a common (to the treatment and 
control groups) precedent path, a common trend before the intervention that can be different in levels 





	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
207	  Internal	   as	  opposed	   to	  external	  validity,	  which	   instead	   relates	   to	   the	  estimate	  being	  generalizable	   to	  a	   larger	  population	   than	   that	   subject	   to	   the	  
treatment	  of	  interest.	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 Up to now I illustrated only the very basic DD design but there are numerous extensions to 
the basic formulation, and many of them are relevant to convey greater credibility to the estimates. An 
important, sometimes necessary, step is to refine the definition of the two groups, treatment and 
control. A first very simple way to do this is to use different control groups that, compared to the 
original treatment group, give the same DD effect of the intervention. In a similar fashion, having a 
placebo group – not affected by the intervention – and comparing it to the control groups and showing 
that the effect of the treatment is null, gives additional strength to the results.  
 
A finer-grained way to generate alterative comparison groups is to subdivide within the 
original treatment and control groups other clusters of affected and not-affected individuals. For 
instance, going back to the Card and Krueger (1994) example, within the treated state of New Jersey it 
is possible to identify sectors, other than fast-food restaurants, that are not affected by the minimum 
wage reform, and use those as an additional control. 
When two controls are used at the same time (in the example, Pennsylvania and the other sectors in 
New Jersey), the method is formally defined as a Difference-in-Difference-in-Difference (DDD) 
estimate, since the model ends up having a triple interaction between time, states and sectors. 
 
Another extension of the DD approach is the use of an intervention variable that considers 
treatment intensity in different groups, instead of a binary (0,1) variable208. The intensity treatment 
variable could represent either the degree or strength of the intervention, or the number of individuals 
within the state who are affected by the intervention. An example of this is the already-cited work by 
Angrist and Evans (1999) on the effects of teen and out-of-wedlock childbearing on education and 
labor-market outcomes using the 1970 US state abortion reforms. In the paper the authors instrument 
fertility with a measure of years of exposure to abortion reforms209. 
 
The last interesting extension to discuss is the inclusion of more than two time periods. The 
first rationale for this inclusion, if the data are available, is to test the parallel-trend assumption; the 
second is to weaken this assumption in cases in which it was not exactly met. Including past years in 
the regression formulation allows us to take into account different trends across groups: in practice this 
is done including year dummies plus specific state-year dummies. With the latter we are controlling 
for state-specific linear time trends, so that the identifying assumption is now that the remaining part 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
208	  Obviously	  in	  this	  case	  the	  analysis	  requires	  the	  use	  of	  a	  regression	  since	  group	  means	  are	  neither	  informative	  nor	  derivable	  anymore.	  
209	  Not	  in	  linear	  terms	  in	  this	  case	  but	  in	  the	  form	  of	  dummies	  for	  each	  possible	  number	  of	  years	  exposed.	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of the time trend (around the intervention) is the same in the two groups. In addition, having many 
periods allows for investigating anticipatory or lagged effects of the treatment like for instance, the 
effect of the announcement of a reform before being put in practice, or to study the long- term impact 




	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
210	  Note	  that	  inserting	  lagged	  and	  past	  periods	  allows	  for	  testing	  for	  Granger	  Causality.	  The	  model	  ends	  up	  being	  the	  same	  testing	  for	  whether	  treatment	  
effects	  happen	  after	  and	  not	  before	  treatment	  itself.	  





 A final remark has to be made concerning the sources of uncertainty in difference-in-
difference analyses (even though the same line of criticism applies to any statistical inference 
methodology). The traditional approach, as described here, is based on the assumption that the 
sampling error generated by estimating the group-time means represents the only source of uncertainty 
in inference (J. Wooldridge, 2011). However, in difference-in-difference as in other estimation 
methods, sampling error is not the only source of uncertainty.  
Firebaugh (2008) classifies the sources of uncertainty into two categories: measurement error and 
exclusion error. The latter includes all the uncertainty that comes from excluding people when moving 
from the population to the collected sample (including the sampling error)211. 
Recently other scholars (Bertrand, Duflo, and Mullainathan 2004; Donald and Lang 2007; Hansen 
2007a,b; and Abadie, Diamond, and Hainmueller 2007) highlighted other sources of uncertainty in the 
estimation process, in addition to the sampling error. Bertrand, Duflo, and Mullainathan (2004) 
suggest the existence of serial correlation problems due to the use of in difference-in-difference 
models of first, long time series, second, of dependent variables that are highly positively serially 
correlated and third, of treatment variables that change very little within a state over time. These 
factors cause the estimated standard errors to substantially underestimate the standard deviation of the 
estimator.  
 
A more general approach to this issue has been proposed by Donald and Lang (2007) – a 
perspective also taken by Abadie, Diamond, and Hainmueller (2007) – who argue that the main form 
of uncertainty in treatment/control studies lies in the quality of the selected control group (J. 
Wooldridge, 2011). In other words, the variance estimated by econometric packages includes the 
sampling variance but not the error due to common year/group cells, so that if the latter exists the 
reported t-statistic will be too high and a treatment effect will be found even if there is none (Donald 
and Lang, 2007). Moreover, in the two-by-two case, when inference is based on the comparison of 
means for two groups, the error variance of the group cannot be estimated only from within-sample 
information, and the t distribution is degenerate. With four means to estimate the regression produces 
a perfect fit with no residual variance, parameters are perfectly identified and inference cannot be 
performed. As Donald and Lang (2007) put it, “the analysis of the two-by-two case requires extreme 
caution” (Donald and Lang 2007: 227).  
However, it is unclear and still debated in the literature what one should pursue in this case of 
aggregate studies. For instance, Abadie, Diamond, and Hainmueller (2007) argue that in aggregate-
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
211	  Exclusion	  error	  includes:	  coverage	  error	  (exclusion	  de	  to	  incomplete	  sampling	  frames),	  sampling	  error,	  and	  nonresponse	  error	  (unit	  non	  response).	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level studies where the analysis concerns the effect of the intervention on a population (e.g. a state), 
the aggregate is measured without sampling error and there is no estimation uncertainty. The only kind 
of uncertainty these authors highlight is that related to the choice of the control group212.  
In conclusion, the issue of uncertainty in difference-in-difference studies (as also in other statistical 
inference techniques) is still an open question and awaits adequate investigation.  
 
The way I address the issue in this chapter is based on Firebaugh (2008) proposal of identical analysis 
on parallel datasets. Together with sampling error, assessed through confidence intervals in the 
analysis, I deal with the issue of measurement error in the dependent variable by replicating the same 
analysis on two US census surveys, based on different random samples of the American population 
and with a slightly different way of posing the question on fertility in the survey questionnaire. 
Internal replication is not very diffused yet in the social sciences but it is a strong tool to substantiate 





	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
212	  In	  their	  paper	  of	  2007	  on	  the	  effects	  of	  the	  California’s	  tobacco	  program	  on	  smoking	  rates,	  they	  develop	  a	  new	  technique	  to	  select	  the	  control	  group.	  
Briefly,	  instead	  of	  picking	  one	  state	  among	  the	  other	  38	  states	  that	  did	  not	  implement	  a	  tobacco	  program	  as	  a	  control,	  they	  generated	  a	  synthetic	  control	  
group	   composed	   of	   a	   weighted	   average	   of	   all	   the	   potential	   control	   states.	   These	   weights	   are	   chosen	   based	   on	   relevant	   covariates	   of	   states’	  
characteristics,	  so	  that	  the	  trend	  in	  the	  pre-­‐intervention	  outcome	  and	  the	  outcome	  predictors	  are	  as	  similar	  as	  possible.	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In the article The cohort as a concept in the study of social change, Ryder (1965) defined a 
cohort as “[…] the aggregate of individuals (within some population definition) who experienced the 
same event within the same time interval. In almost all cohort research to date the defining event has 
been birth, but this is only a special case of the more general approach.” (Ryder 1965: 845). 
According to Ryder (1965), birth cohorts constitute aggregates that minimize the attrition present in 
the society. Each cohort has contact both with innovative and conservative forces, which results in a 
unique way of relating with the remaining of the society. Therefore, birth cohorts usually differ in 
their cultural references. Thus they will value differently education, the propensity of women to 
participate in the labor force, as well as possibly holding different attitudes toward risk and 
preferences over the life course. As Ryder highlights, each cohort is different from the others because 
it “embodies a temporally specific version of the heritage” (Barufi 2012). 
The relevance of a cohort perspective in life-course studies is also highlighted in another passage of 
Ryder’s paper, where he states, “the cohort record, as macro-biography, is the aggregate analogue of 
the individual life history. It provides the necessary temporal isomorphism for linking small-scale 
intensive longitudinal analyses with extensive surveys of the society at a point in time. It has the time 
dimension of the former and the comforting statistical reliability of the latter.” (Ryder 1965: 859). 
 
The pseudo-panel approach is a relatively new econometric approach to estimate models that 
circumvents the need for panel data and their associated problems (mainly, attrition). Pseudo-panel 
data are pooled cross-sectional data collected over time. They differ from true panel data, where 
information is collected repeatedly from the same individuals across waves, because what is 
repeatedly collected, from cross-sectional data, are random samples of individuals drawn from the 
same time-stable cohort. Time-stable cohort means grouping individuals according to one or more 
time invariant characteristics (e.g. year of birth, gender, race).  
What is important is to maintain the stability of the pseudo-panel over time. This can be achieved by 
using only time-constant characteristics, thus avoiding individuals moving across different groups 
over time. As such, the fundamental assumption of pseudo-panel analysis is satisfied: the new unit of 
observation is not the individual but the group of similar individuals assuming, first, that we are 
grouping on fundamental characteristics that make people in the same group as similar as possible 
and, second, that the groups’ composition is given and stable over time. 
 
The pseudo-panel approach was first proposed by Deaton, in a seminal paper of 1985 entitled 
Panel Data from Time series of cross-sections, There he suggested the use of cohorts, as units of 
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analysis, to estimate a fixed effects model from repeated cross-sections. Deaton argues that “For large 
enough cohorts, or large enough samples, successive surveys will generate successive random samples 
of individuals from each of the cohorts. […] The sample cohort means from the surveys are consistent 
but error-ridden estimates of the unobservable cohort population means. […] it is possible to use 
errors-in-variable estimators to estimate consistently the population relationship” (Deaton 1985: 110). 
Subsequently, Moffit (1993) and Collado (1997) extended Deaton’s work to non-linear and dynamic 
cases. Very interestingly, Moffit (1993) proposed an estimator based on an interpretation of the 
grouping into pseudo-panels as an instrumental variable procedure, with the instrumental variable 
estimator being the within estimator and the cohort dummies being in the role of instruments213.  
Besides being useful when true panels are not available, Deaton (1985) demonstrated that pseudo-
panels have some advantages over the latter (i.e. lower impact of measurement errors and attrition, and 
ensuring representativeness).  
Moffit (1993) also stressed interesting features of pseudo-panels, besides being useful when true 
longitudinal data are not available: for instance, compared to the PSID data for US “the U.S. Current 
Population Survey (CPS) has larger samples, more representative samples over time because they are 
unaffected by attrition, and more consistently-defined questions over time than the available U.S. 
panels. […] the analysis of RCS [Repeated cross-sectional data] data is also of interest because such 




	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
213	  As	  shown	  in	  MacKenzie	  (2004),	  Verbeek	  and	  Vella	  (2005),	  and	  Verbeek	  (2007),	  by	  considering	  the	  asymptotic	  properties	  of	  the	  pseudo-­‐panel	  one	  
can	  estimate	  the	  model	  consistently	  by	  OLS,	  (the	  standard	  within	  estimator).	  Verbeek	  and	  Vella	  (2005)	  also	  highlights	  the	  equivalency	  between	  using	  
instrumental	  variables	  (IV)	  with	  the	  cohort	  dummies	  as	  instruments	  in	  a	  pseudo-­‐panel	  or	  apply	  OLS	  to	  the	  model	  where	  all	  variables	  are	  replaced	  by	  
their	  cohort	  sample	  averages	  (Azvedo	  and	  Robles	  2010).	  
214	  Other	  examples	  of	  empirical	  applications	  of	  the	  pseudo-­‐panel	  method	  are:	  Browning,	  Deaton	  and	  Irish	  (1985);	  Banks,	  Blundell	  and	  Preston	  (1994);	  
Attanasio	  and	  Browning	  (1995);	  Blundell,	  Duncan	  and	  Meghir	  (1998);	  Azzoni	  et	  al.	  (2000);	  Popper,	  Rees	  and	  Green	  (2001);	  Deaton	  and	  Paxson	  (2001);	  
Russell	  and	  Fraas	  (2005)	  and	  Verbeek	  (2007)214,	  while	  more	  recently	  Azvedo	  and	  Robles	  (2010);	  Bernard,	  Bolduc	  and	  Yameogo	  (2011);	  Barufi	  (2012)	  
and	  Chi-­‐Hong	  Tsai	  et	  al.	  (2014).	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Nineteenth-century physician John Snow pioneered DD strategy. Snow studied the cholera 
epidemics in London, and demonstrated that cholera was transmitted by contaminated drinking water 
and not through air. He compared the death rates in two districts served by two different water 
companies. In 1849 both companies were getting their water supply from the Thames, but from 1952 
one of the two moved the source of their water upriver to a non-contaminated area. After the company 
moved the death rate in the second district fell sharply, compared to the district supplied by the 
company which did not move. 
The first discipline where DD developed was economics, where already in 1915 Obenhauer and von 
der Nienburg investigated the impact of the minimum wage introduction in the retail industry in 
Oregon, exploiting the different wage effects in Portland compared to the comparable city of Salem. 
Thirty years later Lester (1946) also studied the effects of minimum wages on employment in the US. 
Then DD started to spread to other disciplines, like in psychology with Rose (1952) who studied the 
effectiveness of ‘mandatory mediation’ on reducing work stoppages in the US. After his work scholars 
increasingly used policy and regulation changes for the DD design. For instance, two early pieces 
(Simon, 1966; Cook and Tauchen, 1982) analyzed the price elasticity of liquor sales, using state 
variation in liquor taxation. 
 
More recently, the DD method has spread to the other social sciences thanks to the seminal 
work of Ashenfelter and Card (1985)215 on the effect of participating in training programs on earnings 
of workers. A subsequent classic textbook example is Card and Krueger’s (1994) paper investigating 
the effect of the minimum wage on employment. The authors took advantage of the minimum wage 
reform of April 1992 in New Jersey and compared employment rates in fast-food restaurants in 
February 1992 and again in November 1992. Moreover at the same time they collected the data in the 
same kind of firms just across the border in Eastern Pennsylvania, a state that did not pass any 
minimum wage change. The DD estimation compared the employment rates pre- and post- reform in 
New Jersey to the same difference in Pennsylvania. The idea is that since it is impossible to observe 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
215	  Other	  articles	  concerning	  the	  effects	  of	  training	  or	  other	  labor-­‐market	  programs	  on	  labor-­‐market	  outcomes	  are:	  Ashenfelter	  (1978);	  Heckman	  and	  
Robb	  (1986);	  Heckan	  and	  Hotz	  (1989);	  Heckman	  et	  al.	  (1998);	  Blundell	  et	  al.	  (2004).	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the counterfactual employment rate in New Jersey, had the reform not taken place, Pennsylvania 
serves as that counterfactual (provided that some assumptions are met). 
 
Other papers using DD look at the effect of institutional changes or public interventions: for 
example, Eissa and Leibman’s (1996) study of the effect of the earned-income tax credit, Meyer, 
Viscusi and Durbin’s (1995) work on workers’ compensation, and Finkelstein’s (2002) study of tax 
subsidies and health insurance provision. More recently, Pischke (2007) studied the effect of school-
term length on student performance using a reform in Germany, while Donohue and Wolfers (2005) 
show that there is no death-penalty abolition effect on homicide rates in the US and Canada, 
comparing the brief abolition period in the US and the definite abolition in Canada.  
Some interesting studies have instead the peculiarity of combining the natural or quasi-experiment 
structure with the DD method. For instance, Hainmueller and Bechtel (2011) investigate the electoral 
returns of targeted policies using the 2002 Elbe floods in Germany on the vote share of the incumbent 
party. In a similar fashion, Montalvo (2010) studies the effect of the terrorist attacks of 2004 in Madrid 
on the following election results, and Imbens, Rubin and Sacerdote (2001) use lottery winners to 
analyze the income effect on labor supply.  
Finally, in the literature there are also studies that instead of looking at differences across geographical 
states investigate differences across demographic groups, similarly to the designed proposed in this 
chapter (see Section 3 for a detailed illustration of the research design). For instance, Angrist and 
Evans (1999) analyze the effect of teenage pregnancies, through the change in the 1970 US state 
abortion laws, on educational and labor market outcomes, using both state and year of birth, while 





	   207	  




The application of causal modeling to population studies has been quite limited. One reason is 
that demography, within all social sciences, is probably the discipline with the longest history and the 
best quality of descriptive modeling (vital rates, life tables, etc…) (Moffit 2005). A second reason is 
that demographic processes take a long time to significantly unfold and the variations that can be 
studied within the causal inference framework are usually tiny and temporary phenomena with 
minimal relevance in the long-run process. As Duncan (2008) puts it: “A vast gulf separates the 
research communities with model-based and population perspectives, and for good reason: their very 
bases for inference differ dramatically” (Duncan 2008: 768). 
Another reason relates to the complexity and endogeneity of the processes under study. Educational, 
employment, partnering and childbearing decisions are all codetermined choices that depend on 
unobserved characteristics (i.e. preferences, ability, etc…). It is difficult to identify, even in theory, a 
good counterfactual in a so heterogeneous environment. 
Only recently a debate has been opened in the literature on how to adapt causal inference to population 
studies (Fricke 2003; Smith 2003; Moffit 2003, 2005; Bhrolchàin and Dyson 2007). Following a set of 
symposium papers published in the Population and Development Review in September 2003, the 
applicability of causal modeling to demography was for the first time put on the scholars’ agenda. The 
discussion concerns the difficult implementation of experimental models in demography and the 
necessity of focusing on theory and mechanisms and looking at phenomena from as many angles as 
possible, through comparative analysis, simulation or ethnography, to complement experiments, when 
they are feasible (Bhrolchàin and Dyson 2007). In their paper, Bhrolcháin and Dyson (2007) argue 
that demography is already causal, but in a less formalized way than in other social sciences. They 
raise the issue of the more difficult application of the principle of manipulation in the demographic 
framework (Zuberi 2001); they doubt the difference between the cause of an effect and the effect of a 
cause being meaningful and also raise the problem of confusion of different levels of the analysis 
(macro-micro) in the treatment-control setup. Lastly, Bhrolchàin and Dyson (2007) criticize the 
predominance of the regression analysis in demography, which leads to the “intellectual trap” of 
focusing only on variation instead of on uniformity. The same issues of non-manipulability of the 
many ascribed characteristics under study in demography (e.g. gender, race), of the debatable 
difference in causes of effects and effects of causes and the complication of the multilevel structure of 
experimental and quasi-experimental studies were also highlighted in the 2003 Population and 
Development Review symposium (Smith 2003). 
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Interestingly, Bhrolchàin and Dyson (2007) also illustrate some intuitive criteria of causation 
that serve as pointers, “more with cognitive than logical significance” (Bhrolchàin and Dyson 2007: 
pp. 24) in population studies. Briefly these principles are the following: time order; contiguity; 
duration; distinctiveness; direction; proportionality; recurrence; no cause no effect; mechanism; and no 
alternative (for a detailed description see Bhrolchàin and Dyson 2007: pp. 25). 
Another point of view is expressed by Duncan (2008) who proposes instead to expand the use of 
population perspective and tools, meaning “descriptions (means, distributions, rates) and relationships 
(e.g., correlations) found in the population at large” (Duncan 2008: 764) to other social sciences. The 
author argues that causal design, as much as other observational studies can benefit from those 
methods. He criticizes demographic studies who abandoned population description in favor a solely 
regression-based approach pursued in the attempt to estimate causal models, because estimating causal 
effects from observational data entails two problems: the heterogeneity of the effect on population 
subgroups and omitted variables, and neither of the two can be solved using population data.  
Duncan (2008) admits that the two issues are in most cases circumvented by causal inference designs, 
but he also argues that the latter, contrary to the population perspective, suffer severely from an 
external validity problem. The very selective nature of causal designs (natural experiments, IV, 
siblings FE, etc.) damage the study in terms of external validity also in those cases where population 
data are used: causal design studies dig into population data, identify subgroups for which there is an 
exogenous variation in the key variable, and sacrifice the wide population perspective to solve the 
heterogeneity and omitted variables problems and estimate the causal link. The author suggests that 
future research bring back to the population level the causal estimates identified in the subgroups.  
 
These are some of the reasons why causal inference methodology has had limited application 
in fertility studies. Reviewing seven of the main journals in the discipline of demography 
(Demography, Population and Development Review, Journal of Population Economics, Studies in 
Family Planning, Demographic Research, Population Studies, European Journal of Population) I 
found, between 2000-2015, 59 articles claiming for some kind of causal interpretation216. Concerning 
the econometric method there are 18 Difference-in-Difference (DD) analyses, 5 combining DD and 
Matching, and 2 using Matching alone. Eight articles used Instrumental Variables (IV), 7 used 
longitudinal fixed effects models, 4 studied twins, 3 natural experiments and 3 combine DD with the 
synthetic control method. Finally, I also found 7 theoretical papers, one review of studies of family 
planning interventions, and one article using simulation to address the effect of fertility on economic 
growth in Nigeria. 
Very few studies investigate fertility as the outcome variable in developed countries by applying a 
causal design strategy. Among the 59 papers, only 22 have some measures related to fertility as the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
216	  Among	  those,	  34	  are	  published	  in	  Demography,	  9	  in	  Population	  and	  Development	  Review,	  9	  in	  the	  Journal	  of	  Population	  Economics,	  4	  in	  Studies	  in	  
Family	  Planning	  and	  one	  in	  each	  of	  the	  other	  three	  journals,	  and	  the	  great	  majority	  of	  them	  have	  been	  published	  in	  the	  last	  five	  to	  six	  years.	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dependent variable of interest217. Moreover, among the latter, only two of them focus on the US, four 
on European countries (Belgium, Austria and Germany), and three on OECD or western countries in 
general (Amin and Behrman 2013; Del Bono, Weber, and Winter-Ebmer 2014; Girma and Paton 
2013; Klüsener, Neels, and Kreyenfeld 2013; Lechner and Wiehler 2009; Neugart and Ohlsson 2012; 
Trandafir 2015), while the rest of the studies concerns developing countries (Burlando 2014; Derose 
and Kravdal 2007; Frankenberg and Thomas 2001; Joshi and Schultz 2012; Li, Yi, and Zhang 2011; 
Lutalo et al. 2010; Stecklov et al. 2007; Torche 2011; Yeatman 2009. See also in other journals 
Breierova and Duflo, 2004; McKenzie, 2003; Stecklov et al., 2007; Todd and Wolpin, 2006). 
The nine papers concerning developed countries and focusing on fertility vary in methodology and 
content. 
Klüsener et al. (2013) analyze the impact of family policies and social norms on childlessness and 
total fertility, exploiting a natural experiment on German speaking territories in Belgium. The latter 
comprise, in fact, a German community that after World War I was ceded by Germany to Belgium, 
therefore being subject to family- and labor-market Belgian policies, while maintaining strong cultural 
ties to Germany (through language, frequent contacts, labor commuters, and mass medias). With a 
difference-in-difference approach the authors find that childlessness is much higher in the German 
territories in Belgium than in the rest of the country, while there is no difference in terms of total 
number of children. The first result supports a cultural bias in favor of childlessness in Germany; 
however the second result supports instead the relevance of the institutional and policy context in 
childbearing decisions. 
 
Neugart and Ohlsson (2013) exploited a policy change to investigate the impact of monetary 
incentives on the timing of fertility. The authors used the German parental benefit reform implemented 
in 2007 to investigate how much couples are willing to postpone the timing of delivery of births to be 
eligible to get the economic benefits. They did find very strong evidence of working women managing 
to shift birth long enough to be eligible218.  
Other studies focus on the relationship between the labor market and fertility in Europe. Del Bono et 
al. (2014) uses firm closure as an instrumental variable for being unemployed, to disentangle the effect 
of unemployment and job displacement on fertility in Austria. The authors show that unemployment 
per se does not affect fertility decisions, but being displaced from a career-oriented job does have a 
negative, and long-lasting, effect on fertility rates.  
In another study of Austria, Lechner (2009) investigates the gender-specific effects of active labor 
market programs by using propensity score matching procedure to make participants and non-
participants comparable. The author finds that these labor market programs have an unintended effect 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
217	  DD	  for	  example,	  it	  has	  been	  applied	  mostly	  in	  studies	  of	  fertility-­‐related	  behavior	  and	  the	  great	  majority	  concentrates	  on	  parental	  leaves	  reforms	  and	  
their	  effect	  on	  children	  outcomes	  (Liu	  and	  Skans,	  2010;	  Rasmussen	  2010;	  Dustmass	  and	  Schonberg,	  2012)	  or	  on	  parents’	  economic	  conditions	  and	  labor	  
market	  outcomes	  (Ruhm,	  1998;	  Han	  and	  Waldfogel,	  2003;	  Rossin-­‐Slater	  et	  al.	  2013).	  	  
218	  In	  a	  different	  (historical)	  perspective,	  Fenge	  and	  Scheubel	  (2010)	  study	  in	  a	  working	  paper	  how	  the	  introduction	  of	  the	  Bismarck	  pension	  system	  –	  a	  
substitute	  for	  children	  to	  elderly	  care	  –	  affected	  the	  historical	  decline	  of	  fertility.	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on women’s fertility, namely they reduce birthrates for participants in the program, and that this 
mechanism explains the men-women differences in average employment outcomes. 
Concerning the US, Amin and Behrman (2013) estimate the causal effect of schooling on completed 
fertility, on the probability of being childless, and on age at first birth using the within-monozygotic 
twins methodology. The latter identification strategy allows for the control of all characteristics like 
genetic endowment, socioeconomic background of the family and context in which they grew up. 
Moreover, it also allows for the control of other unobserved characteristics shared by the twins. They 
find a postponement of childbearing for women with higher education, though mediated by their age 
at marriage.  
In the other study on the US, Girma and Paton (2013) investigate the effect on teenage pregnancies of 
the 2003 Texas regulation requiring parental consent for state-funded birth control clinics. They 
exploit the county differences in the presence, or absence, of state-funded family planning clinics, and 
combine difference-in-difference estimation with propensity score–weighted regressions. The authors 
find that the requirement of parental consent led to a large decrease in attendance at family-planning 
clinics among teens; however, it did not lead to an increase in pregnancies219 220.  
  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
219	  In	  a	  similar	  study	  in	  the	  Journal	  of	  Human	  Resources,	  Ananat,	  Gruber	  and	  Levine	  (2007)	  found	  a	  permanent	  negative	  effect	  on	  complete	  fertility	  of	  the	  
abortion	  legalization	  laws	  in	  the	  US	  of	  1971.	  By	  comparing	  early-­‐legalizing	  versus	  late	  and	  non-­‐legalizing	  states	  for	  those	  cohorts	  of	  women	  affected	  by	  
the	  law	  in	  their	  early	  childbearing	  years,	  the	  authors	  show	  that	  as	  a	  consequence	  of	  the	  abortion	  law	  many	  more	  women	  remained	  childless	  through	  the	  
end	  of	  their	  reproductive	  life	  (they	  never	  recuperated	  those	  births).	  
220	  A	  final	  group	  of	  articles	  published	  in	  demography	  journals,	  uses	  the	  synthetic	  control	  method	  developed	  in	  the	  field	  of	  political	  science	  by	  Abadie,	  
Diamond	  and	  Hainmueller	  (2010,	  2011,	  2014).	  Only	  one	  of	  them	  studies	  fertility	  as	  the	  outcome	  and	  it	  is	  based	  on	  Sub-­‐Saharan	  Africa;	  the	  other	  studies	  
are	  very	  much	  alike	  and	   focus	  on	  marriage	  rates	  (Abadie,	  Diamond,	  and	  Hainmueller	  2010,	  2011,	  2014;	  Billmeier	  and	  Nannicini	  2012;	  Cavallo	  et	  al.	  
2013;	  Dillender	  2014;	  Karlsson	  and	  Pichler	  2015;	  Nannicini	  and	  Billmeier	  2011;	  Trandafir	  2013,	  2015).	  
In	  particular,	  Karlsson	  and	  Pichler	  (2015)	  analyze	  the	  consequences	  of	  HIV	  in	  Mozambique,	  South	  Africa	  and	  Zimbabwe	  (treatment)	  on	  mortality,	  life	  
expenctancy	   and	   birth	   rates,	   using	   the	   synthetic	   control	  method	   to	   construct	   the	   artifical	   control	   group.	   They	   found	   large	   causal	   effects	   of	   HIV	   on	  
mortality	  and	  life	  expecatncy	  in	  South	  Africa	  and	  Zimbabwe,	  while	  surprisigly	  small	  effects	  in	  Mozambique.	  They	  also	  found	  no	  effect	  on	  births	  in	  any	  of	  
the	  three	  countries.	  
Trandafir	  (2015)	  examined	  the	  effect	  on	  different-­‐sex	  family	  formation	  (marriage,	  divorce,	  and	  extramarital	  births)	  of	  the	  legal	  recognition	  of	  same-­‐sex	  
couples	   on	  OECD	   countries	   in	   the	  period	  1980–2009.	   The	  paper	   combines	   the	  difference-­‐in-­‐difference	   estimation	   technique,	   exploiting	   the	   country	  
differences	   in	   the	   type	   and	   timing	   of	   the	   legal	   recognition	   of	   same-­‐sex	   couples,	   and	   the	   synthetic	   control	   method,	   used	   to	   construct	   additional	  
counterfactuals.	  Results	  indicate	  that	  the	  introduction	  of	  same-­‐sex	  marriage,	  or	  of	  alternative	  institutions,	  has	  no	  negative	  effects	  on	  different-­‐sex	  family	  
formation.	  In	  a	  precedent-­‐making	  paper	  (Trandafir,	  2013)	  the	  author	  found	  the	  same	  results	  in	  the	  Netherlands.	  
Finally,	  another	  very	  similar	  study	  was	  conducted	  in	  the	  United	  States	  (Dillender,	  2014)	  on	  the	  impact	  of	  changes	  in	  	  same-­‐sex	  couples’	  legal	  recognition	  
laws	  (1995-­‐2010)	  on	  marriage	  rates.	  Using	  a	  difference-­‐in-­‐differences	  strategy,	  Dillender	  (2014)	  also	  found	  no	  evidence	  of	  reduction	  in	  the	  opposite-­‐
sex	  marriage	  rate	  by	  allowing	  same-­‐sex	  marriages.	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The only recent study I found analyzing pseudo-panels’ fertility is that by Currie and 
Schwandt (2014). Very interestingly, they also investigate the effect of economic shocks to fertility; in 
particular they address the short- and long-term births’ response to unemployment rates in pseudo- 
cohorts of American women. They find a negative overall effect of -0.5 conceptions per 1000 women 
for a 1% rise in unemployment. Younger women’s fertility is more sensitive to unemployment 
compared to that of older women (up to finding no effect for women around 40 years old). A 1% 
increase in unemployment rate experienced around age 20-24 old reduces conceptions in the same age 
group (the authors define this as the short-term effect) of about 6 births per 1000 women, but reduces 
completed fertility of these women (always experiencing the rise in unemployment in their twenties) 
at 40 years old of about 14 conceptions per 1000 women221.  
More in general, to my knowledge there are very few papers combining, as done in the present study, 
the two approaches of DD and pseudo-panels and there is just one that has fertility as the outcome 
variable under study.  
Gahzal Naz (2004) combines synthetic cohorts and DD, investigating the impact of cash-benefit 
reforms in Norway on parents’ labor-force participation and couple specialization. In a subsequent 
paper (Gahzal Naz, 2010) compares the effect of the same Norwegian reform on the labor supply and 
earnings of cohorts of native and immigrant women. 
McKenzie (2003) analyzes family strategies, among which is fertility choices, to cope with the 
Mexican peso crisis of the mid-nineties using DD applied to pseudo-panels. Comparing the mean 
average number of children under the age of two, in different pseudo-cohorts, in the periods 1994/96 
(births conceived before the onset of the crisis) versus 1996/98 (births conceived after the onset of the 
recession). The author finds that 5% of the households with a head aged 20-34 decided to postpone or 
renounce to childbearing during the period of the crisis (even though results are statistically not 
significant, due to sample sizes, according to the author). This paper is very interesting, since the 
process under study resembles quite closely the one proposed in this chapter, even though the fertility 
context is completely different in terms of historical period and the country under analysis. Also the 
outcome variable is not the same: McKenzie (2003) studies the effects of the Mexican crisis on the 
intensive margin of fertility, i.e. the total number of children, instead what I study here are the 
consequences of the Great Recession for the extensive margin of fertility, i.e. childlessness. 
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
221To	  my	  knowledge	  at	  the	  moment	  of	  writing	  there	  are	  no	  other	  empirical	  works	  applying	  the	  pseudo-­‐panel	  approach	  specifically	  to	  fertility	  issues.	  
The	  only	  exception	  is	  the	  unpublished	  work	  Pseudo-­‐panel	  analysis	  of	  fertility	  in	  Zimbabwe	  by	  Mencarini	  and	  Drovandi,	  unpublished.	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As delayed childbearing is more and more a typical phenomenon in the US, as in other 
developed countries, births to older women are becoming a key point to understand the dynamics of 
fertility and the changing population structure. According to the US National vital statistics 
(CDC/NCHS) first birth rates for women aged 35–39 started to increase in the mid-1970s and rose 
six-fold from 1973 to 2006, then slightly declined from 2006 to 2010 (from 10.9 to 10.4 per 1,000 
women) and increased again to 11.2 in 2013.222 
The first birth rate of women 40–44, essentially stable during the 1970s and early 1980s, though 
remaining very low increased four-fold from 1985 through 2007 (from 0.5 to 2). Since then it has been 
stable around 2.2-2.3 (per 1,000 women). These trends are common to all races and to all US states. 
As women postpone births, also the proportion of them remaining childless inevitably increases. As 
shown in Figure 5.2, in 1980, only 10% of women did not have children by the age of 40-44, while 
this percentage has grown to 19% in 2000 (CPS) but in the same period for women in the age range of 
35-39 childlessness similarly increased from 12% to around 20%, meaning that not a lot happened 
after 40 years old. 
During the first years of the 2000s, though, the postponed births of the nineties started to be 
recuperated and together with rising birth rates, declining childlessness was registered, among all 
women in their thirties, and right before the onset of the recession also for women in the age group 40-
44. But after 2008 this decline halted and childlessness increased in all age groups, though more 
substantially for the younger group of women aged 30-34 and only mildly for the age group of our 
interest, the 35-39 year-old women (Figure 5.2). We thus expect to find a positive, but weak, effect of 
the crisis on childlessness rates of women in their late thirties. 
 
  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
222	  Data	  available	  at	  http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/databriefs/db152.htm	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Figure 5.2: Rate of childlessness by women age group (1980-2010). 
 
Source: Elaboration of the author based on CPS data (Current Population Report). 
 
 
Even though the intensive and extensive margins of fertility are often analyzed together in the 
literature, they represent two separate concepts and, more importantly, they signal and portray very 
different individual life choices. In economics the intensive margin is defined as the degree (intensity) 
to which a resource is utilized or applied. In our case that means the cumulative fertility (assumed 
strictly positive); in other words, given that a woman has children, how many does she have? In 
contrast, the extensive margin is the range to which a resource is utilized or applied (0,1), which 
translates in our framework as the choice of remaining childlessness or not.  
It is important to distinguish between the two margins for many reasons (Baudin et al. 2015). First of 
all, their historical trends: across different generations the correlation between childlessness and total 
fertility can be positive or negative, but in the long run the relationship is surprisingly positive. 
Historically, childlessness first decreased than increased: the initial decline was due to the general 
decline in poverty (with a decrease in social sterility) but then childlessness increased again due to the 
increase in opportunity cost of childbearing. Fertility of mothers, instead, showed a constant declining 
trend over time. 
Second, there are large differences across countries: some have high completed fertility and low 
childlessness (e.g. France and Sweden that have similar fertility rates of mothers compared to the US 
but much lower childlessness than in the US), while in some other countries (e.g. Austria, Belgium 
and Denmark) childlessness is lower than in US but also completed fertility is lower than in the US. 
Finally, the profile of the two margins across educational levels varies a lot, and subtend to very 
different mechanisms. Fertility of mothers generally declines with education, but between education 
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and childlessness there is a U-shaped relationship: on the one hand, low-educated (and also low- 
income) women are sterile (2.5% of American women) – meaning that they suffer high childlessness 
rates due to consumption constraints. On the other hand, highly educated women register also higher 
childlessness rates but because of the larger opportunity cost of children (8.1% of American women) 
(Baudin et al. 2015). 
 
A 2010 report of the Pew Research Center (Livingston and Cohn 2010) investigates the trends 
in childlessness in the US across educational levels. They measure childlessness at 40-44 years old 
from the June supplement of the Current Population Survey (pooled data 2006-2008) and find a 
general increase in childlessness. While declining for more educated and White women, however, the 
increase is driven by low-educated women and other racial groups. For instance, in the period 2006-
2008, 24% of women aged 40-44 with a bachelor’s degree, 25% of women with a master’s degree and 
23% of those with a doctorate or a professional degree did not have a child. In contrast, childlessness 
rates for the same groups of women in 1992-94 were much more diverse: respectively 23% 
(bachelor’s), 30% (master’s) and 34% (doctorate). Looking at less-educated women the same process 
of increasing similarity is evident. In 2008, 18% of women with some college (but no degree) were 
childless, compared to the 17% of high school graduates and the 15% of women without a high school 
diploma. Those rates in 1992-94 were instead respectively 15%-13% and 9%. Today clearly the gap 
between women with bachelor’s degree and a PhD has disappeared, as it has almost disappeared 
between very-low-educated women and those with some college. Also, if at the beginning of the 
nineties the difference in childlessness rates between tertiary-educated women and very-low-educated 
women was more than 20%, the same gap in 2008 was less than 10%. 
Besides educational levels, also marital status and ethnicity are determinant for childlessness (Bachu 
1999). At the end of the nineties among the women with a high-school diploma, 11.2% of those who 
have been married are without kids at 40-44, compared to the 43.3% of never-married women. The 
difference is even larger at higher education levels: among women with a graduate or professional 
degree, at age 40-44, the 22.6% of those married is childless, compared to the 95.6% of their 
unmarried counterparts (Ray et al. 2014). 
Being married is still a strong precondition to motherhood for White non-Hispanic American women: 
69.5% of the unmarried are childless (same among unmarried Asian women: 65.8%), compared to 
African American unmarried women of which less than a third (27.8%) do not have children by the 
age of 40-44, and 36.4% of Hispanics (US Census Bureau 2011, Roy et al. 2014)223. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
223	  This	  pattern	  is	  very	  different	  for	  instance	  with	  respect	  to	  Northern	  European	  countries	  where	  a	  sizable	  proportion	  of	  births	  are	  out-­‐of-­‐wedlock.	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The group of voluntary224 childless women at an advanced age is a very peculiar one. As, for 
instance, Abma and Martinez (2006) put it: “childless women nearing the end of their reproductive life 
span are unique because they have had considerable time to invest in domains other than parenthood” 
(Abma and Martinez 2006: pp. 1045). Women reaching age 35-40 years without children have 
probably been focused on their educational- and labor-market career and might have very different 
preferences compared to mothers. 
The increasing rates of voluntary childlessness signal societal changes in individuals’ behavior that are 
clear also in the motivations, given in interviews, for voluntary renunciation to parenthood: the dislike 
of children, the protection of the couple’s intimate relation, the career or other financial restrictions, a 
strong privacy orientation and socialization experience.  
The diffusion of childlessness is also favored by the change in attitudes toward childless couples, 
strongly stigmatized as selfish in the past but less and less so today, especially among highly educated 
young cohorts (Roy et al. 2014). Nonetheless, empirical findings do not find a very large difference in 
attitudes between childless and parents (Hakim 2003, 2005). 
The sociological literature on childlessness and its determinants has a long-standing record and it is 
arduous to globally frame it because of the many theoretical ‘nuanced, quasi-philosophical’ (Basten 
2009: 9) concepts associated with the question of why women do not have children, such as 
preferences and life-styles, gender roles, feminism and so on. 
A debate within the sociological literature, though, refers to the issue of voluntary childlessness I just 
introduced. The discussion refer to the sharp division frequently seen in the literature between women 
who are childless-by-choice (child-free) because they do not want babies, and the childless-by-
circumstances women who planned to have offspring but due to some (e.g. medical, economic or 
partnership-related) obstacles have renounced motherhood (Basten 2009; Tanturri and Mencarini 
2008). 
 
However, framing childlessness as an always-conscious, totally voluntary, choice might be 
misleading, as apart from a very small group of ‘early-deciders’, the majority of these women end up 
childless without having exactly planned it. Empirical evidence shows that preferences change over 
time and that, for instance, women who planned to have children might get used to their life style as 
childless and might be unwilling to change it. Thus they revise their original decision and renounce the 
idea of becoming mothers (Morgan 1991). In contrast, among the child-free women there are those 
who are very decided and those who are uncertain about childlessness, with a varying degree of 
uncertainty (Hakim 2005). 
In a more dynamic vision of life-course choices, women are often childless as a result of the 
continuous postponement of motherhood (Keizer, Dykstra, and Jansen 2008; Mynarska et al. 2013; 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
224	  Voluntary	  childlessness	  has	  been	  defined	  as	  the	  couple’s	  choice	  of	  not	  to	  have	  children	  and	  their	  participation	  in	  taking	  anti-­‐conceptive	  measures	  to	  
ensure	  they	  do	  not	  conceive	  a	  child	  (Roy	  et	  al.,	  2014:	  pp.	  53).	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Craig et al. 2014). Being childless is not a one-time and definite decision; it is more the end of a 
process involving choices in other domains of life (partnering, education, or employment) (Campbell 
1985; Hakim 2000). Childlessness should be situated in time and space – across life dimensions – and 
seen as the result of cumulative decisions from previous experiences225. It might therefore be better to 
talk about ‘remaining childless’ in the sense of childlessness being the outcome of never having made 
the decision to become a parent. 
 
A final aspect to consider is the individual ability to predict how far a woman can allow 
herself to postpone childbearing. Some women can anticipate their capability of delaying motherhood 
to an older age (for instance because they are more educated or they can afford better health care) and 
because of this, they might be more likely to do so. Other women might instead not be able to 
anticipate whether they can postpone childbearing or not, and therefore they might be more likely to 
have their children early, even if the external conditions are less than ideal. As Craig et al. (2014) 
reported, among women who turned 45 in 2006, 20% were childless. This has been called the 
‘generation of childless women’, even though they are not women who do not want a child; mostly, 
they end up with no kids because they overestimate their possibility of postponing childbearing 
(underestimating their biological limits of fertility or the availability of potential fathers). 
As a matter of fact women tend to underestimate the age effect on the possibility of conceiving: 
involuntary226 childlessness is particularly acute for highly educated women in the US, who also 
usually overestimate the effectiveness, and underestimate the costs, of Assisted Reproductive 
Technology (ART) or Artificial Insemination (ATI). The probability of conceiving naturally after 40 
years old is only 2% and pregnancy after 45 is very uncommon. Moreover, more than 10% of women 
in the US (and 7.5% of men) have infertility problems (CDC 2012). The most frequent users of ART 
are, in fact, 35-44 year-old women (52% of all users) who are being treated for “diminished ovarian 
reserve” rather than for a natural inability to give births. The ART is very time-intensive and 





	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
225	  Cumulative	  contingencies	  and	  linked	  lives	  as	  defined	  by	  Mynarska	  et	  al.	  2013,	  pp.	  3.	  
226	  Infertility	  is	  defined	  as	  the	  inability	  to	  conceive	  a	  child	  after	  one	  year	  of	  having	  unprotected	  intercourse,	  restricted	  to	  a	  period	  of	  six	  months	  if	  the	  
woman	  is	  over	  the	  age	  of	  35	  (CDC	  2012).	  Being	  involuntarily	  childless	  is	  the	  social	  condition	  coupled	  with	  this	  biological	  definition	  (Roy	  et	  al.	  2014).	  
227	  Their	  cost	   ranges	   from	  1000$	   for	  medications	   to	  50000$	   for	  multiple	  cycles	  of	  ovarian	  stimulation	  and	  embryo	   in	  vitro	   fertilization	   (Craig	  et	  al.,	  
2014;	  Bouwmans	  et	  al.,	  2008).	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As mentioned, the way I test the existence of a causal relationship between the economic crisis 
and the renunciation of motherhood is to follow identical groups of women across time. As required 
by pseudo-panel studies, women are grouped together according to time-invariant characteristics, i.e. 
year of birth and race, and the analysis concentrates on childless women at the end of their 
reproductive lives, around the age of 40, to capture part of the permanent effect of the crisis – at the 
margin – on fertility. These, in fact, are the women for whom a postponement of motherhood might 
very likely mean forgoing birth.  
There are conceptual and technical reasons for measuring definite childlessness at 39, earlier than 
what is usually done in the fertility literature (at 44 years old). 
First of all, according to studies on childbearing at older ages in the US, the proportion of voluntary 
childless women doesn’t change much between 35-39 years old and 40-44 (in 2002, 41 versus 44%). 
Moreover, the great majority of women who declare themselves at age 35-39 to be temporarily 
childless, and declare they want children in the future, become involuntarily childless (are not able to 
actually postpone childbearing) at age 40-44 (Abma and Martinez 2006). As already mentioned, Craig 
et al. (2014) also writes that the odds of conceiving naturally after 40 years old are only 2% and 
pregnancy after 45 is uncommon. Costs are also not within everyone’s reach, ranging from 1000$ for 
medications to 50000$ for multiple cycles of ovarian stimulation and embryo in vitro fertilization 
(Craig et al., 2014; Bouwmans et al., 2008). This evidence shows that we can quite robustly measure 
definite voluntary childless around the age of 40. 
 
The second reason for measuring childlessness at 39 is technical and related to the data. But 
before clarifying this, it is necessary to describe the data at our disposal for this study. Our DD and 
pseudo-panels design requires large N samples to avoid random fluctuations in the variable of interest 
from one year to the next. To ensure a large enough sample and exploit the geographical information 
richness, US census data have been chosen to carry out the analysis. Among US census data, there are, 
in particular, two suitable options: the American Community Survey (ACS) and the June Fertility 
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Supplement of the Current Population Survey (CPS)228 gathered through the Integrated Public Use 
Micro-data Series (IPUMS_USA)229.  
The former (ACS) is a component of the reengineered Census designed to give more timely 
information with respect to the decennial long form census. Every year since 2000 a sample of 3 
million addresses is drawn from the Census Bureau’s Master Address File (MAF) producing a sample 
of about 2.5% of the US population, from geographic areas with population larger than 65000230. The 
average number of family units actually interviewed each year is 2 million.  
The ACS is roughly 40 times larger than the Current Population Survey (CPS), a monthly labor survey 
of around 55000 households. ACS estimates are based on 12 independent monthly surveys per year; 
they are period estimates and have to be interpreted as the average values over the whole year in 
which information was collected.  
The CPS is the primary source of official government statistics on employment and unemployment, 
but it also collects demographic information and includes monthly supplements on special issues. The 
June CPS Supplement on Fertility231 is a biannual special questionnaire offered to the 15-44 year-old 
female members of the households. All waves of the CPS between 1998 and 2010 are also 
downloaded from IPUMS, which harmonizes all variables.232  
On the one hand, the ACS is better than the CPS in terms of sample size, geographical and yearly 
coverage, and year-to-year comparability. 233  234  However, the former suffers from imprecision 
(measurement error) in the fertility (dependent) variable. The way the question is posed on the number 
of (biological) children in two questionnaires is the following: the June CPS asks if women have ever 
had children while the ACS asks about the number of children residing in the household. The latter 
thus excludes children (supposedly older than 18 years of age) who live at college or just moved out, 
and those children who do not reside in the same household of the mother – if divorced or separated 
(they live with the custodial father)235. 
Since I am working with differences, the exclusion of these two groups might invalidate the analysis 
only if the proportion of children not residing with the mother had changed during the recession period 
between 2007-2010, thus making the dependent variable in the treatment group differ in some way 
from the control group. If, for instance, college participation increased due to the crisis after 2007 and, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
228	  For	  a	  detailed	  description	  of	  the	  two	  samples	  see	  www.census.gov.	  
229	  Steven	   Ruggles,	   J.	   Trent	   Alexander,	   Katie	   Genadek,	   Ronald	   Goeken,	   Matthew	   B.	   Schroeder,	   and	  Matthew	   Sobek.	  Integrated	   Public	  Use	  Microdata	  
Series:	  Version	  5.0	  [Machine-­‐readable	  database].	  Minneapolis:	  University	  of	  Minnesota,	  2010.	  
230	  For	   less-­‐populated	  areas	   the	   sample	  must	  be	  accumulated	  over	  a	  number	  of	  years.	  The	  Census	  Bureau	  produces	  3-­‐year	  estimates	   for	  areas	  with	  
20000	  individuals	  or	  more,	  and	  5-­‐year	  estimates	  for	  all	  geographic	  areas.	  
231	  Another	  special	  issue	  is	  the	  CPS	  March	  Social	  and	  Economic	  Supplement.	  
232	  The	  last	  wave	  of	  June	  2012	  was	  not	  yet	  available	  via	  IPUMS	  so	  I	  downloaded	  the	  non-­‐integrated	  version	  available	  through	  the	  National	  Bureau	  of	  
Economic	  Research	  (NBER).	  Data	  from	  http://www.nber.org/data/cps_progs.html	  together	  with	  the	  Stata	  dictionary	  at	  	  
http://www.nber.org/data/progs/cps/cpsjun2012.dct	  as	  suggested	  by	  Joe	  Grover	  at	  the	  Minnesota	  Population	  Center.	  
233	  And	  also	  CPS	  surveys	  are	  less	  comparable	  across	  waves.	  For	  instance,	  in	  the	  wave	  of	  2012	  the	  sample	  of	  women	  who	  received	  the	  supplementary	  
questionnaire	  was	  expanded	  from	  15-­‐44	  year-­‐old	  women	  to	  15-­‐50	  year-­‐old	  women,	  	  to	  match	  the	  age	  range	  of	  women	  answering	  the	  ACS	  survey	  (See	  
Fertility	  of	  Women	  in	  the	  US:	  2012	  Report	  at	  http://www.census.gov/content/dam/Census/library/publications/2014/demo/p20-­‐575.pdf).	  
234	  This	  very	  likely	  is	  the	  reason	  why	  the	  proportion	  of	  women	  without	  children	  drops	  substantially	  in	  the	  2012	  wave	  (and	  there	  is	  a	  discrepancy	  with	  
the	   ACS).	   Another	   reason	   is	   mentioned	   in	   the	   official	   report	   delivered	   by	   the	   US	   Census	   Bureau	   (See	   Figure	   2	   in	   the	   Fertility	   of	   Women	   in	   the	  
US:	  2012	  Report	  at	  http://www.census.gov/content/dam/Census/library/publications/2014/demo/p20-­‐575.pdf)	  where	  this	  pattern	  in	  the	  CPS	  data	  is	  
partly	   explained	   as	  due	   to	   a	   recalculation	  of	  weights	   for	   the	  CPS	   June	  Fertility	   supplement,	   in	   fact:	   the	  weights	   for	   the	   year	  2000	  are	  based	  on	   the	  
decennial	  census	  of	  1990,	  weights	  between	  2002	  and	  2010	  are	  based	  on	  the	  2000	  decennial	  census	  and	  the	  June	  CPS	  of	  2012	  is	  weight-­‐based	  on	  the	  
decennial	  2010	  census.	  
235	  Does	  not	  include,	  however,	  women’s	  stepchildren,	  because	  the	  question	  asks	  about	  own	  biological	  children	  only.	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also, these students were more likely to live on campus, among the women declaring themselves to be 
childless the proportion of those who actually have a child but he/she lives on campus would be higher 
in the treatment group. In this case we would be overestimating the positive effect of the recession on 
childlessness. The same is true if the crisis led to an increase in the proportion of children living with 
custodial fathers.  
 
One first way to exclude possible bias in the estimates is to check the trends in the proportion 
of students leaving home for college and of children residing with the custodial father. 
According to the US Census Bureau the percentage of Millennials236 between 18 and 31 years of age 
living with their parents has been steadily increasing in the last years: it was 32% in 2007 before the 
onset of the recession, 34% in 2009 and 36% in 2012 (Census CPS) – these percentages, however, 
include children who live in colleges as they were still residing with the family, and the latter group 
comprises at least a third of them. If the proportion of children moving to college has increased during 
the recession these numbers might overestimate the phenomenon.  
Data on college enrollment show (Figure 5.3) an initial increase of young adults age 18-24 enrolled in 
college, from 38.8% in 2007 to 41.3% in 2009, peaking at 42% in 2011 (Census CPS). Since then the 
proportion has been declining, reaching almost pre-crisis levels. But among these, how many moved 
out of the family home to go to college? Did this proportion change during the recession? It is more 
difficult to answer these questions since the percentages vary a lot across states, types of college and 
family characteristics. For instance, a recent (2014) report by Sallie Mae237 show that among first- 
generation college attendants, 72% live at home, while for second-generation attendants the proportion 
is only 47%. Nonetheless, it is clear from the report that keeping children at home is a considered as a 
saving strategy for families to afford children’s college enrollment: more than 50% of the parents 
strongly agree with this statement. Moreover, other estimates (Census CPS) show that the proportion 
of individuals moving for college, among total movers, having been roughly stable around 2-3% until 
2010-2011, dropped significantly to around 0.5% in 2011-2012 and 2012-2013 (Figure 5.4).  
 
  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
236	  See	  footnote	  #	  83	  in	  Chapter	  I.	  
237	  Sallie	  Mae,	  2014,	  “How	  America	  pays	   for	  college”.	  Sallie	  Mae	   is	   the	  US	   largest	  corporation	  collecting,	  organizing	  and	  financing	  students’	  debt.	  The	  
report	  is	  available	  at:	  http://news.salliemae.com/files/doc_library/file/HowAmericaPaysforCollege2014FNL.pdf	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Figure 5.3: Proportion of young adults 18-24 enrolled in college (2000-2013) 
 
Source: Elaboration of the author based on CPS data (Current Population Report). 
 
 
Figure 5.4: Proportion of individuals moving for college on total movers (1998-2013) 
 
Source: Elaboration of the author based on Sallie Mae Report 2014. 
 
Despite the increase between 2007 and 2011of around a half-percentage point, the proportion 
of the movers for college was never larger in 2007-2011 than in the pre-crisis period, and also the 
parallel increase during the crisis in college enrollment was much bigger (+4%). Moreover, the 
recession should have theoretically the opposite effect – as the evidence from the Sallie Mae report 
confirms – namely that students tend to choose to attend a college closer to their parental home, so as 
to keep living with them and thus save money.  
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As far as children in custody is concerned, the percentage of them living with only one parent  
increased by around 2% between 2009 and 2011, but among them, the proportion of those that reside 
with the father has been quite stable in the last 10 years, to around one out of six (Census CPS). 
During the recession years, in particular, it changed from 17.4% to 18.3%, a negligible increase 
(Figure 5.5). In conclusion I do not expect the issues of college attendance and of fathers’ custody to 
play a large role in the analysis and to bias the estimates. 
 
 
Figure 5.5: Proportion of children in fathers’ custody (1998-2011) 
 
Source: Elaboration of the author based on CPS data (Current Population Report). 
 
A second way to get a sense of how big the problem of the ACS question is for the analysis, is 
to compare the percentage of childless White women in some ACS cohorts, with that in the same 
cohorts in the biannual June CPS. If the difference is not too large and, more importantly, it is stable 
over time, the analysis could be performed as well with ACS, without damaging the estimates. 
Because the empirical model works with differences over time (DD), the absolute proportion of 
childless women is not relevant, as long as the number of children living in the household is, over 
time, a good proxy of the number of children women have.  
The results from three cohorts (born between 1964 and 1975) are plotted in Figure 5.6 for each of the 
biennial June CPS waves and the corresponding in the ACS. Even though the straight (ACS) and 
dotted (CPS fertility supplement) lines are distant they seems nonetheless parallel. We can attribute 
the roughly 5% systematic difference between the two samples to women who had children in the 
ACS sample but who do not live in the same residential unit with them. Again, since I will be dealing 
with differences it does not matter if the proportion is not exactly the same, as long as the bias is 
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systematically the same in all waves, as it appears to be. The analysis then can be conducted safely on 
both samples and both should yield the same results.  
 
 
Figure 5.6: Proportion of childlessness by cohort in ACS and CPS (2000-2010) 
 
Source: Elaboration of the author based on ACS and CPS June Fertility Supplement. 
 
The last precaution links back to the issue of measuring childlessness (complete fertility) at 39 
years of age instead of 44, mentioned at the beginning of this section. Because of the way the question 
on fertility is posed in the ACS data, the older the women are the higher the probability that they 
actually had children but they do not reside with the mother anymore. To reduce at the minimum the 
potential measurement error and since evidence suggests pregnancy at age 40 and over is not very 
common, I decided to pick women of 39 years-old maximum. The latter choice should not come at a 
large cost since, as mentioned before, first births to women older than age 40 have been stable after 
the recession, around 2.3 (CDC/NCHS), meaning that if women around age 37-39 postponed 
childbearing during the crisis, there is no evidence that those births were recuperated after 2010. We 
can be thus pretty confident that a possible increase in the proportion of childless women at age 39 by 
2010 closely approximates the number of foregone births due to the Great Recession. 
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Identification in the case of fertility decisions and how they change according to particular 
economic conditions is complex because, as mentioned, there are unobserved variables that affect both 
treatment and outcome. For instance, there might be some hidden characteristics (family preferences, 
ability, attitudes towards commitment, etc.) that jointly determine the sector in which a woman works 
and the decision to have children or not, and that specific sector might as well be more or less strongly 
hit by the recession. As these group traits are unobserved, it is unlikely that researchers can actually 
address this endogeneity by simply adding further covariates in the traditional regression framework. 
Moreover, the identification of an effect is made burdensome by the fact that it is extremely hard to 
find an appropriate control group. As also described in the previous chapters, the economic and 
financial crisis has spread all over western ‘comparable’ countries, and within the US over all states, 
which makes it arduous to find two comparable groups of individuals, one hit by the crisis and the 
other not. 
The solution adopted in this chapter is to compare groups of women, not across space, as is usually 
done, but across time, identifying the causal effect of the Great Recession on childlessness via a DD 
approach, applied to pseudo-panels of American non-Hispanic White women. Specifically, our 
treatment and control groups of women differ with regard to the time period in which they turn a 
specific age. We focus on childless women in their late thirties and differentiate between the treated 
women, who spent some crucial years of their reproductive life during the Great Recession, and the 
control women who spent the same years just before the onset of the crisis. This design can be 
described as ‘treatment at a specific age with pseudo-cohorts’238 and it can be applied to estimate the 
postponement effect of the recession on fertility at any age. We focus, however, on women close to 
the end of their reproductive life for whom postponing their first birth likely means renouncing 
motherhood. We define as crucial years for women’s fertility the age range between 34 and 39 
because a postponement of childbearing at that age is more likely to slide into a reduction in 
completed fertility. 
 
Equation 2 in Section 2.1.2 illustrates that the DD causal estimate is, in fact, a difference 
between two differences. The DD estimate is the difference between the treatment (T) and the control 
(C) groups in the variation of the outcome Y over time (0,1) within group. In other words, it cancels 
out within group differences in the outcome over time (within group time trends) and then it makes the 
cross-group difference of those first differences (cancelling out any pre-treatment systematic 
difference between the groups). More specifically in the case presented here, in Eq. 2, Y is the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
238	  In	  a	  different	  context,	  Dinas	  and	  Stoker	  (2014)	  define	  a	  similar	  design	  as	  ‘at	  a	  single	  point	  in	  the	  life	  cycle’.	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proportion of childless women; the upper numbers 0 and 1 refer respectively to age 34-36 and age 37-
39, while the lower letters T and C to the treatment and control group. The control group is given by 
childless women who turned age 34-36 in 2004, while the treatment group is given by childless 
women who turned age 34-36 in 2007. The resulting effect (𝛿!!  in  Eq. 2) is entirely attributed to the 
treatment and in our case it expresses the causal estimate of the average treatment effect of the Great 
Recession on childlessness rates of women close to their forties. 
As already mentioned, for this effect to be identified, the DD method relies on the parallel trend 
assumption: in the absence of the treatment, the outcome paths of the two groups should not be 
systematically different. This means that in the absence of the Great Recession (treatment) the rate of 
childlessness is determined by the sum of a fixed, time constant, group-specific effect and a time-
specific effect common to both groups. This is essential in DD since, in practice, the pre-treatment 
trend is extrapolated into the post-treatment period as a counterfactual. Ideally, the more past time 
points are available, the more you can convincingly prove the parallel trend assumption. 
 
First of all, consider Figure 5.7, which illustrates the pseudo-panel schema and the cohorts 
selected in the case of the ACS sample. White Caucasian non-institutionalized239 women are grouped 
according to their year of birth so that treatment and control groups of women differ with regard to the 
time period at which they turn a specific age. Women in the treatment group (T) are born between 
1971 and 1973, so that they turn age 34-36 in 2007 and they spend the years close to the end of their 
reproductive life during the Great Recession, which starts in December 2007240. Women belonging to 
the 1968-70 pseudo-cohort form instead our control group (C): they are 34-36 years old in 2004, 
meaning that they spend the same period close to the end of their reproductive life just before the 
onset of the crisis241. Childlessness is measured for both groups, as the probability of a woman of a 
specific cohort of being childless in a given year. 
 
  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
239	  I	   excluded	   from	   the	   sample	  women	   living	   in	  Group	  Quarters,	  meaning	   institutions,	   for	   two	  reasons:	   first,	   they	   represent	  a	  very	   special	   case	  and,	  
second,	  because	  they	  are	  excluded	  from	  the	  ACS	  survey	  waves	  2000-­‐2005.	  
240	  US	  National	  Bureau	  of	  Economic	  Research	  (NBER).	  
241	  Groups	  are,	  in	  fact,	  pseudo	  birth	  cohorts.	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Figure 5.7: Pseudo-Panel schema in ACS survey 
Birth Cohort 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 Group 
1965 36 37 38 39 
 
 
P 1966 35 36 37 38 
1967 34 35 36 37 
1968 
 
36 37 38 39 
C 1969 35 36 37 38 
1970 34 35 36 37 
1971 
 
36 37 38 39 
T 1972 35 36 37 38 
1973 34 35 36 37 
Source: Elaboration of the author. 
 
 
The cohorts and years on which the analysis on ACS data is focused are illustrated in Table 
5.1 together with sample sizes. The reason why in 2001-2004 the placebo and control groups have a 
significant smaller sample size is that the ACS survey’s size increased over time: in 2000 it was only 
of 1/750 of the US population, then between 2001 and 2004 it was around 0.4% of the population and 
only since 2005 it is 1%. 
 
Table 5.1: Pseudo-Panels size in the ACS 
Cohort  2001 2004 2007 2010 Tot. 
1965-67 P 20283 19976   40259 
1968-70 C  19141 44764 
 
63905 
1971-73 T   43006 43385 86391 
Tot.  20283 39117 87770 43385 190555 
Source: Elaboration of the author based on ACS data. 
 
 
Within the regression framework, the model is illustrated in Eq. 4 (the analogous of Eq. 3 in 
Section 2.1.2). The variable Age37-39 is a dummy for being age 37-39, which refers to the year 2010 
for the treatment group and for the year 2007 for the control group. The variable Treatment is a 
dummy for being born in the birth cohort 1971-73. The probability of the woman i in the cohort c of 
being childless depends on her age and her birth cohort, which together determine whether this woman 
spent her late thirties during the Great Recession or before. The interaction coefficient 𝛿!! tells us 
what is the causal effect of being 34-39 during the crisis, on the probability of still being childless at 
37-39 years old. X is a vector of additional observable determinants of childlessness added both to 
check the robustness of the results and to test the possible mechanisms through which the recession 
might affect childlessness242. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
242	  State	  fixed	  effect,	  educational	  attainment,	  marital	  status	  and	  employment	  status.	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Pr  (𝐶ℎ𝑖𝑙𝑑𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑠)!,!,! = 𝛼 + 𝛽!𝐴𝑔𝑒37 − 39!,! + 𝛽!𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡! + 𝛿!! 𝐴𝑔𝑒37 − 39!,! ∗ 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡! + 𝑋!,! + 𝜀!,!                                (4) 
 
To ensure the soundness of our DD design, first I test whether the parallel trend assumption is 
met. Second, I present descriptive statistics comparing the distribution of key variables across the 
treatment and control cohorts to show that they do not differ significantly in the main determinants of 
fertility. Finally, I introduce a random placebo treatment in 2004 in the following way: the group in 
the upper part of Figure 5.7 is the placebo pseudo-cohort (P) of women born in 1965-67 who, exactly 
like the control group, spend between age 34 and 39 in a non-recession period. If the research design 
and the assumptions for the identification of the model are correct, replicating the DD analysis 
between the control and the placebo group should show no effect.  
Figure 5.8 illustrates graphically (fictitious data) the research design, which is slightly different from 
the typical difference-in-difference analysis. As mentioned, our design could be defined as a 
‘treatment at a specific age with pseudo-cohorts’ since we compare women who entered their last 
years of reproductive life at the onset of the economic crisis, with women who spent the same years 
just before the recession.  
Each line in Figure 5.8 represents one of the pseudo-cohorts selected: the black line is the treatment, 
the dark grey line with circles is the control and the light grey line represents the placebo. The Y-axis 
shows the percentage of women without children in each group. First, the lines are downward sloping 
because we expect the proportion of childless women in each cohort to decline over time, since some 
of those women with time would have had children. Second, if the assumption of parallel trends holds, 
we expect these negatively sloped lines to be parallel, separated because of fixed cohort effects, but 
parallel. Third, notice that younger cohorts have smaller incidence of childlessness at all ages (e.g. in 
Figure 5.8 the proportion of childless women at age 34-36 is 34% in the P group, 30% in the C group 
and 27% in the T group). This is a pattern we find in our data and which is confirmed by official 
statistics (CPS report) as illustrated in detail in the previous section on childlessness in the US: during 
the first years of the 2000s childlessness declined slightly in every age group, except for women in 
their forties (see Figure 5.2 in Section 2.4). 
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Figure 5.8: Difference-in-Difference Design. Hypothetical example based on fictitious data. 
 
Source: Elaboration of the author based on fictitious data. 
 
 
Finally, the straight black line in Figure 5.8 after 2007 represents what actual data would look 
like if the crisis had a negative effect on fertility (positive on childlessness), while the dotted black line 
represents the counterfactual. The latter is the trend childlessness would have had in the treatment 
group had the recession not happened, extrapolated from the control group. 
We expect the model identification assumption to be satisfied; namely we expect no systematic 
difference between treatment and control, because belonging to a certain birth cohort is randomly 
assigned and, therefore, the selection into treatment is also random.243 244 In other words, we assume 
that no unobserved shock, other than the treatment, happened between 2001 and 2010 that could have 
affected the outcome idiosyncratically in one group and not in the other245.  
  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
243	  Moreover,	  we	  grouped	  women	  in	  small	  birth	  cohort	  intervals	  (only	  three	  years)	  so	  that	  women	  are	  born	  temporally	  close	  enough	  to	  be	  very	  similar.	  
244	  Within	  the	  potential	  outcome	  framework	  the	  possibility	  of	  attributing	  a	  causal	  effect	  to	  a	  non-­‐manipulable	  variable,	  as	  in	  our	  case,	  birth	  cohort,	  is	  
often	  debated.	  However,	  birth	  cohort	  is	  here	  used	  as	  a	  proxy	  of	  the	  true	  causal	  variable	  affecting	  childlessness,	  that	  is,	  the	  socialization	  environment	  in	  
which	  the	  treated	  women	  spend	  part	  of	  their	  life	  cycle,	  i.e.	  the	  Great	  Recession	  (Dinas	  and	  Stoker	  (2014)).	  
245	  We	  support	  this	  claim	  with	  descriptive	  evidence	  in	  the	  following	  Results	  section.	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In this section I present the difference-in-difference causal estimates of the effect of the Great 
Recession on the cohort’s probability of childlessness. To check the robustness of the findings to 
measurement errors I test the same hypothesis on two different datasets: I start in this section showing 
the results based on the ACS dataset and then in Section 5 I show that the results are very similar for 
the June CPS.  
I further use other checks to control that the model is correctly identified and the estimates are robust. 
First, I test graphically whether the parallel trend assumption is met. Second, I present descriptive 
statistics comparing the distribution of key variables across the treatment and control cohorts to prove 
that they do not differ significantly in the main determinants of fertility. Third, I introduce a random 
placebo treatment in 2004 to compare the placebo pseudo-cohort of women born in 1965-67 to the 
control group of women born in 1968-70. Since the two pseudo-cohorts are composed of women who 
spend between age 34 and 39 in a non-recession period, I demonstrate that there is no effect on 
childlessness for them. 
Table 5.2 indicates the percentage of childless White women in the three pseudo-cohorts in each wave 
of the ACS survey. The bold cells highlight the waves used to calculate the Difference-in-Difference 
and the placebo estimates. Childlessness at age 37-39 is around 23-24% in all cohorts and, as 
expected, the proportion declines within cohort while increasing slightly only in the treatment cohort 
at the age of 37-39 (Figure 5.9 plots the same figures).  
 
Table 5.2: Childlessness proportion in ACS. 
  2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010  
Cohort 1965-67 P1 26,56 25,43 24,42 24,17 
      
 
Cohort 1968-70 C 33,15 30,53 28,29 26,44 24,57 23,85 23,36 
   
 
Cohort 1971-73 T 43,62 39,17 35,49 32,00 28,86 26,82 24,85 24,25 23,09 23,6  
Source: Elaboration of the author based on ACS data 
 
 
Figure 5.10 illustrates the trends in proportion of childless women in each cohort, this time by 
age instead of by year. The lighter the line the older is the cohort, and the dotted line represents the 
placebo. The trends seem parallel between the control and placebo, and also for the treatment group 
until 2007, the year in which the cohort 1971-73 turned age 34-36. From 2008 onward the 
childlessness paths of the control and placebo remain parallel while that of the treatment group 
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deviates. There are more childless women than would be expected looking at previous cohorts in 
2008. The proportion continues to be higher also in 2010 and 2011.  
 
 
Figure 5.9: Childlessness proportion across Pseudo-cohorts in ACS. 
 
Source: Elaboration of the author based on ACS data 
 
 
Figure 5.10: Childlessness proportion by age groups in ACS. 
 
Source: Elaboration of the author based on ACS data. 
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In Table 5.3 I compare the treatment and control groups at the age of 34-36 (when women 
enter in our study) and at the age of 37-39 (when the childlessness outcome is measured) on key 
determinants of fertility behavior, i.e. women’s educational attainment, marital status and employment 
status. The table shows the means of each variable on the different groups and the confidence 
intervals. The group means are extremely similar and confidence intervals overlap for many cases, 
meaning that, at least in terms of these fundamental characteristics, our treatment and control groups 
are, on average not substantially different. I also conducted standard t-tests of the difference in means 
across groups and they also confirm that the group means are not statistically different at the age of 
34-36, when childless women enter under observation. The t-test of the difference in means for the 
marital status variables tells us that the means are statistically equal between the treatment and control 
cohort at the age of 34-36 but they are substantially and statistically different at the age of 37-39. This 
is not surprising since partnering, the likelihood of marrying or divorcing are very likely affected by 
the Great Recession, and marital status is expected to be a mediating variable of the effect of the crisis 
on childbearing (as already emphasized in previous chapters). 
 
Table 5.3: Summary statistics by cohort (Treatment, Control, Placebo) at age 34-36 and 37-39. Means and 
confidence intervals. ACS data. 














 Mean Mean Mean Mean Mean Mean 
Education 3.63 3.59 3.42 3.67 3.61 3.49 
 (3.62-3.65) (3.57-3.61) (3.40-3.44) (3.65-3.68) (3.59-3.62) (3.46-3.51) 
Marital Status 2.12 2.12 2.12 2.15 2.05 2.05 
 (2.11-2.14) (2.10-2.15) (2.09-2.14) (2.13-2.16) (2.03-2.06) (2.03-2.08) 
Empl. Status  1.55 1.57 1.55 1.51 1.53 1.56 
 (1.54-1.56) (1.56-1.58) (1.54-1.57) (1.51-1.52) (1.52-1.54) (1.55-1.57) 
Source: Elaboration of the author based on ACS data. 
Notes: 95% confidence intervals in parentheses. Categories of Education are: 1 Less than high-school, 2 Completed high-school, 3 some college but no degree, 4 
Associate’s degree, 5 Bachelor’s degree, and 6 Master’s degree or higher. Categories of Marital status are: 1 Married with spouse present, 2 Married with absent 
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Figure 5.11: Distribution of educational attendance at 34-36 and 37-39 in ACS. Control versus treatment 
pseudo-cohorts. 
 
Source: Elaboration of the author based on ACS data. 
 
 
Since these are all categorical variables it is worthwhile also to look at the distribution across 
categories and check if they are also similar across the treatment and control groups of women. 
Figures 5.11-5.13 show the variables’ distribution at different ages and in different groups. Again I 
find that the distribution respectively of educational attendance, marital status and employment status 
are almost identical across groups. On average women in all the four groups have some college but no 
degree, but more than a quarter of them in each group holds a bachelor degree. By their mid-thirties, 
more than 70% of the women in the sample are married, and around 11% are divorced. Single women 
are around 14% at age 34-36. Finally, the large majority of women is employed, around a quarter of 
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Figure 5.12: Distribution of women’s marital status at 34-36 and 37-39 in ACS. Control versus treatment 
pseudo-cohorts. 
 




Figure 5.13: Distribution of women’s employment status at 34-36 and 37-39 in ACS. Control versus 
treatment pseudo-cohorts. 
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Besides the descriptive speculations, Table 5.4 reports the DD causal estimate of a Linear 
Probability Model (LPM) of the treatment on women’s probability of being childless in the ACS 
dataset (Treatment versus Control). Models (1) and (2) report the results of the main period effect, 
while models (3) to (5) show the effect of the recession mediated by controlling for education, marital 
status and employment status. The control variables are categorical and the reference categories are: 
being married with the spouse present, being very low educated (less than high-school) and working.  
The effect of the Great Recession on the probability of being childless for women age 37-39 is 
positive, though moderate, with a point estimate of +1.8/1.9% depending on whether we control for 
state fixed effect or not. This effect is estimated quite accurately, with a confidence interval that 
ranges from 1% to 3%.  
The estimate is robust across models, also when controlling for state fixed effect, education, and 
marital and employment status. Marital status seems to be the strongest mediator of the effect of the 
recession on childlessness, reducing the effect to +0.9% for married (spouse present) women. Any 
marital condition different from being married with a (present) spouse strongly increases the 
probability of being childless, with the singleton condition being the worst. Higher levels of education 
are also correlated with a larger probability of not having children, controlling for marital status 
(Model (4)). Compared to the working condition, having a job but not working and being out of the 
labor force are associated with lower rates of childlessness (Model (5)). The results regarding control 
variables are extremely robust across models. 
Table 5.5 illustrates the results for the comparison between the Control and Placebo cohorts. As 
predicted by the assumptions of the model, the placebo treatment has no significant effect on the 
difference in childlessness between the control and placebo cohorts, statistically and substantially. The 
results do not change when controls are added in the placebo treatment, where the magnitude of the 
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Table 5.4: Difference-in-difference estimates of the effect of the Great Recession on women’s probability 
of being childless at 34-39. Linear Probability Models (ACS data). Treatment versus control. 
 Treatment versus Control a 
 
Model Model Model Model Model 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Age 37-39 b -0.031*** -0.032*** -0.031*** -0.021*** -0.022*** 
 
(-0.038 - -0.023) (-0.040 - -0.025) (-0.039 - -0.024) (-0.027 - -0.015) (-0.029 - -0.016) 
Treatment cohort -0.016*** -0.017*** -0.017*** -0.019*** -0.019*** 
 
(-0.023 - -0.008) (-0.024 - -0.009) (-0.024 - -0.010) (-0.025 - -0.012) (-0.026 - -0.013) 
DD (Age 37-39* 
Treatment cohort) 
0.018*** 0.019*** 0.019*** 0.009** 0.008** 
(0.009 - 0.028) (0.010 - 0.028) (0.010 - 0.028) (0.001 - 0.017) (0.000 - 0.016) 
Education c      
Completed Highschool   -0.010** 0.020*** 0.008* 
   (-0.019 - -0.001) (0.012 - 0.028) (-0.000 - 0.016) 
Some college but no 
degree 
  -0.022*** 0.018*** 0.004 
   (-0.031 - -0.013) (0.010 - 0.026) (-0.005 - 0.012) 
Associate's degree   -0.031*** 0.020*** 0.002 
   (-0.041 - -0.021) (0.011 - 0.029) (-0.007 - 0.012) 
Bachelor's degree   0.023*** 0.078*** 0.063*** 
   (0.014 - 0.032) (0.070 - 0.086) (0.054 - 0.071) 
Master's degree or higher   0.063*** 0.110*** 0.090*** 
   (0.053 - 0.073) (0.102 - 0.119) (0.082 - 0.099) 
Marital Status d      
Married, spouse absent    0.336*** 0.335*** 
    (0.315 - 0.357) (0.314 - 0.356) 
Separated    0.128*** 0.122*** 
    (0.116 - 0.141) (0.109 - 0.135) 
Divorced    0.237*** 0.228*** 
    (0.230 - 0.245) (0.221 - 0.235) 
Widowed    0.133*** 0.134*** 
    (0.106 - 0.160) (0.107 - 0.161) 
Never married/single    0.622*** 0.614*** 
    (0.616 - 0.628) (0.607 - 0.620) 
Employment Status e      
Has a job, not working     -0.047*** 
     (-0.059 - -0.035) 
Armed forces, at work     0.028 
     (-0.033 - 0.090) 
Armed forces, not at 
work but with job 
    -0.202*** 
     (-0.235 - -0.169) 
Unemployed     -0.010* 
     (-0.021 - 0.000) 
Not in the labor force     -0.064*** 
     (-0.068 - -0.060) 
State fixed effects No Yes No No No 
Constant 0.264*** 0.230*** 0.261*** 0.100*** 0.135*** 
 
(0.258 - 0.271) (0.212 - 0.248) (0.251 - 0.271) (0.091 - 0.108) (0.126 - 0.144) 
N 150296 150296 150296 150296 150296 
Source: Elaboration of the author based on ACS data.  
Notes:  * p≤0.05, ** p≤0.01, *** p≤0.001. Robust Confidence Intervals in parenthesis. 
a In the Treatment group women turn age 37-39 in 2010 while in the Control group women turn age 37-39 in 2007. b Reference category is Age group 34-36.  
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Table 5.5: Difference-in-difference estimates of the effect of the Great Recession on women’s probability 
of being childless at 34-39. Linear Probability Models (ACS data). Placebo versus control. 
 Placebo versus Control a 
 Model Model Model Model Model 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Age 37-39 b -0.024*** -0.023*** -0.025*** -0.015*** -0.015*** 
 (-0.032 - -0.015) (-0.032 - -0.015) (-0.033 - -0.017) (-0.022 - -0.008) (-0.022 - -0.008) 
Placebo Cohort -0.001 -0.001 -0.004 -0.006 -0.005 
 (-0.010 - 0.007) (-0.010 - 0.007) (-0.013 - 0.004) (-0.013 - 0.002) (-0.013 - 0.002) 
DD (age 37-39*Placebo 
Cohort) 
-0.007 -0.009 -0.006 -0.005 -0.007 
(-0.018 - 0.004) (-0.020 - 0.002) (-0.018 - 0.005) (-0.015 - 0.004) (-0.017 - 0.003) 
Education c      
Completed Highschool 
 
 -0.020*** 0.015*** 0.002 
  
 (-0.031 - -0.009) (0.005 - 0.024) (-0.008 - 0.012) 
Some college but no degree 
 
 -0.024*** 0.014*** -0.001 
  
 (-0.035 - -0.013) (0.004 - 0.024) (-0.011 - 0.009) 
Associate's degree 
 
 -0.027*** 0.021*** 0.002 
  
 (-0.039 - -0.014) (0.010 - 0.032) (-0.009 - 0.014) 
Bachelor's degree 
 
 0.025*** 0.070*** 0.055*** 
  
 (0.014 - 0.036) (0.060 - 0.080) (0.045 - 0.065) 
Master's degree or higher 
 
 0.070*** 0.101*** 0.082*** 
  
 (0.058 - 0.083) (0.090 - 0.112) (0.071 - 0.093) 
Marital Status d      












































(0.633 - 0.648) (0.624 - 0.639) 
Employment Status e      
Has a job, not working     -0.047*** 
     (-0.060 - -0.033) 
Armed forces, at work     0.025 
     (-0.048 - 0.097) 
Armed forces, not at work 
but with job 
    -0.221*** 
     (-0.230 - -0.213) 
Unemployed     -0.009 
     (-0.023 - 0.005) 
Not in the labor force     -0.068*** 





State Fixed Effects No Yes No No No 
Constant 0.266*** 0.234*** 0.267*** 0.109*** 0.144*** 
 (0.260 - 0.272) (0.211 - 0.257) (0.256 - 0.278) (0.099 - 0.118) (0.134 - 0.155) 
N 104164 104164 104164 104164 104164 
Source: Elaboration of the author based on ACS data.  
Notes:  * p≤0.05, ** p≤0.01, *** p≤0.001. Robust Confidence intervals in parenthesis. 
a In the Control group women turn 37-39 in 2007 while in the Placebo group women turn 37-39 in 2004. b Reference category is Age group 34-36. c Reference 
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To verify the robustness of our findings, we repeat the analysis on the CPS June Fertility 
Supplement where the question posed to women is the number of children they ever had. 
Unfortunately, as mentioned, the CPS is biennial (conducted in even years) and it has a much smaller 
sample (Table 5.6 reports the size of each cohort by survey wave) compared to the ACS. Therefore, it 
is not possible to replicate the analysis in the exact same way in the two surveys. We can use 2010 as 
the post-treatment year as before, but we have to use 2006 as last pre-treatment year. This implies that 
we now need to form pseudo-panels of 4 birth-year intervals. The treatment group is that of women 
born between 1971 and 1974 and the control group that of women born between 1967 and 1970: in the 
former group, women turn age 36-39 in 2010 and in the latter they turn age 36-39 in 2006. 
 
Table 5.6: Pseudo-panels size in the CPS Fertility Supplement. 
Cohort  1994 1998 2002 2006 2010 Tot. 
1959-62 P2 4014 4025    8039 
1963-66 P1  3175 3789   
6964 
1967-70 C   3334 3195 
 
6529 
1971-74 T   
 
2856 2851 5707 
Tot.  4014 7200 7123 6051 2851 27239 
Source: Elaboration of the author based on CPS June Fertility Supplement data. 
 
 
In addition, with the CPS supplement we can go further back in time since the same survey 
was conducted also during the nineties. We thus now can have two placebo treatments: the first 
placebo is the group of women born in 1963-66 and the second in 1959-62. Except for these slight 
variations in the pseudo-cohorts though, the DD design is exactly the same as before. Therefore we 
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Table 5.7: Childlessness proportion in the CPS Fertility Supplement. 
  1994 1995 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 
Cohort 1959-62 P2 24.40 23.48 19.30       
Cohort 1963-66 P1 34.71 31.78 24.80 21.27 19.08     
Cohort 1967-70 C 52.08 49.32 35.82 27.81 24.11 22.14 18.97   
Cohort 1971-74 T 70.09 65.44 50.20 42.81 35.48 28.47 21.69 21.60 19.70 
Source: Elaboration of the author based on CPS June Fertility Supplement data 
 
 
Table 5.7 is the analogue of Table 5.2 for the CPS data with the proportion of women in each 
cohort and year who stay childless, and Figures 5.14-5.15 below are the analogues of Figure 5.9-5.10. 
We now have two placebos (the two dotted lines in Figure 5.14-5.15) and the cohort trends seem 
reasonably parallel but more overlapping here in the CPS datasets compared to the ACS survey. 
As already mentioned the percentages are smaller in the CPS sample because of the way the fertility 
question is posed in the two surveys. Nonetheless the cohort trends are pretty similar: in all cohorts but 
the treatment one, the proportion of childless women between the early and the late thirties declines 
about 5%. Only in the younger cohort (treatment) is this difference less than 2%.  
 
 
Figure 5.14: Childlessness proportion across pseudo-cohorts in CPS. 
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Figure 5.15: Childlessness proportion by age groups in CPS. 
 




The DD estimates reported in Table 5.8 confirm this fact. The point estimate of the effect on 
the treatment here is slightly larger than before, even though less precisely estimated: childlessness is 
3.2% higher than what would have likely been in the absence of the Great Recession, controlling or 
not for state fixed effect (Models (1)-(2)). However, adding the mediating variable - marital status - 
the effect becomes statistically insignificant (but still positive at two percent)246. Confidence intervals 
are larger compared to the ACS sample where the sample size was much bigger: the lower bound 
estimate is slightly above zero while the upper bound gets to five or six percent depending on the 
model. Importantly, as shown in Table 5.9, the placebo treatment DD estimates are again substantially 
close to zero and the point estimates are statistically non-significant. 
The larger size of the effect in the CPS compared to the ACS might be due to the different way the 
question is posed in the surveys. As argued before, the recession - if anything - had the effect of 
keeping children at home longer than before. This means that the estimates of childlessness in the 
ACS sample are a lower bound of the effect since more women might be classified as childless, when 
they are not, in the waves preceding the recession compared to waves after 2008. However, probably 
due to the smaller sample size, the CPS dataset yields imprecise point estimates of the effect. 
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  Employment	  status	  is	  not	  available	  for	  the	  June	  CPS,	  while	  education	  does	  not	  affect	  the	  estimate,	  as	  it	  was	  in	  the	  ACS	  case.	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Table 5.8: Difference-in-difference estimates of the effect of the Great Recession on women’s 
probability of being childless at 32-39. Linear Probability Models (CPS fertility supplement data). 
Treatment versus control. 
 Treatment versus Control a 
 
Model Model Model Model 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Age 36-39 b -0.051*** -0.052*** -0.055*** -0.037*** 
 
(-0.071 - -0.032) (-0.072 - -0.032) (-0.074 - -0.035) (-0.055 - -0.019) 
Treatment cohort -0.024** -0.026** -0.030*** -0.033*** 
 
(-0.045 - -0.003) (-0.046 - -0.005) (-0.051 - -0.009) (-0.052 - -0.015) 
DD (Age 36-39* Treatment cohort) 0.032** 0.032** 0.030** 0.022 
 
(0.003 - 0.060) (0.003 - 0.061) (0.001 - 0.059) (-0.004 - 0.048) 
Education c     
Completed Highschool 
 
 0.044*** 0.063*** 
  
 (0.021 - 0.066) (0.040 - 0.085) 
Some college but no degree 
 
 0.067*** 0.091*** 
  
 (0.043 - 0.092) (0.066 - 0.115) 
Associate's degree 
 
 0.069*** 0.105*** 
  
 (0.041 - 0.097) (0.079 - 0.132) 
Bachelor's degree 
 
 0.145*** 0.178*** 
  
 (0.120 - 0.169) (0.154 - 0.201) 
Master's degree or higher 
 
 0.216*** 0.229*** 
  
 (0.185 - 0.247) (0.200 - 0.257) 
Marital Status d     
















































State Fixed Effects No Yes No No 
Constant 0.241*** 0.227*** 0.156*** 0.044*** 
 
(0.227 - 0.256) (0.155 - 0.299) (0.134 - 0.178) (0.022 - 0.065) 
N 12221 12221 12221 12221 
Source: Elaboration of the author based on CPS June Fertility Supplement data.  
Notes:  * p≤0.05, ** p≤0.01, *** p≤0.001. Robust Confidence intervals in parenthesis. 
a In the Treatment group women turn 36-39 in 2010 while in the Control group women turn 36-39 in 2006. b Reference category is Age group 32-35.  
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Table 5.9: Difference-in-difference estimates of the effect of the Great Recession on women’s probability of 
being childless at 32-39. Linear Probability Models (CPS fertility supplement data). Placebo versus control. 
 Control versus Placebo1 a 
 Model Model Model Model 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Age 36-39 b -0.057*** -0.060*** -0.061*** -0.038*** 
 
(-0.077 - -0.038) (-0.079 - -0.040) (-0.080 - -0.042) (-0.055 - -0.021) 
Treatment cohort -0.007 -0.010 -0.011 -0.008 
 
(-0.028 - 0.014) (-0.031 - 0.011) (-0.032 - 0.009) (-0.026 - 0.010) 
DD (Age 36-39* Treatment cohort) 0.006 0.008 0.006 0.003 
 
(-0.022 - 0.034) (-0.020 - 0.036) (-0.021 - 0.034) (-0.022 - 0.027) 
Education c     
Completed Highschool 
 
 0.035*** 0.068*** 
  
 (0.014 – 0.057) (0.047 – 0.088) 
Some college but no degree 
 
 0.055*** 0.090*** 
  
 (0.031 – 0.079) (0.068 – 0.113) 
Associate’s degree 
 
 0.067*** 0.102*** 
  
 (0.040 – 0.095) (0.077 – 0.128) 
Bachelor’s degree 
 
 0.165*** 0.188*** 
  
 (0.140 – 0.189) (0.165 – 0.210) 
Master’s degree or higher 
 
 0.220*** 0.231*** 
  
 (0.188 – 0.253) (0.202 – 0.260) 
Marital Status d     
















































State Fixed Effects No Yes No No 
Constant 0.248*** 0.178*** 0.167*** 0.041*** 
 
(0.233 - 0.263) (0.121 - 0.236) (0.145 - 0.189) (0.020 - 0.062) 
N 13476 13476 13476 13476 
Source: Elaboration of the author based on CPS June Fertility Supplement data.  
Notes:  * p≤0.05, ** p≤0.01, *** p≤0.001. Robust Confidence intervals in parenthesis. 
a In the Control group women turn 36-39 in 2006 while in the Placebo group women turn 36-39 in 2002. b Reference category is Age group 32-35. c Reference 
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 I have replicated the DD analysis on different age groups of White American women, both 
younger and older than the age 37-39 group considered in the previous section. Table 5.10 illustrates 
the magnitude of the causal effect estimated exactly in the same way as it was presented in Models 
(1)-(2) in Tabs. 6-9 but for different pseudo-cohorts of women (ACS in Panel (a) and CPS in Panel 
(b)). Placebo treatment estimates are also presented in the cases in which we find an effect on the 
treatment group. 
 
Table 5.10: Difference-in-difference estimates of the effect of the Great Recession on women’s probability 
of being childless (LPM) varying the age range in ACS (a) and in CPS (b). 
(a) 
Cohorts 
Age at Treatment 
in 2007 Age in 2010 
Treatment Effect 
Probability of Childlessness Placebo Treatment Effect 
1966-68 39-41 42-44 -.004 - 
1967-69 38-40 41-43 -.001 - 
1968-70 37-39 40-42 -.003 - 
1969-71 36-38 39-41 +.002 - 
1970-72 35-37 38-40 +.003 - 
1971-73 34-36 37-39 +.018***/+.019*** -.009/+.013 
1972-74 33-35 36-38 +.017***/+.018*** -.005/-.007 
1973-75 32-34 35-37 +.014***/+.015*** .004/.001 
1974-76 31-33 34-36 +.010*/+.012** -.004/-.007 
 
(b) 
Cohorts Age at Treatment 
in 2006 
Age in 2010 Treatment Effect 
Probability of Childlessness 
Placebo Treatment Effect 
1966-69 37-40 41-44 -.021 - 
1967-70 36-39 40-43 -.006 - 
1968-71 35-38 39-42 -.005 - 
1969-72 34-37 38-41 +.003 - 
1970-73 33-36 37-40 +.013 - 
1971-74 32-35 36-39 +.030**/+.032** -.001/+.006 
1972-75 31-34 35-38 +.034**/+.036** -.007/-.006 
1973-76 30-33 34-37 +.040*** -.015/-.016 
Source: Elaboration of the author based on ACS and CPS June Fertility Supplement data. 
Notes:  * p≤0.05, ** p≤0.01, *** p≤0.001.  
 
 
In both samples we find an effect of the Great Recession on the probability of remaining 
childless for women in their thirties. The magnitude of the effect is also quite robust, ranging from 1-
2% in the ACS sample, depending on the age of women and the model specification, to 3-4% in the 
CPS June Fertility Supplement. On the other hand, no effect is found when we consider age groups 
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older than 40. This result is in line with previous findings that suggest that economic downturns 
mainly have an effect on fertility postponement at younger ages (Currie and Schwandt 2014).  
Finally, I have complemented the DD analysis with an analysis of the effect of unemployment rates on 
childlessness, controlling for other unobservable traits common to the year and state of residence. 
Table 5.11 presents the estimates of a Linear Probability Model on the probability of being childless at 
age 37-39 with year and state fixed effects. Model (1) shows the effect of state unemployment rate in 
the year t on the probability of being childless in the year t+1. In the next models (2) to (4) I add 
controls at the individual level. In none of these specifications do I find any effect of state 
unemployment rate. I do find that being unemployed is associated with about 3 percentage points 
higher probability of being childless, although this association vanishes once marital status is included 
in the model. 
Education has a U-shaped correlation with cohort childlessness: very low and very high education is 
associated with greater childlessness. Compared to married women with the spouse present all other 
marital status categories increase the likelihood of remaining childless.  
I have changed the bandwidth of the age group (37-40, 36-40, 36-41) and the results do not change247 
and I have also replicated the analyses for different age groups (20-24, 25-29 and 30-34)248. In line 
with previous studies (Currie and Schwandt 2014) I do find a positive association between state level 
unemployment and childlessness among younger women age 20 to 24 (Table A4.2 in Appendix 4). All 
in all, still, these results suggest that the effect of the Great Recession for the cohort of women born 
between 1971 and 1973 found in the DD analysis is not spurred by an increase in unemployment level 
at the state level. Other mechanisms, such as a perceived sense of economic insecurity throughout the 
country, might account for the reduction in childbearing among women in their middle and late 
thirties. This result once more confirms what I found in the previous chapters on women of all ages: 
aggregate rising unemployment rates do not affect the probability of having or not the first child. 
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  See	  Table	  A4.1	  in	  Appendix	  4.	  
248	  See	  Table	  A4.2	  in	  Appendix	  4.	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Table 5.11: Complementary analysis on the effect of state unemployment rate on childlessness. Linear 
Probability Models (ACS). 
 37-39 year old women 
 Model Model Model Model 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Mean-cent. State Unemployment rate 
(lagged) a 
-0.001 -0.001 -0.002* -0.002*** 
(-0.003 - 0.000) (-0.003 - 0.000) (-0.003 - 0.000) (-0.004 - -0.001) 
Education b     
Completed Highschool 
 
-0.004 -0.021*** 0.016*** 
  
(-0.010 - 0.001) (-0.026 - -0.015) (0.011 - 0.020) 
Some college but no degree 
 
-0.024*** -0.043*** 0.002 
  
(-0.029 - -0.018) (-0.049 - -0.038) (-0.003 - 0.007) 
Associate’s degree 
 
-0.029*** -0.053*** 0.005* 
  
(-0.035 - -0.023) (-0.059 - -0.047) (-0.000 - 0.011) 
Bachelor’s degree 
 
0.006** -0.014*** 0.046*** 
  
(0.000 - 0.011) (-0.019 - -0.008) (0.041 - 0.051) 
Master’s degree or higher 
 
0.038*** 0.011*** 0.069*** 
 
 
(0.032 - 0.044) (0.005 - 0.017) (0.064 - 0.075) 
Employment status c     




(0.024 - 0.037) (-0.009 - 0.004) 




(-0.104 - -0.098) (-0.055 - -0.050) 
Marital status d     
Married, spouse absent    
0.334*** 
 
   
(0.321 - 0.346) 
Separated    
0.126*** 
 
   
(0.118 - 0.133) 
Divorced    
0.228*** 
 
   
(0.224 - 0.232) 
Widowed    
0.167*** 
 
   
(0.151 - 0.182) 
Never married/single    
0.620*** 
 
   
(0.616 - 0.624) 
 
    
Year Fixed Effect e Yes Yes Yes Yes 
State Fixed Effect f Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant 0.212*** 0.215*** 0.258*** 0.113*** 
 
(0.200 - 0.223) (0.203 - 0.227) (0.246 - 0.271) (0.102 - 0.125) 
N 437637 435697 435697 435697 
Source: Elaboration of the author based on ACS data.  
Notes:  * p≤0.05, ** p≤0.01, *** p≤0.001. Robust Confidence intervals in parenthesis. The analysis on different age groups and varying the bandwidth yield 
very similar results and are available in the appendix.a Mean state unemployment rate in the period 2000-2012 is 6.36%. b Reference category is Less than High 
school. c Reference category is being employed. d Reference category is Married with spouse present. e Years available are 2000-2012, the reference year is 
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This last empirical chapter of the thesis investigates the causal effect of the Great Recession 
on the postponement of first births by American White women in their thirties.  
If follows two previous chapters addressing some of the mechanisms of transmission of economic 
uncertainty from the aggregate and individual employment conditions to childbearing, and in 
particular to first births. In all the three empirical chapters of this thesis I do find a negative effect of 
the Great Recession on the transition to parenthood. 
In this chapter the identification of the causal effect is conducted exploiting a ‘treatment at a specific 
age with pseudo-cohorts’ and applying the difference-in-difference (DD) technique to synthetic 
cohorts of White American women. Women are not compared across space, as in traditional 
difference-in-difference models, but across age-periods: the treatment group is composed of White 
women age 37-39 in 2010 while in the control group women turn the same age in 2007, before the 
onset of the crisis. I measure cohorts’ childlessness rates for the treatment group between 2007 and 
2010, whereas between 2004 and 2007 for the control group, who have spent their late thirties not in 
the recession period but just before. Then I difference out cohort-specific and time-specific trends 
through the DD estimate of the effect of the Great Recession on the proportion of women who remain 
childless in each group. Due to the data limitations of both US census surveys, the ACS and the June 
CPS, and to further check the robustness of our findings, I repeat the analysis on both samples and 
compare the results. The surveys differ in the way the fertility question is posed, in their sample size 
and in their frequency but, nonetheless, as shown in previous sections, they are comparable. 
Provided the assumption of parallel trend is met, the difference-in-difference design applied in the 
investigation permits me to attribute the entire effect to the treatment, that is, the recession. This seems 
to be the case here given that the placebo tests conducted on both samples give a substantially and 
statistically zero-effect of the placebo treatment. There is no difference in childlessness probability at 
age 37-39 across cohorts of women in the ACS survey who do not spend their late thirties in the Great 
Recession; in other words, there is no effect of the treatment, without the treatment. It is noteworthy 
that this is also the case when we look at the June CPS sample and measure childlessness at age 36-39. 
 
The DD analysis shows a positive, though mild, effect: depending on the sample, the main 
period effect of the crisis on the proportion of childless 37-39 year-old women ranges from 1.8% to 
3.2% (ACS and CPS respectively)249. In both cases the effect of the Great Recession is not very large, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
249	  As	  mentioned,	  this	  sizable	  difference	  between	  the	  two	  samples	  could	  be	  explained	  by	  the	  way	  the	  different	  questionnaires	  are	  conducted.	  If	  this	  is	  
the	  case,	  the	  true	  effect	  is	  that	  of	  the	  CPS	  where	  the	  key	  question	  is	  on	  the	  number	  of	  (biological)	  children	  ever	  had,	  and	  the	  difference	  of	  the	  DD	  estimate	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and confidence intervals are quite wide, especially in the CPS smaller sample where, even though 
positive, the lower bound is close to zero (i.e. 0.003 in models (1)-(2) in Table 5.8). 
Nonetheless, I can try to quantify how big this effect is, in the more conservative case of a 1.8% 
increase in childless as found in the ACS sample (a 1% sample of US population). In the treatment 
cohort in 2010 I have 43385 White women, meaning that in the US population there were in 2010 
around 4.34 million White women age 37-39. My estimate suggests, in the most optimistic scenario, 
that roughly 78000 White American women age 37-39 remained childless due to the recession. In 
terms of general fertility rate, this implies a decline of 78 births per 1000 women age 37-39.  
Currie and Schwandt (2014) found a very close effect in their study, although studying the effect of 
unemployment rate experienced at younger ages around age 20-24. They showed that a 1% increase in 
unemployment reduces completed fertility at age 40 of about 14 conceptions per 1000 women. 
Considering that in the US the unemployment rate rose during the Great Recession around 5%, the 
estimate by Currie and Schwandt (2014) predict a decline of 70 births per 1000 women. 
 
The focus on 37-39 year-old women follows the rationale of trying to quantify the persistent 
effect of the crisis on fertility, focusing on women close to the end of their reproductive life for whom 
a postponed birth likely means a forgone child, due to the biological difficulties in conceiving after the 
age of 40. In this respect it is important to stress that first birth rates of women age 40-44 have been 
stable at about 2.2 and 2.3 births per 1000 women of that age (CDC/NCHS) between 2008 and 2013. 
This means that if women around age 37-39 postponed childbearing during the crisis of 2007-2009, as 
I have shown in this paper, there is no evidence that those postponed births were recuperated after 
2010.  
I have also replicated the analysis varying the age range. I show that this crisis-related effect of 
increasing childlessness rates is larger among women in their early thirties. However, as already 
mentioned, women in their early-to-mid thirties could still recuperate the postponed births after the 
end of the Great Recession, while this seems very unlikely for women close to their forties. 
 
Rising rates of childlessness have implications both for societies and individuals. First, 
childlessness has demographic implications like declining birth rates and population decline and 
ageing. Second, these changes in the population structure have economic implications such as an 
increase in the dependency ratio (the proportion of retirees to working age population) which burdens 
public spending and generates intergenerational imbalances in the distribution of economic resources 
(e.g. spending in the elderly health care system versus spending in education and social benefits). At 
the individual level, there is no evidence of any health-related or emotional cost of childlessness, even 
though the case of women who remain childless because of postponing motherhood is seldom treated. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
with	  the	  ACS	  (where	  the	  question	  in	  on	  the	  number	  of	  (biological)	  own	  children	  residing	  in	  the	  household)	  is	  due	  to	  more	  families	  keeping	  the	  children	  at	  
home	  due	  to	  the	  recession,	  a	  factor	  decreasing	  the	  difference	  in	  the	  treatment	  group	  and	  reducing	  the	  ACS	  point	  estimate.	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Nonetheless, childless old individuals, especially if in poor health, have been shown to be substantially 
more likely to be socially isolated (Bachrach 1980; Koropeckyj-Cox and Call 2007; Connidis, I.A. 
2010) and in institutionalization (Rowland 1998). 
 
As in previous chapters, I also here touch upon some possible mechanisms through which the 
crisis might affect fertility and, in this specific case, childlessness. In the analysis I control for 
education, marital status and state level unemployment rates. Considering that I am focusing on 
women at about the age of forty, their educational level is very likely exogenous to the model and a 
pure control variable. In fact there is no evidence of a mediating effect of education at age 37-39, 
unlike the marital status case. The economic crisis puts a strain on marriages, both in terms of the 
likelihood of new marriages and the survival of existing ones. If marriages as less frequent due to the 
recession, births are also less likely. This is clearly evident from my findings, as adding marital status 
to the model halves the main period effect (e.g. Model (4) in Table 5.4): married women with a 
present spouse in our treatment group are far less likely to stay childless because of the recession, 
while single 37-39 year-old women are the ones with the highest risk. 
As also shown in previous chapters, rising unemployment rates experienced at older ages, does not 
appear to be a major factor in deciding whether a woman remains childless in her late thirties (see 
Table 5.11). In line with previous studies (Sutton et al. 2010; Percheski and Kimbro 2014; Currie and 
Schwandt 2014) I only find an effect of unemployment rates on childless young women, particularly 
in the age range 20-24. Dehejia and Lleras-Muney (2004) also find that in the US the fertility response 
to rising unemployment differs substantially by ethnicity and socioeconomic status: for instance, the 
negative effect of an increase in the unemployment rate is twice as much for Blacks compared to 
Whites.250 
 
As a final remark I want to mention that the research design that I have used in this analysis 
could be usefully further extended to study childlessness rates in the European countries, using for 
instance the Labor Force Survey Data. The identification strategy based on a ‘treatment at a specific 
age with pseudo-cohorts’ could be applied to study other outcomes, like higher parities, for instance 
the proportion of couples with 2 or 3 children; or to study other treatments like past recessions or 





	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
250	  Even	  though	  preliminary	  analyses	  conducted	  on	  ACS	  and	  CPS	  data	  suggest	   it	   is	  not	  the	  case	  for	  the	  effect	  of	   the	  Great	  Recession	  on	  childlessness	  
rates	  of	  African	  American	  women	  close	  to	  their	  forties.	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“Depressions, wars and periods of extreme social ferment often produce major reorientations of 
society. […] In periods of crisis the element of chance seems to play a major role in influencing 
life outcomes” and “short-run considerations outweigh the potential consequences of an action 
for the future welfare of the household or the individual” 
 
J.A. Clausen, foreword to G. H. Elder Children of the Great Depression (1974): xv-xvii. 
 
 
 This thesis contributes to the crucial and long-standing debate on the economic determinants 
of fertility behavior. The recent Great Recession that occurred in western societies offers an example 
of extraordinary uncertain economic circumstances that are worthwhile exploring in depth. As J.A. 
Clausen argues in the foreword of G.H. Elder’s book Children of the Great Depression (1974), 
extreme social and economic ferment affects households’ and individual’s lives sharply. 
This study addresses essentially the issue of how families changed their childbearing behavior 
depending on the economic conditions they faced during the Great Recession. In particular I focus on 
the extensive margin of fertility, namely the transition to parenthood and the diffusion of childlessness 
in American society, and on how the latter respond to labor market insecurity.  
After an extensive introductory analysis of the macro-trends and the aggregate relationship between 
financial and macroeconomic indicators and birth rates in the US and Europe (Chapter II), the specific 
purposes of this thesis can be summarized by four principal research questions.  
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First, I investigate how the aggregate and the individual cross-level economic and 
employment uncertainties generated by the crisis interact in shaping the transition to the first child in 
the US. This is a cross-cutting research question addressed in both Chapters III and IV. 
Second, looking both at American couples’ employment dynamics (Chapter III) and women’s 
socioeconomic intergenerational mobility (Chapter IV) I investigate the mechanisms of transmission 
of uncertainty from the labor-market dimension to the family domain, and in particular again to the 
transition to the first birth. 
In the third chapter I ask how the probability of becoming parents depends on the different working 
status dynamic of the couple: is it the husband’s employment status that matters for having the first 
child? Does having a non-working wife increase the likelihood of parenthood? These are some of the 
questions I answer in Chapter III. 
The fourth chapter focuses on women testing the Easterlin Hypothesis of resources and aspirations. 
The research question guiding the analysis in Chapter IV is whether women measure their 
socioeconomic position based on the aspirations they formed in their family of origin, and whether 
they further decide to become mothers only once they reach at least the position of their parents. 
Finally, the remaining two research questions are answered in the last empirical chapter. In Chapter V 
I address, first, the causal effect of the Great Recession on childlessness in the US, using a design-
based approach, and second, the existence of a permanent effect of the crisis on cohort childlessness 
among women close to the end of their reproductive lives251. 
 
In the remainder of this last concluding chapter I first outline the main contributions of this 
thesis to the literature and its principal empirical findings. Second, I illustrate the main limitations of 
this study and, third, before I finally conclude, I also speculate on some possible promising future 
streams of research on the topic of the economic determinants of fertility, as suggested by the findings 
of this thesis. 
 
  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
251	  Note	  that	  Chapter	  V	  is	  a	   joint	  work	  with	  Professor	  Fabrizio	  Bernardi	  and	  an	  earlier	  and	  reduced	  version	  has	  been	  published	  in	  the	  IZA	  Journal	  of	  
Labor	  Economics	  in	  November	  2015	  (see	  Comolli	  and	  Bernardi	  2015).	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The first empirical Chapter II contributes to the existing literature on the relationship between 
business-cycle fluctuations and aggregate fertility rates. Research on birth rate-response to the Great 
Recession mainly focuses on the pro-cyclical correlation between economic growth or unemployment 
rates, and fertility rates, during the first years of the crisis. Also most studies look at the United States 
and Europe separately. 
The main innovative features of my study are the following: first, I make use of more recent data that 
allow me to make a comparative analysis of the European and the American cases; and second, I look 
not only at the fertility response to unemployment increases during the Great Recession but I also 
investigate the effect of financial and economic policy uncertainty on births. To measure this 
uncertainty I use an index of economic policy uncertainty (EPU) created by three American 
professors. I also use sovereign debt risks, measured in absolute terms with government bonds’ yields 
and in relative terms via the spread between countries’ bond yields and the German ‘safe’ bonds. 
In line with the existing empirical evidence, my results show that the crisis depressed birth rates both 
in the US and in European countries, and that the largest negative effect was registered on first births 
among very young women. Among older women the negative effect was especially concentrated on 
higher-order births. 
The original findings of my study reveal that the increase in unemployment rates in Europe and the US 
was responsible for more than the two-thirds of the average decline in the general fertility rate in those 
countries. However, although the elasticity of birth rates to unemployment is larger than to financial 
uncertainty measures, the latter did also have a substantial impact on general fertility rates, especially 
in the US and in southern European countries. Specifically the negative effect of the economic policy 
uncertainty in the US and the sovereign debt risk in southern European countries and the birth rates 
was sizable and comparable to the effect of unemployment.  
The bottom line empirical contribution of Chapter II is thus that, at the aggregate level, we witnessed a 
substantial decline in births during the Great Recession, and that this decline strongly correlates not 
only with the – usually investigated – structural objective macroeconomic conditions of countries 
(unemployment rates) but also with indicators of the economic and financial uncertainty generated by 
the crisis.  
However, the results do not reveal the mechanisms that explain this fertility drop. Leaving the 
aggregate perspective and moving to an individual-level (single-country) investigation, the purpose of 
the two central chapters of this thesis is essentially to test some of the mechanisms identified by the 
literature. 
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More precisely, Chapter III and IV focus on the transition to the first child and how the latter 
is affected by the employment instability generated by the Great Recession in the United States. In 
both chapters I analyze the cross-level interplay between aggregate labor market conditions and the  
individual-household employment position; also I rely on the same American dataset, the Panel 
Survey of Income Dynamics, for both chapters.  
However, while Chapter III investigates couples’ employment, unemployment and non-employment 
dynamics, in Chapter IV the focus is on women and the analysis investigates not only the 
employment/unemployment dynamic, but also the influence of intergenerational occupational mobility 
on motherhood. 
The two chapters show common results. First, notwithstanding the strong correlation in the macro-
level analysis conducted in Chapter II, aggregate unemployment rate per se seems not to explain in 
micro-level analyses the negative impact of the Great Recession on first births. Second, my findings 
tend to exclude the possibility of any moderating effect of aggregate macroeconomic conditions, 
supporting instead the opposite hypothesis of a negative multiplicative effect of individual-level 
employment insecurity on the transition to the first child. 
At the couple-level, husband’s unemployment reduces the probability of parenthood compared to 
dual-earner couples, but even in the case that he is employed, if the wife loses her job or goes out of 
the labor force the likelihood of first birth declines compared to dual earners.  
Considering women only (without considering the husband’s occupation) I found that the hazard of 
first birth during the Great Recession in the US is larger for immobile or upward mobile women, 
compared to the downward mobile, confirming the Easterlin Hypothesis of resources and 
socioeconomic aspirations (formed in the family of origin). 
The negative multiplicative effect of the crisis on the transition to first birth was strongest on non-
working women: after the onset of the Great Recession women out of the labor market were the 
slowest to reach motherhood (compared to downward and upward mobile women). 
 
All in all the two investigations in chapters III-IV suggest that the work and family 
dimensions are positively linked and that reconciliation between the two domains is not the main 
driver of postponement during the last decade – of intense financial and economic insecurity – in the 
US. Couple’s employment uncertainty and women’s unemployment and downward mobility correlate 
to the postponement of parenthood.  
Both chapters’ analyses point to the same mechanism of transmission of insecurity from the working 
to the family domain, namely the income effect. The reduction in couples’ earnings due to either the 
	   257	  
husband’s or the wife’s job loss seems responsible for the postponement of childbearing during the 
Great Recession252, with childless dual-earner couples being the most likely to have children.  
In contrast, neither of the analyses supports the hypothesis that the reduction of the opportunity cost of 
childbearing arising from the job loss of one of the two partners speeds up the transition to 
parenthood.  
  
 Chapters II-IV follow the demographic and sociological literature in their attempt to moderate 
the influence on unobserved heterogeneity in the estimates, by adopting well-suited statistical tools to 
control for the possible bias in the estimates of the effect of labor-market conditions on the fertility 
decisions. However, I cannot rule out the possibility that some unobserved couples’ or individuals’ 
characteristics bias the estimates, influencing both employment and fertility decisions. Therefore, the 
last empirical - design-based - Chapter V is dedicated to the assessment of a causal effect of the Great 
Recession on the extensive margin of fertility, namely childlessness. 
In addition, the results from the previous chapters suggest that the crisis does have a postponement 
effect on the transition to parenthood, but from the available data, I cannot infer whether the complete 
fertility of those women would be affected or not. This is the second purpose of Chapter V: assessing 
whether there is a permanent effect of the Great Recession on births.  
The difference-in-difference estimates suggest there is a permanent increase in cohort childlessness 
caused by the crisis in the US. The increase in the proportion of women around the age of 40 who 
remains childless due to the crisis is not very large, as expected from previous findings from the 
literature, but it is significant and, moreover, judging from the robustness checks conducted in Chapter 
V, I am confident that those births were not recuperated after the recession. Thus, we can label this 
decline in first births a permanent consequence of the Great Recession on fertility. 
A final major contribution of this last empirical chapter is the innovative and very flexible research 
design adopted for the analysis. The difference-in-difference approach applied to pseudo-panels of 
women has rarely been implemented in studies of fertility but it is very versatile. I show that it can be 






	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
252	  As	  mentioned	  earlier	  to	  investigate	  the	  other	  two	  mechanisms	  suggested	  by	  the	  literature,	  namely	  the	  adverse	  and	  the	  uncertainty	  reduction	  effect,	  I	  
would	  need	  a	  much	  larger	  sample	  to	  conduct	  analyses	  that	  differentiate	  among	  age,	  occupational	  tenure	  and	  different	  socioeconomic	  and	  educational	  
groups.	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Despite the several contributions of this thesis to the literature on economic determinants of 
fertility in advanced societies, the study is limited in some important ways. 
First of all, as already argued in the introductory chapter, the promptness of this investigation, 
conducted almost simultaneously with the unfolding of the Great Recession, implies that some limits 
had to be imposed on the dynamics under study. First, I could not observe the complete fertility of 
those women affected by the Great Recession and, second, I had to confine my investigation to the 
American case where the recession had hit before, and in a more delimited period, compared to 
European countries that suffered from a second strong recession phase after 2011. For these reasons 
the analysis is limited to the effect that the crisis had on the extensive margin of fertility (first birth and 
childlessness) and on the US. I managed though to partially solve the problem of not observing any 
permanent effect of the crisis on births by measuring in the Chapter V the rise in childlessness among 
women close to the end of their reproductive lives and for whom a recuperation of those births after 
the recession is very unlikely. In the results of the chapter I also compare the effect across different 
age groups of women and show that the increase in childlessness is not confined to women close to 
age 40 but that it is a common finding for all women in their thirties. 
In fact, the focus of the study on first births generates the issue of a necessary selection effect arising 
from the comparison between childless couples and women of different ages. As is particularly 
evident in Chapter III, clearly the group of women reaching age 30 without children represents a 
selected slice of the female population with different priorities, attitudes and behavior not always 
under control in the models. Following the literature I attempt to control as much as feasible for this 
selection effect through the statistical model applied (that controls for women’s age at entrance in the 
survey in the Cox models in Chapter III), by adding all the observable controls that might affect the 
selection process and in Chapter V, as mentioned, by comparing results across age groups of women. 
 
A second group of caveats is more methodological in nature. The first methodological limit is 
that, despite employing different statistical methods, this thesis only makes use of quantitative 
instruments, without using any qualitative tool. The latter would have brought the present 
investigation to a deeper level on the decisional process at the basis of the transitions to parenthood 
and its economic determinants. Moreover, in-depth interviews would allow one to tailor the specific 
questions to the mechanisms that the researcher aims at uncovering. In my case I relied on surveys 
designed to evaluate behavior in a long list of different domains.  
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An example of this kind of limitation is the less-than-optimal way in which the question on 
childbearing is posed in the American Community Survey (ACS). In the latter the questionnaire asks 
about the number of children residing in the house and not the total number of children. To reduce the 
measurement error generated by that question I replicated the analysis on a similar dataset and show 
that the estimates are robust. In this way I managed to limit this problem. 
 
The second methodological caveat is that, due to data limitations, I had to take as exogenous 
and fixed over time, a list of individuals’ and couples’ characteristics that might influence the process 
under study. I, in fact, assumed that attitudes towards childbearing or towards career are exogenous 
and time-invariant, and that therefore the fixed effect model I apply in my analyses in Chapters III-IV 
controls for those characteristics. This is very likely not the case since a major economic shock like 
the Great Recession might have also affected and reshuffled individual priorities and might have 
influenced beliefs and attitudes together with behavior. If this is true, there are missing variables in my 
models that affect both the likelihood of being in a certain occupational position and the likelihood of 
childbearing. 
One way I tried to overcome this problem is to focus in Chapter V on a more designed-based study, 
exploiting randomization, to exclude any unobserved difference between the treated and the control 
group of women. I show that there is a causal effect of the crisis on the likelihood of childlessness 
among women below age 40. The latter result would suggest that there is a negative causal effect on 
first birth among American women, which confirms the findings of the previous chapters. However, 
there is still no guarantee that my estimates of the fixed effect and event history models are completely 
free of selection and unobserved heterogeneity. 
 
A third methodological caveat is related to the complexity of the statistical models and the 
substantial interpretations of my findings.  
To begin with, the micro-level analyses of Chapters III-IV suffer from the problem of a PSID dataset’s 
sample size, which is not always large enough to reach a minimum cell size in the category of interest 
to get statistically significant estimates. The complexity of the models, involving cross-level 
interactions, couples’ working-status combinations and the detailed employment and occupational 
mobility categorization, reduce the cell size especially in the categories of the most uncommon 
employment conditions. Moreover, sometimes this happens in the categories I am more interested in, 
for instance the couples where both partners are unemployed (Chapter III) or the downward mobile 
women during the recession (Chapter IV). There is not much that I could do about that unfortunately. 
However I tried to offer meaningful interpretations of the estimates, beyond their statistical 
significance. For instance, in the case of the non-linear Cox model of Chapter IV, the interpretation of 
the interaction effects was arduous, therefore, I relied on the graphical representation of the different 
profiles of women. 
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A final crucial caveat is that I do not test alternative causes of the decline in fertility witnessed 
in the United States in the last ten years. I focused throughout the thesis only on the economic 
rationale of parenthood while other factors in the same period might have been co-responsible together 
with the crisis, for the postponement of first births in the United States. Among the issues that are 
deemed by scholars to be central to short-term changes in childbearing trends and that are missing in 
this thesis include changes in the welfare state or family policy provisions (Aassve 2008; Aassve and 
Lappergaard 2008) and migration (Goldstein et al 2009; Esping-Andersen and Billari 2015; Parrado 
2011). 
The relevance of the welfare state for fertility behavior is undeniable. Family policies shape, on the 
one hand, the economic incentives and constraints for childbearing decisions. In countries where the 
welfare state offers high-quality universal childcare and a mother-friendly labor market such as the 
Scandinavian countries, the reconciliation of work and family domains is easier and the incentives to 
childbearing are larger, compared to countries where family policies are few or very weak. 
On the other hand, in the long run, family policies’ change also affects behavioral norms by 
subsidizing one type of behavior instead of another, for instance incentivizing marital versus non-
marital births. 
In the US during the nineties the structure of the public assistance programs to low-income families 
changed quite a lot, especially in the direction of giving greater discretion to the states253. The 
principal aim of these policy changes was to reduce out-of-wedlock fertility, in particular teen 
pregnancies, and to increase the incentives for marriage (Blank 2002). The main broad intention was 
to increase the incentives to work, especially for women, to be entitled to receive public assistance in 
childcare and health insurance to low-income families. 
All in all, however, the marital and fertility response to these policy changes of the nineties seems very 
weak. Nonetheless, findings from the literature on the effects of these policy reforms in the US are 
mixed, and very sensitive to the methodology of the study and its model specification (Blank 2002). 
 
Immigration has been often cited as one of the main reasons for the rising period fertility rates 
in the first years 2000s in Europe (Goldstein et al. 2009) and in the US (Parrado 2011). Immigrant 
women have a higher fertility compared to natives’ and when the share of immigrant in the 
composition of women in reproductive age increases, the period fertility rates also rise. However, the 
literature has also shown, for instance in the case of Hispanic women in the US (Parrado 2011) that 
this increase in fertility rates is artificial; it is due to their age at migration and to the fact that 
immigrant women tend to have children right after they arrive in the US. All in all, immigrant 
Hispanic women do not have completed fertility higher than native White American women (Parrado 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
253	  To	  cite	  an	  example,	  the	  Personal	  Responsibility	  and	  Work	  Opportunity	  Reconciliation	  Act	  (PRWORA)	  of	  1996	  replaced	  the	  Federal	  Aid	  to	  Families	  
with	  Dependent	  Children	  Program	  (AFDC)	  –	  the	  primary	  cash-­‐assistance	  program	  for	  low-­‐income	  families	  -­‐-­‐	  with	  the	  Temporary	  Assistance	  for	  Needy	  
Families	  (TANF)	  block	  grant.	  The	  same	  program	  also	  changed	  the	  structure	  of	  child-­‐care	  assistance,	  creating	  a	  Child	  Care	  and	  Development	  Block	  Grant,	  
based	  on	  which	  states	  where	  allowed	  to	  devote	  part	  of	  their	  TANF	  funds	  to	  child	  care	  (Blank	  2002).	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2011). However, clearly the Great Recession did have an impact on migration, reducing the flow of 
migrants to advanced economies, because of the job-market difficulties in those countries. The latter 
process also might have had an effect, at least on the period fertility rates analyzed in Chapter II, but 
for the sake of simplicity I preferred not to take the migration issue into consideration in this thesis. 
All things considered, I acknowledge that both family welfare provisions and migration radically 
influence fertility behavior but their intrinsic complexity prevented me from taking them into 
consideration in my empirical models. 
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As mentioned throughout this thesis the literature and the empirical evidence on the fertility 
response to the recent Great Recession is still scarce. This is because western countries have just 
started to recover from the strong financial and economic shock that hit them at the end of 2007. 
Households still struggle with financial distress and high unemployment rates, and they are far from 
overcoming the economic insecurity generated by the crisis. The existence of so few studies on the 
Great Recession’s consequences for childbearing, however, opens the door to multiple streams of 
research. As a result of my contributions and findings I have in mind four main feasible avenues for 
near-future studies. 
The first main subject to explore is the role of the institutional context in moderating the impact of the 
recession on childbearing. As mentioned in the previous section, the importance of welfare provisions 
in shaping the economic incentives to childbearing but also the behavioral norms attached to the 
various family arrangements is paramount.  
To go more in depth in analyzing the impact of the institutional structures and their interplay with the 
economic circumstances in shaping fertility behavior, a comparative study is necessary, and the 
European countries represent a natural term of comparison for the United States. Europe offers a wide 
array of welfare provisions and family policies that might buffer the impact of the economic insecurity 
generated by the crisis on fertility. Besides family policies European countries also differ in terms of 
their educational system, labor market characteristics, redistributive policies and, last but not least, in 
terms of cultural norms regarding gender equality, parenthood and family structures in general. Due to 
these different features the fertility response to business cycle fluctuations would be clearly different 
in Europe from the effect I identified in this thesis for the United States.  
Moreover, as shown in Chapter II of this thesis, the Great Recession affected each country in a 
particular way. Exploiting this variation would allow one to grasp the effects of the different aspects of 
the recession - among those the ones I started to illustrate in the first empirical chapter of this thesis 
(macroeconomic structural conditions versus financial and economic uncertainty indicators) that 
influence childbearing behavior254. 
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
254	  The	  first	  study	  I	  plan	  to	  conduct	  as	  a	  follow	  up	  on	  this	  thesis	  is	  a	  replication	  of	  the	  analysis	  on	  the	  effect	  of	  the	  crisis	  on	  childlessness	  (Chapter	  V)	  
using	   the	  EU	  Labor	  Force	  Survey,	   initially	  clustering	  countries	   in	  welfare	  state	  groups	   (Esping-­‐Andersen	  1990)	   to	  assess	   the	  different	   impact	  of	   the	  
Great	  Recession	  on	  childlessness	  in	  each	  cluster.	  Secondly,	  if	  the	  dataset	  sample	  size	  is	  large	  enough	  I	  plan	  to	  select	  around	  five	  countries	  and	  compare	  
the	  effects	  of	  the	  crisis	  on	  childlessness,	  mediated	  by	  the	  country-­‐specific	  welfare	  policies,	  family	  provisions	  and	  labor	  market	  features.	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 A second empirical question for future research that would expand the results of this thesis 
concerns the impact of the crisis on higher parities. I limited my analysis to the transition to 
parenthood but, although previous evidence suggests that the effect for parents on the transition to 
higher-order births is limited, there is no empirical evidence on the recent crisis consequences for the 
second or third child. Also a study of this kind would shed light on the different mechanisms 
explaining how the economic incentives or disincentives apply to the first child compared to higher 
parities. The transition to parenthood is, as I also mentioned in this thesis, a clearly different life-
course transition compared to the transition to higher-order births. Nonetheless it is still not clear from 
the existing evidence precisely how they differ and how differently each transition responds to 
economic opportunities and constraints. 
 
 The third stream of research that I would suggest starting from my investigation here concerns 
the application of causal inference to the study of recession and fertility. As I mention in Chapter V, 
design-based studies of fertility are mostly devoted to analyzing the impact of family-policy reforms 
on childbearing and on women’s labor-market participation. 
Moreover, only a handful of recent studies (Del Bono, Weber, and Winter-Ebmer 2014; Dehejia and 
Lleras-Muney 2004; McKenzie 2003) make the effort to use causal inference methods to study the 
effect of employment conditions of fertility. As I also explain in this thesis the relationship between 
working and childbearing behavior is affected by unobserved characteristics that might bias the 
estimate of the causal effect of one variable on the other, obtained in a traditional statistical setting. 
It is fundamental therefore that future research focuses on finding alternative ways to measure the 
causal economic determinants of fertility, net of the selection effects generated by those unobserved 
characteristics. A practical example of this attempt might be - beyond the difference-in-difference 
approach I applied to the pseudo-panels in Chapter V of this thesis - the already-cited, synthetic 
control method developed by Abadie, Diamond and Hainmueller (2010, 2011, 2014). Both methods 
manage to build an alternative control group to be compared to the treatment group in cases where it 
seems more cumbersome to identify one. 
 
A final issue that I treat in this thesis but that could be further and specifically expanded is how 
birth rates respond to economic uncertainty. This avenue of research I have in mind is also linked to 
the causal inference approach I referred to in the previous paragraph. The Great Recession is in fact an 
exceptional source of massive economic and financial insecurity that gives researchers the opportunity 
to study the fertility reaction to uncertainty more closely and more causally. 
For instance, as I describe in the thesis, the sovereign debt crisis (2011-2012) caused financial 
insecurity to rise in Southern European countries. The IMF identified episodes of acute financial stress 
in Italy, Spain and Greece in terms of exceptional spikes in the daily spread between their 
governments’ bonds and the Germans (IMF 2012) between January 2007 and June 2012. 
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A first study on the fertility response to financial uncertainty could look at the consequences 
for aggregate birth rates using those random financial shocks in the attempt to limit the impact of 
unobserved heterogeneity on the estimates and go more in the direction of a causal effect of financial 
uncertainty on births. Using monthly General Fertility Rates (GFR) time series in Italy, Spain and 
Greece, in a country fixed effect model (and controlling for births’ seasonality) I can assess the effect 
on the GFR nine-to-ten months after the financial shocks. To solve the problem of long-lasting periods 
of insecurity where there are many financial close-ranged shocks I propose to look at Google trends. 
The term ‘spread’ in those months came into common use in the media and public debate (compared 
to other technical words like bailout, subprime or bankruptcy); therefore, the search statistics for the 
term ‘spread’ on Google should indicate the hot dates when insecurity peaked255.  
 
A second study could look more specifically at how economic uncertainty is subjectively 
perceived. Studies in the US (Lesthaege and Neidert 2009) show that there is a relationship between 
political preferences, voting behavior and fertility. During the crisis, the negative correlation between 
unemployment and fertility rates was smaller in states where a greater share of citizen voted for 
Obama in the elections of 2008 (Morgan et al. 2011). This result points to a differential effect on 
fertility depending on the partisan perception of the crisis. The argument is that the Obama election 
elicited optimism in those states where the majority of the voters supported his election. This 
optimistic climate dampened the negative effect of the recession on fertility by altering the perception 
of uncertainty. To my knowledge, there is no similar study conducted in Europe. 
The Italian case during the European Elections of 2014 is an interesting one to address the research 
question of whether the perception of economic uncertainty changes the effect on fertility rates of the 
aggregate economic conditions256. 
 
The crisis in Italy was severe, with unemployment exploding and remaining high for many 
years. The 2014 elections in Italy are peculiar since Renzi’s party won with 40% of the votes, a very 
large share for Italian elections. Renewal was a major issue on which Renzi built his victory. The 
promise of change generated optimism among citizens who supported his victory and might have 
influenced their perception of the crisis257.  
Despite the larger coverage of the welfare state in Italy compared to the US258, policy provisions to 
reconcile family and work are few and childcare has to be purchased on the market (though at a lower 
cost than in the US) or, in most cases, it has to be provided by the extended family (i.e., grandparents). 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
255	  And	  indeed	  they	  do:	  from	  a	  preliminary	  analysis	  of	  Google	  trends,	  search	  for	  the	  term	  ‘spread’	  in	  Italy	  peaked	  in	  November	  2011.	  
256	  For	  example,	  following	  Morgan	  et	  al.	  2011	  a	  difference-­‐in-­‐difference	  approach	  could	  be	  applied	  to	  a	  province	  (110	  in	  Italy)	  fixed	  effect	  model	  where	  
the	  monthly	  fertility	  rate	  variation	  2011/2015	  is	  regressed	  on	  the	  monthly	  unemployment	  rate	  variation	  2010/2014,	  interacted	  with	  the	  provincial	  PD	  
votes	  share	  in	  the	  2014	  election.	  
257	  This	  claim	  is	  supported	  by	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  main	  target	  of	  Renzi’s	  campaign	  were	  the	  young	  who	  were,	   first,	   the	  most	  affected	  by	  unemployment	  
during	  the	  recession	  and,	  second,	  those	  proven	  to	  have	  postponed	  childbearing	  the	  most	  due	  to	  the	  crisis.	  
258The	  labor	  market	  structure	  in	  Italy	  is	  much	  more	  rigid	  due	  to	  the	  insiders	  versus	  outsiders	  dichotomy	  in	  employment	  conditions	  (see	  Barbieri	  and	  
Scherer	  2009)	  and	  female	  labor	  force	  participation	  is	  still	  low	  compared	  to	  the	  US.	  Italy	  is	  a	  very	  low-­‐fertility	  country;	  it	  has	  strong	  traditional	  family	  
ties	  and	  a	  still-­‐diffused	  male	  breadwinner	  model	  (Impicciatore	  and	  Billari	  2012).	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This suggests that results would be similar in the two countries; however, the US and Italy differ a 
great deal with respect to interest in politics. Results on the 2005-09 wave of the World Value Survey 
(WVS) show that while in the US 15.5% and 44.5% are respectively very and somehow interested in 
politics, these percentages in Italy are of 9% and 29%. This might counterbalance the importance of 
the 2014 election results and reduce the ‘optimism’ effect of Renzi’s victory on buffering the negative 










This thesis aimed to identify the relationship between the Great Recession and the recently 
witnessed decline in births, and to test, at the micro-level, some of the mechanisms of transmission of 
uncertainty from the employment to the family domains. 
After establishing that there is a negative correlation at the aggregate level between objective job 
market conditions but also financial uncertainty indicators of the crisis and period fertility rates both in 
the United States and in Europe, this study focuses on how employment insecurity affects the 
transition to the first child, analyzing individual level data from the US in the period 2003-2011. 
The two central chapters of this thesis – Chapters III-IV – investigate this issue from two different 
perspectives. The former analyzes the effects for the probability of parenthood of couples’ 
employment dynamics; the latter analyzes how likely it is that women will transition to motherhood, 
given their socioeconomic occupational mobility with respect to their family of origin. 
The main finding of these chapters is that there is, at the micro-level, a negative effect of employment 
insecurity on the probability of first birth. Both looking at the couples’ and at women’s perspectives, 
being in a dual-earner couple, or being a woman in a non-downward mobile occupation increases the 
likelihood of first childbearing. Couples where both partners work are more likely to have their first 
child than traditional male-breadwinner couples. Likewise, upward (or immobile) mobile women are 
more likely to become mothers than downward mobile or non-working women. My findings thus 
suggest that parenthood is linked to economic and employment security through an income 
mechanism and not through an opportunity cost effect. 
This result implies that in the last ten years in the US and during the Great Recession the direct cost of 
childbearing overcame the opportunity and conciliation costs of parenthood. In a country like the US 
where family policies are almost inexistent and the costs of childbearing are concentrated on the 
parents, a satisfying position in the labor market for women and a sizeable household income achieved 
when both partners work are necessary conditions to form a family. 
 
Finally, this thesis also contributes to two other crucial aspects of the debate on the socio-
economic determinants of fertility: first, the causal effect of the recession on the extensive margin of 
fertility, i.e. childlessness, and, second, the tempo or quantum response of fertility to short-term 
economic shocks. Applying an innovative research design I show that there is a positive causal effect 
of the Great Recession on permanent childlessness. Net of selection and unobserved heterogeneity, 
childlessness among women around 40 years old increased around 2-3%. Therefore, women close to 
the end of their reproductive lives postponed their first child during the economic and financial crisis 
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in the US at a rate comparable to women in their thirties, and there is no evidence that they 
recuperated those births after the recession.  
This is a key finding of this thesis because the existing literature on the effect of economic shocks on 
fertility up to now only identified a temporary delaying effect on first birth among young women. My 
findings instead point to an additional permanent negative effect of the Great Recession on births to 
older women. 
The fact that these American women, estimated at around eighty thousand, will end up involuntarily 
childless due to the Great Recession has crucial negative societal implications. First, rising 
childlessness further reduces fertility rates in societies that already face the challenge of population 
decline and ageing. Second, population ageing increases the dependency ratio, burdening public 
spending and generating intergenerational imbalances in the distribution of economic resources.  
Finally, childless couples that would like to have a child but for some reason cannot, suffer from a 
welfare deficit and they represent a large public policy concern and public cost. Childless old 
individuals generate a costly demand for formal care, especially because old individuals are more 
likely to be socially isolated (Bachrach 1980; Koropeckyj-Cox and Call 2007; Connidis 2010) and 
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Figure A1.1: Long-term government bond yield in Eurozone countries (2009-2012) 
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Figure A1.2: Density distribution of independent variables and log-transformed distribution. 
Source: elaboration of the author based on data from Eurostat, ECB, Bank of England, OECD and Federal Reserve Economic Data (St. Louis  
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Table A1.1: The Great Recession indicators effect on Total Fertility Rate in Europe and the US (2003-
2013). Country and Country-year Fixed effect models. 
 
Model Model Model Model Model 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
            
Unemployment rate -0.087*** 
   
-0.064*** 
 (-0.106 - -0.068) 
   
(-0.090 - -0.038) 
Youth Unemployment Rate 
 
-0.086*** 
   
 
 
(-0.108 - -0.065) 







(-0.014 - 0.034) 
 
(0.010 - 0.076) 
EPU Index (annual average) 
   
-0.043*** -0.021*** 
 
   
(-0.060 - -0.026) (-0.036 - -0.006) 
Year 0.003** 0.005*** 0.004*** -0.009*** -0.004** 
 
(0.000 - 0.006) (0.001 - 0.008) (0.001 - 0.006) (-0.012 - -0.005) (-0.006 - -0.001) 
Belgium -2.628 -0.892 -2.883 
  
 (-18.365 - 13.110) (-17.020 - 15.236) (-17.292 - 11.526) 
  Bulgaria -26.751*** -25.923*** -11.081 
  
 (-34.839 - -18.664) (-35.110 - -16.737) (-28.761 - 6.599) 
  Croatia -1.324 -0.529 
   
 (-10.388 - 7.739) (-10.817 - 9.759) 
   Cyprus 10.650** 11.181* 27.323*** 
  
 (1.127 - 20.173) (-0.404 - 22.767) (14.991 - 39.654) 
  Czech Republic -33.137*** -32.646*** -35.393*** 
  
 (-50.308 - -15.967) (-49.868 - -15.424) (-53.769 - -17.016) 
  Denmark 0.126 0.398 7.931 
  
 (-10.370 - 10.621) (-11.970 - 12.766) (-4.005 - 19.867) 
  Estonia -19.402 -15.658 
   
 (-46.025 - 7.220) (-43.803 - 12.488) 
   Finland 7.776 9.745 5.215 
  
 (-3.198 - 18.750) (-2.618 - 22.109) (-5.608 - 16.039) 
  France -12.681*** -11.703** -9.834** 12.203* -15.137*** 
 (-21.576 - -3.786) (-22.069 - -1.337) (-17.684 - -1.985) (-1.977 - 26.383) (-25.818 - -4.456) 
Germany 6.804* 6.323 -3.876 23.484*** 
 
 (-0.717 - 14.324) (-2.963 - 15.608) (-10.652 - 2.901) (9.730 - 37.239) 
 Greece -30.291*** -25.167*** -14.582 
  
 (-41.566 - -19.017) (-38.096 - -12.238) (-34.074 - 4.910) 
  Hungary -10.058* -8.044 4.749 
  
 (-21.945 - 1.829) (-21.866 - 5.779) (-7.987 - 17.485) 
  Iceland -6.403 5.630 11.005 
  
 (-27.678 - 14.872) (-19.612 - 30.872) (-9.654 - 31.663) 
  Ireland -36.599*** -34.187*** -8.027 
  
 (-53.763 - -19.435) (-51.740 - -16.634) (-20.577 - 4.523) 
  Italy -13.196*** -13.270*** -9.412** 16.372** -8.224 
 (-19.732 - -6.661) (-21.196 - -5.343) (-17.602 - -1.223) (3.674 - 29.069) (-19.094 - 2.647) 
Latvia -18.326** -16.216** -6.523 
  
 (-32.853 - -3.799) (-31.046 - -1.386) (-26.727 - 13.681) 
  Lithuania -55.487*** -54.546*** -48.531*** 
  
 (-72.193 - -38.780) (-71.326 - -37.766) (-57.672 - -39.390) 
  Luxemburg 11.795* 11.942 19.570*** 
  
 (-1.359 - 24.949) (-3.271 - 27.156) (11.462 - 27.678) 
  Malta 10.620* 15.807** 8.641 
  
 (-1.792 - 23.031) (2.620 - 28.994) (-3.201 - 20.483) 
  Netherlands 4.307 6.906 6.433 32.689*** 3.551 
 (-3.680 - 12.295) (-3.330 - 17.142) (-2.239 - 15.105) (16.873 - 48.504) (-5.120 - 12.222) 
Norway 8.727 12.381 3.651 
  
 (-6.679 - 24.134) (-3.451 - 28.212) (-11.772 - 19.074) 
  Poland 4.499 3.360 -11.013* 
  
 (-5.573 - 14.571) (-7.202 - 13.922) (-24.082 - 2.055) 
  Portugal -5.585 0.325 12.273 
  
 (-30.928 - 19.759) (-26.083 - 26.732) (-10.110 - 34.656) 
  
	  
	   298	  
Romania -23.533 -24.396* -112.863*** 
  
 (-52.127 - 5.060) (-52.861 - 4.068) (-116.950 - -108.776) 
  Slovakia -18.062** -19.311*** -23.586*** 
  
 (-31.981 - -4.144) (-33.875 - -4.748) (-39.337 - -7.834) 
  Slovenia -58.619*** -50.865*** -53.759*** 
  
 (-70.103 - -47.134) (-61.849 - -39.882) (-69.738 - -37.781) 
  Spain -25.650*** -22.827*** -7.619 20.718** -15.062** 
 (-37.077 - -14.223) (-34.894 - -10.759) (-18.196 - 2.957) (4.755 - 36.681) (-28.046 - -2.078) 
Sweden -20.394*** -18.344** -16.487*** 
  
 (-33.818 - -6.971) (-33.591 - -3.097) (-28.404 - -4.570) 
  Switzerland -15.287*** 3.115 -13.930*** 
  
 (-23.996 - -6.578) (-5.234 - 11.464) (-19.622 - -8.238) 
  UK -31.089*** -28.826*** -20.478*** 
 
-34.504*** 
 (-45.532 - -16.646) (-44.026 - -13.626) (-33.623 - -7.332) 
 
(-48.004 - -21.005) 
US 19.584*** 24.921*** 29.780*** 54.968*** 18.239*** 
 
(10.974 - 28.195) (14.715 - 35.126) (19.422 - 40.137) (40.934 - 69.002) (9.095 - 27.383) 
Belgium*year 0.001 0.001 0.002 
  
 (-0.006 - 0.009) (-0.007 - 0.009) (-0.006 - 0.009) 
  Bulgaria*year 0.013*** 0.013*** 0.006 
  
 (0.009 - 0.017) (0.008 - 0.018) (-0.003 - 0.014) 
  Croatia*year 0.001 0.000 
   
 (-0.004 - 0.005) (-0.005 - 0.005) 
   Cyprus*year -0.005** -0.006* -0.014*** 
  
 (-0.010 - -0.001) (-0.011 - 0.000) (-0.020 - -0.007) 
  Czech Republic*year 0.017*** 0.016*** 0.018*** 
  
 (0.008 - 0.025) (0.008 - 0.025) (0.008 - 0.027) 
  Denmark*year 0.000 -0.000 -0.004 
  
 (-0.005 - 0.005) (-0.006 - 0.006) (-0.010 - 0.002) 
  Estonia*year 0.010 0.008 
   
 (-0.004 - 0.023) (-0.006 - 0.022) 
   Finland*year -0.004 -0.005 -0.002 
  
 (-0.009 - 0.002) (-0.011 - 0.001) (-0.008 - 0.003) 
  France*year 0.007*** 0.006** 0.005** 0.021*** 0.017*** 
 (0.002 - 0.011) (0.001 - 0.011) (0.001 - 0.009) (0.017 - 0.026) (0.012 - 0.021) 
Germany*year -0.003* -0.003 0.002 0.015*** 0.009*** 
 (-0.007 - 0.000) (-0.008 - 0.001) (-0.001 - 0.005) (0.011 - 0.020) (0.004 - 0.013) 
Greece*year 0.015*** 0.013*** 0.007 
  
 (0.010 - 0.021) (0.006 - 0.019) (-0.002 - 0.017) 
  Hungary*year 0.005* 0.004 -0.002 
  
 (-0.001 - 0.011) (-0.003 - 0.011) (-0.009 - 0.004) 
  Iceland*year 0.003 -0.003 -0.005 
  
 (-0.007 - 0.014) (-0.015 - 0.010) (-0.016 - 0.005) 
  Ireland*year 0.018*** 0.017*** 0.004 
  
 (0.010 - 0.027) (0.008 - 0.026) (-0.002 - 0.010) 
  Italy*year 0.007*** 0.007*** 0.005** 0.019*** 0.013*** 
 (0.003 - 0.010) (0.003 - 0.011) (0.001 - 0.009) (0.015 - 0.023) (0.009 - 0.017) 
Latvia*year 0.009** 0.008** 0.003 
  
 (0.002 - 0.016) (0.001 - 0.015) (-0.007 - 0.013) 
  Lithuania*year 0.028*** 0.027*** 0.024*** 
  
 (0.019 - 0.036) (0.019 - 0.036) (0.020 - 0.029) 
  Luxemburg*year -0.006* -0.006 -0.010*** 
  
 (-0.012 - 0.001) (-0.013 - 0.002) (-0.014 - -0.006) 
  Malta*year -0.005* -0.008** -0.004 
  
 (-0.011 - 0.001) (-0.014 - -0.001) (-0.010 - 0.002) 
  Netherlands*year -0.002 -0.003 -0.003 0.011*** 0.007*** 
 (-0.006 - 0.002) (-0.008 - 0.002) (-0.007 - 0.001) (0.005 - 0.017) (0.004 - 0.010) 
Norway*year -0.004 -0.006 -0.002 
  
 (-0.012 - 0.003) (-0.014 - 0.002) (-0.009 - 0.006) 
  Poland*year -0.002 -0.002 0.005 
  
 (-0.007 - 0.003) (-0.007 - 0.004) (-0.001 - 0.012) 
  Portugal*year 0.003 -0.000 -0.006 
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 (-0.010 - 0.015) (-0.013 - 0.013) (-0.017 - 0.005) 
  Romania*year 0.012 0.012* 0.056*** 
  
 (-0.002 - 0.026) (-0.002 - 0.026) (0.054 - 0.058) 
  Slovakia*year 0.009** 0.010*** 0.012*** 
  
 (0.002 - 0.016) (0.002 - 0.017) (0.004 - 0.020) 
  Slovenia*year 0.029*** 0.025*** 0.027*** 
  
 (0.023 - 0.035) (0.020 - 0.031) (0.019 - 0.035) 
  Spain*year 0.013*** 0.011*** 0.004 0.017*** 0.016*** 
 (0.007 - 0.019) (0.005 - 0.017) (-0.001 - 0.009) (0.011 - 0.023) (0.011 - 0.021) 
Sweden*year 0.010*** 0.009** 0.008*** 
  
 (0.004 - 0.017) (0.002 - 0.017) (0.002 - 0.014) 
  Switzerland*year 0.008*** -0.002 0.007*** 
  
 (0.003 - 0.012) (-0.006 - 0.003) (0.004 - 0.010) 
  UK*year 0.016*** 0.015*** 0.010*** 0.027*** 0.026*** 
 (0.008 - 0.023) (0.007 - 0.022) (0.004 - 0.017) (0.020 - 0.034) (0.021 - 0.031) 
US*year -0.010*** -0.012*** -0.015*** 
  
 
(-0.014 - -0.005) (-0.017 - -0.007) (-0.020 - -0.010) 
  
      Constant -5.447** -8.949** -7.153*** -36.714*** -10.309** 
 
(-10.893 - -0.002) (-15.945 - -1.954) (-11.756 - -2.551) (-49.315 - -24.114) (-19.675 - -0.943) 
N 352 343 318 76 76 
R-squared 0.967 0.965 0.965 0.989 0.993 
Source: elaboration of the author based on data from Eurostat, ECB, Bank of England, OECD and Federal Reserve Economic Data (St. Louis FED), US National 
Vital Statistics and US Treasury. EPU index by Beker et al. (2012). 
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Figure A1.3: Youth unemployment rate effect on Age-Specific Fertility Rates. Europe. 
 
Source: elaboration of the author based on data from Eurostat, ECB, Bank of England, OECD and Federal Reserve Economic Data (St. Louis FED), 
US National Vital Statistics and US Treasury. EPU index by Beker et al. (2012). 
Country clusters: Western Europe (Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Ireland, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Switzerland, UK); Central-Eastern Europe 
(Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia); Northern Europe (Denmark, Finland, 
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Figure A1.4: General Fertility Rate (Annual Average) (2003-2013). 
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Table A1.2: Elasticity of monthly fertility rates to macroeconomic indicators of the Great Recession. 31 
European Countries plus the US. OLS with Country and Month fixed effects (2003-2013). 
 Model Model Model Model 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     Unemployment rate -0.085***    
 (-0.092 - -0.077)    10 Years Govt. bond yield  -0.008*   
  (-0.017 - 0.000)   Bond Yields Spread   -0.006***  
   (-0.009 - -0.004)  EPU Index (annual average)    -0.011*** 
    (-0.018 - -0.004)      
Year 0.007*** 0.004*** 0.005*** 0.003*** 
 (0.006 - 0.008) (0.003 - 0.005) (0.004 - 0.007) (0.001 - 0.004) Feb -0.072*** -0.072*** -0.070*** -0.092*** 
 (-0.112 - -0.033) (-0.109 - -0.036) (-0.106 - -0.035) (-0.111 - -0.073) Mar -0.009 -0.008 -0.005 -0.007 
 (-0.045 - 0.028) (-0.043 - 0.026) (-0.039 - 0.029) (-0.045 - 0.030) Apr -0.042** -0.043** -0.040** -0.127*** 
 (-0.082 - -0.002) (-0.080 - -0.005) (-0.078 - -0.003) (-0.165 - -0.089) Ma 0.011 0.010 0.011 0.001 
 (-0.026 - 0.048) (-0.025 - 0.045) (-0.023 - 0.046) (-0.036 - 0.038) Jun 0.013 0.012 0.015 0.062*** 
 (-0.025 - 0.052) (-0.024 - 0.049) (-0.021 - 0.050) (0.022 - 0.103) Jul 0.092*** 0.091*** 0.093*** 0.040** 
 (0.050 - 0.133) (0.050 - 0.131) (0.052 - 0.134) (0.005 - 0.075) Aug 0.064*** 0.063*** 0.066*** 0.021 
 (0.029 - 0.100) (0.029 - 0.098) (0.032 - 0.100) (-0.012 - 0.053) Sept 0.075*** 0.074*** 0.076*** 0.033* 
 (0.036 - 0.114) (0.036 - 0.112) (0.038 - 0.115) (-0.003 - 0.069) Oct 0.034* 0.031* 0.034* 0.033*** 
 (-0.003 - 0.072) (-0.005 - 0.068) (-0.003 - 0.071) (0.014 - 0.053) Nov -0.049** -0.052*** -0.051** -0.008 
 (-0.091 - -0.008) (-0.091 - -0.013) (-0.091 - -0.012) (-0.040 - 0.025) Dec -0.025 -0.028 -0.024 -0.018 
 (-0.062 - 0.012) (-0.065 - 0.009) (-0.062 - 0.015) (-0.058 - 0.023)      
Belgium 0.309*** 0.271*** 0.275***  
 (0.272 - 0.347) (0.235 - 0.307) (0.240 - 0.310)  Bulgaria 0.148*** 0.094*** 0.104***  
 (0.108 - 0.188) (0.045 - 0.143) (0.056 - 0.151)  Croatia 0.204*** 0.141*** 0.151***  
 (0.159 - 0.249) (0.087 - 0.195) (0.097 - 0.205)  Cyprus 0.082*** 0.071*** 0.081***  
 (0.046 - 0.118) (0.033 - 0.110) (0.044 - 0.119)  Czech Republic 0.100*** 0.074*** 0.079***  
 (0.054 - 0.146) (0.023 - 0.126) (0.027 - 0.131)  Denmark 0.232*** 0.224*** 0.224***  
 (0.185 - 0.279) (0.176 - 0.273) (0.175 - 0.273)  Estonia 0.174***    
 (0.124 - 0.223)    Finland 0.311*** 0.271*** 0.271***  
 (0.273 - 0.348) (0.234 - 0.308) (0.234 - 0.307)  France 0.409*** 0.360*** 0.361*** 0.163*** 
 (0.374 - 0.444) (0.327 - 0.393) (0.329 - 0.394) (0.143 - 0.182) Germany -0.034 -0.074***  -0.272*** 
 (-0.095 - 0.028) (-0.128 - -0.019)  (-0.316 - -0.227) Greece 0.137*** 0.067** 0.076***  
 (0.091 - 0.183) (0.013 - 0.121) (0.022 - 0.129)  Hungary 0.068*** 0.030 0.045**  
 (0.029 - 0.107) (-0.012 - 0.071) (0.003 - 0.087)  Iceland 0.385*** 0.400*** 0.415***  
 (0.332 - 0.438) (0.353 - 0.446) (0.364 - 0.466)  Ireland 0.484*** 0.451*** 0.466***  
 (0.401 - 0.567) (0.383 - 0.519) (0.395 - 0.538)  Italy 0.106*** 0.068*** 0.075*** -0.133*** 
 (0.068 - 0.145) (0.028 - 0.107) (0.037 - 0.113) (-0.160 - -0.107) Latvia 0.113*** 0.046 0.048  
 (0.053 - 0.172) (-0.021 - 0.113) (-0.020 - 0.116)  
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Lithuania 0.061* 0.006 0.013  
 (-0.008 - 0.130) (-0.055 - 0.067) (-0.049 - 0.075)  Luxemburg 0.197*** 0.201*** 0.197***  
 (0.153 - 0.241) (0.159 - 0.244) (0.148 - 0.245)  Malta 0.140*** 0.116** 0.126***  
 (0.051 - 0.229) (0.026 - 0.206) (0.036 - 0.216)  Netherlands 0.202*** 0.202*** 0.200***  
 (0.162 - 0.242) (0.164 - 0.239) (0.164 - 0.237)  Norway 0.356*** 0.387*** 0.395***  
 (0.186 - 0.526) (0.217 - 0.558) (0.224 - 0.567)  Poland 0.132*** 0.063*** 0.077***  
 (0.093 - 0.172) (0.018 - 0.109) (0.033 - 0.121)  Portugal 0.056** -0.002 0.003  
 (0.003 - 0.110) (-0.059 - 0.055) (-0.051 - 0.057)  Romania 0.077*** 0.060** 0.074***  
 (0.030 - 0.124) (0.010 - 0.110) (0.023 - 0.124)  Slovakia 0.136*** 0.050* 0.058**  
 (0.080 - 0.191) (-0.007 - 0.107) (0.001 - 0.115)  Slovenia 0.125*** 0.103*** 0.125***  
 (0.058 - 0.192) (0.034 - 0.173) (0.055 - 0.194)  Spain 0.155*** 0.069*** 0.072*** -0.131*** 
 (0.119 - 0.190) (0.029 - 0.109) (0.035 - 0.109) (-0.157 - -0.106) Sweden 0.317*** 0.284*** 0.283***  
 (0.279 - 0.354) (0.248 - 0.320) (0.247 - 0.320)  Switzerland 0.059*** 0.070***   
 (0.023 - 0.095) (0.033 - 0.107)   UK 0.312*** 0.295*** 0.301*** 0.098*** 
 (0.265 - 0.359) (0.252 - 0.337) (0.261 - 0.341) (0.063 - 0.132) US 0.351*** 0.328*** 0.336*** 0.128*** 
 (0.310 - 0.391) (0.281 - 0.375) (0.277 - 0.395) (0.095 - 0.161) BE*Feb -0.019 -0.020 -0.022  
 (-0.065 - 0.026) (-0.062 - 0.023) (-0.063 - 0.019)  BE*Mar 0.010 0.010 0.007  
 (-0.034 - 0.054) (-0.032 - 0.051) (-0.034 - 0.048)  BE*Apr 0.009 0.009 0.006  
 (-0.038 - 0.057) (-0.037 - 0.056) (-0.040 - 0.052)  BE*Ma -0.016 -0.016 -0.018  
 (-0.062 - 0.030) (-0.062 - 0.029) (-0.063 - 0.027)  BE*Jun -0.012 -0.012 -0.014  
 (-0.056 - 0.032) (-0.055 - 0.031) (-0.057 - 0.029)  BE*Jul -0.046* -0.046* -0.049**  
 (-0.093 - 0.001) (-0.094 - 0.001) (-0.096 - -0.001)  BE*Aug -0.024 -0.023 -0.026  
 (-0.066 - 0.018) (-0.064 - 0.018) (-0.066 - 0.015)  BE*Sept -0.057** -0.056** -0.058**  
 (-0.103 - -0.010) (-0.102 - -0.011) (-0.104 - -0.013)  BE*Oct -0.017 -0.018 -0.021  
 (-0.063 - 0.029) (-0.064 - 0.027) (-0.067 - 0.025)  BE*Nov -0.008 -0.010 -0.010  
 (-0.057 - 0.040) (-0.057 - 0.037) (-0.057 - 0.037)  BE*Dec 0.011 0.008 0.006  
 (-0.033 - 0.056) (-0.035 - 0.052) (-0.040 - 0.051)  BU*Feb -0.031 -0.031 -0.036  
 (-0.081 - 0.018) (-0.092 - 0.030) (-0.095 - 0.024)  BU*Mar -0.017 -0.017 -0.021  
 (-0.064 - 0.029) (-0.075 - 0.041) (-0.078 - 0.035)  BU*Apr -0.014 -0.013 -0.014  
 (-0.064 - 0.037) (-0.074 - 0.049) (-0.074 - 0.046)  BU*Ma -0.040* -0.039 -0.039  
 (-0.088 - 0.007) (-0.098 - 0.020) (-0.096 - 0.019)  BU*Jun -0.020 -0.018 -0.018  
 (-0.069 - 0.029) (-0.080 - 0.044) (-0.079 - 0.042)  BU*Jul -0.014 -0.012 -0.013  
 (-0.066 - 0.038) (-0.079 - 0.054) (-0.078 - 0.052)  BU*Aug -0.007 -0.006 -0.007  
 (-0.053 - 0.038) (-0.065 - 0.054) (-0.065 - 0.051)  BU*Sept -0.038 -0.036 -0.036  
 (-0.090 - 0.014) (-0.103 - 0.031) (-0.102 - 0.030)  BU*Oct -0.048* -0.043 -0.043  
 (-0.099 - 0.003) (-0.110 - 0.023) (-0.108 - 0.023)  BU*Nov -0.040 -0.039 -0.037  
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 (-0.098 - 0.018) (-0.109 - 0.032) (-0.107 - 0.032)  BU*Dec -0.026 -0.024 -0.026  
 (-0.080 - 0.028) (-0.092 - 0.045) (-0.094 - 0.043)  CR*Feb -0.031 -0.036 -0.037  
 (-0.085 - 0.023) (-0.101 - 0.030) (-0.102 - 0.027)  CR*Mar -0.047* -0.058* -0.061*  
 (-0.102 - 0.008) (-0.122 - 0.007) (-0.125 - 0.004)  CR*Apr -0.072** -0.082** -0.083**  
 (-0.127 - -0.016) (-0.149 - -0.015) (-0.150 - -0.016)  CR*May -0.078*** -0.083*** -0.083***  
 (-0.132 - -0.025) (-0.145 - -0.021) (-0.145 - -0.022)  CR*Jun -0.087*** -0.097*** -0.098***  
 (-0.139 - -0.034) (-0.161 - -0.033) (-0.162 - -0.033)  CR*Jul -0.048* -0.040 -0.040  
 (-0.103 - 0.007) (-0.106 - 0.026) (-0.107 - 0.026)  CR*Aug -0.057** -0.056* -0.056*  
 (-0.106 - -0.008) (-0.120 - 0.008) (-0.121 - 0.008)  CR*Sept -0.027 -0.030 -0.030  
 (-0.079 - 0.025) (-0.094 - 0.035) (-0.094 - 0.035)  CR*Oct -0.022 -0.016 -0.016  
 (-0.071 - 0.027) (-0.075 - 0.043) (-0.076 - 0.044)  CR*Nov -0.004 0.001 0.002  
 (-0.058 - 0.049) (-0.063 - 0.065) (-0.063 - 0.067)  CR*Dec -0.012 -0.006 -0.009  
 (-0.068 - 0.044) (-0.076 - 0.064) (-0.080 - 0.063)  CY*Feb -0.060** -0.061** -0.063**  
 (-0.110 - -0.010) (-0.118 - -0.004) (-0.120 - -0.007)  CY*Mar -0.018 -0.019 -0.024  
 (-0.066 - 0.030) (-0.075 - 0.038) (-0.084 - 0.035)  CY*Apr -0.085*** -0.086*** -0.094***  
 (-0.138 - -0.033) (-0.142 - -0.031) (-0.150 - -0.038)  CY*May -0.104*** -0.104*** -0.106***  
 (-0.152 - -0.056) (-0.153 - -0.056) (-0.155 - -0.057)  CY*Jun -0.034 -0.036 -0.037  
 (-0.088 - 0.020) (-0.096 - 0.024) (-0.098 - 0.023)  CY*Jul -0.022 -0.017 -0.018  
 (-0.079 - 0.035) (-0.082 - 0.047) (-0.083 - 0.046)  CY*Aug 0.019 0.021 0.021  
 (-0.023 - 0.061) (-0.028 - 0.070) (-0.028 - 0.070)  CY*Sept 0.082*** 0.083** 0.082**  
 (0.028 - 0.136) (0.020 - 0.146) (0.019 - 0.145)  CY*Oct 0.088*** 0.090*** 0.090***  
 (0.036 - 0.139) (0.034 - 0.146) (0.034 - 0.147)  CY*Nov 0.111*** 0.113*** 0.114***  
 (0.057 - 0.166) (0.052 - 0.173) (0.052 - 0.175)  CY*Dec 0.068*** 0.069** 0.067**  
 (0.017 - 0.118) (0.010 - 0.128) (0.007 - 0.127)  CZ*Feb 0.009 0.009 0.005  
 (-0.048 - 0.067) (-0.056 - 0.074) (-0.061 - 0.071)  CZ*Mar 0.040 0.040 0.046  
 (-0.014 - 0.094) (-0.021 - 0.101) (-0.013 - 0.106)  CZ*Apr 0.065** 0.065** 0.063**  
 (0.008 - 0.121) (0.003 - 0.128) (0.001 - 0.126)  CZ*May 0.053* 0.055* 0.050  
 (-0.003 - 0.109) (-0.008 - 0.117) (-0.013 - 0.113)  CZ*Jun 0.061** 0.063* 0.063*  
 (0.005 - 0.118) (-0.000 - 0.126) (-0.000 - 0.126)  CZ*Jul 0.031 0.032 0.033  
 (-0.028 - 0.091) (-0.038 - 0.102) (-0.037 - 0.103)  CZ*Aug 0.021 0.021 0.023  
 (-0.033 - 0.074) (-0.041 - 0.084) (-0.040 - 0.086)  CZ*Sept -0.018 -0.017 -0.019  
 (-0.075 - 0.039) (-0.083 - 0.049) (-0.087 - 0.049)  CZ*Oct -0.027 -0.027 -0.022  
 (-0.086 - 0.033) (-0.096 - 0.041) (-0.090 - 0.046)  CZ*Nov -0.004 -0.004 0.008  
 (-0.070 - 0.063) (-0.078 - 0.070) (-0.063 - 0.078)  CZ*Dec -0.005 -0.005 0.017  
 (-0.068 - 0.057) (-0.077 - 0.067) (-0.058 - 0.092)  DK*Feb 0.010 0.010 0.007  
 (-0.057 - 0.077) (-0.061 - 0.080) (-0.065 - 0.078)  
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DK*Mar 0.031 0.030 0.037  
 (-0.034 - 0.097) (-0.039 - 0.099) (-0.032 - 0.107)  DK*Apr 0.029 0.028 0.031  
 (-0.037 - 0.095) (-0.043 - 0.099) (-0.044 - 0.106)  DK*May 0.026 0.025 0.032  
 (-0.037 - 0.090) (-0.043 - 0.093) (-0.036 - 0.101)  DK*Jun 0.036 0.035 0.041  
 (-0.027 - 0.099) (-0.032 - 0.102) (-0.026 - 0.107)  DK*Jul 0.017 0.017 0.022  
 (-0.045 - 0.079) (-0.050 - 0.083) (-0.046 - 0.091)  DK*Aug 0.036 0.036 0.046  
 (-0.028 - 0.099) (-0.033 - 0.104) (-0.021 - 0.114)  DK*Sept -0.018 -0.019 0.002  
 (-0.084 - 0.048) (-0.092 - 0.053) (-0.066 - 0.071)  DK*Oct 0.015 0.015 0.004  
 (-0.051 - 0.080) (-0.056 - 0.086) (-0.077 - 0.084)  DK*Nov 0.033 0.033 0.033  
 (-0.032 - 0.097) (-0.036 - 0.102) (-0.039 - 0.106)  DK*Dec -0.010 -0.010 -0.013  
 (-0.070 - 0.050) (-0.074 - 0.055) (-0.080 - 0.054)  EST*Feb 0.032    
 (-0.029 - 0.094)    EST*Mar 0.073**    
 (0.000 - 0.145)    EST*Apr 0.072**    
 (0.007 - 0.136)    EST*May 0.067*    
 (-0.000 - 0.134)    EST*Jun 0.083**    
 (0.020 - 0.146)    EST*Jul 0.055    
 (-0.013 - 0.123)    EST*Aug 0.047    
 (-0.018 - 0.111)    EST*Sept 0.008    
 (-0.053 - 0.069)    EST*Oct -0.034    
 (-0.101 - 0.034)    EST*Nov 0.009    
 (-0.066 - 0.083)    EST*Dec 0.011    
 (-0.057 - 0.079)    FI*Feb -0.001 -0.002 0.005  
 (-0.050 - 0.047) (-0.048 - 0.045) (-0.042 - 0.051)  FI*Mar 0.041* 0.041* 0.040*  
 (-0.005 - 0.088) (-0.002 - 0.084) (-0.004 - 0.083)  FI*Apr 0.039 0.039* 0.037  
 (-0.009 - 0.086) (-0.007 - 0.085) (-0.009 - 0.084)  FI*May 0.008 0.008 0.008  
 (-0.035 - 0.051) (-0.034 - 0.050) (-0.035 - 0.051)  FI*Jun -0.001 -0.000 -0.002  
 (-0.046 - 0.043) (-0.043 - 0.042) (-0.046 - 0.041)  FI*Jul -0.029 -0.028 -0.025  
 (-0.075 - 0.018) (-0.074 - 0.019) (-0.072 - 0.023)  FI*Aug -0.006 -0.005 -0.005  
 (-0.048 - 0.036) (-0.046 - 0.036) (-0.048 - 0.038)  FI*Sept -0.049** -0.049** -0.048**  
 (-0.095 - -0.004) (-0.094 - -0.003) (-0.095 - -0.001)  FI*Oct -0.028 -0.032 -0.030  
 (-0.072 - 0.016) (-0.076 - 0.011) (-0.076 - 0.016)  FI*Nov -0.011 -0.011 -0.015  
 (-0.059 - 0.038) (-0.059 - 0.037) (-0.066 - 0.036)  FI*Dec -0.039 -0.038* -0.041  
 (-0.086 - 0.009) (-0.084 - 0.007) (-0.089 - 0.008)  FR*Feb -0.020 -0.020 -0.022  
 (-0.062 - 0.022) (-0.059 - 0.019) (-0.060 - 0.016)  FR*Mar -0.014 -0.014 -0.017 -0.015 
 (-0.053 - 0.026) (-0.051 - 0.023) (-0.054 - 0.020) (-0.058 - 0.027) FR*Apr -0.009 -0.009 -0.012 0.075*** 
 (-0.051 - 0.034) (-0.050 - 0.033) (-0.053 - 0.029) (0.032 - 0.117) FR*May -0.007 -0.006 -0.010 0.001 
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 (-0.048 - 0.035) (-0.046 - 0.033) (-0.050 - 0.031) (-0.043 - 0.044) FR*Jun -0.031 -0.030 -0.032 -0.079*** 
 (-0.071 - 0.010) (-0.069 - 0.008) (-0.071 - 0.006) (-0.123 - -0.035) FR*Jul -0.042* -0.042* -0.044** 0.009 
 (-0.085 - 0.001) (-0.084 - 0.001) (-0.088 - -0.001) (-0.031 - 0.049) FR*Aug -0.030 -0.030 -0.032* 0.011 
 (-0.068 - 0.007) (-0.066 - 0.006) (-0.068 - 0.005) (-0.026 - 0.049) FR*Sept -0.053** -0.053*** -0.055*** -0.014 
 (-0.094 - -0.012) (-0.094 - -0.013) (-0.096 - -0.014) (-0.053 - 0.026) FR*Oct 0.003 0.004 0.000  
 (-0.037 - 0.044) (-0.035 - 0.043) (-0.040 - 0.041)  FR*Nov 0.035 0.035* 0.034 -0.012 
 (-0.008 - 0.078) (-0.006 - 0.076) (-0.007 - 0.076) (-0.049 - 0.025) FR*Dec 0.038* 0.039** 0.036* 0.027 
 (-0.001 - 0.078) (0.000 - 0.077) (-0.005 - 0.077) (-0.017 - 0.071) GER*Feb 0.001 0.002  0.021 
 (-0.066 - 0.069) (-0.057 - 0.061)  (-0.027 - 0.070) GER*Mar 0.007 0.008  0.007 
 (-0.057 - 0.072) (-0.050 - 0.066)  (-0.052 - 0.067) GER*Apr 0.015 0.017  0.101*** 
 (-0.054 - 0.084) (-0.050 - 0.083)  (0.034 - 0.169) GER*May 0.014 0.016  0.025 
 (-0.050 - 0.078) (-0.043 - 0.075)  (-0.036 - 0.086) GER*Jun 0.032 0.035  -0.012 
 (-0.033 - 0.098) (-0.026 - 0.096)  (-0.076 - 0.052) GER*Jul 0.032 0.031  0.082*** 
 (-0.035 - 0.099) (-0.033 - 0.095)  (0.021 - 0.144) GER*Aug 0.044 0.043  0.087*** 
 (-0.020 - 0.107) (-0.017 - 0.102)  (0.028 - 0.146) GER*Sept 0.026 0.025  0.066** 
 (-0.040 - 0.091) (-0.037 - 0.087)  (0.005 - 0.127) GER*Oct 0.007 0.006  0.003 
 (-0.059 - 0.072) (-0.055 - 0.067)  (-0.050 - 0.056) GER*Nov 0.009 0.009  -0.037 
 (-0.058 - 0.076) (-0.054 - 0.071)  (-0.096 - 0.021) GER*Dec 0.005 0.005  -0.006 
 (-0.060 - 0.070) (-0.056 - 0.065)  (-0.069 - 0.057) GR*Feb -0.059** -0.059 -0.061*  
 (-0.118 - -0.000) (-0.132 - 0.014) (-0.133 - 0.011)  GR*Mar -0.057* -0.057 -0.060*  
 (-0.115 - 0.002) (-0.128 - 0.014) (-0.131 - 0.011)  GR*Apr -0.087*** -0.087** -0.090***  
 (-0.141 - -0.033) (-0.154 - -0.021) (-0.155 - -0.024)  GR*May -0.056* -0.057 -0.059  
 (-0.113 - 0.001) (-0.128 - 0.015) (-0.129 - 0.012)  GR*Jun -0.022 -0.023 -0.025  
 (-0.080 - 0.037) (-0.095 - 0.050) (-0.096 - 0.047)  GR*Jul 0.013 0.010 0.008  
 (-0.049 - 0.074) (-0.066 - 0.087) (-0.068 - 0.084)  GR*Aug -0.033 -0.036 -0.038  
 (-0.086 - 0.021) (-0.104 - 0.032) (-0.106 - 0.029)  GR*Sept 0.000 0.001 -0.001  
 (-0.056 - 0.057) (-0.069 - 0.070) (-0.070 - 0.068)  GR*Oct 0.033 0.033 0.032  
 (-0.022 - 0.087) (-0.033 - 0.100) (-0.035 - 0.098)  GR*Nov 0.031 0.032 0.031  
 (-0.025 - 0.088) (-0.036 - 0.099) (-0.036 - 0.099)  GR*Dec -0.038 -0.038 -0.041  
 (-0.094 - 0.018) (-0.107 - 0.031) (-0.111 - 0.029)  HU*Feb -0.035 -0.035 -0.037  
 (-0.087 - 0.017) (-0.091 - 0.020) (-0.093 - 0.018)  HU*Mar -0.037 -0.037 -0.041  
 (-0.090 - 0.015) (-0.094 - 0.019) (-0.098 - 0.017)  HU*Apr -0.053* -0.053 -0.055*  
 (-0.111 - 0.006) (-0.116 - 0.010) (-0.119 - 0.009)  HU*May -0.076*** -0.076*** -0.078***  
 (-0.128 - -0.024) (-0.133 - -0.020) (-0.136 - -0.020)  HU*Jun -0.046* -0.047* -0.049*  
 (-0.097 - 0.004) (-0.102 - 0.008) (-0.105 - 0.007)  HU*Jul -0.023 -0.024 -0.026  
 (-0.077 - 0.031) (-0.083 - 0.035) (-0.086 - 0.035)  
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HU*Aug -0.030 -0.031 -0.032  
 (-0.080 - 0.021) (-0.085 - 0.024) (-0.088 - 0.023)  HU*Sept -0.031 -0.031 -0.033  
 (-0.082 - 0.020) (-0.087 - 0.024) (-0.090 - 0.024)  HU*Oct -0.027 -0.025 -0.026  
 (-0.077 - 0.023) (-0.078 - 0.028) (-0.081 - 0.028)  HU*Nov -0.013 -0.013 -0.013  
 (-0.065 - 0.039) (-0.067 - 0.040) (-0.068 - 0.042)  HU*Dec -0.006 -0.008 -0.012  
 (-0.055 - 0.042) (-0.061 - 0.044) (-0.067 - 0.043)  IC*Feb 0.016 0.016 0.007  
 (-0.050 - 0.082) (-0.043 - 0.075) (-0.056 - 0.070)  IC*Mar -0.011 -0.010 -0.023  
 (-0.080 - 0.058) (-0.074 - 0.053) (-0.089 - 0.044)  IC*Apr 0.026 0.028 0.023  
 (-0.047 - 0.099) (-0.042 - 0.098) (-0.052 - 0.098)  IC*May 0.025 0.027 0.006  
 (-0.045 - 0.095) (-0.041 - 0.095) (-0.069 - 0.080)  IC*Jun 0.015 0.017 0.008  
 (-0.052 - 0.082) (-0.045 - 0.080) (-0.064 - 0.079)  IC*Jul 0.002 0.005 -0.006  
 (-0.066 - 0.070) (-0.061 - 0.071) (-0.079 - 0.067)  IC*Aug 0.028 0.027 0.018  
 (-0.040 - 0.096) (-0.032 - 0.086) (-0.048 - 0.084)  IC*Sept 0.001 0.001 -0.011  
 (-0.075 - 0.078) (-0.073 - 0.074) (-0.088 - 0.066)  IC*Oct 0.016 0.018 0.006  
 (-0.054 - 0.086) (-0.050 - 0.085) (-0.069 - 0.081)  IC*Nov 0.038 0.038 0.041  
 (-0.028 - 0.103) (-0.023 - 0.099) (-0.026 - 0.108)  IC*Dec -0.005 -0.004 0.003  
 (-0.082 - 0.072) (-0.076 - 0.067) (-0.083 - 0.088)  IR*Feb -0.049 -0.050 -0.050  
 (-0.147 - 0.049) (-0.127 - 0.027) (-0.132 - 0.032)  IR*Mar -0.013 -0.015 -0.026  
 (-0.104 - 0.078) (-0.088 - 0.059) (-0.104 - 0.052)  IR*Apr -0.014 -0.015 -0.020  
 (-0.106 - 0.079) (-0.090 - 0.060) (-0.099 - 0.059)  IR*May -0.013 -0.015 -0.029  
 (-0.106 - 0.080) (-0.090 - 0.060) (-0.111 - 0.053)  IR*Jun -0.040 -0.042 -0.057  
 (-0.132 - 0.052) (-0.118 - 0.034) (-0.137 - 0.024)  IR*Jul -0.055 -0.055 -0.063  
 (-0.149 - 0.039) (-0.130 - 0.020) (-0.143 - 0.018)  IR*Aug -0.049 -0.050 -0.065  
 (-0.141 - 0.042) (-0.123 - 0.023) (-0.143 - 0.013)  IR*Sept -0.061 -0.062 -0.080*  
 (-0.155 - 0.033) (-0.141 - 0.017) (-0.163 - 0.004)  IR*Oct -0.029 -0.027 -0.023  
 (-0.127 - 0.068) (-0.105 - 0.050) (-0.103 - 0.058)  IR*Nov 0.001 0.003 0.010  
 (-0.098 - 0.101) (-0.076 - 0.082) (-0.072 - 0.092)  IR*Dec -0.033 -0.032 -0.041  
 (-0.144 - 0.078) (-0.131 - 0.067) (-0.148 - 0.066)  IT*Feb -0.039 -0.040 -0.041* -0.020 
 (-0.086 - 0.008) (-0.089 - 0.010) (-0.089 - 0.007) (-0.056 - 0.016) IT*Mar -0.034 -0.035 -0.037 -0.036 
 (-0.083 - 0.015) (-0.085 - 0.016) (-0.087 - 0.012) (-0.088 - 0.015) IT*Apr -0.085*** -0.085*** -0.086***  
 (-0.137 - -0.032) (-0.140 - -0.029) (-0.140 - -0.032)  IT*Ma -0.028 -0.028 -0.030 -0.020 
 (-0.083 - 0.027) (-0.087 - 0.030) (-0.087 - 0.028) (-0.078 - 0.038) IT*Jun -0.075*** -0.075*** -0.077*** -0.124*** 
 (-0.122 - -0.028) (-0.125 - -0.026) (-0.125 - -0.029) (-0.174 - -0.073) IT*Jul -0.052* -0.051* -0.052*  
 (-0.104 - 0.000) (-0.105 - 0.004) (-0.106 - 0.002)  IT*Aug -0.022 -0.022 -0.023 0.021 
 (-0.069 - 0.024) (-0.068 - 0.025) (-0.069 - 0.023) (-0.023 - 0.066) IT*Sept 0.006 0.006 0.005 0.046* 
 (-0.047 - 0.059) (-0.048 - 0.061) (-0.048 - 0.059) (-0.005 - 0.097) IT*Oct 0.042* 0.042 0.041 0.038* 
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 (-0.007 - 0.090) (-0.011 - 0.095) (-0.012 - 0.093) (-0.004 - 0.080) IT*Nov 0.035 0.035 0.035 -0.012 
 (-0.017 - 0.087) (-0.019 - 0.089) (-0.019 - 0.089) (-0.061 - 0.037) IT*Dec 0.014 0.014 0.011 0.002 
 (-0.037 - 0.064) (-0.038 - 0.066) (-0.042 - 0.064) (-0.053 - 0.056) LV*Feb -0.024 -0.024 -0.015  
 (-0.095 - 0.047) (-0.106 - 0.059) (-0.100 - 0.069)  LV*Mar 0.061* 0.061 0.068*  
 (-0.005 - 0.128) (-0.017 - 0.139) (-0.010 - 0.147)  LV*Apr 0.028 0.028 0.037  
 (-0.046 - 0.102) (-0.057 - 0.114) (-0.050 - 0.123)  LV*Ma 0.028 0.028 0.038  
 (-0.045 - 0.100) (-0.057 - 0.114) (-0.048 - 0.123)  LV*Jun 0.028 0.029 0.038  
 (-0.040 - 0.096) (-0.049 - 0.108) (-0.040 - 0.117)  LV*Jul 0.020 0.022 0.031  
 (-0.056 - 0.097) (-0.065 - 0.108) (-0.057 - 0.118)  LV*Aug 0.000 0.002 0.010  
 (-0.072 - 0.073) (-0.082 - 0.086) (-0.075 - 0.095)  LV*Sept -0.037 -0.035 -0.026  
 (-0.117 - 0.043) (-0.127 - 0.056) (-0.118 - 0.066)  LV*Oct -0.054 -0.038 -0.029  
 (-0.129 - 0.020) (-0.127 - 0.051) (-0.119 - 0.061)  LV*Nov -0.036 -0.037 -0.027  
 (-0.108 - 0.036) (-0.120 - 0.045) (-0.110 - 0.056)  LV*Dec -0.037 -0.038 -0.037  
 (-0.105 - 0.030) (-0.117 - 0.042) (-0.119 - 0.045)  LIT*Feb -0.030 -0.030 -0.030  
 (-0.125 - 0.066) (-0.111 - 0.052) (-0.113 - 0.052)  LIT*Mar 0.002 0.002 -0.001  
 (-0.087 - 0.091) (-0.073 - 0.076) (-0.078 - 0.077)  LIT*Apr 0.030 0.029 0.030  
 (-0.065 - 0.125) (-0.058 - 0.116) (-0.058 - 0.118)  LIT*May 0.019 0.018 0.020  
 (-0.078 - 0.115) (-0.070 - 0.106) (-0.069 - 0.109)  LIT*Jun 0.019 0.019 0.021  
 (-0.077 - 0.115) (-0.065 - 0.102) (-0.064 - 0.105)  LIT*Jul 0.041 0.041 0.042  
 (-0.067 - 0.148) (-0.058 - 0.139) (-0.058 - 0.142)  LIT*Aug 0.016 0.017 0.018  
 (-0.080 - 0.113) (-0.070 - 0.104) (-0.070 - 0.107)  LIT*Sept -0.033 -0.032 -0.031  
 (-0.131 - 0.065) (-0.124 - 0.059) (-0.123 - 0.062)  LIT*Oct -0.062 -0.043 -0.041  
 (-0.153 - 0.030) (-0.132 - 0.046) (-0.132 - 0.050)  LIT*Nov -0.022 -0.013 -0.011  
 (-0.110 - 0.067) (-0.094 - 0.069) (-0.093 - 0.072)  LIT*Dec -0.040 -0.030 -0.032  
 (-0.129 - 0.049) (-0.112 - 0.052) (-0.117 - 0.053)  LUX*Feb -0.035 -0.035 -0.042  
 (-0.099 - 0.030) (-0.098 - 0.027) (-0.123 - 0.040)  LUX*Mar -0.021 -0.022 -0.033  
 (-0.083 - 0.041) (-0.081 - 0.037) (-0.104 - 0.038)  LUX*Apr -0.040 -0.040 -0.054*  
 (-0.105 - 0.026) (-0.103 - 0.023) (-0.117 - 0.009)  LUX*Ma -0.009 -0.010 -0.029  
 (-0.071 - 0.054) (-0.070 - 0.051) (-0.101 - 0.043)  LUX*Jun -0.049 -0.051 -0.061  
 (-0.113 - 0.014) (-0.113 - 0.010) (-0.134 - 0.012)  LUX*Jul -0.006 -0.008 -0.004  
 (-0.065 - 0.053) (-0.066 - 0.051) (-0.075 - 0.066)  LUX*Aug -0.074** -0.077*** -0.079**  
 (-0.131 - -0.018) (-0.134 - -0.021) (-0.141 - -0.017)  LUX*Sept -0.096*** -0.099*** -0.113***  
 (-0.153 - -0.040) (-0.154 - -0.044) (-0.174 - -0.053)  LUX*Oct -0.051* -0.049* -0.057*  
 (-0.108 - 0.007) (-0.105 - 0.007) (-0.126 - 0.011)  LUX*Nov -0.007 -0.006 -0.007  
 (-0.061 - 0.048) (-0.059 - 0.047) (-0.068 - 0.053)  LUX*Dec -0.024 -0.024 -0.024  
 (-0.077 - 0.029) (-0.076 - 0.028) (-0.087 - 0.038)  
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MA*Feb -0.073 -0.073 -0.075  
 (-0.169 - 0.022) (-0.168 - 0.022) (-0.170 - 0.020)  MA*Mar -0.052 -0.051 -0.054  
 (-0.162 - 0.057) (-0.161 - 0.059) (-0.165 - 0.056)  MA*Apr -0.146*** -0.145*** -0.147***  
 (-0.243 - -0.050) (-0.242 - -0.048) (-0.244 - -0.050)  MA*May -0.137*** -0.135*** -0.136***  
 (-0.239 - -0.035) (-0.237 - -0.033) (-0.238 - -0.033)  MA*Jun -0.141*** -0.139*** -0.140***  
 (-0.237 - -0.045) (-0.235 - -0.043) (-0.236 - -0.044)  MA*Jul -0.151*** -0.149*** -0.151***  
 (-0.254 - -0.048) (-0.255 - -0.044) (-0.256 - -0.045)  MA*Aug -0.097** -0.095* -0.096**  
 (-0.190 - -0.003) (-0.190 - 0.001) (-0.191 - -0.001)  MA*Sept -0.061 -0.059 -0.060  
 (-0.156 - 0.033) (-0.154 - 0.037) (-0.155 - 0.036)  MA*Oct 0.002 0.003 0.003  
 (-0.097 - 0.101) (-0.095 - 0.101) (-0.096 - 0.102)  MA*Nov 0.026 0.024 0.025  
 (-0.075 - 0.127) (-0.077 - 0.126) (-0.076 - 0.126)  MA*Dec -0.027 -0.025 -0.027  
 (-0.183 - 0.130) (-0.171 - 0.122) (-0.175 - 0.121)  NETH*Feb -0.005 -0.006 -0.006 0.013 
 (-0.058 - 0.048) (-0.054 - 0.042) (-0.056 - 0.044) (-0.019 - 0.044) NETH*Mar 0.007 0.007 0.002 0.008 
 (-0.043 - 0.057) (-0.038 - 0.051) (-0.043 - 0.048) (-0.037 - 0.052) NETH*Apr 0.012 0.011 0.013 0.093*** 
 (-0.039 - 0.064) (-0.037 - 0.059) (-0.035 - 0.062) (0.047 - 0.139) NETH*May -0.004 -0.005 -0.006 0.006 
 (-0.051 - 0.043) (-0.048 - 0.038) (-0.048 - 0.037) (-0.035 - 0.048) NETH*Jun -0.008 -0.010 -0.010 -0.052** 
 (-0.058 - 0.042) (-0.057 - 0.037) (-0.056 - 0.037) (-0.100 - -0.004) NETH*Jul -0.022 -0.024 -0.024 0.027 
 (-0.073 - 0.029) (-0.073 - 0.026) (-0.074 - 0.025) (-0.015 - 0.069) NETH*Aug 0.004 0.001 0.001 0.046** 
 (-0.041 - 0.048) (-0.041 - 0.043) (-0.041 - 0.042) (0.009 - 0.083) NETH*Sept -0.020 -0.024 -0.025 0.021 
 (-0.068 - 0.028) (-0.070 - 0.022) (-0.071 - 0.022) (-0.020 - 0.062) NETH*Oct 0.005 0.006 0.001 -0.003 
 (-0.046 - 0.056) (-0.042 - 0.053) (-0.047 - 0.048) (-0.033 - 0.026) NETH*Nov 0.028 0.029 0.025 -0.023 
 (-0.025 - 0.081) (-0.020 - 0.078) (-0.024 - 0.075) (-0.063 - 0.018) NETH*Dec 0.002 0.002 -0.001 -0.007 
 (-0.049 - 0.053) (-0.046 - 0.051) (-0.052 - 0.050) (-0.055 - 0.041) NO*Feb -0.078 -0.080 -0.082  
 (-0.253 - 0.097) (-0.253 - 0.094) (-0.256 - 0.093)  NO*Mar -0.048 -0.050 -0.053  
 (-0.223 - 0.126) (-0.223 - 0.123) (-0.228 - 0.121)  NO*Apr 0.075 0.075 0.072  
 (-0.169 - 0.319) (-0.170 - 0.320) (-0.174 - 0.318)  NO*Ma -0.026 -0.026 -0.028  
 (-0.198 - 0.146) (-0.198 - 0.146) (-0.200 - 0.145)  NO*Jun -0.039 -0.039 -0.041  
 (-0.212 - 0.134) (-0.211 - 0.133) (-0.214 - 0.133)  NO*Jul 0.016 0.017 0.016  
 (-0.229 - 0.261) (-0.229 - 0.264) (-0.232 - 0.263)  NO*Aug -0.075 -0.076 -0.078  
 (-0.247 - 0.097) (-0.248 - 0.096) (-0.250 - 0.095)  NO*Sept -0.138 -0.138 -0.139  
 (-0.312 - 0.037) (-0.312 - 0.036) (-0.314 - 0.036)  NO*Oct -0.033 -0.032 -0.033  
 (-0.281 - 0.214) (-0.280 - 0.216) (-0.283 - 0.217)  NO*Nov -0.125 -0.123 -0.124  
 (-0.299 - 0.050) (-0.297 - 0.051) (-0.299 - 0.051)  NO*Dec -0.165* -0.164* -0.168*  
 (-0.339 - 0.009) (-0.338 - 0.009) (-0.343 - 0.007)  POL*Feb -0.051** -0.051* -0.053*  
 (-0.101 - -0.001) (-0.110 - 0.009) (-0.111 - 0.005)  POL*Mar -0.009 -0.009 -0.012  
 (-0.062 - 0.044) (-0.069 - 0.051) (-0.071 - 0.047)  POL*Apr -0.004 -0.002 -0.004  
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 (-0.057 - 0.050) (-0.064 - 0.060) (-0.065 - 0.057)  POL*May -0.029 -0.027 -0.028  
 (-0.079 - 0.020) (-0.085 - 0.031) (-0.086 - 0.029)  POL*Jun -0.029 -0.027 -0.028  
 (-0.078 - 0.019) (-0.084 - 0.031) (-0.084 - 0.028)  POL*Jul -0.026 -0.022 -0.024  
 (-0.075 - 0.023) (-0.083 - 0.039) (-0.084 - 0.036)  POL*Aug -0.050** -0.047 -0.048*  
 (-0.096 - -0.005) (-0.103 - 0.009) (-0.103 - 0.007)  POL*Sept -0.048* -0.043 -0.045  
 (-0.097 - 0.001) (-0.105 - 0.018) (-0.105 - 0.015)  POL*Oct -0.082*** -0.084*** -0.085***  
 (-0.130 - -0.034) (-0.144 - -0.023) (-0.144 - -0.025)  POL*Nov -0.086*** -0.087*** -0.086***  
 (-0.137 - -0.034) (-0.150 - -0.023) (-0.149 - -0.023)  POL*Dec -0.104*** -0.104*** -0.107***  
 (-0.159 - -0.049) (-0.173 - -0.035) (-0.176 - -0.038)  POR*Feb -0.036 -0.037 -0.038  
 (-0.109 - 0.037) (-0.115 - 0.042) (-0.113 - 0.037)  POR*Mar -0.005 -0.006 -0.007  
 (-0.076 - 0.066) (-0.083 - 0.071) (-0.081 - 0.066)  POR*Apr -0.009 -0.010 -0.010  
 (-0.080 - 0.062) (-0.087 - 0.067) (-0.083 - 0.064)  POR*May 0.005 0.004 0.005  
 (-0.058 - 0.069) (-0.065 - 0.074) (-0.061 - 0.071)  POR*Jun -0.041 -0.042 -0.042  
 (-0.112 - 0.030) (-0.119 - 0.034) (-0.115 - 0.031)  POR*Jul -0.050 -0.052 -0.052  
 (-0.121 - 0.021) (-0.129 - 0.025) (-0.126 - 0.023)  POR*Aug -0.019 -0.022 -0.022  
 (-0.088 - 0.050) (-0.098 - 0.055) (-0.094 - 0.051)  POR*Sept 0.019 0.017 0.017  
 (-0.056 - 0.094) (-0.065 - 0.099) (-0.062 - 0.096)  POR*Oct 0.031 0.033 0.029  
 (-0.041 - 0.103) (-0.046 - 0.112) (-0.050 - 0.108)  POR*Nov 0.064* 0.066* 0.066*  
 (-0.006 - 0.135) (-0.011 - 0.143) (-0.008 - 0.140)  POR*Dec 0.036 0.037 0.029  
 (-0.034 - 0.107) (-0.040 - 0.115) (-0.048 - 0.106)  RO*Feb -0.039 -0.043 -0.045  
 (-0.105 - 0.027) (-0.114 - 0.029) (-0.117 - 0.028)  RO*Mar -0.028 -0.037 -0.041  
 (-0.095 - 0.038) (-0.110 - 0.035) (-0.114 - 0.033)  RO*Apr -0.038 -0.051 -0.054  
 (-0.104 - 0.027) (-0.122 - 0.019) (-0.125 - 0.017)  RO*Ma -0.038 -0.045 -0.047  
 (-0.104 - 0.027) (-0.118 - 0.027) (-0.120 - 0.027)  RO*Jun -0.006 -0.009 -0.011  
 (-0.067 - 0.055) (-0.076 - 0.059) (-0.079 - 0.058)  RO*Jul 0.025 0.023 0.021  
 (-0.037 - 0.088) (-0.046 - 0.093) (-0.049 - 0.092)  RO*Aug -0.006 -0.007 -0.009  
 (-0.070 - 0.057) (-0.079 - 0.065) (-0.082 - 0.064)  RO*Sept -0.025 -0.025 -0.027  
 (-0.110 - 0.060) (-0.124 - 0.074) (-0.127 - 0.073)  RO*Oct -0.002 0.006 0.005  
 (-0.058 - 0.054) (-0.056 - 0.069) (-0.059 - 0.069)  RO*Nov 0.010 0.011 0.011  
 (-0.047 - 0.068) (-0.051 - 0.074) (-0.053 - 0.075)  RO*Dec -0.018 -0.013 -0.016  
 (-0.073 - 0.038) (-0.076 - 0.050) (-0.081 - 0.048)  SK*Feb -0.019 -0.019 -0.020  
 (-0.090 - 0.052) (-0.090 - 0.053) (-0.092 - 0.051)  SK*Mar -0.004 -0.004 -0.007  
 (-0.077 - 0.068) (-0.078 - 0.070) (-0.082 - 0.068)  SK*Apr 0.004 0.005 0.003  
 (-0.063 - 0.071) (-0.064 - 0.075) (-0.066 - 0.073)  SK*Ma -0.014 -0.012 -0.014  
 (-0.080 - 0.052) (-0.081 - 0.057) (-0.083 - 0.056)  SK*Jun -0.019 -0.017 -0.018  
 (-0.085 - 0.047) (-0.085 - 0.051) (-0.086 - 0.051)  
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SK*Jul -0.028 -0.026 -0.028  
 (-0.094 - 0.037) (-0.098 - 0.045) (-0.100 - 0.044)  SK*Aug -0.034 -0.032 -0.032  
 (-0.095 - 0.026) (-0.097 - 0.033) (-0.098 - 0.033)  SK*Sept -0.025 -0.022 -0.023  
 (-0.089 - 0.040) (-0.092 - 0.048) (-0.093 - 0.048)  SK*Oct -0.092*** -0.092** -0.092**  
 (-0.155 - -0.028) (-0.162 - -0.022) (-0.162 - -0.021)  SK*Nov -0.088** -0.088** -0.087**  
 (-0.156 - -0.020) (-0.161 - -0.015) (-0.160 - -0.014)  SK*Dec -0.073** -0.072* -0.066  
 (-0.145 - -0.000) (-0.152 - 0.007) (-0.148 - 0.016)  SL*Feb -0.058 -0.058 -0.067  
 (-0.150 - 0.033) (-0.152 - 0.035) (-0.162 - 0.029)  SL*Mar -0.013 -0.014 -0.028  
 (-0.101 - 0.074) (-0.104 - 0.076) (-0.120 - 0.065)  SL*Apr -0.006 -0.006 -0.009  
 (-0.102 - 0.090) (-0.104 - 0.092) (-0.109 - 0.090)  SL*Ma 0.014 0.014 0.000  
 (-0.075 - 0.102) (-0.077 - 0.105) (-0.091 - 0.091)  SL*Jun -0.014 -0.013 -0.026  
 (-0.099 - 0.072) (-0.102 - 0.075) (-0.114 - 0.062)  SL*Jul -0.017 -0.017 -0.030  
 (-0.114 - 0.080) (-0.117 - 0.084) (-0.131 - 0.070)  SL*Aug -0.012 -0.012 -0.026  
 (-0.109 - 0.085) (-0.112 - 0.088) (-0.126 - 0.074)  SL*Sept -0.023 -0.023 -0.037  
 (-0.117 - 0.071) (-0.121 - 0.074) (-0.135 - 0.061)  SL*Oct -0.019 -0.019 -0.032  
 (-0.116 - 0.078) (-0.120 - 0.081) (-0.132 - 0.068)  SL*Nov -0.024 -0.025 -0.037  
 (-0.123 - 0.074) (-0.126 - 0.076) (-0.137 - 0.064)  SL*Dec -0.042 -0.042 -0.057  
 (-0.132 - 0.049) (-0.137 - 0.053) (-0.153 - 0.039)  SP*Feb -0.026 -0.026 -0.028 -0.007 
 (-0.070 - 0.019) (-0.078 - 0.026) (-0.076 - 0.020) (-0.045 - 0.031) SP*Mar 0.003 0.002 -0.001 -0.000 
 (-0.039 - 0.045) (-0.049 - 0.052) (-0.048 - 0.046) (-0.050 - 0.049) SP*Apr 0.004 0.003 0.000 0.087*** 
 (-0.041 - 0.049) (-0.051 - 0.058) (-0.051 - 0.051) (0.036 - 0.138) SP*Ma -0.006 -0.008 -0.014  
 (-0.049 - 0.036) (-0.061 - 0.046) (-0.065 - 0.037)  SP*Jun -0.046** -0.048* -0.050** -0.096*** 
 (-0.089 - -0.003) (-0.101 - 0.006) (-0.100 - -0.001) (-0.150 - -0.043) SP*Jul -0.064*** -0.063** -0.065** -0.014 
 (-0.110 - -0.018) (-0.119 - -0.007) (-0.118 - -0.012) (-0.063 - 0.036) SP*Aug -0.042** -0.041* -0.043*  
 (-0.082 - -0.001) (-0.090 - 0.008) (-0.089 - 0.003)  SP*Sept -0.037* -0.037 -0.038 0.001 
 (-0.081 - 0.007) (-0.091 - 0.017) (-0.090 - 0.013) (-0.049 - 0.052) SP*Oct 0.015 0.017 0.014 0.011 
 (-0.027 - 0.058) (-0.035 - 0.068) (-0.035 - 0.063) (-0.027 - 0.049) SP*Nov 0.048** 0.048* 0.047*  
 (0.002 - 0.094) (-0.004 - 0.101) (-0.003 - 0.098)  SP*Dec 0.030 0.031 0.028 0.019 
 (-0.017 - 0.078) (-0.024 - 0.086) (-0.027 - 0.082) (-0.037 - 0.074) SE*Feb 0.029 0.027 0.028  
 (-0.019 - 0.077) (-0.017 - 0.072) (-0.019 - 0.075)  SE*Mar 0.080*** 0.078*** 0.077***  
 (0.035 - 0.124) (0.037 - 0.118) (0.034 - 0.120)  SE*Apr 0.110*** 0.109*** 0.103***  
 (0.065 - 0.154) (0.066 - 0.151) (0.057 - 0.149)  SE*Ma 0.074*** 0.073*** 0.072***  
 (0.032 - 0.117) (0.034 - 0.113) (0.030 - 0.115)  SE*Jun 0.046** 0.046** 0.049**  
 (0.002 - 0.090) (0.004 - 0.088) (0.003 - 0.095)  SE*Jul 0.014 0.014 0.012  
 (-0.032 - 0.060) (-0.032 - 0.059) (-0.036 - 0.059)  SE*Aug 0.012 0.010 0.006  
 (-0.030 - 0.053) (-0.030 - 0.049) (-0.035 - 0.046)  SE*Sept -0.060*** -0.061*** -0.064***  
	  
	   312	  
 (-0.104 - -0.015) (-0.104 - -0.018) (-0.109 - -0.019)  SE*Oct -0.045** -0.045** -0.050**  
 (-0.089 - -0.000) (-0.087 - -0.002) (-0.094 - -0.005)  SE*Nov -0.067*** -0.067*** -0.071***  
 (-0.114 - -0.020) (-0.112 - -0.023) (-0.118 - -0.025)  SE*Dec -0.103*** -0.103*** -0.105***  
 (-0.146 - -0.059) (-0.145 - -0.061) (-0.149 - -0.060)  SW*Feb -0.013 -0.010   
 (-0.058 - 0.031) (-0.054 - 0.035)   SW*Mar -0.006 -0.001   
 (-0.047 - 0.035) (-0.042 - 0.041)   SW*Apr 0.017 0.019   
 (-0.026 - 0.061) (-0.026 - 0.064)   SW*Ma 0.015 0.016   
 (-0.026 - 0.057) (-0.026 - 0.057)   SW*Jun 0.004 0.005   
 (-0.038 - 0.047) (-0.038 - 0.047)   SW*Jul -0.016 -0.013   
 (-0.064 - 0.031) (-0.063 - 0.036)   SW*Aug -0.013 -0.012   
 (-0.054 - 0.028) (-0.054 - 0.030)   SW*Sept -0.017 -0.019   
 (-0.061 - 0.028) (-0.064 - 0.027)   SW*Oct -0.008 -0.014   
 (-0.054 - 0.038) (-0.061 - 0.033)   SW*Nov 0.019 0.013   
 (-0.028 - 0.066) (-0.033 - 0.059)   SW*Dec 0.017 0.014   
 (-0.025 - 0.059) (-0.029 - 0.057)   UK*Feb -0.020 -0.021 -0.023 -0.001 
 
(-0.078 - 0.037) (-0.071 - 0.029) (-0.070 - 0.025) (-0.046 - 0.043) 
UK*Mar 0.002 0.001 -0.002  
 
(-0.052 - 0.055) (-0.046 - 0.048) (-0.046 - 0.043)  UK*Apr 0.003 0.003 0.001 0.086*** 
 
(-0.052 - 0.059) (-0.047 - 0.053) (-0.047 - 0.049) (0.033 - 0.139) 
UK*May -0.003 -0.004 -0.005 0.005 
 
(-0.059 - 0.052) (-0.053 - 0.046) (-0.052 - 0.042) (-0.049 - 0.060) 
UK*Jun -0.018 -0.019 -0.020 -0.067** 
 
(-0.073 - 0.036) (-0.067 - 0.029) (-0.067 - 0.027) (-0.122 - -0.013) 
UK*Jul -0.049* -0.050* -0.051** 0.001 
 
(-0.106 - 0.008) (-0.102 - 0.001) (-0.101 - -0.001) (-0.051 - 0.052) 
UK*Aug -0.030 -0.031 -0.032 0.012 
 
(-0.082 - 0.022) (-0.077 - 0.015) (-0.077 - 0.012) (-0.037 - 0.061) 
UK*Sept -0.039 -0.040 -0.042*  
 
(-0.093 - 0.015) (-0.089 - 0.009) (-0.089 - 0.006)  UK*Oct 0.004 0.004 0.003 0.000 
 
(-0.052 - 0.060) (-0.045 - 0.054) (-0.045 - 0.052) (-0.045 - 0.045) 
UK*Nov 0.034 0.034 0.036 -0.013 
 
(-0.026 - 0.094) (-0.019 - 0.087) (-0.016 - 0.087) (-0.066 - 0.040) 
UK*Dec 0.012 0.012 0.007  
 
(-0.044 - 0.068) (-0.038 - 0.063) (-0.043 - 0.058)  US*Feb 0.097*** 0.097*** 0.093** 0.117*** 
 
(0.046 - 0.149) (0.035 - 0.159) (0.012 - 0.174) (0.070 - 0.163) 
US*Mar 0.036 0.035 0.023 0.034 
 
(-0.016 - 0.088) (-0.026 - 0.096) (-0.055 - 0.101) (-0.023 - 0.091) 
US*May 0.055** 0.053* 0.040 0.138*** 
 
(0.002 - 0.107) (-0.008 - 0.115) (-0.036 - 0.117) (0.083 - 0.194) 
US*Jun 0.016 0.015 0.009 0.025 
 
(-0.033 - 0.064) (-0.044 - 0.074) (-0.064 - 0.081) (-0.030 - 0.079) 
US*Jul 0.048* 0.047 0.039  
 
(-0.004 - 0.099) (-0.014 - 0.107) (-0.034 - 0.113)  US*Aug -0.017 -0.018 -0.028 0.034 
 
(-0.069 - 0.035) (-0.081 - 0.045) (-0.103 - 0.048) (-0.019 - 0.088) 
US*Sept 0.027 0.025 0.022 0.069*** 
 
(-0.021 - 0.074) (-0.032 - 0.082) (-0.051 - 0.096) (0.019 - 0.120) 
US*Oct 0.023 0.022 0.004 0.064** 
 
(-0.029 - 0.076) (-0.040 - 0.083) (-0.076 - 0.084) (0.010 - 0.118) 
US*Nov 0.015 0.015 0.001 0.014 
 
(-0.033 - 0.064) (-0.043 - 0.072) (-0.076 - 0.078) (-0.028 - 0.057) 
US*Dec 0.079*** 0.079*** 0.079* 0.034 
UK*Feb (0.027 - 0.132) (0.020 - 0.139) (-0.001 - 0.159) (-0.016 - 0.084) 
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0.057** 0.057* 0.038 0.046* 
 (0.008 - 0.105) (-0.001 - 0.114) (-0.038 - 0.113) (-0.009 - 0.102) 
     Constant -10.400*** -4.594*** -7.221*** -1.168 
 (-12.039 - -8.761) (-6.286 - -2.902) (-9.612 - -4.831) (-3.504 - 1.168) 
     N 4,181 4,004 3,503 898 
R-squared 0.857 0.841 0.830 0.945 
Source: elaboration of the author based on data from Eurostat, ECB, Bank of England, OECD and Federal Reserve Economic Data (St. Louis FED), US National 
Vital Statistics and US Treasury. EPU index by Beker et al. (2012). 
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Table A1.3: Elasticity of monthly fertility rates to macroeconomic indicators. EPU sample. 
 
Model Model Model 
 
(1) (2) (3) 
Unemployment rate -0.085*** -0.069*** -0.062*** 
 
(-0.096 - -0.074) (-0.083 - -0.054) (-0.076 - -0.048) 
EPU index 0.005 0.005 0.006* 
 
(-0.002 - 0.012) (-0.003 - 0.013) (-0.001 - 0.014) 





(-0.024 - -0.001) 
 Spread in Bond Yields 
  
-0.011*** 
   
(-0.014 - -0.009) 
Year 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.008*** 
 
(0.003 - 0.005) (0.003 - 0.006) (0.006 - 0.009) 
Feb -0.092*** -0.098*** -0.097*** 
 (-0.108 - -0.076) (-0.119 - -0.077) (-0.119 - -0.076) 
Mar -0.007 -0.005 -0.003 
 (-0.051 - 0.037) (-0.027 - 0.016) (-0.033 - 0.028) 
Apr 0.012 -0.029** -0.022 
 (-0.017 - 0.042) (-0.057 - -0.001) (-0.051 - 0.008) 
Ma 0.005 0.007 0.003 
 (-0.015 - 0.025) (-0.036 - 0.049) (-0.020 - 0.026) 
Jun -0.017** 0.001 -0.018** 
 (-0.032 - -0.002) (-0.028 - 0.030) (-0.032 - -0.004) 
Jul 0.041* 0.048*** 0.028** 
 (-0.004 - 0.085) (0.035 - 0.060) (0.006 - 0.049) 
Aug 0.032 0.033*** 0.034** 
 (-0.011 - 0.075) (0.020 - 0.046) (0.003 - 0.065) 
Sept 0.037*** 0.037*** 0.036** 
 (0.018 - 0.056) (0.016 - 0.057) (0.005 - 0.067) 
Oct 0.048*** 0.029** 0.025* 
 (0.027 - 0.069) (0.001 - 0.057) (-0.002 - 0.052) 
Nov -0.018 -0.029* -0.032** 
 (-0.067 - 0.031) (-0.059 - 0.000) (-0.061 - -0.003) 
Dec -0.014 -0.016 -0.027 
 
(-0.048 - 0.019) (-0.060 - 0.028) (-0.060 - 0.006) 
FR 0.205*** 0.196*** 0.197*** 
 




(-0.290 - -0.184) 
  IT -0.097*** -0.102*** -0.089*** 
 
(-0.123 - -0.071) (-0.130 - -0.074) (-0.117 - -0.061) 
SP -0.048*** -0.062*** -0.061*** 
 
(-0.071 - -0.026) (-0.089 - -0.036) (-0.088 - -0.034) 
UK 0.107*** 0.105*** 0.117*** 
 




(0.119 - 0.172) 




(-0.020 - 0.031) (-0.020 - 0.030) 
FR*Mar -0.015 -0.017 -0.019 
 
(-0.063 - 0.032) (-0.043 - 0.010) (-0.053 - 0.015) 
FR*Apr -0.063*** -0.021 -0.031* 
 
(-0.096 - -0.029) (-0.053 - 0.010) (-0.064 - 0.003) 
FR*May -0.000 -0.003 -0.001 
 





(-0.040 - 0.054) 
 





(-0.045 - 0.046) 
 
(-0.033 - 0.034) 
FR*Sept -0.016 -0.017 -0.014 
 
(-0.040 - 0.008) (-0.041 - 0.007) (-0.048 - 0.020) 
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FR*Oct -0.013 0.006 0.009 
 
(-0.041 - 0.015) (-0.027 - 0.038) (-0.023 - 0.040) 
FR*Nov 0.001 0.012 0.016 
 
(-0.051 - 0.053) (-0.020 - 0.045) (-0.016 - 0.048) 
FR*Dec 0.025 0.026 0.041** 
 






(-0.050 - 0.012) 
 GER*Feb 0.021 
  
 
(-0.032 - 0.074) 
  GER*Mar 0.005 
  
 
(-0.061 - 0.072) 
  GER*Apr -0.040 
  
 
(-0.101 - 0.022) 
  GER*Ma 0.019 
  
 
(-0.034 - 0.073) 
  GER*Jun 0.062** 
  
 
(0.010 - 0.115) 
  GER*Jul 0.081** 
  
 
(0.014 - 0.147) 
  GER*Aug 0.074** 
  
 
(0.008 - 0.139) 
  GER*Sept 0.062** 
  
 
(0.008 - 0.115) 
  GER*Oct -0.010 
  
 
(-0.065 - 0.045) 
  GER*Nov -0.025 
  
 
(-0.096 - 0.045) 
  GER*Dec -0.009 
  
 
(-0.070 - 0.051) 
  IT*Feb -0.019 -0.014 -0.013 
 
(-0.049 - 0.011) (-0.047 - 0.020) (-0.046 - 0.020) 
IT*Mar -0.036 -0.037* -0.038* 
 
(-0.089 - 0.018) (-0.075 - 0.001) (-0.082 - 0.005) 
IT*Apr -0.139*** -0.098*** -0.104*** 
 
(-0.184 - -0.094) (-0.142 - -0.053) (-0.149 - -0.059) 
IT*Ma -0.023 -0.025 -0.020 
 
(-0.067 - 0.022) (-0.083 - 0.034) (-0.066 - 0.026) 
IT*Jun -0.045*** -0.063*** -0.043*** 
 
(-0.073 - -0.016) (-0.102 - -0.025) (-0.072 - -0.014) 
IT*Jul -0.003 -0.009 0.013 
 
(-0.057 - 0.052) (-0.044 - 0.025) (-0.025 - 0.051) 
IT*Aug 0.008 0.008 0.009 
 
(-0.044 - 0.060) (-0.024 - 0.040) (-0.033 - 0.051) 
IT*Sept 0.042** 0.042** 0.046** 
 
(0.004 - 0.081) (0.003 - 0.082) (0.001 - 0.091) 
IT*Oct 0.026 0.044** 0.051** 
 
(-0.012 - 0.064) (0.001 - 0.087) (0.009 - 0.093) 
IT*Nov 0.001 0.012 0.017 
 





(-0.054 - 0.057) (-0.031 - 0.063) 
NETH*Feb 0.015 0.020 0.023 
 
(-0.018 - 0.048) (-0.017 - 0.058) (-0.019 - 0.064) 
NETH*Mar 0.005 0.003 
 
 
(-0.047 - 0.056) (-0.033 - 0.039) 
 NETH*Apr -0.041** 
  
 
(-0.080 - -0.002) 
  NETH*Ma 0.000 -0.002 0.004 
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(-0.011 - 0.050) 
 
(-0.011 - 0.054) 
NETH*Jul 0.029 0.021 0.045** 
 
(-0.021 - 0.080) (-0.008 - 0.050) (0.010 - 0.079) 
NETH*Aug 0.035 0.033** 0.035* 
 
(-0.012 - 0.083) (0.007 - 0.059) (-0.003 - 0.074) 
NETH*Sept 0.016 0.015 0.018 
 




(-0.052 - 0.016) 
  NETH*Nov -0.011 
  
 
(-0.068 - 0.046) 
  NETH*Dec -0.013 -0.012 
 
 
(-0.057 - 0.031) (-0.065 - 0.042) 
 SP*Feb -0.006 
  
 
(-0.031 - 0.020) 




(-0.048 - 0.050) 
 
(-0.039 - 0.036) 
SP*Apr -0.050*** -0.008 -0.017 
 






(-0.050 - 0.046) 
 SP*Jun -0.016 -0.035** -0.017 
 
(-0.039 - 0.007) (-0.069 - -0.000) (-0.040 - 0.007) 
SP*Jul -0.014 -0.021 
 
 
(-0.063 - 0.035) (-0.046 - 0.004) 
 SP*Aug -0.011 -0.012 -0.011 
 




   





(-0.017 - 0.054) (-0.012 - 0.058) 
SP*Nov 0.014 0.025 0.029 
 
(-0.040 - 0.068) (-0.011 - 0.062) (-0.008 - 0.066) 
SP*Dec 0.017 0.018 0.032 
 
(-0.028 - 0.062) (-0.035 - 0.071) (-0.013 - 0.078) 
UK*Feb -0.000 0.005 0.005 
 





(-0.047 - 0.044) (-0.047 - 0.041) 
UK*Apr -0.051* -0.010 -0.015 
 





(-0.048 - 0.054) 
 
(-0.036 - 0.046) 
UK*Jun 0.012 -0.007 0.013 
 











(-0.042 - 0.039) 
 UK*Sept -0.003 -0.003 
 
 
(-0.049 - 0.044) (-0.047 - 0.040) 
 UK*Oct -0.012 0.006 0.013 
 










(-0.060 - 0.057) 
 




(0.085 - 0.150) 
  US*Mar 0.034 
  
 
(-0.020 - 0.089) 
  
	  




(-0.012 - 0.055) 
  US*Jun 0.077*** 
  
 
(0.044 - 0.110) 
  US*Jul 0.033 
  
 
(-0.018 - 0.085) 
  US*Aug 0.059** 
  
 
(0.008 - 0.109) 
  US*Sept 0.061*** 
  
 
(0.026 - 0.096) 
  US*Oct -0.000 
  
 
(-0.034 - 0.033) 
  US*Nov 0.046 
  
 
(-0.010 - 0.103) 
  US*Dec 0.044** 
  
 
(0.002 - 0.087) 
  Constant -4.163*** -4.253*** -11.032*** 
 
(-6.345 - -1.980) (-7.051 - -1.454) (-14.210 - -7.855) 
N 898 646 636 
R-squared 0.959 0.938 0.944 
Source: elaboration of the author based on data from Eurostat, ECB, Bank of England, OECD and Federal Reserve Economic Data (St. Louis FED), US National 
Vital Statistics and US Treasury. EPU index by Beker et al. (2012). 
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Table A1.4: Elasticity of monthly fertility rates to macroeconomic indicators. Southern European 
countries. 
 Model Model Model Model 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Unemployment rate -0.110*** -0.125*** -0.069*** -0.082*** 
 (-0.127 - -0.092) (-0.144 - -0.106) (-0.116 - -0.021) (-0.127 - -0.036) 
10y Govt. Bond Yields -0.026***  -0.038***  
 (-0.038 - -0.014)  (-0.056 - -0.019)  
Spread in Bond Yields  0.001  -0.020*** 
  (-0.004 - 0.006)  (-0.031 - -0.009) 
Year 0.004*** 0.004*** -0.013*** -0.007 
 (0.002 - 0.006) (0.001 - 0.006) (-0.021 - -0.004) (-0.016 - 0.002) 
Feb -0.146*** -0.131*** -0.220** -0.095*** 
 (-0.234 - -0.057) (-0.167 - -0.096) (-0.398 - -0.042) (-0.127 - -0.062) 
Mar -0.064*** -0.062 -0.002 -0.141 
 (-0.109 - -0.020) (-0.166 - 0.042) (-0.034 - 0.030) (-0.324 - 0.042) 
Apr -0.049** -0.128*** -0.041*** -0.048** 
 (-0.091 - -0.008) (-0.171 - -0.085) (-0.065 - -0.017) (-0.094 - -0.001) 
Ma 0.005 -0.045** 0.033 -0.197** 
 (-0.015 - 0.025) (-0.082 - -0.008) (-0.012 - 0.079) (-0.377 - -0.016) 
Jun -0.032*** -0.128*** -0.021 -0.020 
 (-0.051 - -0.014) (-0.217 - -0.039) (-0.073 - 0.032) (-0.075 - 0.035) 
Jul 0.038** 0.025** 0.030 0.030 
 (0.007 - 0.069) (0.001 - 0.049) (-0.030 - 0.090) (-0.028 - 0.087) 
Aug 0.041*** 0.040** 0.023 0.027 
 (0.011 - 0.070) (0.009 - 0.070) (-0.008 - 0.054) (-0.009 - 0.064) 
Sept 0.079*** 0.036*** 0.061*** 0.059*** 
 (0.047 - 0.111) (0.012 - 0.059) (0.016 - 0.106) (0.023 - 0.095) 
Oct 0.061*** 0.046*** 0.090*** 0.051** 
 (0.015 - 0.106) (0.020 - 0.072) (0.024 - 0.157) (0.009 - 0.094) 
Nov -0.026 -0.022 0.035 -0.030 
 (-0.121 - 0.068) (-0.058 - 0.014) (-0.042 - 0.111) (-0.073 - 0.014) 
Dec -0.054 -0.015 -0.010 0.008 
 (-0.207 - 0.098) (-0.049 - 0.020) (-0.070 - 0.050) (-0.068 - 0.085) 
Cyprus -0.090***  -0.049 -0.061** 
 (-0.118 - -0.063)  (-0.107 - 0.009) (-0.119 - -0.003) 
Greece -0.011 0.084*** 0.017 0.010 
 (-0.045 - 0.023) (0.047 - 0.121) (-0.028 - 0.062) (-0.036 - 0.055) 
Italy -0.061*** 0.038*** -0.046 -0.056* 
 (-0.085 - -0.038) (0.010 - 0.066) (-0.105 - 0.013) (-0.117 - 0.004) 
Malta -0.032 0.065 0.066 0.053 
 (-0.115 - 0.052) (-0.022 - 0.152) (-0.112 - 0.244) (-0.125 - 0.231) 
Portugal -0.101*** -0.002 -0.125*** -0.132*** 
 (-0.133 - -0.069) (-0.041 - 0.037) (-0.174 - -0.077) (-0.180 - -0.084) 
Spain  0.109***   
  (0.077 - 0.141)   
CY*Feb 0.013 -0.001 0.074 -0.050* 
 (-0.081 - 0.108) (-0.049 - 0.047) (-0.109 - 0.257) (-0.107 - 0.006) 
CY*Mar 0.038 0.040 -0.021 0.120 
 (-0.017 - 0.093) (-0.070 - 0.149) (-0.081 - 0.039) (-0.070 - 0.310) 
CY*Apr -0.077***  -0.106** -0.096** 
 (-0.134 - -0.021)  (-0.187 - -0.024) (-0.188 - -0.004) 
CY*May -0.098*** -0.048* -0.120*** 0.114 
 (-0.142 - -0.053) (-0.103 - 0.007) (-0.202 - -0.038) (-0.079 - 0.307) 
CY*Jun 0.013 0.108** -0.021 -0.016 
 (-0.028 - 0.054) (0.011 - 0.206) (-0.087 - 0.045) (-0.085 - 0.052) 
CY*Jul 0.029 0.041*  0.005 
 (-0.021 - 0.079) (-0.006 - 0.087)  (-0.078 - 0.089) 
CY*Aug 0.040** 0.040** 0.038 0.039 
 (0.002 - 0.079) (0.001 - 0.080) (-0.012 - 0.088) (-0.016 - 0.094) 
CY*Sept 0.076*** 0.119*** 0.053 0.059 
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 (0.028 - 0.125) (0.075 - 0.163) (-0.030 - 0.136) (-0.022 - 0.139) 
CY*Oct 0.057* 0.071***  0.044 
 (-0.001 - 0.116) (0.025 - 0.118)  (-0.036 - 0.124) 
CY*Nov 0.084 0.079***  0.069 
 (-0.017 - 0.186) (0.028 - 0.130)  (-0.020 - 0.158) 
CY*Dec 0.094 0.054** 0.044 0.031 
 (-0.063 - 0.250) (0.002 - 0.105) (-0.035 - 0.123) (-0.060 - 0.122) 
GR*Feb 0.015  0.076 -0.050* 
 (-0.082 - 0.111)  (-0.108 - 0.259) (-0.105 - 0.005) 
GR*Mar  -0.004 -0.053* 0.085 
  (-0.116 - 0.108) (-0.108 - 0.002) (-0.104 - 0.274) 
GR*Apr -0.078*** -0.000 -0.097*** -0.091*** 
 (-0.135 - -0.022) (-0.055 - 0.055) (-0.150 - -0.044) (-0.156 - -0.027) 
GR*May -0.050**  -0.098*** 0.131 
 (-0.093 - -0.006)  (-0.163 - -0.033) (-0.055 - 0.318) 
GR*Jun 0.025 0.121** -0.010 -0.011 
 (-0.015 - 0.065) (0.025 - 0.216) (-0.075 - 0.054) (-0.077 - 0.056) 
GR*Jul 0.067*** 0.081*** 0.052 0.054 
 (0.016 - 0.118) (0.036 - 0.126) (-0.018 - 0.121) (-0.015 - 0.122) 
GR*Aug -0.008 -0.006 -0.008 -0.010 
 (-0.057 - 0.041) (-0.053 - 0.040) (-0.061 - 0.044) (-0.065 - 0.045) 
GR*Sept -0.006 0.037* -0.004  
 (-0.057 - 0.045) (-0.006 - 0.081) (-0.061 - 0.053)  
GR*Oct 0.002 0.017 -0.042  
 (-0.059 - 0.062) (-0.028 - 0.063) (-0.120 - 0.036)  
GR*Nov 0.004  -0.067  
 (-0.098 - 0.106)  (-0.154 - 0.019)  
GR*Dec -0.013 -0.051* -0.065* -0.078* 
 (-0.171 - 0.145) (-0.103 - 0.001) (-0.136 - 0.007) (-0.165 - 0.008) 
IT*Feb 0.034 0.020 0.115 -0.009 
 (-0.057 - 0.126) (-0.022 - 0.062) (-0.068 - 0.299) (-0.064 - 0.046) 
IT*Mar 0.022 0.019 -0.041 0.100 
 (-0.031 - 0.075) (-0.089 - 0.127) (-0.095 - 0.012) (-0.089 - 0.289) 
IT*Apr -0.076*** 0.002 -0.084*** -0.076** 
 (-0.129 - -0.024) (-0.052 - 0.055) (-0.137 - -0.031) (-0.142 - -0.009) 
IT*Ma -0.022 0.027 -0.062* 0.171* 
 (-0.064 - 0.019) (-0.024 - 0.079) (-0.136 - 0.011) (-0.020 - 0.361) 
IT*Jun -0.028** 0.067 -0.055 -0.052 
 (-0.057 - -0.000) (-0.024 - 0.159) (-0.122 - 0.011) (-0.122 - 0.018) 
IT*Jul  0.012 -0.005  
  (-0.026 - 0.051) (-0.086 - 0.076)  
IT*Aug   0.030 0.031 
   (-0.025 - 0.086) (-0.030 - 0.091) 
IT*Sept  0.043**  0.006 
  (0.002 - 0.083)  (-0.053 - 0.064) 
IT*Oct 0.012 0.027 -0.020 0.023 
 (-0.042 - 0.067) (-0.013 - 0.067) (-0.111 - 0.072) (-0.056 - 0.102) 
IT*Nov 0.009 0.004 -0.030 0.038 
 (-0.092 - 0.109) (-0.045 - 0.053) (-0.118 - 0.057) (-0.024 - 0.099) 
IT*Dec 0.040   -0.014 
 (-0.116 - 0.196)   (-0.111 - 0.083) 
MA*Feb  -0.015  -0.124 
  (-0.110 - 0.081)  (-0.301 - 0.052) 
MA*Mar 0.003  -0.140  
 (-0.110 - 0.117)  (-0.329 - 0.048)  
MA*Apr -0.139*** -0.061 -0.245*** -0.237*** 
 (-0.238 - -0.041) (-0.160 - 0.038) (-0.421 - -0.068) (-0.414 - -0.059) 
MA*May -0.132*** -0.082 -0.233**  
 (-0.231 - -0.033) (-0.185 - 0.021) (-0.423 - -0.043)  
MA*Jun -0.096**  -0.212** -0.210** 
 (-0.188 - -0.005)  (-0.400 - -0.025) (-0.394 - -0.025) 
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MA*Jul -0.099* -0.085* -0.121 -0.117 
 (-0.201 - 0.004) (-0.186 - 0.016) (-0.310 - 0.068) (-0.303 - 0.068) 
MA*Aug -0.074 -0.073 -0.102 -0.102 
 (-0.169 - 0.020) (-0.168 - 0.022) (-0.282 - 0.078) (-0.280 - 0.076) 
MA*Sept -0.067 -0.023 -0.100 -0.096 
 (-0.161 - 0.028) (-0.115 - 0.069) (-0.279 - 0.079) (-0.269 - 0.077) 
MA*Oct -0.027 -0.013 -0.141 -0.098 
 (-0.131 - 0.076) (-0.109 - 0.083) (-0.346 - 0.064) (-0.293 - 0.098) 
MA*Nov  -0.005 -0.126 -0.059 
  (-0.107 - 0.096) (-0.317 - 0.064) (-0.235 - 0.118) 
MA*Dec  -0.040 -0.236 -0.251 
  (-0.196 - 0.115) (-0.599 - 0.127) (-0.613 - 0.112) 
PO*Feb 0.037 0.023 0.113 -0.013 
 (-0.062 - 0.137) (-0.036 - 0.082) (-0.073 - 0.299) (-0.077 - 0.051) 
PO*Mar 0.052 0.049 -0.008 0.131 
 (-0.010 - 0.113) (-0.065 - 0.162) (-0.068 - 0.053) (-0.059 - 0.322) 
PO*Apr  0.078** -0.006  
  (0.017 - 0.139) (-0.059 - 0.047)  
PO*May 0.012 0.061**  0.230** 
 (-0.029 - 0.052) (0.009 - 0.114)  (0.044 - 0.416) 
PO*Jun 0.006 0.101**   
 (-0.041 - 0.053) (0.001 - 0.202)   
PO*Jul 0.004 0.018 0.016 0.017 
 (-0.047 - 0.055) (-0.031 - 0.067) (-0.060 - 0.092) (-0.059 - 0.092) 
PO*Aug 0.005 0.007 0.021 0.017 
 (-0.047 - 0.057) (-0.047 - 0.060) (-0.040 - 0.082) (-0.047 - 0.082) 
PO*Sept 0.016 0.060** 0.026 0.028 
 (-0.040 - 0.072) (0.006 - 0.114) (-0.050 - 0.102) (-0.041 - 0.098) 
PO*Oct  0.013 -0.045 -0.003 
  (-0.043 - 0.069) (-0.145 - 0.056) (-0.088 - 0.081) 
PO*Nov 0.037 0.033 -0.023 0.044 
 (-0.067 - 0.141) (-0.024 - 0.089) (-0.132 - 0.085) (-0.043 - 0.132) 
PO*Dec 0.062 0.017 0.015  
 (-0.097 - 0.220) (-0.041 - 0.075) (-0.082 - 0.112)  
SP*Feb 0.048 0.034 0.124  
 (-0.043 - 0.140) (-0.010 - 0.077) (-0.056 - 0.305)  
SP*Mar 0.059** 0.056  0.141 
 (0.009 - 0.109) (-0.051 - 0.163)  (-0.046 - 0.327) 
SP*Apr 0.013 0.091***  0.008 
 (-0.034 - 0.060) (0.042 - 0.140)  (-0.046 - 0.062) 
SP*May  0.050** -0.040 0.192** 
  (0.007 - 0.094) (-0.094 - 0.015) (0.009 - 0.376) 
SP*Jun  0.096** -0.023 -0.020 
  (0.005 - 0.188) (-0.083 - 0.037) (-0.084 - 0.044) 
SP*Jul -0.013  -0.019 -0.014 
 (-0.051 - 0.026)  (-0.082 - 0.045) (-0.078 - 0.050) 
SP*Aug -0.020 -0.020   
 (-0.059 - 0.019) (-0.060 - 0.021)   
SP*Sept -0.043**  -0.038 -0.032 
 (-0.082 - -0.005)  (-0.088 - 0.012) (-0.074 - 0.010) 
SP*Oct -0.015  -0.043 0.001 
 (-0.066 - 0.037)  (-0.113 - 0.026) (-0.048 - 0.049) 
SP*Nov 0.021 0.016 -0.039 0.030 
 (-0.077 - 0.119) (-0.028 - 0.061) (-0.121 - 0.043) (-0.022 - 0.081) 
SP*Dec 0.056 0.017 0.007 -0.007 
 (-0.100 - 0.212) (-0.032 - 0.065) (-0.072 - 0.085) (-0.097 - 0.083) 
Constant -4.178* -3.319 29.869*** 18.046** 
 (-8.480 - 0.123) (-8.541 - 1.903) (12.737 - 47.001) (0.515 - 35.578) 
N 782 777 332 332 
R-squared 0.674 0.670 0.727 0.726 
Source: elaboration of the author based on data from Eurostat, ECB, Bank of England, OECD and Federal Reserve Economic Data (St. Louis FED), US National 
Vital Statistics and US Treasury. EPU index by Beker et al. (2012).Note: Robust CI in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Figure A1.5: Elasticity of monthly General Fertility Rate in Southern European countries. 
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Table A2.1: Summary Statistics 
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Child Birth date 2495 554.9 26.4 516 (Jan. 2003) 
623 (Dec. 
2011) 
First Child Birth 5375 0.096 0.29 0 1 
US State 5375 27.97 15.47 1 56 
Year 5375 2008 2.62 2003 2011 
State Unemployment Rate 5375 7.31 2.48 2.59 13.41 
State Unemployment Rate Quartiles 5375 2.49 1.12 1 4 
Head Employment Status 5347 1.04 0.36 0 2 
Wife Employment Status 5308 1.31 0.78 0 3 
Head in Job Market 5375 0.86 0.34 0 1 
Wife in Job Market 5375 0.72 0.45 0 1 
Head Employment Status (+ Students) 5347 1.11 0.52 0 4 
Wife Employment Status (+ Students) 5308 1.03 0.76 0 4 
Couple 5375 2.31 0.98 0 3 
Couple Detailed 4640 0.97 1.89 0 8 
Heads age 5375 30.53 5.41 18 45 
Wives age 5375 29.28 5.90 16 49 
Heads Marital Status 5373 1.35 0.71 1 4 
Head Education 3781 4.72 1.41 1 8 
Wife Education 3537 5.15 1.53 1 8 
Head High Education 5375 0.27 0.44 0 1 
Wife High Education 5375 0.33 0.47 0 1 
Head Race 5321 1.35 0.59 1 3 
Wife Race 5286 1.32 0.58 1 3 
Migrant 5375 0.05 0.22 0 1 
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Table A2.2: Distribution of couples’ working status (episodes) across waves. 
 2003 2005 2007 2009 2011 
Dual Earners 73,48 71,6 69,89 61,12 59,9 
HD Employed - WF Out of LF 10,22 15,95 16,63 16,74 17,5 
HD Employed - WF Unemployed 4,72 3,5 4,95 5,4 6,56 
HD Out of LF - WF Employed 4,72 3,24 2,63 3,1 2,73 
HD Out of LF - WF Unemployed 0,2 0,13 0,32 0,53 0,62 
HD Unemployed - WF Out of LF 0,79 1,04 0,74 2,04 2,58 
HD Unemployed - WF Employed 3,93 2,72 3,37 7,88 6,4 
Both Out of LF 1,18 1,04 0,95 1,06 1,64 
Both Unemployed 0,79 0,78 0,53 2,13 1,95 
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Table A2.3: Distribution of couples’ working status (childless, and months before and after first birth). 
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Table A3.1: Occupation Titles and Codes (CENSUS 2002) 
Code Occupation Title 
1-43 Management Occupations 
50 - 73 Business Operations Specialists 
80 - 95 Financial Specialists 
100 - 124 Computer and Mathematical Occupations 
130 - 156 Architecture and Engineering Occupations 
160 - 196 Life, Physical, and Social Science Occupations 
200 - 206 Community and Social Services Occupations 
210 - 215 Legal Occupations 
220 - 255 Education, Training, and Library Occupations 
260 - 296 Arts, Design, Entertainment, Sports, and Media Occupations 
300 - 354 Healthcare Practitioners and Technical Occupations 
360 - 365 Healthcare Support Occupations 
370 - 395 Protective Service Occupations 
400 - 416 Food Preparation and Serving Occupations 
420 - 425 Building and Grounds Cleaning and Maintenance Occupations 
430 - 465 Personal Care and Service Occupations 
470 - 496 Sales Occupations 
500 - 593 Office and Administrative Support Occupations 
600 - 613 Farming, Fishing, and Forestry Occupations 
620 - 676 Construction Trades 
680 - 694 Extraction Workers 
700 - 762 Installation, Maintenance, and Repair Workers 
770 - 896 Production Occupations 
900 - 975 Transportation and Material Moving Occupations 
980 - 983 Military Specific Occupations 
Source: CENSUS OF POPULATION AND HOUSING: ALPHABETICAL INDEX OF 
INDUSTRIES AND OCCUPATIONS issued by the U.S. Department of Commerce and the 
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Table A3.2: Top High and Top low SEI and relative Occupation 
Code H&W SEI  Occupation Title 
834 7.55 Top stitcher 
832 9.56 Tie maker 
842 10.95 Spool tender 
841 13.56 Latcher 
831 13.59 Shirt ironer 
414 15.55 Dish stacker 
423 15.72 Maid \ n.s. 
416 15.94 Food mobile driver 
853 16.1 Gang saw operator 
880 17.58 Capsule filler 
403 17.61 Culinary worker 
840 18.03 Cutter, cloth 
412 18.09 Curb attendant 
604 18.59 Chicken sexer 
961 18.77 Sanitation worker, cleaning machinery 
[…] 
145 61.77 Engineer, plating 
493 61.99 Engineer, sales 
171 62.45 Physical meteorologist 
146 62.56 Engineer, hydraulic 
106 63.81 Data recovery planner 
104 63.94 Computer specialist, exc. software 
136 64.07 Engineer, design \ n.s. 
152 64.27 Engineer, natural gas 
140 64.44 Computer designer 
111 64.57 Web producer 
153 64.73 Engineer, salvage 
142 64.81 Engineer, industrial, hygiene 
305 65.06 Pharmacist 
331 65.75 Oral hygienist 
314 66.92 Audiologist 
323 66.92 Speech clinician 
121 68.34 Mathematician 
326 69.2 Naturopathic doctor 
135 69.92 Engineer, plant 
180 70.46 Price economist 
151 70.66 Engineer, radiological 
325 70.86 Public health veterinarian 
132 71.46 Engineer, vibration 
120 71.8 Actuary 
183 73.23 Research worker, social welfare 
210 79.11 Manager, legal department 
306 80.5 Physicians and Surgeons 
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Table A3.3: Summary Statistics 
Variable #Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Years of Education 22798 14.20 2.05 6 17 
Birth date 24805 215.18 66.90 72 (01/1966) 336 (01/1988) 
State Unemployment Rate 24668 6.48 2.28 2.4 14.2 
State Unemployment Rate (Cent.) 24668 1.48 2.28 -2.6 9.2 
Relative Job SEI 15084 1.17 .547 0.21 6.22 
Relative Job SEI (Categorical) 15074 1.56 0.50 1 2 
SEI Absolute 14493 40.91 14.40 8.84 80.5 
Average Parents’ SEI 21790 37.41 14.16 7.55 80.5 
Employment Status with Mobility (Categorical) 19268 1.22 0.78 0 2 
Siblings 24763 2.14 1.83 0 13 
Marital Status 21241 0.97 0.82 0 3 
Race 24674 1.43 0.59 1 3 
Date of First Child Birth 2510 569.9 27.74 519 (03/2003) 620 (08/2011) 




Figure A3.1: Kaplan-Meier Survival Function 
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Table A3.4: Education and marital status mediation effect on the effect of the Great Recession on first 
birth. 
 Model Model Model Model Model Model Model Model 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Pre- Recession: 
<Dec 2007 (Ref. Cat)         
         
Recession: 
Dec2007-Jun2009 0.65*** 0.67*** 0.65*** 0.67*** 0.64*** 0.64*** 0.69*** 0.71*** 
 (0.54 - 0.78) (0.56 - 0.81) (0.53 - 0.79) (0.55 - 0.82) (0.51 - 0.79) (0.51 - 0.80) (0.54 - 0.87) (0.56 - 0.91) 
Post-Recession: 
>Jun2009 0.66*** 0.67*** 0.77** 0.80* 0.54*** 0.54*** 0.68** 0.71** 
 (0.53 - 0.82) (0.54 - 0.83) (0.62 - 0.97) (0.64 - 1.01) (0.41 - 0.71) (0.41 - 0.71) (0.51 - 0.91) (0.53 - 0.96) 
Downward mobile 
(Ref. Cat)         
         
Upward mobile     1.26** 1.25** 1.23** 1.25** 
     (1.03 - 1.53) (1.02 - 1.54) (1.01 - 1.50) (1.02 - 1.55) 
Out of Labor Force     2.10*** 2.20*** 2.07*** 2.18*** 
     (1.68 - 2.61) (1.75 - 2.78) (1.64 - 2.63) (1.70 - 2.80) 
Cohort <1974 (Ref. Cat)         
         
Cohort 1974-1980 1.75*** 2.03*** 1.76*** 1.93*** 1.92*** 2.16*** 1.92*** 2.00*** 
 (1.31 - 2.34) (1.48 - 2.79) (1.31 - 2.35) (1.40 - 2.66) (1.34 - 2.74) (1.48 - 3.17) (1.34 - 2.75) (1.37 - 2.93) 
Cohort >1980 3.38*** 4.09*** 3.33*** 3.64*** 4.02*** 4.72*** 3.87*** 3.97*** 
 (2.24 - 5.12) (2.63 - 6.35) (2.18 - 5.08) (2.30 - 5.77) (2.42 - 6.66) (2.77 - 8.02) (2.32 - 6.45) (2.31 - 6.80) 
Single (Ref. Cat.)         
         
Married   6.21*** 5.92***   6.74*** 6.44*** 
   (4.72 - 8.17) (4.47 - 7.84)   (4.91 - 9.24) (4.66 - 8.90) 
Cohabiting   3.15*** 3.27***   2.76*** 2.91*** 
   (2.27 - 4.38) (2.34 - 4.58)   (1.86 - 4.07) (1.95 - 4.34) 
Divorced/Separated   1.33 1.24   1.66 1.63 
   (0.75 - 2.35) (0.67 - 2.30)   (0.87 - 3.19) (0.82 - 3.24) 
Years completed Education  0.98  1.01  1.03  1.05** 
  (0.95 - 1.02)  (0.97 - 1.06)  (0.99 - 1.08)  (1.00 - 1.11) 
Number of Siblings    1.06***    1.05* 
    (1.02 - 1.10)    (1.00 - 1.10) 
White non-Hispanic (Ref. Cat)         
         
Africana American    1.04    1.05 
    (0.90 - 1.21)    (0.87 - 1.27) 
Other race    0.93    0.83 
    (0.68 - 1.27)    (0.53 - 1.30) 
US State FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
N 24,805 22,802 21,262 19,354 19,279 17,927 16,573 15,245 
Source: Elaboration of the author based on PSID data. 
Note: Odds rations with Confidence Intervals in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. State unemployment centered at the mean 
	  




Table A4.1: Complementary analysis on the effect of state unemployment rate on childlessness 
(ACS). Robustness checks varying the bandwidth. 
37-40 years old women 
 Model Model Model Model 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
Mean-cent. State Unemployment rate (lagged) a 
-0.001 -0.001 -0.002** -0.002*** 
(-0.003 - 0.000) (-0.003 - 0.000) (-0.003 - -0.000) (-0.003 - -0.001) 
Education b     
Completed Highschool  -0.006*** -0.022*** 0.015*** 
  (-0.011 - -0.002) (-0.026 - -0.017) (0.011 - 0.019) 
Some college but no degree  -0.028*** -0.047*** -0.001 
  (-0.033 - -0.024) (-0.051 - -0.042) (-0.006 - 0.003) 
Associate’s degree  -0.035*** -0.058*** 0.000 
  (-0.040 - -0.030) (-0.063 - -0.052) (-0.005 - 0.005) 
Bachelor’s degree  -0.006** -0.023*** 0.035*** 
  (-0.010 - -0.001) (-0.028 - -0.019) (0.031 - 0.040) 
Master’s degree or higher  0.025*** -0.001 0.056*** 
  (0.019 - 0.030) (-0.006 - 0.005) (0.052 - 0.061) 
Employment status c     
Unemployed   0.036*** 0.003 
   (0.030 - 0.042) (-0.003 - 0.008) 
Not in labor force   -0.097*** -0.050*** 
   (-0.099 - -0.094) (-0.052 - -0.048) 
Marital status d     
Married, spouse absent    0.330*** 
    (0.320 - 0.341) 
Separated    0.128*** 
    (0.121 - 0.134) 
Divorced    0.229*** 
    (0.225 - 0.232) 
Widowed    0.164*** 
    (0.152 - 0.177) 
Never married/single    0.622*** 
    (0.618 - 0.625) 
Year Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes 
State Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant 0.216*** 0.226*** 0.267*** 0.125*** 
 (0.206 - 0.226) (0.215 - 0.237) (0.256 - 0.278) (0.115 - 0.135) 
N 598686 596121 596121 596121 
Source: Elaboration of the author based on ACS data. Notes:  * p≤0.05, ** p≤0.01, *** p≤0.001. Robust Confidence intervals in parenthesis. a Mean state unemployment rate in the 
period 2000-2012 is 6.36%. b Reference category is Less than High school. c Reference category is being employed. d Reference category is Married with spouse present. e Years 
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Table A4.1 cont’d: Complementary analysis on the effect of state unemployment rate on 
childlessness (ACS). Robustness checks varying the bandwidth. 
36-40 years old women 
 Model Model Model Model 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
Mean-cent. State Unemployment rate (lagged) a 
-0.001 -0.001 -0.001** -0.002*** 
(-0.002 - 0.000) (-0.002 - 0.000) (-0.003 - -0.000) (-0.003 - -0.001) 
Education b     
Completed Highschool  -0.006*** -0.022*** 0.015*** 
  (-0.010 - -0.001) (-0.026 - -0.017) (0.012 - 0.019) 
Some college but no degree  -0.026*** -0.045*** 0.001 
  (-0.030 - -0.022) (-0.049 - -0.041) (-0.003 - 0.005) 
Associate’s degree  -0.031*** -0.055*** 0.004* 
  (-0.035 - -0.026) (-0.059 - -0.050) (-0.000 - 0.008) 
Bachelor’s degree  0.002 -0.017*** 0.043*** 
  (-0.002 - 0.006) (-0.021 - -0.013) (0.040 - 0.047) 
Master’s degree or higher  0.034*** 0.008*** 0.066*** 
  (0.029 - 0.039) (0.003 - 0.012) (0.062 - 0.070) 
Employment status c     
Unemployed   0.034*** 0.002 
   (0.028 - 0.039) (-0.003 - 0.006) 
Not in labor force   -0.101*** -0.052*** 
   (-0.103 - -0.099) (-0.054 - -0.050) 
Marital status d     
Married, spouse absent    0.333*** 
    (0.324 - 0.343) 
Separated    0.125*** 
    (0.119 - 0.131) 
Divorced    0.229*** 
    (0.226 - 0.232) 
Widowed    0.162*** 
    (0.151 - 0.174) 
Never married/single    0.619*** 
    (0.616 - 0.622) 
Year Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes 
State Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant 0.209*** 0.215*** 0.259*** 0.114*** 
 (0.200 - 0.218) (0.206 - 0.225) (0.249 - 0.268) (0.105 - 0.122) 
N 737614 734451 734451 734451 
Source: Elaboration of the author based on ACS data. Notes:  * p≤0.05, ** p≤0.01, *** p≤0.001. Robust Confidence intervals in parenthesis. a Mean state unemployment rate in the 
period 2000-2012 is 6.36%. b Reference category is Less than High school. c Reference category is being employed. d Reference category is Married with spouse present. e Years 
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Table A4.1 cont’d: Complementary analysis on the effect of state unemployment rate on 
childlessness (ACS). Robustness checks varying the bandwidth. 
36-41 years old women 
 Model Model Model Model 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
Mean-cent. State Unemployment rate (lagged) a 
-0.001** -0.001** -0.002*** -0.002*** 
(-0.003 - -0.000) (-0.002 - -0.000) (-0.003 - -0.000) (-0.003 - -0.001) 
Education b     
Completed Highschool  -0.007*** -0.023*** 0.014*** 
  (-0.011 - -0.004) (-0.027 - -0.019) (0.010 - 0.017) 
Some college but no degree  -0.029*** -0.048*** -0.002 
  (-0.033 - -0.025) (-0.052 - -0.044) (-0.006 - 0.001) 
Associate’s degree  -0.035*** -0.058*** -0.001 
  (-0.039 - -0.030) (-0.062 - -0.054) (-0.005 - 0.003) 
Bachelor’s degree  -0.007*** -0.025*** 0.034*** 
  (-0.011 - -0.003) (-0.029 - -0.021) (0.030 - 0.037) 
Master’s degree or higher  0.025*** -0.001 0.055*** 
  (0.020 - 0.029) (-0.005 - 0.004) (0.051 - 0.059) 
Employment status c     
Unemployed   0.037*** 0.004 
   (0.032 - 0.042) (-0.001 - 0.008) 
Not in labor force   -0.097*** -0.050*** 
   (-0.099 - -0.095) (-0.052 - -0.049) 
Marital status d     
Married, spouse absent    0.330*** 
    (0.322 - 0.339) 
Separated    0.127*** 
    (0.122 - 0.133) 
Divorced    0.229*** 
    (0.226 - 0.232) 
Widowed    0.163*** 
    (0.152 - 0.173) 
Never married/single    0.620*** 
    (0.617 - 0.622) 
Year Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes 
State Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant 0.213*** 0.224*** 0.265*** 0.122*** 
 (0.205 - 0.221) (0.215 - 0.232) (0.256 - 0.274) (0.114 - 0.130) 
N 893947 890173 890173 890173 
Source: Elaboration of the author based on ACS data. Notes:  * p≤0.05, ** p≤0.01, *** p≤0.001. Robust Confidence intervals in parenthesis. a Mean state unemployment rate in the 
period 2000-2012 is 6.36%. b Reference category is Less than High school. c Reference category is being employed. d Reference category is Married with spouse present. e Years 
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Table A4.2: Complementary analysis on the effect of state unemployment rate on childlessness 
(ACS). Robustness check for different age groups. 
20-24 years old women 
  Model1 Model2 Model3 Model4 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Mean-cent. State Unemployment rate (lagged) 
0.003*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.002*** 
(0.001 - 0.004) (0.002 - 0.004) (0.002 - 0.005) (0.001 - 0.003) 
Education b     
Completed Highschool  0.130*** 0.109*** 0.092*** 
  (0.125 - 0.135) (0.104 - 0.114) (0.088 - 0.097) 
Some college but no degree  0.271*** 0.246*** 0.192*** 
  (0.266 - 0.276) (0.241 - 0.251) (0.188 - 0.196) 
Associate’s degree  0.282*** 0.249*** 0.224*** 
  (0.276 - 0.287) (0.244 - 0.255) (0.219 - 0.229) 
Bachelor’s degree  0.373*** 0.337*** 0.293*** 
  (0.368 - 0.378) (0.332 - 0.341) (0.288 - 0.297) 
Master’s degree or higher  0.358*** 0.323*** 0.300*** 
  (0.351 - 0.365) (0.317 - 0.330) (0.293 - 0.307) 
Employment status c     
Unemployed   -0.052*** -0.055*** 
   (-0.056 - -0.048) (-0.059 - -0.051) 
Not in labor force   -0.104*** -0.073*** 
   (-0.106 - -0.101) (-0.075 - -0.071) 
Marital status d     
Married, spouse absent    0.203*** 
    (0.194 - 0.212) 
Separated    -0.011* 
    (-0.023 - 0.000) 
Divorced    0.082*** 
    (0.072 - 0.092) 
Widowed    0.196*** 
    (0.158 - 0.233) 
Never married/single    0.411*** 
    (0.408 - 0.414) 
     
Year Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes 
State Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     
Constant 0.749*** 0.522*** 0.581*** 0.333*** 
 (0.739 - 0.759) (0.511 - 0.532) (0.570 - 0.592) (0.323 - 0.342) 
 
    N 579529 576438 576438 576438 
Source: Elaboration of the author based on ACS data. Notes:  * p≤0.05, ** p≤0.01, *** p≤0.001. Robust Confidence intervals in parenthesis..a Mean state unemployment rate in the 
period 2000-2012 is 6.36%. b Reference category is Less than High school. c Reference category is being employed. d Reference category is Married with spouse present. e Years 
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Table A4.2 cont’d: Complementary analysis on the effect of state unemployment rate on 
childlessness (ACS). Robustness check for different age groups. 
25-29 years old women 
  Model1 Model2 Model3 Model4 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Mean-cent. State Unemployment rate (lagged) 
-0.001 0.001 0.001 -0.001 
(-0.002 - 0.001) (-0.001 - 0.003) (-0.001 - 0.002) (-0.002 - 0.001) 
Education b     
Completed Highschool  0.054*** 0.011*** 0.028*** 
  (0.049 - 0.059) (0.006 - 0.016) (0.024 - 0.033) 
Some college but no degree  0.105*** 0.046*** 0.068*** 
  (0.100 - 0.110) (0.041 - 0.051) (0.064 - 0.073) 
Associate’s degree  0.165*** 0.091*** 0.132*** 
  (0.159 - 0.171) (0.085 - 0.097) (0.127 - 0.138) 
Bachelor’s degree  0.389*** 0.306*** 0.312*** 
  (0.385 - 0.394) (0.301 - 0.311) (0.307 - 0.316) 
Master’s degree or higher  0.436*** 0.346*** 0.363*** 
  (0.431 - 0.442) (0.340 - 0.351) (0.358 - 0.368) 
Employment status c     
Unemployed   -0.050*** -0.067*** 
   (-0.055 - -0.044) (-0.072 - -0.062) 
Not in labor force   -0.219*** -0.149*** 
   (-0.222 - -0.216) (-0.152 - -0.146) 
Marital status d     
Married, spouse absent    0.251*** 
    (0.242 - 0.259) 
Separated    0.053*** 
    (0.045 - 0.061) 
Divorced    0.141*** 
    (0.136 - 0.147) 
Widowed    0.147*** 
    (0.122 - 0.172) 
Never married/single    0.431*** 
    (0.428 - 0.433) 
     
Year Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes 
State Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     
Constant 0.483*** 0.287*** 0.405*** 0.231*** 
 (0.471 - 0.495) (0.275 - 0.299) (0.393 - 0.417) (0.221 - 0.242) 
 
    N 613982 611664 611664 611664 
Source: Elaboration of the author based on ACS data. Notes:  * p≤0.05, ** p≤0.01, *** p≤0.001. Robust Confidence intervals in parenthesis..a Mean state unemployment rate in the 
period 2000-2012 is 6.36%. b Reference category is Less than High school. c Reference category is being employed. d Reference category is Married with spouse present. e Years 
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Table A4.2 cont’d: Complementary analysis on the effect of State Unemployment rate on 
childlessness (ACS). Robustness check for different age groups. 
30-34 years old women 
  Model1 Model2 Model3 Model4 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Mean-cent. State Unemployment rate (lagged) 
-0.000 0.000 -0.001 -0.002** 
(-0.002 - 0.001) (-0.001 - 0.002) (-0.002 - 0.001) (-0.003 - -0.000) 
Education b     
Completed Highschool  0.018*** -0.013*** 0.017*** 
  (0.013 - 0.022) (-0.018 - -0.009) (0.013 - 0.021) 
Some college but no degree  0.019*** -0.021*** 0.022*** 
  (0.014 - 0.023) (-0.025 - -0.016) (0.018 - 0.026) 
Associate’s degree  0.034*** -0.017*** 0.045*** 
  (0.029 - 0.039) (-0.022 - -0.011) (0.041 - 0.050) 
Bachelor’s degree  0.152*** 0.103*** 0.158*** 
  (0.148 - 0.157) (0.098 - 0.107) (0.154 - 0.162) 
Master’s degree or higher  0.218*** 0.156*** 0.215*** 
  (0.213 - 0.223) (0.151 - 0.161) (0.211 - 0.220) 
Employment status c     
Unemployed   0.000 -0.032*** 
   (-0.006 - 0.006) (-0.037 - -0.027) 
Not in labor force   -0.179*** -0.108*** 
   (-0.181 - -0.176) (-0.110 - -0.105) 
Marital status d     
Married, spouse absent    0.320*** 
    (0.311 - 0.329) 
Separated    0.122*** 
    (0.115 - 0.128) 
Divorced    0.216*** 
    (0.212 - 0.221) 
Widowed    0.180*** 
    (0.162 - 0.198) 
Never married/single    0.552*** 
    (0.549 - 0.554) 
     
Year Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes 
State Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     
Constant 0.262*** 0.187*** 0.275*** 0.106*** 
 (0.252 - 0.272) (0.176 - 0.198) (0.264 - 0.286) (0.096 - 0.116) 
 
    N 645666 643221 643221 643221 
Source: Elaboration of the author based on ACS data. Notes:  * p≤0.05, ** p≤0.01, *** p≤0.001. Robust Confidence intervals in parenthesis..a Mean state unemployment rate in the 
period 2000-2012 is 6.36%. b Reference category is Less than High school. c Reference category is being employed. d Reference category is Married with spouse present. e Years 
available are 2000-2012, the reference year is 2010. f Reference state is Alabama. 
 
